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ABSTRACT 
Thi s  i s  a s tudy of the n i ne nati onal ban ks whi c h  operated i n  
Knoxv i l l e ,  Tennessee , from 1 864 to 1 91 3 .  The purpose o f  th i s  s tudy was 
to determine the major  factors i nfl uenci ng the behavi or of  those banks  
as they responded to changes · i n  the nati ona l  regul atory envi ronment and 
l ocal bus i nes s condi t i ons . The l ocal banks were compared wi th one 
another and wi th other groups of nati onal banks  to di s co ver patterns of 
acqu i s i t ion and use of funds . I nformat ion about assets and l i ab i l i ti es 
was obta i ned from reports made by nat i onal  banks wh ich  were publ i shed i n  
l ocal newspapers o r  by the Comptrol l er o f  the Cu rrency , from unpubl i s hed 
reports made by the l oca l nati ona l  banks , and from the correspondence 
of the l ocal ban ks wi th the Comptro l l er of the Currency . I n formati on 
about the nati onal regu l ato ry envi ronment and about l ocal  bus i nes s 
condi ti ons was obta i ned from the work of othe r s tudents o f  the Nati ona l 
Banking System , from the Censu s , and from l ocal h i stori es . 
The Nat iona l Banki n g  Sys tem has been the s ubject of  much schol arly 
i n teres t .  There is general agreement  about h ow that system i nfl uenced 
the s tabi l i ty of the economy , but there i s  l es s  agreement about the 
effect that sys tem had upon capi ta l fl ows . In  sp i te of  gene ral ly  
accepted i deas about how banks  i n  each of  the  th ree c l asses functi oned , 
there have been few i nves ti gat i on s  of  the operat i ons of i ndi v i dua l 
nati onal  ban ks and rel at i ve ly  l i ttl e di s cuss i on of  how l oca l cond i ti on s  
affected the behav ior  of  banks wi thi n each ca tegory .  Th i s  s tudy l i nks 
change i n  the acti vi ties  of the l oca l banks w.i th chanae in  the s tructure 
i v  
v 
of  the local fi nanci al market . Other s tudies  of  the behav ior  of  the 
broad di v i s i ons  of  the Nati onal Banki ng Sys tem have tended to empha s i ze 
the impo rtance of  s tatutory requi rements and conceal the s i qn i fi cance of  
local bus i nes s a nd  f i nanc i al cond i t i ons . 
The major fi nd i ng of th i s  s tudy i s  that the nati onal banks  of 
Knoxvi lle were not greatly limi ted by statutory requ i rements . I n s tead , 
the s tructure of assets and liabi li ties  changed i n  response to the local 
bus i ness  and financi al envi ronment .  When that envi ronment  changed , the 
local banks ' . acqu i s i ti on of l iab ili t ies  and employmen t of assets changed 
also . Thi s  s tudy has also found that the laws govern i ng nati onal ban ks 
allowed them muc h  more freedom to develop imagi nati ve responses to 
chang ing  bus i ness  condi ti ons than has been thought to be the cas e .  
Consequently , there was a wi de  range i n  the behavi or pattern s  di s played 
by the local banks . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 
./!. INTRODUCT I ON 
vti . THE NAT IONAL BAN KING SYSTEM AND ITS EVALUATION  
Introducti on . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . .  
The Stabi l i ty of  the Nati onal Ban ki ng Sys tem 
Structure and  Operati on : An Eval uation . . .  
Summary . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
�I I I .  ECONOM IC  ACT IV ITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF BAN KI NG IN KNOXV I LL E  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
A Hi story o f  Banki ng i n  Knoxvi l l e  . . . 
IV . NATIONAL BANKING I N  KNOXVI LLE , 1 864-1 886 
I ntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
Def in i t i ons . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
Acqu i s i t i on of L i abi l i t i es , 1 864-1 886 . 
Empl oymen t  of As sets : 1 867- 1 886 
Summary . • . . . . . . . . . . . 
V .  THE TRANSITION  PERIOD : 1 887-1 900 . .  
I ntroducti on . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Acqu i s i ti on of li ab i l i ti es :  1 887 -1 900 
Empl oyment of Assets : 1 887-1 900 
loan Pol i c i es : 1 887- 1 900 . . . 
Summary . . . • • . . . . • . . • . . . 
VI. THE FINAL PERIOD :  1 900-1 9 1 3  
I ntroducti on . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
Acqui s i ti on of Li ab i l i ties : 1 900- 1 9 1 3 
Empl oyment of  As sets : 1 900-1 91 3 
Summary . . . . • 
V I I .  CONCLUSION 
B I BLIOG RAPHY 
APPENDICES . . . . . . 
vi 
PAGE 
1 
7 
7 
1 2  
1 8  
32 
34 
47 
59 
59 
61  
65 
1 00 
1 1 6 
1 1 8 
1 1 8  
1 22 
1 39 
1 57 
1 87 
1 89 
1 89 
1 9 1 
204 
223 
225 
239 
244 
Appendix A 
Appendix B 
Appendix  C 
VITA 
. . 
vii 
PAGE 
245 
247 
253 
261 
L I ST OF TABLES 
TABLE 
I I I - 1 . Popu l ation o f  Knoxv i l l e; Knox County and the Un i ted 
PAGE 
States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5  
I I I - 2 .  Number of  Persons Emp l oyed i n  Manufacturi ng  Industri es 
per One Thousand of Popu l at ion . . . . . . . . 37  
I I I - 3 . Empl oyment per F i rm i n  Manufacturi ng Compan i es 38 
I I I -4 .  Val ue of Products Produced per Manufacturi n g  Fi rm . 3q 
I I I -5 . Emp l oyment ,  Tota l Product ,  and the Number o f  F i rms i n  
Vari ous Manufacturi ng I ndustries  i n  Knox County ( 1 870 
and 1 880 ) and Knoxv i l l e  ( 1 890 and 1 900 ) . . . . . . . . 41 
IV- 1 . Average Rati o of Pri vate Depos i ts to Al l L i a bi l i ti e s , i n  
Percent . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
IV-2 . Average Rat i o  of Borrowed Money to Al l L i abil i ti es , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 
IV-3 . Average Rat i o  of Government Depos i ts to Al l Li abi l i ti es ,  
i n  Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
IV-4 . Average Rat i o  of I nd i v i dual  Depos i ts to Pri vate Depos i ts , 
i n  Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1  
IV- 5 .  Average Rat i o  of  Shareho l der I nves tment to Al l 
L i abi l i t i es , i n  Percent . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
IV -6 . Average Rati o of C i rcul a ti on I s s ued to Cap i tal , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . 
I V- 7 .  Average Capi tal per Ban k , i n  Thous ands 
IV-8 . Average Rat i o  of Ea rn i ng As sets to Al l As s ets , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
IV- 9 .  Average Rat i o  of  Loans to Assets , i n  Percent  
IV- 1 0 . Average Rati o of Primary Res erves to Ass ets , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
IV- 1 1 .  Average Rat i o  o f  Secondary Reserves to As sets , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
v i i i  
83 
89 
91 
1 01 
1 03 
1 08 
1 09 
ix 
TABLE PAGE 
IV-1 2 .  Average Rati o of Cash  to Primary Reserves , i n  Percent . 1 1 1  
IV- 1 3 .  Average Ra t io  o f  Bank Depos i ts to Prima ry Reserves , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2  
IV-1 4 .  Average Rat io  o f  Depos i ts wi th Reserve Agents and 
C l ea ri n g  House Certi fi cates of Depos i t  Hel d to Bank  
Depos i ts , i n  Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 5  
V- 1 . Average Rat i o  of Pri vate Depos i ts to Al l l i a bi l i ties , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . 1 23 
V-2 .  Average Rat i o  of  I nd i vi dual  Depos i ts to Private Depos i ts , 
i n  Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 25 
V-3 . Average Rati o o f  Borrowed Money to Al l l i abi l i t i es ,  i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 33 
V-4 . Average Rat i o  o f  Sha rehol der Inves tment to Al l 
l i ab i l i t i es , i n  Percent . . . . . . . . . . .  . 1 36 
V- 5 .  Average Rati o of Ci rcul at ion I s s ued to Cap i ta l , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . .• . . . . . . . . . . . 1 40 
V-6 . Average Rat i o  of Ea rn i n g  As sets to Al l As s ets , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 42 
V�7 . Average Rat io  of Loans  to As sets , i n  Percent 1 45 
V-8 . Average Rat i o  of  Primary Reserves to As s ets , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 48 
V-9 . Average Rat io  of Cas h  to Primary Res erves , i n  Percent 1 50 
V- 1 0; Average Rat i o  of Ban k Depos i ts to Prima ry Reserves , i n  
V- 1 1 . 
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Average Rat i o  of  Depos i ts wi th Reserve Agents and 
C l eari ng House Cert if i cates of Depos i t  to A l l Bank 
Depos i ts ,  i n  Percent . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
1 52 
1 54 
V- 1 2 .  Average Rat i o  o f  Secondary Reserves to Assets , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 56 
V-1 3 .  Demand loans  as a Percentage of Al l loans . . . 1 6 1 
V-1 4 .  Bad . Debts , Doubtful loans , and Overdue loans as a 
Percentage of  A l l loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 3 
TABLE  
V- 1 5 .  
V-1 6 .  
Two Name Time Loans as a Percentage of Al l Loans 
Percentage of Loans Endorsed by Pri nci pal s of  the 
Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
X 
PAGE 
1 66 
1 67 
V-1 7 .  Time Loans Secured by Col l atera l s as a Percentage of Al l 
Loans . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 1 69 
V- 1 8 .  Percentage of  Stocks and Bonds Acqui red for Debts 
Previ ous l y  Contracted Regu l arly Payi ng I nterest or 
D iv i dends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 70 
V- 1 9 .  One-Name Time Loans and Time Loans Secured by Col l ateral 
as a Percentage of Al l Loans 1 7 1 
V - 20 .  Usual  I n terest  Rate on Lo�ns 1 74· 
V-21 . Number o f  Overl oans 1 76 
V-22 . Overl oans as a Percentage of  Al l Loan s 1 7 7 
V-23 . Rat io  of  the Largest Loan Made to the Larges t Legal 
Loan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 86 
V I - 1 . Average Rat i o  of Pri vate Depos i ts to Al l L i abi l i ties , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 92 
V I -2 . Average Rat io  o f  Ind i v i dual Depos i ts to Pri vate Dep os i ts , 
i n  Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 94 
V I -3 . Average Rat i o  o f  Borrowed Funds to Al l L i ab i l i t i es , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 96 
V I -4 .  Average Capi ta l  per Ban k ,  i n  Thousands of Dol l ars . 1 97 
V I -5 .  Average Rat i o  of Sharehol der I nvestment to Al l 
L i ab i l i ti es , i n  Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 99 
Vl..;6, Average Rat i o  of Ci rcul a ti on I s s ued to Cap i tal , 
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
V I -7 .  Average Rati o of Ea rn i n g  As sets to Al l Assets , 
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
V I -8 . Average Rat io  of  Loans to Assets , i n  Percent 
V I -9 . Average Rat i o  o f  Primary Reserves to As s ets , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
i n  
i n  
202 
206 
207 
208 
xi 
TABLE PAGE 
V I - l Oo Average Rat io  of  Bank Depos i ts to Primary Reserves , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
V I - l lo Average Rat i o  of Amounts Due from Reserve Agents to Bank 
2 1 0 
Depos i ts ,  i n  Percent o o o o o o o o o o o o 21 2 
V I - 1 2o Average Rat io  of  Cash to Primary Reserves , i n  Percent 21 3 
V I - 1 3o Average Rat i o  of Secondary Reserves to Assets , i n  
Percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4 
V I - 1 4o Demand Loans as a Percentage of  A l l  Loans  o 0 o o 21 7 
V I - 1 5o Two-Name Time Loans as a Percentage of All Loans 21 7 
V I- l 6o Other T ime Loans as a Percentage of  Al l Loans o o o 2 1 8 
· V I - 1 7 o Rat i o of  Largest Loan Actua l l y  Made to the Larges t Lega l 
Loa n  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 
C-1 . Net I ncome as  a Percentage of  Average Sharehol der 
I nvestment 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 257 
CHAPTER I 
I NTRODUCT ION 
I n  1 863 and 1 864 Congres s created a new ,  federa l l y  s upervi sed sys tem 
of banki n g  i n  the Uni ted States . The National  Banki nq System l a s ted 
unti l the creation of  the Federal Reserve System i n  1 9 1 3 ,  and has been 
wri tten about at l ength , with parti cul ar emphas i s  be i ng gi ven to the 
quest i on s  of the extent to wh i ch i ts s tructure affected capi ta l fl ows 
and contri buted to i nstab i l i ty of the economy . The many stud i es d i rected 
toward these ques tions  h ave been done u s i nq aggregate data for each of 
the th ree k i nds of banks wh i ch exi s ted wi thi n the sys tem-cen tra l  reserve 
c i ty banks , reserve c i ty banks , and coun try ban ks . Rather wi del y  accepted 
i deas about h ow banks i n  each of these three c l asses functi oned have 
emerged . I t  i s  general l y  agreed that the absence of a l ender of l as t  
resort  made t he Nati onal Ban k i ng System s uscepti b l e to p eri odi c cri ses , 
but there i s  l es s  agreement about the extent to wh i c h  the s tructure of 
that sys tem affected capi ta l fl ows . 
I n  sp i te of the cons i derabl e scho l arly i nteres t i n  the Nationa l  
Ban k i ng Sys tem , however , there have been few i nvesti gati ons of the  
operati on s  of  i nd i v i dua l nati ona l banks  and  rel ati ve ly  l i tt l e  d i s cuss i on 
of  h ow l ocal condi ti ons  may have affected the performance of  banks  
wi th i n  each category .  For exampl e ,  R i chard Syl l a , one o f  the l ead i nq 
s tudents of the System , has argued that monopol i s ti c country banks  
restri cted l ocal loans , and  i n s tead l ent to  c i ty banks , wi th the effect 
that capi ta l mobi l i zation  for i n dustry took p l ace at the expense  of the 
1 
agri cul tural sector .  Th i s  may be a correct c haracteri zati on of country 
bank behavior  on the whol e ;  that  i t  was true of a l l country ban ks i s  
2 
more doubtfu l . The major theme of th i s  d i s sertat ion i s  that the behavior  
of nati ona l banks , operati ng  wi th i n  the  s tructu re of  the  Nati ona l  Ban k i ng  
Sys tem , was s i gn i fi cantly affected by condi ti ons of  the l ocal economy 
and changes i n  that economy .  Emphas i s  on the behav ior  o f  the three 
l a rge categories  of banks has tended to obs cure th i s  ooi n t .  
Th i s  s tudy l i nks change i n  ban k acti v i ty i n  Knoxvi l l e ,  Tennessee , 
wi th change i n  the s tructure of the l ocal fi nanc i al market . The hu s i ness 
and f i nanci a l  h i s tory of Knoxvi l l e  from 1 864 to 1 91 3  can be di vi ded i nto 
three d i s ti nct peri ods , each wi th a un ique combi nati on of bus i ness 
acti v i ty ,  ban k ing  structure , and behavi or  patterns of  fi nanc i a l  i nst i tu ­
ti ons . Starting  i n  1 864 , Knoxvi l l e ' s  nati onal banks were und i sti ngu i s hed 
and unexcepti onal for approximate ly  twenty years . Duri n g  the next ten 
or fi fteen yea rs , beg i nn i ng i n  the m i d - 1 880 ' s ,  national  banki nq  i n  
Knoxv i l l e  was transformed , not because  o f  chanqes i n  the Nat i onal  Bank i n g  
System , wh i c h  were few , b u t  because  of  changes i n  the l oca l s i tuat ion . 
The f ina l  peri od , from about 1 900 on , was cha racteri zed by behav i or 
p atterns that were qu i te di fferent  from what had been common i n  t he 
fi rst peri od . 
The method used to i dent i fy patterns of  behavior i s  that of 
compari ng the l ocal banks to one another and to the three c l a s ses of 
banks wi th respect to the i r acqu i s i t i on of l i abi l i ti es and proporti on i nq 
of as sets . The research has i nd i cated that , des p i te appearances to the 
contrary ,  national banks were not greatly l imi ted by statutory requi rements 
prescri b i ng proporti ons for as sets or l i ab i l i ti es . Consequently ,  the 
proporti ons sel ected by the l oca l banks primari ly  refl ected opi n i on s  
o f  and  responses to thei r bus i ness envi ronment rather than to the i r 
l ega l s tatus . When that envi ronment chanqed , the i r acqu i s i t i on and 
-empl oymen t  of funds changed . 
3 
A secondary � heme of  thi s  d i s sertati on i s  that many prov i s i ons  o f  
the l aws govern i ng nati ona l ban ks d i d  not have the effects they were 
i ntended to have . Those stud ies wh i c h  focused upon the broad di v i s i ons 
of the Nati ona l  Banki ng System have not found the di fferences between 
i ntent and effect to be o f  great importance often because  that d i fference 
can be observed only by exam i n i ng the behavi or of i nd i v i dua l  banks . I n  
contrast  to other s tud ies o f  the Nat i onal  Ban k i n g  Sys tem , th i s  one has  
found that  di fferences in  the  response  by i ndi vi dual banks  to  part icu l ar 
provi s i on s  of  the l aw govern i ng nati ona l  banks  is  an i mportant  e l emen� 
whose recogn i ti o n  contri butes much i nformati on about the ways i n  wh i ch 
the behavior of those parti cul a r  banks  fi t ,  or  fa i l ed to fi t ,  the 
genera l i zati on s  descri b i ng  the expected behav ior of banks  i n  that 
category . 
I n  addi t ion to the work of other studen ts of  the Nat i ona l Banki ng 
Sys tem , there are three primary sources of i nformati on about the l oca l  
national  banks that were emp l oyed in  the research for th i s  d i s sertat i on . 
Those sources are the peri od i c  Reports of Cond i t i on ,  the Reports of 
Exami nati on , and the banks ' correspondence wi th the Comptrol l er o f  the 
Currency . Each nati onal bank was requi red each year to send to the 
Comptro l l er a de�ai l ed descri pti on of i ts condi ti on on fi ve dates h e  
sel ected . ( On ly  fou r  Reports were requi red from 1 864 to 1 869 , but f ive 
thereafter . ) Each bank was a l so requ i red to publ i s h  tha t statement i n  
4 
a l ocal newspaper ,  and i t  was from the l oca l newspapers that the Reports 
o f  the l ocal banks  were col l ected . The Comptrol l er publ i s hed consol i dated 
and condensed vers i ons  o f  these  Reports each yea r i n  h i s  Annual Report . 
The Report of Condi t i on was a l i s ti ng of  the assets and l i a b i l i ties  
a t  the  cl ose of bu s i ness on  the  dates spec i fi ed .  As a general ru l e ,  
about twenty i tems were l i s ted under assets and about fi fteen under 
l i abi l i ti es .  Al l nat iona l  banks were requ i red to reoort on the same 
days and to use the same format , and consequentl y ,  for each year there 
were fi ve days on wh ic h any nati onal ban k ' s  proportion i ng of  assets and 
liabi l i ti es coul d be compared wi th any other ban k ' s ,  or w i th any group ' s .  
Even though Rep6rts of Exam i n at ion  were made much l es s  frequently  
than Reports of Cond i ti on ,  they provide more deta i l ed i n formation about 
the banks '  acti vi ti es . Bank exami nat i ons  were usual l y  made once a year 
before 1 894 and general ly  twi ce a year from then on . ( I n  mos t  cases , 
the l oca l ban ks were exami ned wi th i n  a few days o f  one another ,  and 
therefore d i rect compari sons between them can be usefu l . )  The u sua l  
Report of Exami nation i nc l uded a s tandard statement o f  cond i t i on wh ich  
was fol l owed by a more deta i l ed d i scuss i on of  each of  the  i tems l i s ted 
there i n .  For exampl e ,  the s tandard s tatement o f  cond i ti on l i s ted the 
va l ue of non-U . S .  government securi t ies  hel d by a ban k .  The Report of  
E xami nati on woul d i denti fy those purchased by the bank for i nvestment 
purposes and t�ose acqu i red i n  payment of debts . Those  s ecur i ti es oay ing  
d i vi dends or i nterest woul d  be i denti fi ed and  any di fferences between the 
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bank ' s  eva l uati on of the i r  market and book va l ue woul d be noted . I n  
addi ti on , the exami ner woul d eva l uate the offi cers , d i rectors , and 
empl oyees  of the bank . The s tatus of  the ban k ' s  reserves wou l d be noted 
and i ts l oans portfo l i o  exami ned in detai l .  The exami ner woul d  a l so  
d i scuss the bank' s  rel ati ons wi th i ts reserve agents , other banks , and 
i ts deposi tors . The Report of Examinat i on woul d a l so i nc l ude a di scus s i on 
. of  any other matters affecti ng  the bank ' s  so l vency , profi tab i l i ty ,  or 
observance of l egal requ i rements . 
Because the Reports of Exami nati on were made wi th the expectati on 
that materi a l  contai ned there woul d not be made publ i c , the Comptro l l er 
has severely l im i ted the publ i c ' s  acces s to them . Those wi th a genu i ne 
i nterest i n  research may obta i n  permi s s i on to exami ne those Reports only 
if  the bank i n  question  has g i ven  up i ts nat i ona l  charter . I f  i t  has , 
then the Reports over fi fty years of  age may be exami ned . Of  the national  
banks  operati ng in  Knoxv i l l e from 1 864 · to  1 9 1 3 ,  on ly  the Eas t  Tenness ee 
Nati onal (wh ich  has become the Park National ) has reta i ned i ts nati onal 
charter .  Consequently ,  the Reports of Exami nation for a l l the l ocal 
bank s , except one , have been made ava i l a b l e  for the resea rch  for th i s  
di s sertation . 
The correspondence of  the l ocal banks  wi th the Comptro l l er has  a l so 
been made avai l ab l e for th i s  s tudy . U nfortunate ly , that correspondence 
is enti rely one- s i ded . I t  cons i sts o f  l etters wri tten by the l oca l 
bank s  or other concerned parti es to the Comptrol l er .  None of  the l etters 
from the Comptro l l er to the l oca l ban ks rema i n .  (As i n  the case wi th 
the Reports of Exami nati on , the name s of the i nd i vi dua l s and fi rms 
menti oned i n  the l etters to the Comptrol l er h ave been omi tted . ) 
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Together , the Reports of Condi ti on ,  Reports of Exami nat i on , and 
correspondence wi th the Comptroller of the Currency revea l a deta i l ed 
p i cture of  the behav i or of the l ocal  nati ona l banks . The Annual Reports 
of the Comptro l l er of the Currency and the work of other students of the 
Nati onal Ban k i ng System .  prov ide the background agai nst  wh ich  the pi cture 
of the l ocal bank s  can be vi ewed . The  analys i s  presented here makes no 
attempt to argue that previous ly  deve l oped mode l s  of the behav ior  of 
national bank s  are i ncorrect because they do not sati sfactori ly  account 
for Knoxv i l l e ' s  experi ence . I ns tead , these model s have been found to 
be useful genera l i zati ons  because they provi de the perspect i ve neces sary 
for a reasonabl e j udgement of  the s i g n i fi cance of  vari ous aspects of  
the l ocal  banks ' behavior . Converse l y ,  the ana lys i s  o f  Knoxv i l l e ' s  
experi ence i s  us eful because i t  s hows that the Nati ona l Bank i ng  System 
was not a monol i th ic organ i zat ion , but a comp l ex one , adm i tt i ng great 
vari�ty i n  responses to s tatutory requi rements and bu s i ness envi ronments . 
CHAPTER  I I  
THE NATI ONAL BANKING  SYSTEM AND ITS EVALUAT I ON 
I ntroduct i on 
The Nati ona l Bank i n g  Sys tem was created by t he Nati onal Currency 
Acts of  1 863 and 1 864* and l asted unti l 1 9 1 3 ,  when i t  was rep l aced by 
the Federal Reserve System . The Acts were des i gned to accomp l i s h  
severa l a ims ; some were s hort-term wh i l e  others were l ong-term , and 
some were bas i ca l ly fi nanc ia l  wh i le others were not .  The  short-term 
a ims were primari l y  to deal wi th cond i t i ons brought  about by the Ci vi l  
War ,  whereas l ong-term aims were more c l ose ly  t i ed to pa s t  d i fficu l ti es 
wi th the f inanci a l  system of the Uni ted States . 
By 1 863 the Ci vi l War had produced three rel ated probl ems affect i ng 
wartime fi nance : a fa l l i n  bond pri ces , a shortage o f  "good" money , 
and i nfl ation . The wa rti me defi c i ts were financed by bond sa l es and 
paper money ( " l egal . tenders " ) rather than by i ncreased taxes . Huge 
expendi tures soon saturated the bond market , bond pri ces began to fal l , 
*The fi rst o f  these two acts was ti t l ed "An act to provide  a nati ona l 
currency , secured by a p l edge of  Uni ted States s tocks , and to prov ide for 
the c i  rcu l  ati on and redempti on thereof ,  11 and was enacted on February 25 , 
1 863 . Th i s  act was repeal ed and repl aced by the Act o f  June 3 ,  1 864 , 
whi ch  was ti tl ed 1 An act to prov i de a nati onal currency , s ecured by a 
p l edge of Un i ted States bonds , and to provide for the c i rcu l at ion and 
redemption thereof . " The Act of  1 864 (often referred to as "The Nati onal 
Bank Act " ) , made no fundamental c hanges i n  the l aw ,  but i t  d i d  correct a 
number o f  mi nor and techn i ca l  defi c i enci es i n  the Act of 1 863 . The Act of 
1 864 and subsequent amendments to tha t  Act have been publ i s hed i n  a number 
of  sources . Those used i n  th i s  s tudy appear i n  the B i b l i ography . 
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and bond · sal es became more and more di ffi cul t .  Because bonds ( an d  
import fees ) had to b e  pai d  w i th gol d ( 11 s peci e 11 ) ,  a s pec i e  s hortage 
deve l oped . I n  addi tion  to ever- i ncreas i ng amounts of l egal  tenders , 
the  amount of ban knotes i s sued by pri vate and s ta te-chartered banks 
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grew , and gol d rose to a premi um over al l forms of paper money . Wartime 
demand and i ncrea s i ng  amounts of money i n  ci rcu l a tion  caused a growi n g  
probl em wi th i nfl ati on . 
The Nati onal Ban ki ng Sys tem appeared to offer a sol uti on to these 
and other probl ems . A l arge demand for bonds woul d be created and ma ke 
pos s i bl� eas i er fi nanc i ng  of the war . Nati onal  ban knotes ( '' c i rcu l at i on 11 ) , 
convert i b l e  i nto spec i e  at par , woul d repl ace other l es s  des i rabl e forms 
of paper money- i nconvert i b l e  l egal tenders a nd other ban knotes . Stri ct 
prov i s i on s  wou l d  make nat i onal banks commerc i al banks , rather than 
mortgage bank s  or i nvestment bank s . A commerc i al ban k i n q  sys tem , coupl ed 
wi th .an el asti c s upply of banknotes , woul d ,  accord i n g  to the then current 
bel i ef ,  prevent further i nfl at ion . *  Further , a Nati ona l  system of banks 
and bank regul ati on woul d s trengthen the Un i on . 
Lon g-term a ims were. mostly fi nanci a l . The commerci a l  nature of 
the system was  expected to prov ide s tabil i ty to a previous ly  unstab l e 
economy .  Federa l control and regul ation  wou l d  enforce 1 1 sound 11 banki nq  
practi ces . Note hol ders and , to a l es ser extent , depos i tors woul d be 
*Th i s  bel i ef has been termed the rea l -bi l l s  doctri ne and hol d s  that  
11 the d i scounti ng of bona-fide b i l l s  carri es i ts ' proper ' l i mi tation w i th 
i t  and that i n  add i t ion i t  ma kes the c i rcu l ati ng·medi um expand and  
contract ' el asti cal l y ' a s  producti on and  trade expand and  contract 11 
( Schumpeter ,  1 954 , p .  731 ) .  · 
better p rotected than  ever before . Previ ous fi nanci a l  cri ses had been 
characteri zed by i nconverti b i l i ty of banknotes , and the new system 
woul d vi rtua l l y  guarantee ban knote redempti on at par .  Enforcement o f  
good ban k ing  practi ces wou l d  protect depo s i tors , shareho l ders , and 
borrowers . A l together , i t  wa s an ambi ti ous underta k i n g .  
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The major  i ncenti ves attracti ng banks to th·e Sys tem woul d be the 
patrioti sm of the state banks  i n  the North , the prest ige  of national  
affi l i ati on , and the r ight  to i ss ue banknotes . For the publ i c ,  the 
Nati ona l cu:rency Acts estab l i s hed s evere securi ty meas ures wh i c h  
guaranteed banknote redempt i on a nd  improved the s afety of  the i r depos i ts . 
I n  l a ter years , changes i n  the l aws governi ng nati onal banks genera l l y  
had the ef fect of mak i ng affi l i at i on more attract ive (or  l es s  burdens ome ) ,  
rather than d i rectly improvi ng  protect ive measures for the publ i c .  
The Nati ona l  Currency Acts created a three-ti ered arrangement wi th 
three cl asses  of ban ks bei ng establ i shed : what came to be ca l l ed country 
banks , reserve c i ty banks , and centra l  reserve c i ty banks . Banks i n  one 
c l a s s  di ffered from bank s  i n  other c l asses by l ocati on , reserve requ i re­
ments , and capi tal . Si gni fi cant di fferences between nat i ona l  banks and 
s tate banks were created . 
Reserve c i ty banks  were l ocated i n  some of the l arger c i t ies . 
(There were s i xteen i n  1 863 , and the number grew to forty-ei ght  by 1 9 1 3 . )  
New York was ori g i na l ly  the on ly  central reserve c i ty and rema i ned s o  
unti l C h i cago a n d  St . Lou i s  achi eved that sta tus  i n  1 887 . The 11 reserve 11 
i n  11reserve c i ty 11 and 1 1central reserve c i ty11 meant that a l l nati onal 
bank s  l ocated i n. these  c i t ies  acted as  reserve and redeem i n g  agents for 
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banks  i n  l ower c l a s s i fi cati on s . The depos i ts that banks i n  l ower 
c l asses made wi th these banks cou l d  act as reserves for the depos i ti n g  
banks , provi ded that the reserve agent bank was des i qnated·as a n  off i c i al 
reserve agent for the depos i ti ng ban k  i n  ques ti on . A redeemi ng  agent 
co l l ected the c i rcul ating  ban knotes i s sued by the depos i t i ng bank and 
forwarded them to that bank for redemption in l ega l  tenders or spec i e .  
Each nati onal bank was requ i red to hol d reserves aga i ns t  depos i ts 
and unti l 1 874 , agai nst  banknotes i s s ued . (After 1 874  a smal l reserve 
amounti ng  to 5 percent  of ban knotes i s sued was depos i t�d wi th the 
U . S .  Treasury . ) Country banks  had to hol d  1 5  percent  of the i r depos i ts 
i n  reserve , whereas the other two cl asses of  nati ona l banks h ad to hol d  
25 percent .  Coun try banks coul d hol d as much as two-th i rds o f  thei r 1 5  
percent reserve i n  the form of depos i ts wi th the i r  reserve aqents . 
Reserve c i ty banks had to hol d . one-ha l f o f  thei r 25 percent reserve i n  
cash , and the rema i nder coul d be he l d  as depos i ts wi th aoproved res erve 
agents i n  a central reserve c i ty .  Central reserve c i ty banks had to 
hol d  a l l  reserves i n  cas h� i n  l egal  tenders and s oec i e .  Ban knotes were 
not l egal tender and did  not count a s  reserves . 
The mi n imum capi tal requ i rement l i n ked bank capi tal i zat i on to 
commun i ty s i ze and rose as  that s i ze i ncreased , but at  a s l ower rate . 
For pl aces wi th l es s  than s i x  thousand peopl e ,  $ 50 thousand i n  cap i ta l  
was requ i red . For c i ti es w i th a popul ati on between s i x  thous and and 
fi fty thousand , $1 00 thousand i n  capi tal was requ i red , and for l arger 
c i ties , a capi ta l  of $200 thousand was requi red . I n  1 900 the mi n imum 
was reduced for pl aces wi th a popu l at ion bel ow three thousand to $25 
thousand . 
The mos t  s i gn i fi cant di fferences between nati ona l ban ks and other 
banks i nvol ved exami nation and publ i c  reports of cond i ti on , l imi ts on 
the s i ze and types  of  l oans permi tted , and l imi ts on the i ssuance of 
. . 
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banknotes . Nati ona l banks were proh i b i ted from mak i n g  rea l estate l oans ; 
· s tate ban ks were not .  Nat i ona l  banks were proh i b i ted from ma k i n g  rea l  
es tate l oans ; s ta te banks  were not . Nati onal banks cou l d  not l end an 
amount exceed i ng 1 0  percent of pa i d- i n  capi tal to one borrowe r .  (There 
was one exception  to thi s l imi tati on : no limi t was p l aced on  b i l l s  on  
exchange d i scounted for goods i n  trans i t .  The  l i mi t on  other · l oans was 
rel axed i n  1 906 . )  State banks  and private banks were not so  restri cted . 
National  banks were requ i red to publ i s h  peri odi c reports of  thei r 
cond i ti on and to undergo peri odic  exami nation ; s tate banks genera l l y  
faced l es s  s tri n gent  requ i rements for reports and exami nations , and i n  
some cases no requ i rements at a l l .  
Nati ona l  banks were requ i red to depos i t  U . S� government bonds wi th 
the Comptrol l er of the Currency i n  order to secure c i rcu l at i on . (The 
m i n imum bond depos i t  was reduced for some national  banks i n  1 874 and 
for the res t in 1 882 . )  Hav i n g  made a depos i t  of bonds , a nati ona l bank 
·coul d i s sue banknotes amounting to 90 percent of the va l ue of the bonds 
depos i ted , wi th the l ower of ma rket or par bei ng the fi qure aga i n st  
whic h t he  90 percent appl i ed .  (T h i s  l imi t was rel axed i n  1 900 . ) Unti l  
1 866 there was no nati onal  restri cti on upon banknotes i s s ued by non­
nati ona l  banks , but after that  date s uch banknotes had a proh i bi t i ve 
1 0  percent tax p l aced upon them , and they rap i d ly  d i sappeared from 
c i rcul at i on . Unti l 1 874 there was an upper l imi t on the total  amount of 
banknotes that coul d be i s s ued by the sys tem as a whol e ,  as wel l as  a 
requi remen t govern i ng the geograph ica l  d i s tri buti on o f  those notes . 
The Stabi l i ty o f  the Nat ional  Ban k i ng System 
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The s uccess o f  the Nationa l Ban k i n g  Sys tem has been eva l uated by 
numerous s tudents , part i c i pants , and observers . Genera l l y  s oea k i ng , two 
l i nes of  approach have been taken . One focused upon the s tabi l i ty of 
the sys tem as  a whol e wh i l e  the other exami ned the s tructure, performance , 
and conduct of the various el ements of  the system . Over t ime , opini ons 
have changed regard i n g  both the s tabi l i ty of the sys tem and i ts operat ion . 
I n teres t i n  the s tab i l i ty of the system qrew out of  the experi ences 
wi th the fi ve major fi nanc i a l  d i s turbances ( and numerous mi nor ones ) 
wh i ch affl i cted the economy and the Nati onal Ban ki nq Sys tem from 1 863  
to 1 91 3 .  A most  thorough analys i s o f  the  h i story of these cri ses  was 
pres�nted by 0 .  M .  W .  Sprague i n  1 91 0 . *  A deta i l ed h i s tory of  the 
operati on of the system from 1 863  to 1 89 1 , emphas i z i ng bank and currency 
l eg i s l ati on and the rol e  of the Comptro l l er o f  the C urrency , was wri tten 
by John Jay Knox ( 1 903 ) . ** Ma rgaret Myers ( 1 931 ) focused attention  upon 
*Hi s Hi story of Cri ses under the Nati onal Banki ng System , was part 
of the Nati onal MOnetary Comm i s s i on's  report o n  t he  s tate of  the fi nanci a l  
system of the Un i ted States . The Commi s s i on ' s  report w a s  a n  i mp ortant  
step i n  the process o f  repl ac i ng that arrangement wi th the  Federa l Reserve 
System . Sprague ' s  book was a l uc i d  and persuas i ve ana lys i s  of the 
s tructural weaknesses i n  the Nati ona l  Banki n g  System . 
**Hi s boo k ,  A H i s tory o f  Banki ng i n  the Un i ted States , was f i rs t  
publ i s hed i n  1 900 , e i ght yea rs after h'fs death . Knox  had served as Comp­
tro l l er of the Currency from 1 872 to 1 884 . Before that , he had been Deputy 
Comptrol l er of the Currency , from· l 867  to 1 872 . Hi s c l ose rel ati on wi th 
the Nati onal Bank i n g  Sys tem provided h im  w ith  a uni que vantage poi nt and 
h i s  book has become a s tandard source for a l l s tudents of nati onal banks . 
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the growth  and devel opment of New York  Ci ty a s  the major fi nanc i a l  center 
of  the Uni ted States , and that c i ty • s  emergence as a center of i nter­
nati onal fi nance and trade . Recently , s tudents have focused more 
attention  upon the operati on and organi za tion of the Nati onal Bank i n g  
System than upon i ts stabi l i ty ( Kl ebaner , 1 974 ; Syl l a ,  1 975 ; West ,  1 974 ; 
Upd i ke ,  1 977 ) . 
Crises  i n  the Uni ted States• fi nanci al sys tem occurred when bank s  
o uts i de o f  New York had bui l t  up l arge bal ances i n  banks there . When 
these funds were reca l led  to the i nteri or of the country ,  and especi a l ly  
when it  happened rapi d ly , the  New York  banks were. forced to  reduce l oans 
s harp ly  because they had no s hort-term s ource of  l i q u i d i ty .  Concentrati on 
of  funds i n  New York and the absence of  a 1 1 l ender of  l as t  resort1 1  made 
the Nati onal Banki n g  System , and i ndeed the Ameri can fi nanci a l  system , 
unstabl e .  
Each cri s i s  wa s marked by substanti a l  wi thdrawa l of funds ( by 
i nteri or banks ) from the central reserve c i ty ban ks of  New York , by 
bank  fa i l ures , and by sus pens i on of cash payments . I n  New York and 
o ther ci t i es , c l eari n g  house certi fi cates were i ssued . The s tock market 
and the forei gn exchange market were v iol ently  d i sturbed ( Sprague , 1 9 1 0 ) . 
Funds concentrated i n  New York primari ly  for two reasons : · the 
reserve s tructure o f  the Nati ona l Banki n g  Sys tem and the impo rtance of  
New York i n  manufacturi ng , trade , a nd  fi nance . Every country ban k  and 
reserve c i ty bank  was requi red to sel ect a reserve agent . Mos t  had more 
than one and mos t  eventua l l y  sel ected at l east  one i n  New York . ( Every 
nati onal bank i n  Knoxv i l l e  had a res erve agen t i n  New York C i ty and 
most had two . )  
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I n  addi tion , because i t  was a center of trade and manufacturi nq , 
funds woul d have moved toward New York from the inter ior .  Th i s  had been 
the pattern prior  to the creati on of the Nati ona l Bank i ng Sys tem , and 
there was no reason for i t  to change afterwards . Myers wrote : 
Bankers ' bal a nces were d i rected toward New York C i ty i n  
ever- i ncreas i n g  vol ume by the course of  trade , whi ch put a 
premi um on New York funds . The neces s i ty for note redempti on 
in the c i ty ,  and the greater variety and superior qual i ty of 
New York commerc ia l  paper were subs i di ary factors i n  th i s  
movement .  ( 1 93 1 , p .  1 24 )  
Once these funds had concentrated , the s tage was set . West wrote : 
The word " reserve" as used i n  the Nati onal Ban k i ng Act i s  
rea l l y  a mi s nome r .  Since banks tended to be " l oaned up" 
and thus al ways nea r the i r m i n imum reserve rat i o ,  the 
amounts hel d in bank  vau l ts or on depos i t  wi th other ban ks 
were not  avai l ab l e  to meet s udden demands wi thout v i o l a t i nq 
the l aw .  Banks were i nduced by the prof i t  moti ve to app roach 
thei r m i n imum reserves but were forbi dden by l aw to go be l ow 
them . I n  s tri ngent s i tuati ons , banks were forced to contract 
cred i t  to ga i n  l i qu i d i ty . . .  ( 1 974 , p .  24 ) 
I n  h i s  analys i s of  the i s suance of c l eari nq house cert i f i cates by 
the New York cl eari ng  house duri ng  the pan i c  of 1 890 , Sprague wrote 
that there was 
. . .  an i ncreas ing  tendency to regard the 25 percent reserve 
as a permanent requ i rement not to be reduced i n  any c i rcum­
stances . The acceptance of such a bel i ef was certa i n  to 
i nvol ve troub le  i n  an emergency . . .  ( 1 9 1 0 ,  p .  15 1 ) 
Temporary i ns uffi c i ency of res erves carri ed no real pena l ty ;  more 
pers i stent defi c i enc i es carr i ed i ncrea s i n g  pena l t ies ( Section 31 , Act 
of June 3 ,  1 864 ) . 
Emergenc i es arose because  the f l ow of funds to New York was not 
con stant but h i g h ly seasona l . Econom i c  acti v i ty outs i de New York a nd 
the Northeast  was c l osely l i n ked to agri cul ture . I n  the autumn , 
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rel ati vely l arge amounts of both cash and credi t were requi red to 
fi nance the harvesti n g  and transport of crops . I n  addi ti on , demand for 
a var iety of other products was c l osely t i ed to the growi ng season . 
Merchants made mos t  of  thei r sal es  to farmers shortly after harvest 
and in order to meet th i s  demand , merchants had to bu i l d  up i nventori es 
s hortly before harve st .  C 1 Shortl y before 11 because  that wou l d m i n imi ze 
carryi ng costs . )  
Demand for cred i t  reached a pea k i n  the fa l l .  Outstand ing  debts 
woul d be reduced duri ng the wi nter .  A smal l i ncrease in demand woul d 
accompany spr ing pl a nti ng , and then another s l ac k  peri od wou l d fol l ow 
i n  the s ummer . By the · l ate s ummer and early fal l , a s teady s trengtheni ng 
i n  the demand for cred i t  woul d be underway , s tart i ng the cycl e  over 
agai n .  
The seasonal nature of the credi t cycl e cou l d have caused serious  
problems for the  ban ks outs i de New York  C i ty because o l d l oans woul d 
h ave been repa i d  and few new l oans extended dur ing  the s l ack  peri ods of  
wi nter and s ummer . Long te rm commi tment of  funds was ,  by and l a rge , 
barred by the prohi b i t ion  agai n st  l oans secured by real esta te . The 
New York money ma rket o ffered an opportuni ty to banks outs i de New York 
because i t  gave them a p l ace to empl oy t he i r  excess  reserves for short 
peri ods . Banks cou l d  l end d i rectly  to i nd i v i dua l s ( for examp l e ,  to 
s toc kbro kers ) ,  or  i nd i rectly through the banks of  that c i ty ,  and th i s  
made pos s i bl e  the devel opment o f  the cal l l oa n  market . 
Therefore , the fol l owi n g  reasons can be g i ven for the concentrati on 
of funds in New Y ork : the reserve s tructu re of the National Ban k i ng 
System , the importance of New York as a center for manufacturi ng and 
trade� and the presence of markets for vari ous fi nanc i al i nstruments--
the New Y ork Money Market . One other factor has often been c i ted as 
p l ay ing  a dec i s i ve rol e i n  the movement of  funds to New Y ork from the 
rest  of the country :  the payment of  i nteres t on ban kers ' ba l ances . 
Sprague wrote 
The payment of  i nteres t upon depos i ts had two undes i rabl e 
cons equences . I ts most obv i ous resu l t was to caus e money 
to be s ent to New York i n  l arger quanti t i es than woul d 
otherw i se h ave been the case , though how much more was s ent 
on th i s  account can not be determi ned . Had no i n teres t 
been offered by the New York  b anks , the outs i de bank s  wou l d  
doubtl ess  have l ent more l a rgely d i rect ly  to borrowers i n  
New York when the demand for l oa ns was s l i g ht  at home , but 
it  i s  not reasonabl e to thi nk  that money thus i nvested 
woul d have by any means equa l l ed bal ances depos i ted i n  New 
York i n  exces s of  l egal res erve requi rements . But the ch i ef 
evi l of i nterest  upon bankers ' depos i ts was of a d i fferent  
cha racte r .  The  i nterest pay i ng banks were unab l e to 
ma i ntai n l arge reserves and at the same time rea l i ze a 
profi t from the use of the funds thus attracted . Parti cu l arly 
was · thi s the case when the accumul ation  of such  funds was 
. on ly  temporary . The extra supp l y  o f  money to be l ent  forced 
down rates , and as rates  fel l ,  more and more had to be 
l ent  by the ban ks i n  order even to equa l the i nteres t 
whi c h  they had contracted to pay . ( 1 91 0 ,  p .  21 ) 
Both poi nts s houl d be questi oned . Sprague ' s  f i rst  po int  seems 
to be ba sed on the argument that � New York banks pai d i n teres t 
on depos i ts .  Th i s  i s  i ncorrect because the payment o f  i nterest  on  
bankers ' bal ances was not  a practi ce confi ned to  the central reserve 
ci ty banks of New York . Had New York  banks been the onl y  ones to pay 
i nteres t on bankers ' bal ances , then of course such  payments wou l d 
"cause money to be sent to New York i n  l arger quanti ti es than wou l d  
otherwi se  have been the case . "  But many ban ks  pai d  i nterest o n  
bankers ' bal ances . H i s  argument woul d s ti l l  be correct i f  the New 
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York banks had pa id  h i gher rates than d i d  other banks , but the 
ava i l abl e exami ners • reports of the l ocal  nati ona l banks  i nd i cate 
that interest  rates pa i d  t6 Knoxv i l l e  banks  by the i r  reser�e agents i n  
New York were as l ow as and s ometimes l ower than i nterest  rates pai d 
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by the ir  other reserve agents . Interest payments i nd i cate no advantage 
(or at t imes , a margi na l  d i sadvantage)  to res erve depos i ts in New 
York Ci ty .  Had no i nterest  been pai d on !nl reserve or ban kers • 
ba l a nce , i t  wou l d  appea r that Knoxv i l l e would  have trans ferred about 
the same amount of  depos i ts to New York . 
Second , Sprague ' s  argument about the 1 1C h i ef evi l 1 1 i s  a l s o  fl awed . 
He s eems to imp ly that the New York banks had l i ttl e or no control over 
. the ir  acqu i s i tion of bankers • ba l ances , and t hat wh i l e  rates on l oans by 
New York banks were vari abl e { varyi ng i nversely wi th the vol ume o f  l oans ) , 
rates on bankers• ba l ances were not .  Th i s  i s  i ncorrect . I nteres t rates 
on both bankers • bal a nces and l oans  were vari abl e ,  and the New York  
banks  did  have some control over the  vol ume o f  bankers • bal ances acqu i red 
and l oans made . Rates of i nterest  on ban kers • bal ances , certi fi cates of 
depos i t ,  red i scounted paper pa id  by and to l ocal banks s how they genera l l y  
had t o  pay s i gni fi cantly more for money borrowed from other banks than 
they rece i ved from other banks  for money l ent . Th i s wi l l  be more ful ly  
d i scussed be l ow .  Of course , Knoxv i l l e' s  experi ence may have been atyp i ca l , 
but Myers • analys i s  seems to confi rm the above fi nd i ngs . 
The pas sage c i ted a bove from Myers { 1 93 1 , p .  1 24 )  conti nued : 
The payment of  i n terest  on bal ances had l e s s  to do w i th 
bri ngi ng funds to New York than wi th determi n i ng i n  whi c h  
o f  the banks i n  New York they were depos i ted . 
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The concentrati on o f  funds i n  New York created a system wh i ch wa s 
potenti a l l y  un stab l e  because changes i n  the demand for credi t cou l d  not 
be met wi thout  ser ious d i sturbances to prev i ous ly  exi s" ti ng · credi t 
arrangements . When banks i n  New York regarded thei r 25 percent reserve 
as i rreduc i bl e m i n imum , i ncreased demands for cas h  and credi t coul d 
on ly  be sati s fied  by a reduction o f  l oans , because there was no other 
way i n  wh i ch the New York banks  coul d ga i n  l i qu i d i ty .  Large and rap i d  
reductions i n  l oans then brought  o n  the cri s i s . 
Structure and Operat i on : An Eva l uat i on 
The Nati ona l Currency Acts were an  experiment i n  the regu l at ion 
of .an important i ndustry ,  and wh i l e  tha t experiment cannot be con s i dered 
an unqua l i fi ed s ucces s , i t  was suffi c i ently effecti ve to serve as a model 
for l ater regul atory systems . The System ' s  effi c i ency i n  mobi l i zi ng  and 
directi n g  the empl oyment of  money and cred i t  has become one of the 
probl ems that students of the system h ave stud ied , and much of the recent 
ana lys i s  has approached eva l uat i on of  the System from th i s  perspecti ve . 
Pri or to the Nati onal Currency Acts , regul ati on of  bank i n g  had been 
ma i n ly  the provi nce of the s tates , and the var i ety of the s tates was 
mi rrored by the vari ety and compl exi ty of  the regul ati on s enacted and 
enforced by each . The Nationa l  Currency Acts a l tered thi s cond i t i on by 
creati ng ,  i n  one sense ,  a two-tiered system . On one l evel , the national  
banks  operated under one set of  regu l at i ons , and on another l evel , the 
s tate ban ks conti nued to operate under a bewi l deri ng variety of rul es . 
I n i ti a l ly ,  the creati on of the Nati onal Ban k i ng Sys tem was to 
· accomp l i sh three spec i fi c  goal s :  federal control of a l l ban ki ng ,  
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e l imi nati on o f  s tate ban knotes ( the substi tuti on o f  good money for bad ) , 
and as a war meas ure , the creation of a better market for federal bonds . 
The fi rs t  two of these were means  to be empl oyed i n  the achi evement 
of more general goal s .  Federal control of banki ng was thought to be 
more des i rabl e than s tate contro l ( Knox , 1 903 , p .  9 7 ) . A mo re desi rabl e  
medium o f  exchange ( nai i onal  .banknotes ) woul d rep l ace the ol d ,  uncerta i n  
med i um o f  ban knotes i s sued by sta te banks . I t  was t hought  neces sary to 
accomp l i sh these and other s pec i fi c goa l s i n  orde r to serve the l arger 
publ i c  i nterest .  Over the fi fty years the Nati onal Bank i ng  System 
operated , some of these s pec i fi c  goa l s  were accomp l i s hed , and some were 
not .  I n  some res pects , the publ i c  i nterest  was wel l served , and i n  
others i t  was not . The eva l uation o f  the Nat ional  Bank i ng System from 
th i s  perspecti ve i s  a topi c  i n  wh ich  much i nterest  has recently been 
s hown . 
There has been cons i derab l e change s i nce 1 863-1 864 i n  the theory 
and pract ice of ban k i n g ,  and i t  woul d be unfa i r  to cri ti c i ze those  who 
drafted the Nati onal Currency Acts  for fa i l ure to understand bank i ng i n  
today ' s  terms . Thei r defi ni tion  of good behavi or by those who operate 
and regul ate banks woul d not be compl ete ly  agreed to now . Thei r bel i ef 
i n  the " real bi l l s ' ' doctri ne was respons i bl e  for severa l prov i s i ons  i n  
the Nati ona l Currency A cts . One proh i bi ted banks from ma ki ng l oans 
secured by real es tate . Another was the absence of l imi ts on the vol ume 
of d i s counted b i l l s  of exchange . Section  29 of the 1 864 Act  reads : 
That the total l i abi l i ti e s  to any assoc i at ion [Nati ona l 
Bank] . . . for money borrowed [ by one borrower] s ha l l a t  
n o  t ime exceed one-tenth part o f  the amount of the capi ta l 
s toc k [of that bank] : Prov i ded , That the d i scount of bona 
fide  bi l l s  of  exchange drawn aga i nst  actual l y  exi s ti ng 
val ues , and the d i s count o f  commerci al or bus i ness paper · 
actual l y  owned by the person or persons , corporation , or 
f irm negoti ati ng  the same s ha l l not be cons i dered as money 
borrowed . 
Kl ebaner has eva l uated the rol e o f  the real b i l l s  doctri ne i n  
i nfl uenci n g  both regu l ati ons  . and bank operat i on . He wrote : 
In  the venerab l e  Bri t i s h  ideal , . . .  only s hort-term , 
sel f-l iqui dati ng l oans  were proper for commerc i a l  banks 
to make . . .  [ because] the means o f  repayment woul d be 
obtai ned before maturi ty i n  the course of produc i ng and 
marketi ng  the goods . . . .  Comptro l l er Hepburn ' s  c l a im  
that  " nati onal banks do  a purely commerci al  bus i nes s "  
was more accurate as a descri pti on o f  the 1 864 acts ' 
concepti on than of the real i ty of 1 892 . ( 1 974 , p .  7 5 )  
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Because the real bi l l s  d octri ne i nfl uenced. the content of the 1864  Act , 
i t  a l so affected bank formati on and the geograph i cal  di s tr i buti on of 
nati onal ban ks . The s tructure of bank i n g  i n  turn affected the conduct  
o f  i nd i v i dual fi rms , and thei r conduct determi ned the performance of 
the system as  a whol e .  
Whether the Nati onal Banki ng  Sys tem fostered competi t ion  or not 
has been debated at  some l ength . Some contemporary cri ti cs , for exampl e 
the popu l i sts and greenbackers , v i ewed the system as hav i ng encouraged 
and protected monopol i st i c  behav i or by New Y ork C i ty ( or Eastern 
Establ i s hment )  banks . More recently ,  two a l ternative arguments h ave 
been advanced to deal wi th the operati onal  characteri s t i cs o f  the 
Nati onal Bank i ng System . 
R i c hard Syl l a  ( 1 9 75 )  has argued that the Nat i ona l  Currency Acts 
conta i ned prov i s i ons whi c h  created barri ers to entry that gave nati ona l 
banks more market power i n  some l ocati ons than i n  others . Di fferences 
i n  market power ( d i fferences in conduct depend i n g  upon d i fferences i n  
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opportuni t i es a l l owed and opportun i t i es deni ed)  produced d i fferences i n  
behav ior  l i nked to l o cati on . Di fferences i n  behavior  l i n ked to l ocati on 
meant that performance woul d di ffer , depend i n g  upon l ocat i on . Hel en 
Upd i ke ( 1 977 ) has argued that i t  was not barri ers to entry created by 
federal regu l ati on , . but rather ri s k s  assoc i ated wi th pa rti cul ar locati on s , 
wh i ch were the i mportant  factor . Both arguments meri t cons i derat i on . 
Syl l a  has argued that barri ers to entry were created that made 
nati ona l bank  formati on i n  sma l l commun i ti es and rural areas more 
d i ffi cul t than nati ona l  bank formati on i n  the urban areas of  the 
i ndus tri a l  Northeast .  Whi l e  fewer nati onal  banks woul d in any case have 
been . founded in t he l ess  densely popul ated South , Wes t ,  and rura l reg ions  
than wou l d have been founded i n  the more d�nsely popu l ated Northeas t ,  
there was , Syl l a  argues; a greater d i s pari ty i n  banki ng serv i ces between 
reg i ons caus ed by the parti cul ar barri ers to entry embod i ed i n  the 
Nati ona l Currency Acts . 
Pri or to the C iv i l War , 
. . .  the ban k i n g  s tructure was respond i ng to the geograph i c  
di s tri buti on o f  popu l ati on as  wel l  a s  to popul ati on s h i fts , 
and pres umably , therefore , to the d i stri buti on o f  demand 
for banki ng servi ces . The growth of pri vate ban k i ng p l ayed 
a key rol e  i n  th i s  response , though i t  i s  l i kely that the 
l i beral i zati on of  s tate banki ng l aws towa rd free ban k i ng  
was work ing  i n  the same d irect i on unti l i nterrupted by 
events duri ng the C i v i l War . ( Syl l a ,  1 975 , p .  46 )  
The  d i str ibution  of  bank i ng s ervi ces* was rad i ca l ly  a l tered i n  t he 
decade of the 1 860 ' s  and i n  1 870 the i nequa l i ty far exceeded what  i t  
*The di s tr i buti on o f  ban ki n g  servi ces was based on a compari son o f  
the re l at i on o f  depos i ts to popu l ati on between reg i ons  { Sy l l a , . 1 975 , 
p .  44 ) . 
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had been i n  1 860 . After 1 870 the di s pari ty d imi n i s hed s l owly , but even 
by 1 91 0  the di stri buti on of ban k i ng serv i ces was somewhat l es s  equal 
than i t  h ad been i n  1 860 { Syl l a ,  1 975 , pp . 25-47, especi a l ly pp . 44-47 ) .  
Syl l a  argues that the cause of the greater i nequa l i ty i n  banki ng  
serv i ces can be  found i n  National Currency Act provi s i on s  that created 
· barr iers to entry i n  certa i n  l ocat i on s  but not i n  others . Rel at i vely 
free entry i nto nati onal banki ng in  the Northeast  tended to make ban ks  
there more compet i t i ve , · wh i l e  the rel ati vely  mo re res tri cted entry 
outs i de the Northea st  tended to g i ve the nati ona l  ban ks i n  those reg i ons  
market power wh i ch was protected from potent i a l  competi ti on .  
Two barri ers to entry tended to res tri ct  nati ona l  bank  formati on 
outs i de the Northeast ,  whereas two other barri ers to entry tended to 
g i ve the few ban ks wh i c h  were formed in those reg ions substant ia l  
advantages over thei r l ocal , nonnati ona l ban k  competi t ion . The two 
majo r  restri ctions  l im i t i ng entry were m i n imum cap i tal requi rements and 
the proh i b i t i on ·aga i nst real estate l oans { Sy l l a ,  1 97 5 , pp . 50-56 ) . 
The two factors restr i ct i ng competi t i on from nonnati onal banks  were a 
tax on s tate . ban knotes and l imi ts on the tota l c i rcul at i on of  nati onal 
banknotes perm itted the sys tem as  a whol e ( Syl l a , 1 97 5 ,  pp . 56-70 ) . 
Mi n imum �ap i tal requi rements { see pages 3 and 4 )  were more 
burdensome for sma l l  communi ti es than for l arge , and therefore made 
bank formati on more di ff i cu l t outs i de the Northeast .  The mi n imum capi tal 
was reduced i n  1 900 , and a l arge number of sma l l  nati ona l  banks  were 
formed . *  The proh i b i ti on aga i ns t  l oans secured by rea l  esta te made 
*From the fi rst Report of Cond i tion of 1 900 { February 1 3 ) , to the 
Last Repo rt of 1 904 { November 1 0 ) , the n umber of country ban k s  rose 
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affi l i ati on wi th  the nati onal sys tem l es s  des i rabl e i n  the South , the 
West, and rural areas , where the demand for s hort term commerci al  
fi nance s houl d have been rel atively sma l l and the demand for l ong term 
agri cul tural l oans rel at i vely l arge . Becaus e nati ona l  banks were 
proh i bi ted from competing  for real es tate l oans , a potent i al l y  attracti ve 
market was den i ed them . These provi s i on s  were not nearly so  burdensome 
to ban ks  wh i c h  m i ght  have dec i ded to l ocate i n  the urban areas o f  the 
Northeast .  
Had th i s  been a l l , the s tructure of l ate ni neteenth century ban k i ng 
m ight  have been much di fferent from what  i t  was . Nati onal banks woul d 
h ave predominated i n  the urban Northeast , and s tate chartered and pr i vate 
banks wou l d ·  have predomi nated e l s ewhere . The mi n imum cap i tal requi re­
ments and proh i b i ti ons aga i nst  rea l .  estate l oans wou l d  have p l aced 
nati ona l banks  at a deci ded d i s advantage rel at i ve to s tate and pri vate 
bank� i n  the South , West, and rural areas . However , nati onal banks 
were g i ven s ubstanti a l  advantages over these ootent i a l  competi tors by 
l imi tati ons on · ban knote c i rcul ati on . In 1 866 a proh i b i ti ve tax on  
banknotes i s sued by s tate banks , cotipl ed wi th the  r iqht  of  nati onal  banks 
to i s sue notes , gave cons i derabl e market power to nati ona l banks at the 
expense of s tate banks . Checks were not widely used outs i de the Northeast . 
Nati onal banknotes  were espec i al l y  advantageous because  the s evere 
s ecuri ty measures  taken to assure thei r redempti on gave the publ i c  a 
from 3 , 285 to 5 , 1 28 .  ( Annual Report o f  the Comptrol l er o f  the Currency , 
1 900 and 1 905 . )  
confi dence i n  the i r  worth and eventua l  redempt i on that had not been 
poss i b l e  for s tate banknotes . 
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Note i s s ue was an i mportant e l ement i n  the s uccess o f · many nati onal 
banks and served to attract many i nto the national system . However ,  
an addi ti ona l  aspect of the  l im i tati on on banknote i s sues mus t be  
recogni zed . The Nati on a 1 Currency Acts set an upper. 1 imi t upon t he 
amount of  ban knotes wh i c h  coul d be i s s ued by the banks of the system . 
That l imi t was approached at the end of  1 866 , when the tax on state 
banknotes went  i nto effec t ,  and new entrants i nto the nat i onal  system 
cou l d  not i s sue as many notes as they mi ght  o therwi s e  have been wi l l i ng 
to i s sue . One of the s trongest  attracti ons to entry ceased to exi st , 
and  those banks wh i ch had a l ready obta i ned a nati onal charter were l eft 
in a protected pos i ti on , i nsu l ated from potenti a l  competi tors , both 
s tate and nationa l . In  the Northeast  and i n  other l a rge urban areas , 
banknote i ss ues had l i ttl e effect on  entry and d i d  not s erve to protect 
banks there from new competi t i on . 
The l i kel y effect of  the ce i l i n g  on the tota l amount of ban knotes , 
together wi th the 1 866 tax on banknotes i s sued by state ban ks , wa s 
immedi ately recogni zed , as i s  i nd i cated i n  the fol l owi ng i tem : 
No More Nati ona l Banks 
We are to have no more Nati onal Banks . The ful l  amount of 
bonds upon wh i ch ,  by the l im i tation of the Law , currency can 
be i s sued , has been recei ved at the offi ce of the Comptro l l er 
of  the Currency . . Three h undred m i l l i ons of dol l ars i s  the 
s um s peci fi ed and in order to. prevent parti es ambi ti ous of 
s tarti ng . new banks from proc uri ng d i sappo i n tment  for them­
sel ves , i t  i s  announced that no further depos i t  of bonds 
wi l l  be rece i ved . . . .  ( Brownl ow • s  Knoxv i l l e  Whig,  
November 28 , 1 866 , p .  2 )  
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Actual ly , there is a m i s tatement of the l aw here . National bank s  
were a lways requi red to depos i t  bonds to  secure the ir  banknotes , but 
t hey were not requi red to i ss ue s uch note s . The requ i rement for depos i t  
of bonds was i ndependent of banknotes  i ss ued ; depos i t  o f  bonds was 
mandatory ,  i ss uance of  banknotes  was opti ona l . However , the i tem 
quoted above i s  s ubstanti al l y  correct .  Wh i l e the cei l i ng  on banknotes  
was  never actual l y  reached , the  total i ss ued approached that  cei l i ng 
nearly enough to prevent new banks from i s su i ng as  much a s  they m i ght  
have wi shed . New banks coul d expect to i s sue on l y  a smal l amount  of  
banknotes , and a s  a consequence , formati on of new nati ona l  banks and 
convers i on of s tate chartered ban ks to nat ional  charters s l owed greatl y .  
The total number of nati onal banks  d i d  not change very much u nti l 1 870 . 
I n  that year ,  the cei l i ng on ban knotes was i ncreased by $ 54 mi l l i on ,  
and there was an assoc i ated i ncrease i n  the n umber of nati onal banks . 
F i ve _yea rs l ater , the ce i l i ng was repeal ed enti rel y ,  yet the response was 
qu i te di fferent from what i t  had been i n  1 870 . The repea l of the 
ce i l i ng i n  1 875  d i d  not s pur a l arge i ncrease i n  the number of national  
banks , because the attracti veness  of i s su i ng banknotes had d imi n i s hed 
s ubs tanti a l l y .  
The i s s uance of  banknotes was a des i rabl e pr iv i l ege for nati onal 
banks because i t  was profi tab l e and a l so because i t  provi ded a means 
of adverti s i ng .  Banknotes were profi tab l e  because the i s s u i ng bank  
conti nued to receive  i nterest pa i d  on the government bonds  depos i ted 
to secure the ban knotes , as we l l  as recei vi ng i nterest  from l oans made 
wi th banknotes . _ In  the earl y  yea rs of the System , government bonds 
s o l d  at  a subs tanti a l  di s count from par ,  meani ng that they ea rned a 
h i g h  return , espec ia l l y  cons i deri n g  the capi tal gai n due when the 
bonds ma tured . The h i g h  return from s imply own i n q  bonds , coupl ed wi th  
the i nterest earned on l oans made wi th banknotes , made ban knote i s s ues 
qu i te profi tab l e ,  at  l east  unt i l  the · mi d-1 870 ' s .  
26 
By 1 875  ( two years after the commencement of the depress i on of 
1 87 3 )  banknotes were no l onger q u i te so profi tabl e .  I n teres t rates 
had fa l l en s harp ly , and bonds whi ch had been trad ing  bel ow pa r now 
traded above pa r .  Wh i l e  the i nteres t return on bonds fel l , and the 
capi ta l  gai n turned i nto a capi ta l  l os s , the cos t  o f  i s su i ng banknotes 
changed l i ttl e ,  i f  at an ( Syl l a , 1 97 5 ,  pp . 60-6 1 ) .  Amon� the costs  
was a federa l tax  of  1 percent on  ban knotes outstand i ng .  Th i s  was  not  
rega rded as especi a l iy onerous when bonds so l d much bel ow par ,  but  by 
1 875  i t  s ubs tanti al l y  reduced the profi tabi l i ty of  note i s s ues . Wi th 
the dec l i ne in the profi tab i l i ty of banknote i s suance , the remova l o f  
the ce i l i ng o n  the total d i d  not stimul ate a s i gn i fi cant i ncrease i n  
the number of  na ti ona l  banks ( Sy l l a ,  1 975 , pp . 60�61 ) .  
Substant i a l  numbers . of new nati ona l ban ks were not crea ted un t i l 
1 900 , when the m i ni mum cap i ta l  requi rement was reduced to $25 thousand . 
Therefore , between 1 875  and 1 900 , few new nati ona l  banks were created 
to compete wi th those a l ready operati ng i n  1 875 . There was , of  course , 
some i ncreas e i n  the total number of banks between 1 875  and 1 900 , but 
most  of  the i ncrease in banki ng acti v i ty came because of an i ncrease i n  
the number o f  s tate and pri vate ban ks , rather than nati onal ones 
( Syl .l a ,  1 975 , pp . 68-70 ) . From 1 875 to 1 900 , then , nationa l ban ks were 
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not  s ubjected to greater competi ti on from other , newl y formed nati ona l 
banks . They were faced wi th more competi t i on from s tate bank s , yet even 
here , the national  banks conti nued to have s ome advantages ·. The profi t­
abi l i ty of  note i s sues to nati onal  ban ks may have decl i ned , yet i t  s t i l l  
wa s a s i gn i f i cant advantage for nati ona l banks compet i ng  wi th  s tate 
banks . 
There are s ome add i t i ona l po i nts , not emphas i zed by Syl l a ,  wh i c h  
bol s ter h i s  a rgument about t he  presence o f  barri ers to  entry created 
by the Nati onal Currency Acts . F i rs t ,  underlyi ng the argumen t wi th 
regard to the South in part icul a r ,  and to a l es ser extent those areas 
bordering the South , i s  a recogni ti on that bank formation  i n  t hose 
areas was for some t ime retarded by the destructi on of  l and , l abor , 
and capi tal attendant  on the War i tse l f .  Th i s  effect was exacerbated 
by the impos i ti on of aggregate l im i ts on nati ona l banknote c i rcul ation . 
As  the South and the border areas recovered , demand for ban k i ng 
faci l i ti es woul d have grown . That nat ional banks p l ayed a sma l l rol e 
i n  that growth i s  i ndi cat ive of the barri ers to entry wh i c h  Syl l a  has 
i denti f i ed .  ( I t may al s o  be i ndi cat i ve o f  South ern prej udi ce aga i ns t  
. ....._ _ anyth i ng rel ated to the Nati onal governm�, � l east  for some of the 
fi rs t  yea rs fol l ow i ng  the War . ) 
Further , wh i l e  h i gh . mi n imum cap i ta l  requi rements c l early made 
nati onal ban k  formati on more di ffi cul t ,  there was another provi s i on of 
the Nati onal  Currency Acts  wh i ch restri cted t he purchase of capi tal 
s tock i n  nat i ona l banks , and therefore res tri cted nat i ona l bank 
formati on . I n  pa rt ,  Secti on 1 2  o f  the 1 864 Act reads : 1 1That the 
capi ta l  stock of an as soci ati on formed under th i s  act s ha l l  be d i vi ded 
28 
i nto shares of one hundred dol l a rs each . . .  11  That  i s , the m i n i mum 
i nves tment  per sharehol der was set at a rel ati vel y h i g h  l evel . The 
n umber of  farmers in a smal l communi ty in the Mi dwes t . or the South who 
were both wi l l i n g  and abl e to purchas e shares of $1 00 was certa i n ly l es s  
than the number who mi ght have been wi l l i ng a nd  a bl e  to buy a few { say 
two or three ) shares i f  the par val ue  of a s hare had been $ 1 0 .  F i na l l y ,� 
the genera l  b i as towa rd commerc i a l  banki ng , as opposed to mortgage , 
bank i ng , embod i ed i n  the Nati ona l Currency Acts made nati onal banks l es s  
s u i.tabl e to l es s  urbani zed reg i ons  of the country .  Th i s  favored growth 
of nati onal ban ks in the Northeas t  and retarded growth of nat iona l ban ks 
outs i de that reg i on . 
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I n  summary ,  the barri ers to entry tended to protect the rel a ti vely 
few na ti onal ban ks that were formed outs i de the u rban areas of the 
Northeast  from the competi t i on they woul d have faced had more nati ona l  
banks been formed i n  those reg i ons . At the same t ime , the res tri cti ons 
and l imi tati ons on the  i s suance of banknotes  gave exi sti ng  nati onal  
banks  in  those  regi ons  extens i ve advantages over banks wh i ch were not 
affi l i ated wi th the nati ona l system . These s tructural characteri st i cs 
{ the geographi cal and l ocati ona l bi ases ) of the nat ional system permi t 
Syl l a  to arg ue that they caused important di fferences between the 
conduct of banks i n  those reg i on s  and the urbani zed Northeast .  
Di fferences i n  competi ti venes s  between reg i ons  shou l d b e  refl ected 
by d i fferences i n  ban k  operati on and s ucces s . The advantages g i ven to 
country ban ks outs i de the urban Northeas t  s houl d be refl ected i n  both 
l ower output and h i g her pri ces for the i r  serv i ces , as  wel l as h i g her 
profi ts than ci ty ban ks . Good i nformati on i s  not ava i l ab l e  regardi ng  
pri ces charged by country ban ks . ( I t  was on l y  a fter 1 894 that the 
exami ners • reports conta i ned i nformat ion on i nteres t rates ·, a nd t hose 
f i gures are only approx imate . )  Syl l a  used net i ncome as a percentage 
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of earni n g  assets as  a proxy for i nteres t rates . · Compari sons of these 
rates of  return for the three c l as ses of banks . genera l ly  support the 
argument that country banks had an advantage over ci ty banks ( Syl l a ,  
1 975 , pp . 1 0 1 - 1 07 ) . Further ,  country banks  s hou l d  have exh i b i ted l ower 
rates of output than c i ty banks . Syl l a  ( 1 97 5 ,  p p .  1 07- l l l) s el ected 
l oan-as set ratios  as a measure of  output , and aga i n  found that h i s  
argument was supported . He a l so compared profi t rates between bank 
cl as ses and reg i ons , and aga i n found that  country banks  had h i g her 
returns on shareho l der  i nvestment (Syl l a ,  1 97 5 ,  pp . 1 1 1 - 1 1 7 ) . A l so , 
the h i gher returns enjoyed by country ban ks s upport h i s  arqument that 
country banks were l es s  competi t i ve than c i ty banks . 
F i na l l y ,  Syl l a  ( 1 975 , pp . 1 1 7- 1 29 )  argued that becaus e  bankers • 
bal ances often ea rned i nterest ,  country ban ks were i n  a doubl y  des i ra b l e  
pos i tion . Not on ly  coul d they d i s crimi nate between thei r l ocal  cus tomers , 
they coul d a l so  d i scrimi nate between l oca l  customers and customers i n  
the urban Northea s t ,  and th i s  di scrim i nat ion cou l d  be done d i rectly  
( e . g . ,  through l oans to  s tockbrokers ) or  i nd i rectly ( e . g . , through  l oans 
to banks ) .  Country banks as a general rul e  tended to keep more cash on 
hand than was needed to s ati s fy the reserve requ i rement .  These same 
banks a l s o  tended to hol d l arge bal ances i n  excees of requ i red reserves 
wi th the i r  reserve agents . These 
excess  reserves . . .  cou l d  have been recal l ed had the 
banks  chosen to l end the funds at home . That they d i d  not 
i nd i cates that the banks regarded the i r  bal ances i n  the 
c i ti es at  l east as profi tabl e ,  after tak i ng account of the 
ri s ks i nvol ved , as l ocal  l oans . ( Syl l a ,  1 975 , p .  1 2 1 )  
There was a gradual reduction over the peri od i n  excess res erves hel d 
wi th reserve agents ( Myers , 1 931 , p .  236 ) . Syl l a  exp l a i ns th i s  by 
argu i n g  that state ban ks s taged a resurgence towa rd the end o f  the 
peri od . In  1 900 some of  the barriers to entry were s harply rel axed . 
The i ncrease i n  the number of s tate ban ks and nat iona l banks tended 
to force ex i sti ng nati onal  banks to act i n  a more competi ti ve manner . 
30 
Updi ke ' s  v i ew of the .Nati ona l Banki ng Sys tem is q u i te d i fferent 
from Syl l a ' s . Her bas i c  thes i s  i s  that entry was re l atively free and 
country banks  were fa i r ly compet i t i ve .  She arg ues that country banks  
coul d enter the nati onal system wi thout undue d i ffi cu l � ,  and so  there 
was a h i gh ly  competi t i ve envi ronment .  H i g h  fa i l ure rates were symptomat i c  
of  the h i g h  r i s ks assoc i ated wi th th i s  competi ti ve envi ronmen t ,  a s  wel l  
as  the probl ems assoc iated wi th operati ng a l arge ban k  i n  a sma l l 
commun i ty .  Furthermore , s he i nterprets the rel at ive ly  h i gh  profi ts 
earned by country banks as  bei ng a r i s k  premi um .  
I t  was found that country banks faced s harp ly  h i gher 
probabi l i ti es of bankruptcy than d i d  ci ty banks . Thus , 
h i gher money rates of  return to the s ubset of  banks  
that  s urvi ved refl ected ri s k  prem i ums . . . •  (Updi ke , 
p .  i v )  
That i s ,  the country ban ks i n  the nati onal system faced a competi ti ve 
and ri s ky s i tuation whi c h  produced both h i g h  fa i l ure rates and h i g h  
profi ts for the remai n i n g  banks . 
The d i ff i cul ty with  Upd i ke ' s  argument i s  that h i gh  fa i l ure rates 
and h i gh profi ts can just  as eas i ly be a s soc i ated wi th monopoly  as wi th 
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competi t i on . Not every monopol i sti c wi l l  survive and prosper . A s i ngl e ,  
l a rge bank i n  a sma l l  town wi th a one-dimens i ona l  economy i s  part i cu l arly 
s uscept i bl e to changes i n  that economy ,  regardl es s  of  whether that bank 
has been conducti ng i ts a ffa i rs in a monopol i s t ic  or competi t i ve manner . 
Cons equentl y ,  h i g h  fa i l ure rates are not necess ari ly i nd i cati ve o f  the 
nature of the competi ti ve envi ronment .  
The rea l d i ffi cu l ty seems to be that , wh i l e  i n  theory ,  competi t ion 
and monopoly represent pol ar extremes i n  the behavior of  fi rms , i n  
pract i ce conservati sm and aggres s i veness are the actual extremes . I t  
may , i n  some cases , be more frui tful to d i st i ngu i s h  between conservative 
behavi or and aggres s i ve pursu i t of  bu s i ness  than between monopoly  and 
competi tion . Certa i nl y ,  a parti cu l ar  arrangement of i nputs and outputs , 
of  pri ces pa i d  and recei ved , coul d be unders tood to be ei ther conserva ti ve 
or monopol i s ti c ,  ei ther competi t i ve or r i s ky .  
For examp l e ,  wh i l e  i t  i s  probably correct to say that country banks 
were l es s  compet i t ive than c i ty banks , it i s  questionab l e  i f  the practice 
of  keep i ng  h i gh cash reserves and l a rge ban kers ' ba l ances can be expl a i ned 
onl y ,  or primari l y ,  by the monopo ly  pos i t ion hel d by country banks . The 
monopol y pos i ti on of country banks  may have contri buted to th i s  practi ce , 
but one must a l s o  remember that th i s  behavior  was vi ewed as a sound , 
conservative pol i cy .  The key here i s  the emphas i s  one wi s hes to g i ve 
to the import of  Syl l a ' s  phra se ,  "after taki ng  account  o f  the rel at i ve 
ri s ks i nvol ved . "  That country banks  d i d  not extend more l ocal l oans 
a nd empl oy more of the i r resources at  home , rather than i n  New York or 
other reserve ci t i es , i s  not necessari ly evi dence of monopoly power 
used to curtai l output and rai se pri ces . I t  can be expl a i ned i n  part 
by the es timati on of  h i g h  ri s ks and cos ts for l ocal  l oans . Monopol y  
power i s  not the only condi t ion whi ch  woul d  l ead to th i s  type o f  
behav i or .  Low l oan-a s set rati os · cou l d  be con s i s tent wi th ei ther 
monopol y  (as a resu l t of res trict ing  output to ra i se pri ces ) or 
competi t i on (as a res ul t of r i s k  avoi d i n g  behavi or ) . 
· In  the same vei n  one must  remember that publ i shed statements of  
cond i ti on were , to say the l eas t ,  a novel ty for much of  the country ,  
and espec i a l l y  for rural banks and ban ks outs i de the Northea st . The 
Nati ona l Currency Acts requi red a country bank  .to keep on hand i n  
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cash a m i n imum of 6 percent of the ir  depos i ts .  An addi t i onal  9 percent 
coul d be hel d as bankers ' ba l ances . · For a pub l i c  unaccus tomed to the 
deta i l s  of bank operati on , 6 percent may have seemed qui te smal l .  I n  
the early yea rs of  the National  Banki n g  Sys tem , the memories o f  bank 
fa i l ures w i th unredeemabl e banknotes must have been q u i te s trong , and 
banks may have kept an  unusua l ly h i g h  ( by modern sta ndard s )  rati o of 
cash  reserves to depos i ts in order to a l l ay fears of i nsuffi c i ency 
of reserves . Myers presents ev i dence that exces s reserves d imi n i s hed 
s l owly over t ime . Th i s  i s  what one woul d expect i f  both banks and 
the publ i c  were l earn i ng that a fracti onal  cash  reserve was rel atively  
safe . 
Summary 
The Nati onal Currency Acts and the C i vi l War a l tered both the 
s tructure of banki ng and the behavior  of ban ks i n  the Un i ted States . 
Al l s tudents of the Nati ona l Bank i ng System agree that changes i n  
s tructure and behavi or took p l ace ; they d i s agree about the effects . 
Some woul d have i t  that competi t i on was encouraged , but others argue 
that the reverse was the case . Th i s  d i s sertat ion wi l l  add l i ttl e to 
th i s  deba te . I ns tead , the focus here wi l l  be upon the s tructure of 
bank i ng and the behav ior  of banks  in  one smal l market , rather than on  
broad aggregates . 
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CHAPTER I I I  
ECONOMIC  ACT IV ITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF  BANK ING I N  KNOXV ILLE  
Knoxv i l l e  i s  an i nteres t ing  communi ty for the  s tudent  of the 
Nati ona l Ban k i ng System because i t  represents both country and c i ty 
ban k i ng  and the trans i ti on from the one to the other . Knoxv i l l e 
a l so underwent a trans i t ion from be i n q  a sma l l Southern town to a 
rel at i ve ly  l a rge Southern i ndus tr i a l  cente r .  Prior to the mi d - 1 880 ' s , 
ban k i ng i n  Knoxv i l l e  was much  l i ke that descri bed by Syl l a  for country 
banks l ocated outs i de the urban Northeas t .  Between the m id- 1 880 ' s  and 
the l ate 1 890 ' s ,  the ban k i ng i ndustry in Knoxvi l l e  wa s trans formed , 
and by the l ater date ( for  conveni ence put at 1 900)  the nati onal  banks 
operated much more l i ke reserve c i ty banks . Roug h ly ,  the same peri ods 
apply  to the economy of Knoxv i l l e  and Knox County . Before 1 880 , 
Knoxvi l l e  was very much l i ke other sma l l Southern towns ,  but by 1 900 
s uch  was no l onger the case . 
Four  banks were i n  bus i ness  i n  Knoxvi l l e  by 1 867 , and only one 
had a national charter .  Th�re were s ti l l  four banks in 1 886 but the 
compos i ti on had been changed . Two (or oerhaos three ) new ban ks had 
appeared and two (or perhaps three ) o l d ones had di sappeared . Of the 
four remai n i ng in 1 886 , two had nati onal charters . Between 1 887 and 
1 900 , ten new banks  were founded , four  of wh i ch had obtai ned nati onal 
charters . Duri n g  th i s  same peri od , one nati ona l bank fa i l ed ,  two 
pri vate banks cl osed , and two merged . Th i s  l eft ten banks operat i ng  
i n  1 899 , fi ve of  wh i c h  were nati onal  banks . By the end o f  1 91 3 ,  there 
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were s ti l l ten banks . One o f  the ol der nati onal banks  had g i ven up 
i ts nati onal cha rter for a s tate cha rter ,  but two other banks had 
j oi ned the nati onal  system . (One had been a s tate ban k ,  whereas the 
other was newly founded . )  One s tate bank  had fa i l ed .  
I n  s umma ry , three di s ti nct peri ods for bank i nq  i n  Knoxv i l l e  can 
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be i denti f ied . The tota l number of banks d i d  not chanqe in the peri ods 
1 867-1 886 and 1 899-1 9 1 3 ,  but the tota l number of banks  more than 
doub l ed i n  the peri od between 1 887-1 899 . There was one nat iona l bank  
i n  1 867 , two i n  1 886 , fi ve by 1 899 , and s i x i n  1 9 1 3 .  
I t  i s  more di ffi cul t to prec i sely i denti fy the turn i n q  ooi nts for 
the economy o f  Knoxvi 1 1  e and Knox County ,  but the census fi qures for 
1 850-1 9 1 0  i nd i cate that a s im i l a r  d i vi s i on i nto peri ods i s  warranted . 
Tabl e I I I - 1 s hows popul ati on i n  Knoxv i l l e ,  Knox County ,  and  the Un i ted 
States ( i n  mi l l i ons ) on the cen sus dates for 1 850 to 1 9 1 0 .  The fi gures 
i n  p�rentheses s how the percentage c hange from the previ ous census . 
;.m: .. 
Year 
1 850 
1 860 
1 870 
1 880 
1 890 
1 900 
1 91 0  
Tabl e I I I - 1 
Popul ation  of Knoxvi l l e ,  Knox County and the Uni ted States 
( Percentage Change Shown i n  Parentheses ) 
U n i ted States 
Knoxv i l l e  Knox County ( i n  Mi l l i on s )  
2 , 076 1 8 , 807 23 
3 , 704 ( 78 ) 22 ,81 3 ( 21 ) 31 ( 36 ) 
8 , 682 ( 1 34 ) 28 , 990 ( 27 ) 40 ( 27 ) 
9 , 693 ( 1 2 ) 39 ' 1 24 ( 35 ) 50 ( 26 ) 
22 ,535  ( 1 32 ) 59 , 557 ( 52 ) 63 ( 26 ) 
32 , 637 (45 ) 74 , 302 ( 25 ) 76 ( 21 ) 
36 , 346 ( 1 1 ) 94 ' 1 87 ( 27 ) 93 ( 22 ) 
Source : Census of the Uni ted States , 1 850-1 91 0 .  
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The fi gures for Knoxv i l l e  are to some extent mi s l ead ing  i nd i cators 
of  the popu l ati on served by the l ocal ban k i n g  corrmun i ty ,  espec i a l ly 
because some of the i ncrease was due to annexati on of  add i ti onal  areas 
by the C i ty .  S i gni ficant add i t i ons t o  Knoxv i l l e affected the censuses 
of 1 860 , 1 870 , 1 890 , and 1 9 1 0  {MacArthur , 1 976 ) . . Knox County • s  fi gures 
g i ve a much better i ndi cati on of  the popu l ati on s erved by the l ocal  
banks , yet even here , it  mus t  be recogn i zed tha t the market for bank i no 
servi ces extended beyond the County • s  borders . 
Through 1 870 , Knox County grew_ more s l owly than d i d  the country 
as a who l e ,  but from ·1 870 to 1 890 , county growth was much  more rap id  
than the nati ona l average . After 1 8qo , Knox County grew on ly  s l i qhtly 
more rap i d ly  than d i d  the country as a whol e .  
More stri k i ng than the change i n  popu l at i on was the change i n  the 
proporti on of the popul at ion emp l oyed i n  manu facturi n g .  Tabl e 1 1 1 -2 
presents the number of  persons  emp l oyed i n  manufacturi ng  i ndustries 
per one thousand of popu l ati on .  
There was a l a rge i ncrease for the Un i ted States from 42 per 
thou sand i n  1 860 to 50 i n  1 870 , whereas l i ttl e c hange occurred i n  
Knox County duri n g  the s ame peri ods . The next peri od , 1 870 to 1 880 saw 
l i tt l e  change for the Uni ted States but a l a rqe i ncrease for Knox 
County .  But the ten years between 1 880 and 1 890 produced extraord i nary 
changes for both the Uni ted States and Knox County . I n  that oeri od . the­
proporti on of  the popu l ati on emp l oyed i n  manufacturi n g  i n  Knox County 
· a l most  trebl ed and i ncreased by 39 percent for the Un i ted States . { As 
wi l l  be seen , the cha racteri st ic s  of manufacturi ng i n  Knox County a l s o  
changed . )  By 1 890 , Knox County a n d  the Un i ted States were on a p a r ,  
Tabl e 1 1 1 -2 
Number o f  Persons Empl oyed i n  Manufacturi nq I ndu str ies 
per One Thousand of  Popu l at ion 
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Year Knox County Un i ted States 
1 860 . 1 3  
1 870 1 5  
1 880 25  
1 890 74 
1 900 83 
Sources : Un i ted States Census : 
1 860 , Vol ume 3 ,  pp . 567-568 , 729 ; 
1 870 , Vol ume 3 ,  pp . 392 , 733 . 
1 880 , Vol ume 2 ,  pp . 5 ,  1 75 ,  357 ; 
1 890 , Vol ume 6 ,  Part 1 ,  pp . 9 ,  594-595 , 
Part 2 ,  pp . 280-281 ; 
1 900 , Vol ume 7 ,  Part 1 ;  p .  3 ,  
Pa rt 2 ,  pp . 857 -858 . 
42 
52 
54 
7 5  
7 7  
and Knox County ' s  proporti on �rew more than that for the Un i ted Sta tes 
i n  the next decade . 
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I n  add i t i on , fi rm s i ze ,  as measu red by emo l oyment per · f i rm ,  s howed 
the same pattern of  c hange . Tabl e 1 1 1 -3 s hows empl oyment per fi rm i n  
manufacturi ng  compan i es .  Knox County had sma l l er fi rms than d i d  the 
Un i ted States from 1 860 to 1 880 . After 1 880 , the l oca l f i rms were 
l arger than the U . S .  average , and once agai n the s h i ft came mostly i n  
the decade o f  the 1 880 ' s .  I n  1 860 and 1 870 , the average Knox County 
fi rm empl oyed about one-ha l f  as many empl oyees a s  d i d  the average fi rm 
i n  the Un i ted States • . The year 1 880 saw Knox County fi rms s ti l l  bel ow 
average , but a s l i gh t  ga i n  had been made . Duri ng  the next ten years 
s ubs tanti a l  gai ns  occurred , and empl oyment per fi rm more than doubl ed . *  
Tab l e  1 1 1 -3 
Empl oyment per F i rm i n  Manufacturi ng Compa n i es 
Yea r Knox County Un i ted States 
1 860 3 9 
1 870 5 8 
1 880 7 1 1  
1 890 1 7  1 3  
1 900 1 8  1 1  
Source : Uni ted States Census , 1 860- 1 900 . See Sources , Table I I I  -2 , 
page 37 . 
*The dec l i ne i n  emol oyment per f i rm i n  manufacturi n g  compan i es from 
1 890 to 1 900 was caused by an i nadequate defi n i ti on of manufacturi ng 
compan ies . That defi n i tion was revi s ed for the census  of 1 9 1 0  and l ater 
censuses , and therefo re census  data for 1 91 0  a re not comparabl e  wi th the 
cen sus data for earl i er years and have not been presented here . For th� 
s ame reason , census data for the val ue of products produced per manufac­
turi ng  fi rm i n  1 91 0  have not  been presented i n  Tab l e  1 1 1 -4 .  
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These concl u s i on s  a re rei n forced by a second measure of fi rm s i ze ,  
the val ue of products per fi rm .  Tab l e  I I I -4 presents the average of 
the va l ue of products of manufacturi n g  fi rms from 1 860 to 1 900 . Knox 
County f i rms produced about one-hal f as much on the average as the 
Un i ted States i n  1 860 . By 1 870 , both had grown and the d i fference had 
narrowed-- Knox County f i rms now produced about two-th i rds  as much as 
the average U . S .  f i rm .  There was v i rtual l y  n o  change i n  Knox County 
i n  the peri od  from 1 870 to 1 880 , wh i l e the a�erage for the Un i ted States 
conti nued to grow . But between 1 880 and 1 890 , the averaqe for Knox 
County manufacturi ng fi rms doubl ed , to about the U . S .  average . The 
average for both fel l s l i ghtly by 1 900 . (The fi gures  are i n  nomi nal --
not real --terms , and g i �en the pri ce defl ati on duri ng  the 1 890 ' s ,  rea l  
output per  fi rm probably _ rose . )  
Year 
1 860 
1 870 
1 880 
1 890 
1 900 
Source : 
page 37 . 
Tabl e I I I -4 
Val ue of Products Produced per Manufacturi nq Fi rm 
Knox County 
$ 6 , 375  
1 1 , 259 
1 1  ' 978 
2 5 , 206 
24 ' 591 
Un i ted States Censu s ,  1 860-1 900 . 
Un i ted State s  
$ 1 3 ,429 
1 6 , 785 
2 1  ' 1 52 
2 6 , 370 
25 ,402 
See Sources , Tabl e I I I -2 , 
The censuses of 1 870 to 1 900 presented data for empl oyment , val ue 
of produce , and the n umber of fi rms for vari ous pol i ti cal  s ubd i vi s i on s  
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o f  each s tate . Unfortunate ly ,  the censuses d i d  not a lways report for 
the same pol i t� ca l  s ubdi v i s i ons . The censuses ·o f  1 870 and 1 880 reported 
for Knox County ,  but the next two censuses , 1 890 and 1 900 , · reported for 
Knox v i  1 1  e .  Furthermore , the censuses o f  1 890 and 1 900 were not as  
deta i l ed as the  earl i er two . Approx imate ly  one-ha l f of the  manufactur ing  
i ndustri es i n  Knoxv i l l e i n  1 890 and  1 900 were aggregated i n  the  catch-al l 
category 110ther . 11 Tab l e  I I I -5 presents data for some of  the more 
important i ndustries i n  Knox County i n  1 870 and 1 880 for wh i ch comparabl e 
fi gures are ava i l abl e for Knoxvi l l e i n  1 890 and 1 900 . ( Both empl oyment 
and tota l  product for each i ndustry are g i ven as a percentage for the 
county or ci ty tota l s . )  
The fol l owi ng  i ndus tri es were c l ea rly  more i mportant by 1 900 than 
they were i n  1 870 : texti l es and c l oth i ng , fl our products , manufactu red 
wood products , and bakeri es . Metal products , paper products , and l ea ther 
prodycts e i ther fel l i n  i mportance or rema i ned about the same . Marb l e 
and s tone products and l umber appear to have been l es s  important , but 
other ev i dence about these i ndustri es l eads to the oppos i te conc l us i on .  
There were no ma rbl e or stone works l i s ted for Knox County i n  
ei ther 1 870 or 1 880 . By 1 890 and 1 900 , accord i n q  to the census f igures , 
they contri b uted a . sma l l amount to Knoxv i l l e ' s  economy , but here the 
censu s  i s  mi s l ead i ng . F i rs t ,  most  of  these products wou l d have been 
produced at the quarry . Raw marb l e b l ocks woul d not have been transported 
to the c i ty to be worked i nto bu i l di ng s tone or monuments . The work 
woul d have been done at the quarry . There were very few marb l e quarr i es 
wi th i n  the corporate l im i ts ,  but by 1 890-1 900 , marbl e quarri e s  were 

Industry Year 
Baki ng 1 870 
and 1 880 
Confec- 1 890 
ti  onary 1 900 
Tab l e 1 1 1 -5 ( Cont ' d ) 
Empl oyment 
(As a Percentage of  
the Tota l 
2 . 1  
3 . 3  
2 . 8  
Total Product 
(As a Percenta9e of  
the Total } 
3 . 4  
4 . 8  
3 . 5  
42 
Number 
o f  F i rms 
2 
9 
8 
Source : Census of  the Un i ted States , 1 870-1 900 . See Sources , 
Tabl e I I I -2 , page 37 . 
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ubi qu i tous in  Knox County and surroundi ng areas . Second , reports by 
bank exami ners i ndicate that starti ng i n  the e i g hti es , the l ocal nat i onal  
banks i ncreased both the vol ume and  n umber of l oans to  l ocal marbl e 
compan i es . Not only were the marbl e compan i es borrowi ng  more , there 
were more of them . S imi l arl y ,  l umber compan i es were ment i oned more 
frequently i n  the exami ners • reports after 1 880 , yet most of the ones 
do i n g  bus i ness  wi th l ocal banks  were l ocated outs i de Knox  County .  That 
i s , l umber became i ncreas i ng ly  i mportant to East Tennes see , and through 
the l i nks between the l umber compan i es and the l oca l banks , to  Knox 
County ,  even though that l i n kage d i d  not show up i n  the census . Much 
the same can be s a i d  for coa l mi n i ng ,  but because there were no coal 
mi nes i n  Knox County or Knoxvi l l e ,  coa l m i n i ng • s  contri buti on to the 
growth of Kno xv i l l e . i s  h i dden . Al so , the exami ners • reports show that 
many of the pri nci pal s of the l ocal banks were deepl y i nteres ted i n  
coal .mi nes , marbl e quarri es , and timber compan i es . The evi dence i s , then , 
that marb l e ,  timber , and coal were more important to the economy of 
Knoxv i l l e  and Knox County in  1 900 than they had been in  1 870 . 
The topography of the reg i on and the rel ati vely h i o h  ra i nfa l l 
affected both manufacturi ng a nd agri cu l ture . East Tennes see i s  bordered 
on the east  and west  by mounta i n  ranges runni n g  northeas t to southwes t .  
Between the mounta i ns are numerous smal l va l l eys whi ch dupl i cate the 
broad pattern in mi n i ature . Steep , but not overl y ta l l  ri dges run 
northeast and southwest .  Descendi ng from the top o f  the ri dge l i ne ,  
one encounters rol l i ng  h i ll s ,  wh i ch d imi n i s h i n  hei ght and s teepnes s ,  
unti l a narrow stri p of  ri ch , and fl a t ,  bottoml and lyi ng al ong a sma l l 
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s tream or r iver i s  reached . The bottoml and was c l eared and p l anted i n  
corn and wheat .  The rol l i ng h i l l s  were c l eared up to the bottom of  the 
r i dge , but because  they were too steep for row crops , they were turned 
i nto pasture for catt l e  and horses . The r idge i tse l f was l eft uncut 
for i t  was too s teep for pasture l and , and because  i t  was covered by a 
dense hardwood fores t conta i ni n g  many oaks and c hestnuts , i t  prov i ded 
forage for hogs . 
East Tennes see agri�ul ture had devel oped al ong l i �es that were 
di fferent from much o f  the South . Few l arge p l antati ons exi s ted , and 
cotton and other stapl e crops were not as exten s i ve ly  cu l ti vated here 
as i n  the res t  of the South . Mos t  farms were rel atively sma l l and 
worked by the owner , rather than by s l aves ( prior to the War) , or  tenants 
or s harecroppers ( after the War) . The topography of the l a nd , nati ve 
f lora , ra i nfa l l ,  and patterns of ownersh i p  d i rected agri cu l ture toward 
corn � wheat ,  catt l e  and hogs . The topography o f  the l a nd and the 
rel at i ve ly  hi gh ra i nfal l made extens i ve empl oyment of  water powered 
m i l l s  pos s i b l e , hence the growth and deve l opment of text i l e  and fl our 
mi l l s  and , a l though the census does not show i i , a modest  meatpack i ng  
i ndustry ( East  Tennes see Nati onal Bank , Ju ly  27 , 1 881 . ) * 
Throughout the peri od , Knoxv i l l e  had a good and improv ing  
transportati on system . The  centerpi ece was the ra i l  l i ne  wh i ch connected 
Knoxv i l l e  to the northeast  wi th V i rg i n i a  and the eastern seaboard , and 
*Throughout , ci tati ons and references from the correspondence of 
the l ocal  banks wi th the Comptro l l er wi l l  be  i dent i f i ed by the part i cul ar 
bank ' s  n ame and the date on wh i ch the l etter was wri tten . Ci tati ons and 
references from Reports of Exami nat i on wi l l  be s o  i den t i f ied . 
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to the south wi th  Chattanooga .  From Chattanooga , l i nes ran s outh to 
Atl anta and north to Nashvi l l e .  ( Longstreet attacked Knoxv i l l e i n . 
November of  1 863 wi th the i n tent of recapturi ng th i s  important ra i l way . 
Had he done s o ,  d i rect rai l  servi ce between R ichmond and Atl anta wou l d  
have been res tored through a n  area that was recogni zed a s  a n  important  
and  r i ch source of  the necess i ties  o f  war . ) A d i rect l i n k  between 
Knoxv i l l e  and Ashevi l l e ,  N . C . , wa s comp l eted in 1 881 . Two yea rs l ater , 
a di rect l i ne to Loui svi l l e was opened . A d i rect l i nk  between Knoxv i l l e  
and C i nc i nnati was opened i n  1 888 ( Pa tton , 1 976 , pp . 1 94-1 99 . )  
Thus , by 1 883 , Knoxvi l l e had good ra i l  connecti on s wi th the 
Northeast ,  Eas t ,  South , and Mi dwes t ,  and numerous sma l l feeder l i nes 
connecti ng  vari ous poi nts i n  East Tennes see . Further improvements were 
made throughout the peri od . The l i n k s  to the Mi dwest and eastern 
seaboard were compl eted i n  the early years of the decade in whi ch  the 
greatest growth occurred , and probabl y expl a i n  much of the very rap i d  
i ncrease i n  economi c act i v i ty .  Because much o f  Knoxv i l l e  and Knox 
County ' s  i ndustr ia l  devel opment depended upon s h i pment  o f  heavy ,  bul ky 
materi a l s -coal , marb l e ,  timber , etc . ._a good transportati on system 
was cruc i al . 
Numerous turnpi kes were bu i l t  shortly  after the War and d i d  much 
to i mprove l ocal movement of  persons and goods ( P atton , 1 976 , pp . 1 86 -
1 88) . Fi nal l y ,  the Tennessee R i ver was a us eful means o f  transport 
duri ng  most  of  the year .  
Wi th the end of the War and the comp l eti on of  the ra i l  network i n  
the early 1 880 ' s ,  Knoxvi l l e ' s  reta i l  and espec i al l y  i ts whol esal e trade 
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boomed . " In i ts heyday . . .  Knoxvi l l e was the fourth or  pos s i bl y  the 
th i rd l a rgest jobb i n g  center bel ow the O h i o  Ri ver . • .  1 1  ( Bri scoe , 1 976 , 
p .  4 1 1 ) .  Bri scoe does not i denti fy the peri od for wh i ch th i s  was true 
( i f  i t  was ) , but i t  probably was cl ose to the truth from 1 890 to 1 9 1 0 .  
Pri or to about. 1 880 , Knoxvi l l e/ Knox County ' s , manufacturi ng 
i ndus tri es were about what  one cou l d  expect to fi nd i n  a l mos t every other 
Southern ci ty ( or town ) of i ts s i ze :  bl ac ksmi ths , saddl e and harnes s 
makers , smal l hand i crafts (coppersmi ths , ti nsmi ths , etc . ) ,  carri age and 
wagon makers , coopers , news papers , repa i r  shops of var i ous  k i nds , and 
other sma l l fi rms . The one apparent excepti on t6 th i s  was the l a rge 
i ron-foundry i ndus try assoc i ated wi th the ra i l roads . As the rai l roads 
con so l idated , l ocal  production and repa i r  of equ i rment for ra i l roads 
d imi n i shed . On the other hand , manufacturi n q  o f  i ron and s teel oroducts 
empl oyed i n  coa l  mi n i n g ,  marb l e  quarryi n g ,  and texti l e  mi l l s 9rew 
( Bri �coe , 1 976 , pp . 4 1 2-41 3 ) . By 1 900 , i ron foundri es were s ti l l  qu i te 
important to Knoxv i l l e and Knox County , yet thei r rel at i ve pos i ti on 
had fal l en due to the rap i d  growth of  other i ndustri es . At the turn 
of the century ,  Knoxv i l l e  was the center of an economi cal l y  acti ve 
regi on  mak i ng extens i ve use of  the avai l ab l e natura l  resources .  
Primari l y ,  these resources were coal , marb l e ( and some other , l es s  
i ntens i vely mi ned mi nera l s and ores } , timber , and water .  
47 
A Hi s tory of Banki ng i n  Knoxv i l l e 
The Fi rst  Nati onal Bank of  Knoxvi l l e  recei ved i ts charter ,  number 
391 , on Apri l 1 9 ,  1 864 . *  I t  was one of  the f i rs t  nat iona l  banks founded 
i n  a Southern s tate , and the date of i ts formati on bears some di s cu s s i on . 
I n  November of  1 863 , General Longstreet had besei ged the Un i on Genera l 
Burns i de i n  Knoxv i l l e ,  but the Confederate campa i gn fa i l ed . The Un i on 
kept i ts hol d on Knoxvi l J e  and the Tennessee and Vi rg i n i a  Ra i l road . 
The threat o f  a renewed Confedera te campai gn i n  the . spri ng  of  1 864 l ay 
over East Tennessee and  i ncreased the determi nati on , even i n  the face of 
cons i derabl e ri s k ,  of the Uni oni st  e l ement i n  th i s  reg i on to found  a 
Na�i onal bank in a s tate wh i ch had l eft the Uni on . 
East Tennes see was more sharply d i v i ded over the Wa r than any other 
reg i on i n  the South . By 1 864 i t  was cl ear  to al l those l i v i n g  here 
that the enmi ty st i rred by the Wa r woul d l as t  for a l ong  time , whi chever 
s i de ·won . And , whi l e . the Uni on cause i n  early 1 864 was i n  better shape 
than i t  had been , i ts success was not assured . A number of seri ous 
obstac l es to the s ucces s  of � bank  in  Knoxv i l l e  l oomed dangerous ly  
on  the near hori zon . At  that t ime , Knoxv i l l e  had not suffered extens i ve 
phys i cal damage from the War ,  but because o f  i ts ra i l road , i t  was an 
i nv i ti ng  target . Because  Knoxv i l l e • s  sympath i es were d i v i ded , both 
s i des had refra i ned from ravagi ng i t ,  but had Knoxv i l l e been caught  i n  
the m idst  of a rea l l y  l arge battl e ,  i t  coul d have been destroyed . 
*The Fi rst National gave up i ts cha rter and c l osed i n  1 872 . 
Immedi ately upon i ts l i qui dati on a new ban k ,  The Eas t  Tenness ee Nati onal , 
was opened . · 
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Tennes see , fi l ed wi th the Comptro l l er of the Currency , Apr i l  6 ,  1 864 . )  
To a man , the · l ocal  sharehol ders were stout Un ion i sts  ( Temp l e ,  1 9 1 2 ,  
1 899 ) . Perk i ns and Patterson l eft wi th i n  two years and l ocal res i dents 
took control . 
The c i rcumstances of  Patters on ' s  l eavi ng are not  parti cu l arly 
s i gn i fi cant , but the exp l anation of  h i s  departure gi ven by Brownl ow 
revea l s  much about the Ea st  Tennes see Un i on i sts and the i r determi nation 
to s upport the Uni on i st  cause , by then i denti f ied wi th the Rad i ca l  
Republ i cans , as wel l as the i r  s trong defense agai nst real o r  imagi ned 
a ttacks on thei r regi on . .  Brown l ow wrote : 
· Bankrupt Seek ing  Notori ety 
W .  R .  Patterson , l ate Cash i er of  the Nati onal Bank o f  th i s  
pl ace , sa i d recent ly  to E .  T .  Carson , a · ci ti zen o f  C i nc i nnati , 
that he 11 had l e ft Knoxv i l l e  because a Northern man cou l d  not 
l i ve i n  the South . .. Thi s we l earn from the most  rel i ab l e 
source . I t  wi l l  be news to the peopl e o f  Knoxv i l l e  and East 
Tennessee , and i s  a refl ect i on u pon our peop l e whol l y  
fa l se and di scredi tabl e .  Such a sta tement m i g ht  be made 
justly i n  regard to the rebel Cotton States , but i t  i s  
·not true o f  East Tennessee . The utterance o f  such a s l a nder 
upon the peopl e  of East Tennes see compel s  us to g i ve the 
reasons why he l eft Knoxv i l l e .  By the Pres i dent and Di rectors 
he was requ i red · to res i gn  h i s  pos i t i on as Ca sh i er of the 
National  Bank , because h i s  management of the Bank  was not 
acceptabl e .  He d i s counted paper for the benefi t of  a 
mercanti l e  house i n  wh ich  he had an i nteres t ,  after a s tyl e 
whi c h  d i d  not s u i t the purpose o f  the Boa rd of Di rectors . 
To favor h im  as much as  pos s i b l e ,  and save h i s  feel i ngs ,  
he was a l l owed to resi gn . He ought ,  therefore , to a s s i gn 
no such reason for l eav i ng Knoxvi l l e .  Up to the hour of  
h i s  departure from thi s pl ace , h e  was ardent i n  support 
of the s o-ca l l ed pol icy of the Pres i dent , and  unspari ng 
i n  denunc i at i on of  rad i ca l s . 
Thi s  was·  h i s  course i n  Knoxv i l l e .  Becaus e we sai d 
through thi s paper that i n  the sect i ons  of  the South where 
the majori ty of the peop l e had rebe l l ed there was a feel i ng 
of hostility toward Northern men , Mr . Patterson was of  that 
cl a s s  who denounced us  as  1 1a  l i bel l er of the i n tegri ty 
and l oya l ty of the South . .. Now he goes further and puts 
Eas t  Tennes see i n  the same boat wi th South Caro l i na .  
Ol d Thad Stevens ought  to have Patterson summoned as a 
wi tnes s before the Reconstruction Commi ttee . We have 
heard of no testimony that East Tennes see i s  so d i s l oyal 
that a Northern man can ' t  l i ve here , unt i l  W. R .  Patterson 
gave i t .  
The truth i s , Patterson "pl ayed out 11 here more 
effectual ly than any man we know in the pl ace . He i s  of  
the cl a s s  of Northern men who are noth i ng for any p l atform 
of pri nc i p l es ,  and i n  pol i ti cs take the course wh i c h  they 
th i n k  wi l l  pay best .  I n  Ma i ne or Ma s sachusetts they are 
bitter in denunciati on of rebel s .  I n  a few days i n  
Knoxv i l l e ,  to curry favor wi th a pi nch-bac k ,  broken down 
s l ave ari stocracy , they denounce the major i ty i n  Congress 
as tra i tors , and al l who defend them . 
Fi na l ly , i t  i s  thi s l yi n g  c l a s s  o f  Northern men who 
create a l l the prejudi ce whi c h  exi sts  aga i ns t  Northern men 
i n  th i s  secti on . They are the worst representati v�s of  
the meanes t  c l a s s  o f  men at  the North . For thei r bread 
and meat they change the i r  pri ncip l es , and creep after 
the d i s l oyal , who use  them for thei r di rty \'tork . 
A l a rge majori ty of the Northern men who have settl ed 
i n  East Tennes see , are of an ent i re ly  d i fferent c l a s s , · 
and are as good c i ti zens and honorabl e men as Tennessee 
or any other State can boast .  ( Brown l ow ' s  Knoxvi l l e  Wh ig,  
Apri l 1 1 , 1 866 , p .  2 .  Spel l i ng , syntax , and italics his . )  
Pol i ti ca l organ i zat i on was a promi nent part of bank formati on i n  
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the last  years of the War and for a s hort whi l e  a fterwards . The founders 
of  the F i rst  Nati onal were Wh igs  before the War .  Two other banks were 
founded s hortly  before the Fi rst Nati onal by men wi th d i fferent pol i ti ca l  
t ies . The o l des t  was what eventua l l y  became known a s  the Peopl es Ban k .  
I t  was owned by C .  M .  McGhee , J .  R . Mi tchel l ,  John R .  Bra nner ,  and 
T. R .  Ca l l oway . These i nd i v i dua l s were o l d- l i ne Democrats and s uppo rted 
the Confederacy , a l though thei r commi tment  was moderated by strong 
attachment to the i r  communi ty .  C .  M .  McGhee was a Col onel i n  the 
Confederate Army , and yet he appea l ed i n  l ate 1 86 1  or  early 1 862 for 
the rel ease from pri s on of  a James S .  Bradford , who had been arrested 
because of h i s  s tron g  support of the Uni on cause (Temp l e ,  1 899 , pp . 41 5-
41 6 ) . Fri ends h i p  and a des i re to protect the commun i ty s eem to · have 
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mot ivated McGhee • s  acti on . More s tri ki ng was the behavi or of John R .  
Branner , Pres i dent of  the East Tennessee and V i rg i n i a  Ra i l road . I n  
earl y June of  1 861 , a conference o f  Southern sympath i zers was hel d i n  
Knoxvi l l e  a t  wh i ch i t  was dec i ded to arres t Andrew Johnson and pos s i b ly  
T .  A .  R .  Nel son , who were speaki ng at  Rodgersvi l l e .  Templ e  wrote : 
At thi s  conference there was present a man who h ad been 
a personal and po l i ti ca l  fr i end of Johnson from boyhood . 
Though a wa rm fri end of  Southern i ndependence , he d i sapproved 
of h i s  [Johnson • s ] arre st .  He therefore i nformed John R .  
Bra nner , pres i dent o f  the rai l road wh i c h  [was to have been 
used] i n  order to reach Rodgers vi 1 1  e ,  of the . . . purpose 
[of arresti ng Johnson] . Branner was a l so a fri end of the 
South , but he  feared the Un i on men wou l d be i nd i gnant  wi th 
h i m  for furni s h i ng an extra tra i n  to be used i n  arres ti ng one 
of  thei r favori te l eaders , and i n  revenge wou l d  des troy 
ra i l road property . . .  [Branner] s ent every engi ne he had 
out on the road . . . .  [Upon the request for a trai n ]  Mr . 
Branner was b l and ,· pol i te ,  w i s hed to accorrmodate [the 
Southerners ] and hel p  the Southern caus e by every means 
wi th i n  h i s  power , but he was very sorry tha t every engi ne 
he had i n  the worl d was out on duty , and none of them wou l d  
be i n  before that eveni n g .  ( 1 9 1 2 ,  pp . 402-403 ) 
Certa i n ly , Branner wanted to protect h i s  i nves tment .  But that was not 
h i s  only mot ive .  Hi s acti on must  a l so be unders tood as an a ttempt by 
an East Tennessean to protect hi s commun i ty from the d i s i ntegration 
wh i ch was l i kel y to accompany a c i vi l war .  Uni on men , i n  thei r turn , 
took s imi l ar acti ons for s imi l ar reasons . They were remembered by 
both s i des i n  time , and reconc i l i ati on eventual l y  came . But unti l 
some t ime h ad passed , i t  was impos s i b l e  for bus i ness rel ati onshi ps to 
i gnore po l i ti ca l  ones . 
By and l a rge , the owners of the Peopl es Ban k were Democrats before 
and after the Wa r ,  yet i t  i s  c l ear that they had gotten on rel ati ve ly  
wel l wi th thei r pol i ti ca l  opponents prior  to  the  War as  wel l as  
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afterwards . { The s harpest di fferences i n  pol i ti cs grew from the sp l i t  
i n  the Republ i can party i n  1 864 . ) The Peopl es Bank was vari ous l y  cal l ed 
the Knoxv i l l e  Depos i tory and the J .  R .  Mi tchel l Co . I t  c losed i n  1 89 2 .  
The most  b i tter d i s putes arose between the two branches o f  
Uni oni sts : those who s upported the Republ i can party throughout the 
War and Recons truct ion { the Rad i ca l  Republ icans ) and tho se who broke 
wi th the Republ i can party as a resu l t of Emanci pati on { the McCl e l l a n 
Democrats ) .  In East  Tennes see , the McC l el l an Democrats were a mi xture 
of  o l d-l i ne Democrats who opposed secess i on and Whi gs who opposed 
emanc i pati on . Temp l e { 1 9 1 2 )  wrote : 
[John M .  Fl emi ng] rema i ned true to the Un ion  and the 
admi n i s trat i on of Mr . L i n co l n u nti l the spring  of 1 864 , 
when he jo i ned Nel son , Baxter , and other Un i on l eaders 
in support of General McC l el l an . . . •  He oppos ed the 
admi n i strati on of Wi l l i am G .  Brown l ow as Governor , and 
a l s o  the Reconstruction measures ·Of the Reoubl i can  Party . 
He fi nal ly  became a ful l -fl edged Democrat , rema i n i n g  so  
to  the end of h i s l i fe . { p .  1 20 )  
After [John]  Baxter came to Tennessee h e  took n o  acti ve 
part i n  pol i t i cal  affa i rs unti l the threaten i ng asoect of 
the seces s i on movement aroused h im  i n  November 1 860 . 
He was a Whi g ,  a Southern man ,  and a s l ave- hol der . . . .  
He bel i eved at that time the Uni on coul d be preserved by 
wi se , conservati ve counc i l s , and by the uni ted act i on of 
al l good men i n  the South . Accord i ng ly ,  . . . hel p 
proposed and advocated a Conference . . .  for the purpose 
of devi s i n g  some pl an . . . .  But as h i s  propos i t i on was 
advocated by the known fri ends of seces s i on , the Uni on 
men voted i t  down . ( p .  68 ) 
When the governor propos ed a state conventi on to vote on seces s i on , 
Baxter took to the s tump to argue aga i ns t  s uch a convent i on .  I n  
that campa i gn , " I  doubt i f  any man i n  the State , not even Andrew 
Johnson , was so bi tter i n  denunc i ati on of  secess ion and i ts l eaders " 
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(Templ e ,  1 91 2 ,  p �  69 ) .  Yet i n  1 864 , Baxter s upported McCl el l an a nd  the 
Democrats . He conti nued h i s  support of that pa rty for a few yea rs after 
the War as we 1 1  . 11 Some time between 1 872 and 1 875 , Mr . Baxter ceased 
h i s  wanderi ngs , and came bac k  to h i s  ol d pa rty , where he rema i ned wi th 
more or l es s  s tead i ness unti l h i s  dea th 11 ( Templ e ,  1 9 1 2 ,  p ,  73 ) .  Andrew 
John son i s  the most notabl e  Tennes see Democrat  who supported the Uni on 
through the War ,  but neverthe l ess , he eventua l l y broke wi th the Repub l i can 
party over Reconstructi on . 
A Republ i can-turned-Democrat founded the th i rd bank , wh i ch was 
ca 1 1  ed the Exchange and Depos i t  Bank . He was John Baxter , a 1 awyer and 
judge . He may have been ass i s ted in th i s  bus i nes s by John Fl emi ng ,  
al though no d i rect evi cence l i n k i ng the two i n  partnersh i p  has been 
found . Th i s  ban k wen t  under duri ng the cr i s i s  of 1 87 3 .  The Eas t  
. . 
Tennes see Nati onal Bank of  Knoxv i l l e ,  wrote to the Comptro l l er of the 
Curr�ncy , October 1 4 ,  1 873 : 
From Br i sto l  on the V i rg i n i a  and Tennes see l i ne  to C l evel and . 
Tennes see , a d i s tance of two hundred and ten mi l es the 
enti re ban k i ng capi tal as reported by the fiVe ban ks ( four 
pri vate and one nati ona l ) i s  $1 61 , 050 . 00 .  Three of these 
banks have suspended in the past two weeks wi th an 
aggrega te cap i ta l  of $41 , 050 . 00 l eav i n9 but 1 20 ,000$ capi ta l  i n  the two banks s t i l l  open . (The bank • s  punctuation 
i s  fo 1 1  owed . ) 
That i s ,  the East Tennes see Nati onal Bank and one pri vate bank  rema i ned 
open . That pri vate ban k was probably the Peopl es Bank , for i t  s urvi ved 
that cri s i s  and rema i ned open unt i l 1 892 . 
Further , because the Eas t  Tennes see Nati onal Bank had a cap i tal of 
$ 1 00 thousand , the capi tal of  the Peopl es  Bank can  be p l aced at  $20 
thousand . Th i s  woul d mean that the Exchange and Depos i t  Bank probably 
had a capi tal  i n  the nei qhborhood of  $1 0 thousand to $20 thousand . 
One o f  the other suspended banks was probab ly  the Knoxv i l l e Bank . I t  
probab ly  had a capi ta l that was bel ow that o f  the Exchanqe · and Depos i t  
Bank because i t  was owned by on ly  one i ndi vi dua l . See the fol l owi ng  
d i scus s i on of  that  bank . )  Al l to l d ,  the Peopl es Ban k  and  the Exchange 
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and Depos it Bank (wi th the poss i b l e  i nc l u s ion of the Kno�vi l l e Bank )  
probably had a tota l capi tal o n  the order of $30 thousand to $50 thousand . 
Th i s  was not fa r from the amount necessary to form another national  
bank , and that  they chose no t to do so  was  probab ly  because they had 
no des i �e to affi l i ate thems�l ves wi th the Na tional  sys tem . Later i n  
the peri od , the hard fee l i ngs created by the War d imi n i s hed and had 
l i ttl e to do wi th bus i ness  rel ati onsh i p s  (Temp l e ,  1 9 1 2 ,  pp . 72-73 ) .  
However ,  i n  the l as t  year of the War and the fi r st  years of  Reconstruc ­
ti on , l oyal ty and pol i ti ca l  a ffi l i at ion were i mportant determi nants of  
busi ness as soci at ion . 
The Knoxvi l l e Ban k ,  menti oned a bove , was fo unded by J .  S .  Van 
Gi l der ,  a l ocal bootmaker and i n surance sa l esman whos e pol i ti cs are 
not known . He eventua l l y  obta i ned a s tate charter and opened the 
Merc hants Bank i n  1 881 ( Wh i te ,  1.976 , pp . 367 ,373 ) . 
The Merchants Bank c l osed i n  1 9 1 5 .  Judg ing from the l etter 
quoted above from R. C .  Jackson to the Comptro l l er ,  i t  is l i kely that 
Van Gi l der ' s  bank su spended in 1 873 . I t  may have rema i ned cl osed for 
awh i l e ,  but he probably reopened i t  some time before 1 881 . None of the 
ads for thi s bank wh ich  appeared in the l oca l newspapers l i s ted any 
other owners bes i des Van Gi l der . Th i s  means that i t  probabl y had a 
I 
rel ati vely sma l l capi ta l . �one of the correspondence by the l oca l  
nati ona l  banks wi th the Comptrol l er ,  nor any of  the exami ners ' reports 
menti on - any deal i n gs wi th the Knoxvi l l e Bank . Every i nd i cat ion i s  
that  th i s  wa s a very smal l operation unti l Van Gi l der obta i ned a s tate 
charter for the Merchants Ban k .  
The Fi rst Nati onal Bank  c l osed i n  October o f  1 872 a nd was 
immed i ate ly s ucceeded by the Eas t Tenne� see Nat i ona l . By and l arge , 
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the sharehol ders and offi cers of the Eas t Tennessee had been s ha reho l ders 
and offi cers of the F irst  Nati onal . The Eas t  Tennes see i s  the o l des t 
bank i n  Knoxvi l l e .  I t  was reorgani zed i n  the 1 9 30 ' s  as  the Park 
Nati ona l . ( A  further di scus s i on of  the c l o s i n g  of the Fi rst  Nat i ona l  
a nd  the open ing  of the E a st  Tennes see Na tional wi l l  be  found i n  Chapter 
IV . )  
T he next bank to obta i n  a nati onal charter i n  Knoxv i l l e  was the 
Mechan ic s  National  1n early 1 882 . Th i s  bank was formed on Ma rch  22 , 
1 875 , by Thomas O ' Conner ( Moul der ,  1 977 ) . O ' Conner was a Democrat and 
had served in  the Confederate Army . 
The Mechan i cs Bank operated wi th a s tate charter unti l 1 882 when 
i t  was converted to a national  bank . I n  October of  that year ,  Presi dent 
O ' Conner fought a duel outs i de the bank wi th two of h i s  pol i ti ca l  
opponents . Al l three were ki l l ed but the bank conti nued i n  bus i nes s . 
What i s  i nterest ing  i s  that both he and h i s  two opponents  had been 
a rdent s upporters of the Confederacy , and that by 1 882 , the ol d pol i ti cal 
d i v i s i ons  ( Radi ca l  Repub l i cans  oppos i ng McCl el l an Democrats ) were much 
l es s  important and had l ost  most of thei r s i gni fi cance wi th respect to 
bus i ness affa i rs .  When o l d  comrades - i n-arms cease to s upport one 
anothe r ,  and turn to due l i n g ,  then cond i ti on s  have c l earl y  changed . 
The Mechan ics  Nati ona l gave up i ts national charter i n  1 907 and became 
the Mechan ic s  Bank  and Trust Company . I t  wa s absorbed by another bank 
i n  1 922 . 
By 1 886 , four l oca l banks were i n  bus i nes s : the East tennessee 
Nati onal , the Mechan ic s  Nati ona l , the Merchants Bank , and the Peopl es 
Ban k . Throughout mos t  of the peri od from 1 867 to 1 886 , four  banks  
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were in  bus i nes s . The number may (depend i ng on  what happened to the 
Knoxvi l l e  Ban k )  have fal l en to two from l ate 1 873  to early 1 875 . After 
1 875 there were a l ways three and pos s i bl y  fou r ,  aga i n  depend i ng  on 
wh�t Van Gi l der d i d  i n  banki ng  between 1 873 and 1 88 1 . I t  i s  l i kely 
that  his bank  di d not s tay " suspended " for l ong . I f  h i s  bank had 
fai l ed ( and there i s  no ev idence tha t  i t  d i d )  i t  i s  unl i kely tha t he 
waul � have opened a new bank in 1 881 . What is more l i ke ly  i s  that he 
cont inued to operate h i s  bank  i n  a sma l l  way unti l he dec ided to get 
a s tate cha rter .  Th�refore , Knoxv i l l e  can be s a i d  to have had four 
banks  (wi th mi nor excepti ons ) from 1 867  to 1 886 . 
I n  1 887 , the Thi rd Nati onal Bank of Knoxvi l l e  was formed . The 
fol l owi ng  year the Ci ty Na ti ona l obtai ned i ts cha rter and the Knoxv i l l e  
Bank i ng  Comoany opened . The State Nati onal opened the next year ( but 
fa i l ed in  1 893 ) . I n  1 890 , two new banks were created : the Ho l s ton 
Bank i ng  and Trust  Company and Knox County Bank and Trust Company .  T he 
Hol ston Banki ng and Trust  Company obta i ned a na t i onal cha rter i n  1 89 1 , 
wh i ch was a l s o the year i n  wh i c h  the Fa rmers and Traders Bank , Safe 
Depos i t and Trust  Company was formed . T h i s  bank mer�ed w i th the 
As soc i ated Banki ng a nd Trust  Company ( 1 892 ) in 1 895 to form the Uni on 
Bank . The Un i on Ban k operated wi th a s tate charter unti l 1 9 1 3  when i t  
converted to nati onal s tatus . Two other sma l l s tate ban ks were formed 
before 1 900 : the Ma rket Ban k ( 1 893- 1 89 5 )  and the Marbl e  Ci ty Bank 
( 1 898-1 904 ) (Whi te , 1 97 6 , pp . 367 -369 ) . 
By 1 900 there were ten banks i n  Knoxvi l l e :  fi ve nationa l , and 
five s tate chartered . The Nati onal Banks were the Eas t Tennes see , the 
Mechan i c s , the Th i rd ,  the C i ty ,  and the Hol s ton . The s tate banks  
57 
were the Merchants , the Knoxvi l l e  Banki ng  Company , the Knox County Bank 
an� Trust Company , the Uni on , and the Marb l e Ci ty .  Between 1 900 and 
1 91 .3 ,  one bank fa i l ed ( the Marb l e Ci ty ,  1 904 ) , one bank  gave up i ts 
nati onal cha rter for a s tate cha rter ( the Mechan i cs , 1 907 ) , one s tate 
bank converted to a nati onal  ban k ( the Un ion , 1 9 1 3 ) , and one ban k was 
foun�ed ( the Ameri can Nati onal , 1 91 3 ) , l eav i ng  Knoxv i l l e  s ti l l  wi th 
ten banks  i n  1 9 1 3 .  S i x  had nati onal  charters an d four had s tate 
charters . 
Whi l e  pol i ti cs rema i ned important  to the i ndi vi dual s as soci ated 
wi th Knoxv i l l e banks after Reconstruction , pol i t i cal  affi l i at i on d i d  
not determi ne bank creation  or operati on . For examp l e ,  John Baxter of 
the Exchange and Depos i t Ban k  recommended to the Comptro l l er of  the 
Currency that the · East Tennes see Nat i ona l  be gi ven a cha rter {June 29 , 
1 872 ) . I n  the l ate ei ghti es , C .  M .  McGhee , one o f  the ori g i nal  owners 
of the Peopl es Bank , became a s hareho l der in  and di rector of  the Ea s t  
Tennessee Nati onal . I n  the mi d-60 1 s  nei ther o f  these i nd iv i dua l s wou l d 
have consi dered jo i n i ng i n  a �ati onal  bank , nor woul d Thomas O ' Conner 
have done so . By 1 880 certa i nly , nati onal banki ng was no l onger 
confi ned to those who had s trongly and cons i s tently s upported the 
Un ion  i n  the War .  
The great i ncrease i n  banki ng acti vi ty occurred i n  the l a te 
ei ghti es and early n i neti es . At l east one new bank was formed i n  
each year from 1 887 to 1 893 . The great i ncrease  i n  the number of 
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banks and economi c acti v i ty i n  the l ate 1 880 ' s  and  ea rly 1 890 ' s  cau sed 
a s imi l ar al teration  i n  the manner i n  wh i ch the banks  operated . Banks 
wh i ch coul d ( and d i d )  operate as sma l l ,  conservat ive country banks were 
forced , more and more . s trongly after the mi d-80 ' s ,  to become l arger , 
more aggres s i ve c i ty ban ks . Most  of  the chanqe i n  behav i or fo l l owed 
the i ncrease  i n  the numbers of  banks . That i s ,  much of the chanqe i n  
the way i n  wh i c h  these banks  d i d  bu s i nes s occurred between 1 890 and 
1 900 ,  yet even by the l ate 80 ' s  the s i gn s  were there . After 1 900 , 
l i ttle  chang� o�curred ei ther i n  the �tructure of  banki ng  or  i n  the 
operati on of the banks  themsel ves . 
CHAPTER I V  
NAT I ONAL BANKING I N  KNOXV I LL E , 1 864-1 886 
I ntroducti on 
The nati onal banks o f  Knoxv i l l e  were , for a bout twenty years , 
conventi ona l country banks , operat ing  i n  ways that were s i gni fi cantly 
di fferent from the ways in  w h i ch c i ty banks operated . Th i s cond i ti on 
was the resu l t of thei r parti cul a r  envi ronment rather than thei r s tatus 
as  country banks . When the l oca l  envi ronmen t changed ( the change began 
in earnest i n  the mi d- 1 880 ' s ) ,  the behavior of  the l oca l nat iona l banks 
changed a l so . I t  i s  not pos s i b l e  to know wi th certa i nty why the l oca l 
bank s  acted a s  they d i d ,  because the minutes · of  the meeti ngs of  t he 
· boa rds of  di rectors no l onger  ex i st. However ,  records of the resul ts 
of  the i � dec i s i ons do ex i s t  i n  the form of reports o f  cond i t i on a nd 
examfnati on , and these revea l the actua l , a l though not necessar i l y  
the i ntended , arrangement  o f  a ssets and l i ab i l i ti es . 
I t  i s  the actual arrangemen t of as sets a nd l i ab i l i ti es ,  wh i c h  wi l l  
provi de cl ues to the operati on of these banks . They , l i ke a l l other 
ban ks , had some control over the acqu i s i ti on of the i r  funds and the 
manner i n  wh i ch thos e funds were emp l oyed , but of course , that control 
was not a bso l ute . There were statuto ry requi rements affecti ng reserves , 
ban knote i ss ues , bond purchases , and cap i tal , to menti on a few o f  the 
more important  l imi tati ons . A m i n imum reserve was s pec i fi ed .  Both a 
mi n imum and a max imum appl i ed to ban knotes i s sued . There was a m i n i mum 
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bond depos i t and a m i n imum capi ta l  requi rement ,  but no maximums . There 
were no l imi ts on the proporti on o f  l i ab i l i ti es wh i ch coul d be acqui red 
from pri vate depos i tors or bankers ' bal a nces . 
What i s  important here i s  that these statutory requ i rements were 
few and that nati ona l  ban ks of whatever c l as s  had a wi de range o f. 
opti ons wi thi n whi c h  they coul d choose .  The l ocal nati onal banks c hose 
to a ct much l i ke other country banks for about  twenty yea rs , but then 
the i r  behav ior  chanqed , refl ect ing  changes in the l ocal  envi ronment , 
. not changes i n  the i r  l egal  s tatus . Because  they coul d choose between 
and among var ious p roporti ons for thei r  a s sets and l i ab i l i ti e s , the 
actual choi ces they made wi l l  reveal  much  about the i r envi ronment and 
thei r s trateg ies  and tacti cs for dea l i ng wi th tha t env i ronmen t .  
I n  exam i n i ng the records of  the cl as ses o f  banks and of  the 
va rious reg i ons of the country , Syl l a  wa s i nteres ted i n  demonstra t i n g  
that �erta i n  ban ks coul d choose  t o  opera te i n  a monopo l i s t i c  way . I f  
they di d ,  he argued that choi ce s houl d be apparent .  Syl l a  wrote : 
The theory of  monopoly . . .  pred icts that a bank . monopo l i s t  
wi l l  charge h i gher average i nterest  rates , produce l es s  
l oca l  l oan output , a nd  earn h i gher pr6fi ts than a 
competi tively- s i tuated producer ope rati ng u nder the . same 
cos t cond i t i ons . ( 1 975 , p .  1 01 ) 
For each of  these three predi cti ons he  devi sed an  empi r ica l  tes t .  
Loan-asset rati os  te sted re l at i ve output , the rat i o  of  ea rn i n gs to 
earn i ng assets tested rel ati ve pr i ces , and the ratio  of net earn i ngs 
to s harehol der i nves tment tes ted rel at i ve profi tabi l i ty .  We are i n  
a pos i ti on to use  mo re tes ts . Add i t i ona l  tes ts wi l l  exam i ne rel a t i ve 
cos ts of  product ion a s  wel l a s  rel a t i ve pri ces , a nd output . 
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The costs of  obtai n i ng and manag i ng funds ca nnot  be a s s umed to be 
the same for the di fferent  cl asses of banks . I f  Syl l a • s  a rgument that 
country bank s  were monopo l i s ti c  i s  correct , then those banks were i n  
. the envi abl e pos i ti on o f  bei ng  both monopol i s ts and monopson i sts . I f  
th i s  seems a ras h s tatement ,  l et the reader remember tha t nonban k 
fi nanc i a l i ntermedi ar ies ( sav ing  and l oan  as soci ati on s , c red i t  u n i ons , 
s avi ngs banks , and the l i ke )  were re l ati vely rare and un important pr ior  
to the twenti eth century , especi a l ly i n  smal l commun i ti es outs i de the 
u rban Northeas t .  A l a rge nati onal bank in a sma l l  commun i ty mi ght  face 
some competi ti on from s tate chartered i n st i tuti ons o r  pri vate ban ks , 
but because i t  was much l arger , and because i t  wou l d  have re l ati vely 
extens i ve connecti on s  wi th the nati onal financ i a l  ma rketpl ace , i t  wou l d  
have substanti al advantages over i ts sma l l er state c ha rtered competi tors 
i n  a ttracti n g  deposi tors as wel l as  borrowe rs . And , i f  i t  had advantages , 
i t  p�obably expl oi ted them . Therefore , the s ources , as  wel l as  u ses , o f  
funds must b e  i nvest i gated . I t  may then be pos s i bl e  to di st i ngu i s h  
between monopol i s t ic  and competi ti ve res ponses to the l oca l envi ronment ,  
a l though i t  i s  probabl e that the l ocal f i nanc i a l  market can best be 
expl a i ned i n  terms of the conservati sm o r  the aggres s i veness of the 
part i c i pants . 
Defi'n i tions  
Funds were obtai ned from sharehol de r  i n vestmen t ,  depos i ts ,  banknotes 
i s s ued , and borrowi ngs . They were primari ly  empl oyed i n  l oans , · i n  
purchas es o f  securi t ies , and hel d  a s  res erves . Each  of thes e broad 
categori es can be further d i vi ded and s ome occas i ona l ly  overl a p .  
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Depos i t  l i ab i l i ti e s  were of  three types : pri vate deoos i ts ,  ban k 
depos i ts ,  and depos i ts of  the Uni ted States government . The reports of 
condi ti on publ i s hed in  the l oca l newspapers usual ly  d i v i ded private 
depos i ts i nto i nd i vi dua l depos i ts (wh i ch were equi va l ent to demand 
depos i ts ) , demand certi fi cates of  deoos i t  (whi ch were i nterest  beari n g . 
depos i ts l eft for a spec i fi c  peri od of time , payabl e on demand ,  but 
whi ch woul d be asses sed a pena l ty i f  redeemed pr ior  to maturi ty) , t ime 
depos i ts'  (wh i ch  were i n teres t beari ng  deposi ts made for a spec i f i c  
peri od of t ime but wh i ch were not payabl e o n  demand ) ,  c a sh iers ' checks , 
a nd certi f ied c hecks . The Annua l Reports of the Comptrol l er of the 
Currency d i d  not di s ti ngui s h  between the vari ous forms of pri vate depos i ts 
unti l after 1 9 1 0 ,  but the reports of cond i ti on publ i s hed i n  the l oca l 
newsoapers began to do s o  after 1 870-71 . The l ast  three of the separate 
categori es of  pri vate deposi ts l i s ted above were general ly  a n  i n s i q n i f i ­
cant . porti on of a l l pri vate depos i ts .  
Bank depos i ts were d iv i ded i nto depos i ts due to nati ona l ba nks 
and depos i ts due to 6ther banks . ( I t  wa s not unti l 1 900 that the 
reports di sti ngu i s hed between depos i ts due to reserve agents , other 
nati onal ban ks , other banks , and trust  compan i es . )  Ba nknotes i s sued 
were d i v i ded i nto national  banknotes and s tate banknotes , a l though  the 
l atter were a lways i ns i gn i fi cant . Shareho l der i nves tment wa s the tota l 
of the capi ta l pa i d  i n ,  the surp l us account ,  and undi vi ded profi ts . 
Borrowed funds were notes and b i l l s red i scounted , bi l l s  payabl e ,  and 
bonds borrowed . Other i tems a l so occas i ona l ly  a ooeared in the l i s t of 
l i abi l i ti es ,  but their i mportance was usua l l y  qu i te smal l .  
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A s i mpl e di vi s i on of  assets i nto categories i s  much more di ffi cu l t .  
The major di ffi cul ti es ar i se  i n  tryi ng to defi ne res erves  and ea rn i n q  
assets . Lega l reserves were l ega l tenders , spec i e ,  and depos i ts w i t h  
reserve a gents , and after 1 874 , the redempti on fund wh i c h  was deposi ted 
wi th the U . S .  Treasury and wh i c h  amounted to 5 percent of nat iona l  
banknotes i ssued . There were � h owever , other i tems wh i c h  cou l d genera l l y  
sati s fy the operat i ona l , _ i f  not l ega l , needs for reserves . These were 
other bank depos i ts ( espec i a l ly  thos e i n  other nati ona l ban ks ) , nati onal 
banknotes ( because  the publ i c  had no obj ecti on to accepti ng them i n  
l i eu o f  l egal  tenders ) ,  co ins  ( " fract iona l  currency" ) ,  cash i tems 
( checks and other i tems i n  the proce s s  of col l ecti on and redempti on ) , 
and ba l ances wi th  c l eari ng houses . I n  a sen se , th i s  expanded l i s t of  
reserves i ndi cates t he  banks ' preference for l i q u i d  assets , and therefore 
i n  some cases wi l l  be a more useful i ndi cator o f  ban k behav i or than l ega l  
rese�ves wou l d  be . Lega l reserves d i d  not i nc l ude many as sets that 
were just as l i qu i d  and just as  good at  sati s fyi ng cus tomer demands 
a s  l egal  reserves were and , therefore the amoun t  of l ega l reserves d i d  
not refl ect a ban k ' s  preference for l i q u i d  a s  opposed to non l i qu i d  
assets . 
Primary reserves wi l l  be  defi ned to be those a s sets wh i ch a ban k  
coul d immed i ate ly  empl oy to sati sfy depos i tor demands for payment , o r  
wh i c h  the bank coul d reaio�ably expect to convert i n  a s hort time i nto 
an a cceptabl e  form to s ati s fy depos i tor demands for payment �  That i s ,  
primary reserves are defi ned to be composed of three types o f  a s set : 
ban k  depos i ts ,  cas h , and . f tems i n  the p rocess  of  bei ng converted i n to 
one or both of the above categori es . Bank depos i ts i ncl ude depos i ts 
wi th reserve agents , depos i ts wi th other nati ona l  ban ks , depos i ts  wi th 
nonnati onal ban ks , and certi ficates of deoos i t  i ss ued by a ·  c l eari ng 
hous e .  Cash i nc l udes l egal tenders , spec i e ,  nati ona l ban knotes , and 
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fracti onal currency . The fi na l category i nc l udes ba l a nces with c l eari ng  
houses and  cash  i tems . 
On l y  one i tem of  l ega l  reserves , the 5 percent redempti on fund , 
has been excl uded from the defi n i t i on of  primary reserves . The redemp­
ti on fund was exc l uded because i t  wa s not a l i qu i d  a s set ; a bank had 
no control over when or by how much i t  m i ght  be reduced . That depended 
upon the presentati on of banknotes to the U . S .  T reasury , and a bank 
never knew when that woul d occur .  Further , a ban k  coul d not draw down 
i ts redempt i on fund account duri ng  a bri ef peri od o f  monetary s tri ngency , 
and consequently i ts s i ze at  any time di d no t refl ect a ban k • s  preference 
for 1 i qu i di ty .  The redempti on fund deoended ent i re ly  upon the amount of 
ci rcul ati �n outstandi ng , and because c i rcul a tion  outs ta nd i ng  d i d  not 
represen t choi ces made between l i qu i d  and i l l i q u i d  a s sets , except i n  
the most general sense , the redempti on fund has been excl uded from primary 
reserves . 
Secondary reserves are defi ned to be those as sets wh i ch  a bank 
coul d reasonably expect to convert i nto l i q u i d  a s sets g i ven a moderate 
amount of t ime . They i nc l ude U . S .  government bonds , premi ums on those 
bonds , and other securi ti es owned by a ban k .  By far a nd away , · the 
most  i mportant i tem i n  th i s  category was U . S .  government bonds . 
Earn i ng  as sets a re defi ned to i nc l ude l oans  and d i s counts , U . S .  
government bonds , other securi tes , a nd bank depos i ts . U . S .  bonds were 
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purcha sed to secure banknotes i ss ued , to secure U . S .  government 
depos i ts ,  and for i nvestment purposes . Some , but not a l l ,  bank depos i ts 
pa i d  i nterest .  Some , but not a l l , o f  the i tems i n  the category "other 
stocks , bonds , and securi t i es " were i ncome producers , and so were s ome 
of  the i tems l i s ted under " real estate owned . "  These l as t  i tems - bank 
depos its , other securi ti es , and rea l estate-can be i nc l uded , i n  who l e 
or  i n  part ,  i n  ea rn i ng a s sets , but on ly  by mak i n g  an  arbi trary se l ect ion . 
The reports of ban k  exam i nat i on i nd i cate that bank depos i ts and other 
securi ties  general l y  pa i d  i nterest  or  d i v i dends , wh i l e  real estate d i d  
not .  Therefore , ban k  depos i ts a nd other securi t i es are i nc l uded i n  
earni ng assets a n d  rea l estate i s  not .  
Acqu i s i tion of L i ab i l i ti es ,  1 864-1 886 
Nati ona l  banki ng i n  Knoxvi l l e duri ng  the early peri od had a 
d i s t i nctly conservati ve ( and  pos s i bly monopol i s t i c )  cas t  wh i ch can 
be demonstrated by exami nat ion  of the proportion i ng of a ssets and 
l i ab i l i ties . The aria lys i s  of  l i abi l i ti es wi l l  s how that the l oca l 
nati ona l ban ks d i d  not aggress i ve ly  pursue funds , and  that once funds 
were obtai ned , the banks  al l ocated them i n  a conser�a ti ve manner . 
The rel ati ve i mportance of two categori es o f  l i ab i l i ti e s -private 
depos i ts and borrowed funds ---can i ndi cate much about a bank ' s  envi ron­
men t .  I f  a ban k  can rel y  upon i ts pr ivate deoos i tors t o  supply an 
i ncre'as i n g  p roporti on of i ts l i ab i l i ti es w ithout havi ng to pay those 
depos i tors i n teres t ,  it i s  c l early in a strong pos i ti on .  Conversely , 
i f  the ban k  had to pay i nteres t upon a l a rge proport ion of i ts pr i vate 
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depo s i ts ,  or i f  i t  had to rel y  upon ban k depos i ts ( for wh i ch i nterest  
often had  to  be  pa i d ) , and upon other borrowed funds ( fo r  wh i ch i nterest 
a l ways had to be pa i d )  i n  order to i ncrease i ts l i ab i l i ti es ,  then 
aggres s i ve ,  competi t i ve behavi or by that ban k  was requ i red . 
By and l arge , the l ocal ban ks duri ng  the f i rs t  peri od were not 
subject to s tron g  competi tion  for l i abi l i ti e s .  The rati o of  pri vate 
depos i ts to a l l l i ab i l i ti es for the F i rs t  Nati onal Bank ( see Tab l e  t V - 1 ) 
i mmed i ately appea rs to contrad i ct th i s  s tatement .  The  F i rst  Nat i ona l  
obta i ned about one-qua�ter to one-th i rd of i ts l i abi l i ti es from p ri vate 
depos i ts , and the p roporti on dec l i ned rather than rose  over time . At 
the same t ime , i ts ratio of  pr i vate deposi ts to l i ab i l i ti es was be l ow 
that of a l l reserve c i ty ban ks , and i n  s ome years ( 1 870-1 872 ) was bel ow 
that of the average coun try bank . However , the l ow rat io  of  pri vate 
depos i ts to l i abi l i ti es was not offs et by a h i gh rat i o  of borrowed 
fund� to a l l l i abi l i ti e s  ( see Tabl e I V -2 ) , but a very h i g h  proport i on 
of  l i abi l i ti es comi ng from Uni ted States government depos i ts , upon whi ch 
no i nteres t was pa i d .  ( See Tab l e  I V-3 . )  When pri vate depos i ts and 
government depos i ts are added together , the resu l t  s hows that an  
i ncreas i ng proporti on of the Fi rst Nati onal ' s  l i ab i l i ties  were deri ved 
from non i nterest bear inq sources , and that i n  i ts l a st  three years o f  
operation  ( 1 870-1 872 ) the tota l of the two exceeded the same tota l for 
each of the three c l asses of national  banks . 
For the three yea rs 1 867- 1 869 , the tota l of  pri vate deposi t s  and 
government depos i ts for the Fi rs t Nationa l  genera l l y  fe l l  between the 
tota l s for central reserve c i ty and reserve c i ty banks , wh i l e  i t  
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Tabl e IV- 1  
Average Rati o of Pri vate Depos i ts to Al l L i abi l i ti es , 
i n  Percenta 
Central 
Ea st  Reserve Reserve Coun try 
Yearb Fi rst Tennessee Mechan i c s  Ci ti e s  Ci ti es Banks 
1 867 ( 3 )  33 . 8  5 1 . 3  3 5 . 7  28 . 1  
1 868 ( 1 ) 32 . 2  5 1 . 8  3 6 . 8  28 .8  
1 869 ( 4 ) 32 . 4  5 1 . 7  3 5 . 0  27 . 2  
1 870 ( 4 26 . 9  46 . 4  34 . 6  27 . 6  
1 87 1  3 23 . 3  46 . 9  . 36 . 0  28 . 5  
1872 27 . 0  ( 4 )  34 . 1  ( 1 ) 46 . 0  36 . 0  29 . 1  
1 873 38 . 3  44 . 5  3 5 . 5  28 . 9  
1 874 35 . 4  45 . 3  36 . 5  29 . 2  
1 875 41 . 0  45 . 5  37 . 4 30 . 2  
1876 . 43. 5  44. 8 · 37.4 29 . 7  
1 877 ( 4 ) 48 � 1 47 . 8  37 . 9  30 . 0  
1 878 5 1 . 6  46 . 8 .  36 . 8  29 . 9  
1 879 ( 2 )  5 5 . 9  49 . 1  38 . 0  31 . 8  
1 880 p) 61 . 2  5 5 . 8  4 1 . 7  38 . 4  
1881 7 1 . 0  56 . 0  42 . 8  4 1 . 3  
1 882 69 . 1  . 53 . 8  ( 4 )  54 . 4  43 . 5  42 . 6 
1 883 66 . 1  62 . 9  50 . 1  43 . 9  43 . 0  
1 884 . ( 3 )  63 . 9  62 . 3  49 . 2  43 . 6  41 . q  
1 885 63 . 2  57 . 7 51 . 9  44 . 8 42 . 2 
1 886 66 .4 58 . 2  50 . 8  46 . 1  44 . 9 
aPri vate depos i ts a re i nd i v i dua l  depos i ts ,  demand certi fi ca tes of 
depos i t ,  time depos i ts ,  cash i ers checks , certi fi ed c heck s , and unpai d 
di v idends . 
bNumbers i n  pa rentheses refer to the number of reports of cond i ti on 
used to cal cul ate the rati os . I f  for a g i ven year ,  no number i n  
parentheses i s  g i ven , then a l l  reports made by each bank  and each group 
of banks  was used . Nati ona l banks made four  reports of cond i ti on through 
1 869 ; thereafte r ,  fi ve reports were made . N umbers i n  parenthes i s  next 
to a yea r apply to the three c l a s ses of banks , a nd un le s s  otherwi se  
noted , to t he  i nd i v i dua l banks . 
Source : For the i ndi v idual banks , reports pub l i shed i n  l oca l 
newspapers were the source . The Comptro l l er ' s  Annual Report provided 
i nformati on on the three cl asses . See a l s o  the d i s cus s i on i n  Append i x  A .  
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Tabl e IV-2 
Average Rati o of Borrowed Money to Al l L i ab i l i ti e s , 
i n  Percenta 
Central 
Ea s t  Res erve Reserve Country 
Year Fi rs t Tennes see Mechani cs · C i ti es C i t i es Banks 
1 867 ( 3 )  1 . 8 1 5 . 4 9 . 2  2 . 2 
1 868 ( 1 ) 4 . 7  .1 5 . 8  9 . 9 2 . 0 
1 869 ( 4 )  3 . 2 1 6 . 0 1 0 . 0  2 . 6 
1 870 4 1 . 4 1 9 . 8 1 0 . 9 2 . 9 
1 87 1  3 3 . 5 2 1 . 9  1 2 . 1  2 . 9 
1 872 2 . 6  ( 4 )  0 . 8  ( 1 ) 2 1 . 5  1 1 . 8 3 . 2 
1 873 1 . 2 22 . 2  1 2 . 7 3 . 2  
1 874 1 . 0 23 . 6  1 3 . 5  2 . 9  
1 875  1 . 8 23 . 9  1 3 . 8  2 . 9  
1876 1.6 . 25 �2 14. 1  3 . 0 
1 877 ( 4 )  1 . 1 23 . 9  1 3 . 7  2 . 9  
1 878 1 . 3 22 . 7  1 3 . 2  2 . 6 
1 879  ( 2 )  1 . 3 22 . 4  1 4 . 4 2 . 8  
1 880 ( 2 )  1 . 5 25 . 4  1 8 . 1  3 . 4 
188 1  . 1 . 5 25 . 2  1 8 .4 3 . 5  
1 882 0 . 8  2 . 7  ( 4 )  25 . 3  1 6 . 9 3 . 7  
1 883 0 . 8  2 . 1  28 . 4  1 6 . 1 3 . 8  
1 884 ( 3 )  1 . 4 1 . 0 29 . 4  1 6 . 5  4 . 0 
1 885 3 . 2  8 . 3  29 . 0  1 7 . 6  3 . 9 
1886 3 .9 11.1 29.7 1 8 .1 4 . 3 
asorrowed money i s  bank depos i ts and borrowed funds . Bank depo s i ts 
are depos i ts wi th reserve agents , other nat i onal ban ks , other banks , 
tru st  compan ie s , and c l eari ng  house l oan certi fi cates i s sued . Borrowed 
funds are red i s counts , b i l l s  payab l e ,  and borrowed bonds . 
Source : Reports of Cond i t i on .  See a l s o  note b ,  Ta bl e IV- 1 , 
page 67 , and Append i x  A .  
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Tab l e  IV-3  
Average Rati o of Gove rnment Depos i ts to Al l 
L i abi l i t i es , i n  Percenta 
Centra 1 
East Reserve Res erve Country 
Year F irst  Tennessee Mechan i cs C i ti es C i t ies  Banks 
1 867 ( 3 )  9 . 1  0 . 6  2 . 7  2 . 5  
1 868 ( 1 )  4 . 2  0 . 6  1 . 7 1 . 7 
1 879 ( 4 )  9 . 7  0 . 1  0 . 8 1 . 4 
1 870 ( 4� 24 . 0  0 . 4  0 . 5  1 . 2 
1871 ( 3 24. 0 0 .4 1 . 0 1.2 
1 872  27 . 9  ( 4 )  1 9 . 0 ( 1 ) 0 . 1  0 . 5  1 . 0 
1 873  11 . 2  0 . 1 0 . 6  1 . 1 
1 874 7 . 6 0 . 1  0 . 4  0 . 9  
1 87 5  6 . 7 0 . 1  0 . 5  0 . 8 
1876 7.4 0 . 1 0 .5 0 . 9  
1 877 ( 4 )  9 . 5  0 . 1 0 . 6  0 . 8 
1 878 8 . 2  3 . 8  1 .  3 0 . 8  
1 879  ( 2 )  . 7 . 5  5 . 5  1 . 4 0 . 9  
1 880 ·{2 ) 5 . 7  0 . 1  0 . 5  0 . 7  
1881 3 . 8 0 . 1  0 . 6  0 . 7  
1 882 4 . 1  0 0 . 1  0 . 6  0 . 7  
1 883 4 . 9 0 0 . 1 0 . 6  0 . 7  
1 884 ( 3 )  4 . 9 0 0 . 1  0 . 7  0 . 7  
1 885 5 . 1  0 0 . 1  0 . 7  0 . 7 
1886 �. 9 0 0. 2 0. 7 0 . 8 
aGovernment depo s i ts are Un i ted States government depos i ts and 
depos i ts of U . S .  d i sburs i ng offi cers . 
Source : Reports of Cond i ti on . See a l so no te b ,  Ta bl e I V - 1 , page 
67 , and Appendi x A .  
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exceeded the total for country banks . Because  the Fi rs t  Nati onal  
rare ly  pa i d  i nterest on i ts pri vate depos i ts ,  espec i a l l y  after 1 870 , 
i ts proporti on  of  noni nterest  bea ri ng deposi ts  probably  exceeded the 
proportion of  non i nteres t bearing  depos i ts for the three cl as ses of 
banks . I t  was not unti l 1 870 that the reports of  exami nation di sti n ­
gu i s hed between vari ous  categori es o f  pri vate depos i ts .  In that year ,  
the exami nation of  the Fi rst Na ti ona l s howed i t  had demand certi fi cates 
of  depos i t  (wh i c h  pai d i nterest )  amounti ng  to 27 percent of a l l pri vate 
depo s i ts . T he fol l owi ng year ,  the exami nat ion found no demand certi fi ­
cates of depos i t .  ( See Tab l e  IV-4 . )  The reports o f  cond i t i on publ i s hed 
i n  the l ocal newspapers i n  1 87 1  and 1 872 d i d  not l i s t  any demand 
cert i fi cates of depos i t ,  and therefore i t  appears that after 1 870 the 
F i rst  Nati ona l  d i d  not pay i nterest on depos i ts .  
The F irst  Nati onal may have had to pay i n teres t on some depos i ts 
i n  y�a rs before 1 870 . I n  1 867 two of\ the smal l er ,  nonna tional  banks 
l ocated i n  Knoxv i l l e adverti sed that they woul d pay i nterest on some 
accounts . One advert i sement read : 
A Savi ngs Ban k i n  Knoxvi l l e .  The Exchange and Depos i t  Bank 
hav ing  made arrangements to carry on a Savi ngs Bank i n  
connect ion wi th thei r present bus i ness are now ready to 
rece i ve depos i ts of one dol l ar and upwards , al l owi ng  
i nterest  at the rate o f  s ix  per cen t .  per annum . To  those 
especi a l l y  whose savi ngs are not l a rge enouqh to enabl e 
them to i nvest i n  bonds and other securi ti es , none of 
wh i ch are under the denomi nation of  fi fty dol l ars , th i s  
pl an wi l l  recommend i tse l f .  Not only i s  a safe place 
offered , wh i ch i n  these unsettl ed t imes i s  of  great 
importance , but the amount depos i ted i s  con stantly  
i ncreas i ng . To  the  l abori n g  man , the mechani c ,  the  sma l l 
dea l er,  th i s  i ns tution wi l l  be especi a l l y  benefi c i a l . 
Smal l earni ngs saved from day to day , or week to week ,  
wi l l  be made much safer to the owner when l ocked up i n  
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Tabl e IV-4  
Average Rati o of I nd i v i dua l  Depos i ts to Pri vate Depos i ts ,  
i n  Percenta 
Year 
1 867 
1 868 
1 869 la;v fH 
1 872 
1 873  
1 874  
1 875  
1876 
1 877 ( 4 )  
1 878 
1 879 · ( 2 )  
1 880 (2) 
1881 
1 882 
1 883 
1 884 ( 3 )  
1 885 
1886 
Fi rst 
N . D .  
N . D . 
I 73 
I 106 
N . D .  
East  
Tennessee 
N . D .  
42 . 7 
46 . 1  
63 . 5  
73.5 
83 . 3  
86 . 9 
85 . 1  
9 1 . 0  
84 . 3  
9 1 . 8  
93 . 9  
9 5 . 0  
97 . 8  
94.7 
Mechan ic s  
92 . 6  ( 4 )  
90 . 5  
86 . 9  
85 . 3  
84.8 
asource : See notes a and b ,  Tab l e  IV - 1 , paqe 67 , and  Apoend i x  A ,  
for both the Ea st  Tennessee Nati onal and the Mechani c s  National . Fo r 
the Fi rst National , the source was the reports o f  bank exami nat i on on 
December 6 ,  1 870 , and December 1 9 , 1 87 1 . N . D . s tands for No Data . 
the safe of th i s  trustworthy Bank than when wadded about 
in the breeches pocket , or l eft wi th thos e who i ncrease 
it noth i ng .  The i ns ti tution  is a common one i n  l arge 
c i ti es . Further i nformat ion  can be obtai ned by cal l i ng 
at the Ban k ,  corner of Ma i n  and Gay , unt i l  December 1 s t ,  
at  wh i c h  time i t  wi l l  be moved to the New Bank Bui l d i nq  
on  Gay Street . { The  Kn6xv i l l e  Da i ly Free Press , 
November 9 ,  1 867 , p .  3) · 
Th i s  adverti sement i s  qu i te i nformative . F i rs t ,  the not i on that 
the creation  of a separate i nsti tuti on- "a Savi n gs Ban k "-payinq  
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i n terest on  depos i ts was requ i red , i nd i cates that the payment of i n terest . . 
on depos i ts was not common pract i ce .  Second , the impl i cati on of the 
sentence endi ng wi th  " th ose who i ncrease i t  noth i ng "  i s  al so that 
payment of i nterest on depos i ts was unusual . In fact , t he whol e ad 
seems to imp ly  tha t no other l ocal bank pa i d  i nteres t on depos i ts .  
However ,  another l ocal bank pl aced an  adverti sement wh i ch apoeared i n  
the same newspaper on �he fo l l owing· day , a l so offeri ng to pay i n terest 
on  depos i ts .  The adverti sement read : 
Knoxvi l l e Bank 
and 
Savi ngs Insti tuti on 
Al l sums of fi ve dol l ars and over recei ved on depos i t  
and i nterest pa i d  by speci a l  contract . Separate accoun ts 
kept i n  th i s  Bank-for Depos i ts drawi n g  i nteres t-to 
accomodate a l l who des i re to put i n  smal l amounts at  a 
time , for accumul ati on . (The Knoxvi l l e Da i ly Free Press , 
November 1 0 , . 1 867 , p .  2 ) 
Here agai n ,  a separate i ns t i tution was i nvol ved and the appea l  was 
di rected toward the smal l depos i tor . But what about the other two banks , 
the Fi rst Nati ona l and the Peopl es Bank? They never expl i c i tly stated 
that they pa i d  i nterest on depos i ts ,  a l though thei r occas i onal  references 
to thei r sav i n gs departments and certi ficates of depos i t  may have i mpl i ed 
the payment of i nterest .  Ins tead , they emphasi zed other aspects of  
73  
thei r bus i nes s ,  primari l y  the safety of depos i ts and the i r  w i l l i n gness  
to buy and  sel l vari ous mon ies , c l a ims , coupons , bounty certi ficates , 
s tocks , bonds , government vouchers , etc .  I n  the earl y years , the Fi rst 
Nati onal emphasi zed depos i t  safety i n  i ts adverti sements and in  arti c l es 
. i n  a · l oca l  newspaper wri tten by sharehol der and d i rector W .  G .  Brown l ow .  
For examp l e ,  Brown l ow wrote : 
.The offi cers of  th i s  bank  wi l l  have occupi ed the fi ne Banki n g  
House of  the Ocoee Bank  by the time �h i s  paper reaches 
subscri bers . I t  i s  one of  the Government Banks , and i s  a 
safe deposi tory for sol d i ers and c i t i zens , who are l i abl e to 
be robbed of thei r money every day . Many o f  our farmers have 
money , and the gurri l l a  thi eves know i t ,  and are l i abl e to 
das h i n  upon them any n i ght . Many o f  the sol d i ers and offi cers 
of the army have some money , and are des i rous of  sav ing  i t  . 
unti l a future time . We as sure them that they can fi nd no 
safer p l ace than Knoxvi l l e  to depos i t ,  for i t  i s  the best 
.forti fi ed town i n s i de o f  the Federa l l i nes , and can and w i l l 
be hel d aga i nst  any force that may come . ( Brown l ow ' s  · 
Knoxvi l l e  Wh i, , and Rebel Venti l a tor ,  August  1 0 ,  1 864 , p .  2 .  
H i s spel l i n g . . . · · 
The fol l owi n g  week there was another recommendat ion for the F i rs t  
Nati onal , wi th the emphas i s  a l so  upon  safety .  
By 1 865 1 1gurri l l a  th ieve s 11 were l es s  o f  a probl em , and promi ses  of  
the safety o f  deposi ts appeared l es s  frequently in  bank  adverti semen ts . 
I nstead , the Fi rst Nati onal and the Peopl es Bank . emphas i zed the other 
serv i ces they were abl e to prov i de . The Peopl es Bank adverti sed that 
i t  wou l d  1 1transact General Banki ng and Brokerage Bu s i nes s , receive 
depos i ts ,  i s sue certi fi ca tes of depos i t ,  dea l in  Exchange , buy Gol d ,  
S i l ver , Bank Notes , Bonds and Stocks 11 ( Brown l ow ' s  Knoxv i l l e  Whig,  and 
Rebel Venti l ator , Ju ly  25 , 1 865 , p .  1 ) .  I n  the s ame i s s ue ,  J .  R .  
Mi tchel l offered to buy sol d i ers ' bounty certi fi cates at the Peop l es 
Bank , then cal l ed the Knoxv i l l e Depos i tory .  Mos t  of the Fi rst Nati onal ' s  
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adverti sements after 1 865  s imply l i s ted the names of  the Pres i dent  and 
Cas h i er ,  and the Bank ' s  l ocation . Ment ion of  servi ces occurred on the 
few occas i ons  when the F i rs t  Nati onal had someth i ng s peci al to sel l . No 
ads were found wh i ch woul d  s how that the F irst  National actively sought  
and pa i d  i nterest  to attract depos i ts . The  Peopl es Bank  oa id  i n terest 
on some accounts , but th i s  fact was not constantly kept before the 
publ i c  by adverti sements to that effect . The Fi rs t  Nati onal does not 
appear to have empl oyed the payment of i nterest  as a means to attract 
pri vate depos i ts ; the other l ocal  banks  di d .  I n  fact , the F i rst Nati onal 
seems to have done l i ttl e to attract customers ; the other l oca l  banks 
seem to have been much . more active . A h i nt of thi s i s  g i ven in  the 
exami ner ' s  report on the Fi rs t  Nati ona l i n  1 866 , where he wrote : "The 
present cas h i er does not des i re to run any ri sks  and i s  doi ng very l i tt l e  
except to the bes t  o f  the parti es " ( F i rs t  Nati onal B an k , Report of  
Exam inat i on , October 25 , 1 866 ) . 
The exami ner was wr i ti ng about the l oan  pol i c i es of the Fi rst 
Nati onal , and h i s comments cannot be cons i dered proof that the bank 
behaved in th i s  fas h i on towa rds i ts depos i tors , but i t  does s upport 
the argument . Good records of the acti vi t ies  of  the l ocal pri vate banks 
do not ex i st ,  but i t  appears that a growi ng proporti on of l ocal  pri vate 
depos i ts was goi ng to them rather than to the Fi rst Nat iona l . They 
acti vel y sought s uch depo s i ts , but the F i rst National d i d  not and i ts 
private depos i ts d i d  not grow i n  proporti on to i ts l i abi l i ti es .  Of the 
l ocal banks , the Fi rst Nati onal  had sol e acces s to U . S . government 
depos i ts and these mi t igated the Fi rst Nati onal ' s  need to acqui re bank 
depo s i ts or other borrowed funds as  wel l as  the need to comoete 
acti vely wi th the other l ocal  ba nks for pri vate deoos i ts .  I n  fact , i t  
appears that by the l ate 1 860 ' s  and early 1 870 ' s ,  there was a tendency 
for a rebi rth of state ban k i ng  i n  Knoxvi l l e  i n  response to the uncom­
peti ti ve atti tude di s p l ayed by the F i rst  Nat i ona l . Had thi s tendency 
cont inued ,  i t  may be that the Fi rst Nati ona l woul d have had to c hanqe 
i ts strategy . Th i s  trend ( i f  i t  actual l y  exi sted ) , was however cut 
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s hort by the Cri s i s  of 1 873 , the effects of  that cr i s i s  on the l ocal 
nonnati ona l banks , and by th e vo l untary l i qu i dat ion o f  the Fi rs t  Nat i onal  
and  the  s ubsequent forma tion of  the  East  Tennessee Nati ona l . As  early 
as Apri l of 1 87 1 , the owners of  the Fi rst  Na ti ona l  were cons i deri ng 
l i qu i dati ng that ban k ,  and the anti c i pation of that l i qui dation may 
have been respons i b l e  for the bank ' s  behav i or toward ootentia l  depos i tors 
i n  1 872 and i n  the l a st  pa rt of 1 87 1 · . However ,  i t  does not exp l a i n  the 
ban k ' s  behav i or i n  prior yea rs . 
Because  the Fi rs t  National was abl e to acqu i re a l arqe and qrow i ng 
. proporti on of i ts l i abi l i ties  from non i nterest  beari ng  depos i ts ,  i t  d i d  
not have to rel y  upon borrowed money . The proporti on of i ts l i a bi l i ti es 
comi ng  from bank  deposi ts and borrowed funds was usua l ly about as l ow as  
the proporti on for country banks , and both were much l ower than the 
proporti on for e i ther cl ass  of c i ty bank s . Both cl as ses of c i ty banks 
i ncreas ed the proport ion of thei r l i ab i l i t i e s ob ta i ned from borrowed 
money from 1 867 to 1 872 . -Becaus e  mos t  of  these funds earned i nterest ,  
the growth i n  the s i gni fi cance of borrowed money for c i ty banks  ( but not 
for the Fi rs t  Nati onal ) i ndi cate substanti a l  d i fferences in thei r 
.· 
respecti ve envi ronments . Of cours e ,  not a l l  ci ty ban ks s ought out 
bankers ' ba l ances nor di d they a l l  parti c i pa te extens i vely in  red i s ­
count ing  l oans , but those  who d i d  had to pay �or the pr i v i l e9e . The 
. payment of i n terest  on depos i ts was often hel d 
accountab l e  for the concentrati on o f  ban kers ' bal ances i n  
New York . It  seems to have been true rather that i n terest 
on depo s i ts was a dev i ce wh ich  banks  used in  the i r  competi - · 
ti on wi th each other . Not a l l of  the banks pai d  i n terest  
on bal ances . . . .  A s  a matter of  fact , many i n teri or banks 
pa i d  i n terest on depos i ts too . ( Myers , 1 93 1 , pp . 249-250 ) 
76  
From 1 867 to  1 872 the  F i rst Nati ona l obtai ned a l a rqe and  growi na4 
proport ion of  i ts l i ab i l i ti es from non i n terest beari ng deoos i ts . . The  
Fi rst  Nati onal ' s  pos i tion  as the  onl y l oca l nati ona l  bank  wi th the  
advantages of  ban knote i ssue , cl ose connecti on wi th  the  nati onal 
fi nanc i a l  market ,  and l a rge qovernment deoos i ts ,  as  wel l as a na tura l  
consti tuency among the  East  Tennessee Un i on i s ts , enabl ed it  to acqu i re 
l arge depos i ts at l ow cos t .  Becau se  the other l ocal ban ks l acked these 
advantages , they had to empl oy the payment of i n teres t to attract 
depos i ts .  The evi dence a l so  suggests that the Fi rs t  Nati ona l  was more 
succes sful  i n  acqu i ri ng l ow cos t depos i ts than the average c i ty bank 
or the average country ban k .  Furthermore , the s uccessor to the Fi rs t 
Nati ona l , the East  Tennessee Nati ona l , was just  as succes sful  after a� 
few yea rs , i f  not more s o .  
The on ly  report o f  cond i ti on o f  1 872 for t h e  East Tennessee Nat i on 
i nd i cates that about one-thi rd o f  i ts l i ab i l i ti es came from nri vate 
depos i ts .  I n  the fol l owing  yea rs , the average p roportion  of  i ts 
l i abi l i ti es deri ved from pri vate depos i ts qrew s tead i l y  unti l 1 881  when 
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the rat io  reached 71 percent . *  From 1 882 to 1 886 the Ea st  Tennes see 
Nati ona l obta i ned an average of two-thi rds o f  i ts l i ab i l i ti e s  from 
private depos i ts . I n  i ts fi rst year wi th  a nati ona l  charter ,  the 
Mechan i cs Nati onal had s l i gh tl y  over one-hal f of i ts l i ab i l i ti es comi ng · 
from pri vate depos i ts ,  and i n  the next years , 1 883 to 1 886 , i t  averaqed 
cl ose to 60 percent of i ts l i ab i l i ti es from private depos i ts ,  a s l i ghtly 
l ower ratio  than that for the Ea st  Tennessee Nat i ona l . These two banks  
did  at l east  as wel l  as the average c i ty or coun try bank , and in  mos t 
cases they d i d  much better than the average nati onal ban k i n  any cl a s s . 
· . When account i s  ta ken of  the contri buti on to l i ab i l i ti es made by 
government depos i ts , i t  i s  c l ear that government and pri vate depos i ts 
suppl i ed the Ea s t  Tennes see wi th a h i gh proport i on { compa red to other 
banks ) of  i ts l i abi l i ti es ,  at  l east through 1 880 . After 1 880 , govern-
ment  depos i ts were l es s  i mportant to the East Tennessee than they had 
been , even though that bank al most  a lways obta i ned a h i g her proport i on 
of  i ts l i abi l i ti es from the federa l government than d i d  the average 
nati onal bank .  {There were a few years after 1 900 i n  wh i c h  the East 
Tennes see ' s  rat i o  fel l  s l i g htly  bel ow the rat i o  for c i ty banks , but at 
*The s harp i ncrease in the Eas t Tennessee Nati onal ' s  rati o of  
pri vate depos i ts to  a l l l i abi l i t i es { from 6 1  percent in  1 880 to  7 1  
percent i n  1 881 ) seems to  have been a del ayed react i on to  the  same cause 
wh i ch produced a sharp i ncrease  i n  that rati o for the three c l a s ses of  
banks i n  1 880 . The  rati o  rose  for centra l res erve c i ty banks  { 4 9  percent 
to 56  percent ) , for reserve c i ty ban ks ( 38 oercent to 42 oercent ) , and 
for country banks  { 32 percent to 38 percent ) from 1 879 to 1 880 . The most  
l i ke ly  source for the cause of  th i s  s ha rp i ncrease was the resumotiori of  
spec i e  payments i n  1 879 . Resumption  meant that gol d no  l onger wou l d  
trade at a prem i um over other fo rms o f  money { paper money and bank 
depos i ts ) . Conversely , paper money and ban k  depos i ts woul d no l onger  
trade at a di scount rel at ive to gol d .  Cons equentl y ,  t he  rel ative val ue 
of  paper money and depos i ts rose ,  and the vol ume of depos i ts i ncreased . 
that t ime the rati os were q u i te l ow . ) The �echan ics  Nati onal d i d  not 
report any government depos i ts unti l much l a ter ( 1 900-1 907 ) , and 
consequently that bank • s  non i nterest beari ng  depos i ts were enti rely 
in the form of  priva te depos i ts .  
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However , the proporti o n  of l i ab i l i ti es comi n g  from pri vate deposi ts 
i s  on ly  an approximation of noni nterest beari n g  depos i ts .  When pri vate 
depos i ts are exami ned , there i s ,  for the East Tennessee , a c l ear 
dev i ati on from the usua l  pattern . No di vi s i on of pri vate depos i ts 
i nto i nterest bea ri ng and non i n terest  beari ng  depos i ts was � i ven i n  the 
Eas t  Tennes see • s  one publ i shed report of cond i t i on i n  1 872 , but i n  the 
fol l owi ng two years , a l a rge vol ume of  demand certi fi cates was reported . 
( See Tab l e  IV-4 , page 7 1  . ) I n  fact , for 1 873 and 1 874 s uch certi fi cates 
made up more than one-ha l f  of a l l pri vate depos i ts .  Even when account 
is  taken of the non i nterest beari ng depo s i ts of the federal gove rnment ,  
i t  i s  c l ear that the cost of obta i n i ng depos i ts fo r the East Tennes see 
was unusua l l y  h i gh compared to the cost for the Fi rs t National  and for 
the Ea s t  Tennessee i n  subsequent  years . After 1 874 , i n terest  beari ng 
depos i ts fel l s harp ly .  I n  two years , noni nteres t beari ng  deposi ts 
amounted to about  three-quarters of pri vate depos i ts ,  and i n  l ater 
yea rs were usua l ly  85 percent or more of pri vate depos i ts .  I n  fact , 
from 1 881  to 1 886 , the rat i o  rose over 90 percent .  ( It  peaked i n  1 887-
1 889 at 98 percent . ) 
If  the Eas t  Tenness ee coul d attract a l arge , growi ng vol ume ( and 
proporti on ) of noni nterest bear ing  pri vate deposi ts from 1 875  to 1 886 , 
why d i d  i t  fa i l  to do so from 1 872 to 1 874? There are ,  I th i n k , two 
. .  
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rel ated expl anati ons . Fi rst , the Ea s t  Tennes see may have i s s ued 
certi ficates of  depos i t  to the depo s i tors of the Fi rst Nati onal as part 
of  the process  of  l i qu i dation  of that bank and the formation of the 
East Tennessee .  Unfortunately ,  the exami ners • reports for the East 
Tennessee for those years a re not avai l ab l e to the publ i c  for i nspecti on . 
I t  i s  l i kely that the exami ner woul d have commented on s uch an  arrange­
ment , but so l ong as  those reports are wi thhe l d ,  no proof can be obta i ned . 
Second ,  i n  1 873 a sharp and l ong reces s i on commenced , and the East 
Tennessee may have i ssued the cert if i cates i n  l a rge q uant i ties  to 
ass ure the s tabi l i ty of i ts depos i ts . Th i s  expl anat ion may be more 
sati sfactory than the .fi rst ,  because the cri s i s  of 1 873 commenced i n  
the autumn , and no demand certi fi cates o f  deposi t were reported unti l 
the report of  condi ti on on September 1 2 ,  1 87 3 .  However ,  the ban k may 
have s imply  fa i l ed to di sti ngu i s h  between i ndi vi dual  depos i ts  and 
dema�d certi fi cates of depos i t  i n  i ts publ i s hed reports of condi t ion 
prio r  to September 1 2 .  From tha t date through October 2 ,  1 874 , demand 
certi fi cates of depos i t  cons ti tuted more than one-ha l f  of pr ivate 
depos i ts , but  by December 3 1 , 1 874 , dema nd certi fi cates represented 
l es s  than one-ha l f of a l l pri vate depos i ts , and the proporti on  fel l  
s teadi l y  thereafter . 
The fal l i n  the proport i on may have been due to two causes . F i rs t ,  
the Eas t  Tennes see d i d  manage to s urvi ve the cri s i s  o f  1 873 and pros per .  
Many banks across the country d i d  not .  A proven abi l i ty to avoi d 
bankruptcy when many bank s  fa i l ed may have persuaded depo s i tors to 
trust the East Tennessee wi th the i r depos i ts , even though th at bank was 
rel uctant to pay i nterest  on tho se depos i ts .  Second , the Eas t Tennes see 
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may have been abl e to convert many of  i ts i nterest  payi n g  depos i ts i nto 
non i nterest beari ng  accounts because of the absence of s trong l oca l 
competi t i on .  · 
The Peopl es  Bank had survi ved the cri s i s  of 1 87 3 , but what 
cond i t i on i t  was i n  i s  not known . The Excha nge and Depos i t  Bank 
fa i l ed ,  and i t  i s  pos s i b l e that the Knoxvi l l e Bank c l osed for a time . 
The Mechani c s  Nati onal had been founded i n  1 875 as a pri vate bank , 
but i t  was much sma l l er than the Eas t  Tennes see when i t  converted 
to nati onal s tatus  i n  1 882 . (At i ts fi rst report of cond i ti on on May 1 9 ,  
1 882 , the Mechan i c s  Nat ional reported assets of $ 1 81 , 484 . 9 1 . At that 
date , the Ea st  Tennes see had assets equa l i ng $887 , 453 . 07 . )  The Mechan i c s  
was not i n  a strong  pos i tion between 1 875  and 1 882 to cha l l enge the 
Ea st  Tennessee . Further , i t  i s  not l i kely that the Merchants Ban k ,  
wh i c h  obta i ned a state charter i n  1 881 ( and wh i c h  may have opera ted 
wi th�ut a c ha rter unti l then as the Knoxvi l l e  Ban k ) , was l a rge enough 
to be an effecti ve competi tor wi th the Ea st  Tennes see . Tha t i s ,  the 
East  Tennessee probably used both i ts reputa ti on as a successful , safe 
bank and i ts rel ati vely monopol i s ti c pos i ti on i n  the l oca l market to 
l ower i ts costs of acqu i ri ng depos i ts .  
When the rel ati on o f  i nterest  beari ng to noni nterest  beari ng 
depos i ts is  exami ned for the Mechani cs Nati onal , the first h i nt of the 
trans i ti on to come i s  seen . Th i s  bank  was i n i ti a l ly abl e to acqu i re 
depos i ts wi thout pay ing  i nterest on many of  them . But the propo rtion  
of  pri vate depo s i ts on whi ch no  i nterest was pa i d  decl i ned s tead i l y  
through 1 886 , even though i t  was sti l l  rel at i vel y h i gh i n  that yea r .  
The · fol l owi n g  chapter wi l l  deta i l  the sharp reversa l  for th i s  and 
other banks in  the proporti on of  pri vate depos i ts oayi ng i nterest . 
Borrowed money d i d  not contri bute a s i zabl e porti on of  the East  
Tennes see ' s  l i ab i l i ti es . The  rati o  of  borrowed money to  l iab i l i t i es 
was a lways l ower than the average for any of  the three c l asses  of  
8 1  
banks , a nd  appea rs to have been hel d to the m i n i mum necessary to conduct 
busi nes s  wi th  other banks . Unti l 1 885 the Mechan i cs Nati onal a l so  had 
a l ower rati o of  borrow�d money to l i ab i l i ti e s  than d i d  the average 
bank i n  any of the three cl a sses . I n  that year ,  the rati o grew sharp l y ,  
and i n  the fo l l owi ng  year  . i t  i ncreased agai n .  Thi s too i s  an  i nd icati on 
of  the trans i ti on wh i c h  had i ts major impact duri ng the years 1 887 to 
1 900 . 
To sum up , both the Eas t  Tennes see and  the Mechan i c s  Na tional  wer;l 
abl e to acqui re a l arge and growi ng proportion  of  thei r l i ab i l i ti es at 
l ow cos t .  Th i s  cond i t ion  was dramatica l l y  reversed duri ng the next 
peri od , 1 887 to 1 900 , when both these banks faced i ncreas i ng ly  s trong 
competi tion in the l oca l market . But so l ong  as the i r  l ocal competi tors 
were sma l l  and not numerous , l ow cos t  l i ab i l i ti es were the genera l rul e .  
Once those competi tors i ncreased i n  both number a nd s i ze ,  acqui s i ti on 
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of l i abi l i ti es became mo re and more costl y .  
Deposi ts and borrowed money genera l ly  accounted for about two-thi rds  
to three-quarters o f  a l l l i abi l i ti es of  the l oca l nati onal banks dur i n q  
the fi rst peri od . At the begi nn i ng of  the peri od ,  the percentage was 
a b i t l ower ,  and i t  i ncreased s l owly .  The other one-th i rd to one-quarter 
of l i abi l i ti es was obta i ned from sha rehol der i nvestment and banknotes 
i s sued (c i rcul at ion } .  Al thoug h an  ana lys i s  of  s hare ho l der i nvestment 
and ci rcu l at i on wi l l  shed l i ttl e l i g h t  on the competi tive  nature of  
the  l ocal  envi ronment ,  i t  wi l l  c l ari fy other important  aspects of  the 
behavi or of the l ocal  banks . 
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As a general rul e ,  the proporti on o f  l i ab i l iti es  comi ng  from 
s hareho l der i nvestment dec l i ned s l owly from the re l at i ve ly  h i gh l evel s  
of the fi rs t  yea rs o f  operati on as the new bank deve l oped and  extended 
i ts rel ations wi th customers and  other banks . ( See Tab l e IV-5 . )  There 
were many smal l vari ati ons from the l ong-run trend , but  s i gni fi cant 
devi ations a lmos t  a l ways were assoc i a ted wi th changes in the banks ' 
'cap i ta l . Changes i n  capi ta l were i n frequent , owi ng l arge ly to the 
requi rements that each share of capi tal stoc k have a par va l ue of  $ 1 00 
and that each i ncrease i n  capi tal be approved by the Comptro l l er of the 
Currency . T he Comptro l l er m ight  never have refused permi s s i on to 
i nc�ease a bank ' s  capi ta l , but the process was cumbersome and banks 
tended to go through i t  only i f  a re l at i vely l arge change was to be 
made . I nstead , they found i t  fa r eas i er to i ncrease shareho l ders ' 
i nvestment by addi ng to the surp l u s fun d .  The Nati ona l Currency Acts 
requ i red ban ks to add 1 0  percent of  earn i ngs to thei r surp l u s  accoun t  
unti l the i r  surp l us equa l ed 2 0  percent o f  capi ta l ( Sect i on 33 , the Act 
of June 3 ,  1 864) . I n  the second and thi rd peri ods , some ban ks i ncreased 
thei r surp l us much more rap i d ly  than requi red by l aw as  a means to 
prepare for an i ncrease i n  capi tal , but i t  was not part o f  t he l ocal 
banks ' operat ions in the fi rst peri od . 
Changes i n  capi tal duri ng the fi rst peri od were primari l y  rel a ted 
to taxes and banknotes . ( Duri ng  the second and th i rd periods , changes 
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TABLE IV-5  
Average Rati o of Sharehol der I nves tment to  Al l L i ab i l i ti es , 
i n  Percen ta 
Central 
Ea s t  Reserve Reserve Country 
Yea r  Fi rs t  Tennessee Mechani cs C i t ies C i t i es Banks 
1 867  ( 3 )  33 . 9  24 . 2  34 . 3  39 . 9  
1 868 ( 1 )  3 7 . 4  23 . 6  34 . 0  40 . 8  
1 869 ( 4 )  33 . 5  24 . 0  36 . 2  42 . 2  
1 870 4 )  29 . 7  25 . 3  36 . 6  42 . 3  
1 871  3 3 1 . 0  23 . 6  34 . 6  4 . 7 . 
1 872 26 . 8  { 4 )  25 . 6  { 1 ) 2 5 . 3  35 . 0  41 . 2  
1 873 28 . 0  26 . 2  35 . 0  41 . 6  
1 874 30 . 5  24 . 7  34 . 4  42 . 1 
1 875 34 . 0  25 . 5  34 . 6  42 . 3  
1876 . 37.6 25.6  35 . 6  43 . 3  
1 877 { 4 )  30 . 6  23 . 5  35 . 2  43 . 0  
1 878 28 . 1  2 1 . 3  35 . 0  42 . 7  
1 879 { 2 )  25 . 9  1 7 . 9  32 . 4  40 . 8  
1 880. (2 )  24 . 2  1 5 .  1 27 . 3  36 . 3  
1881 18 .4 15., 26 .7 34 . 9  
1 882 20 . 4  32 . 9  { 4 )  1 6 . 5  27 . 6  34 . 2 ' 
1 883 22 . 0  25 . 4  1 8 . 0  28 . 5  34 . 7  
1 884 { 3 )  23 . 7  28 . 6  1 8 . 3  29 . 4  36 . 4  
1 885 22 . 9  29 . 2 1 6 . 7  28 . 2  37 . 1  
1886 �1.8 �().() 17.l5 28.5 �6.S 
ashareho l der i nves tment is  capi ta l ' surp l us , and und i v i ded profi ts . 
Source : Reports of  Condi t i on . See al so note b ,  Tab l e  IV- 1 , 
page 67 , and Appendi x A .  
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i n  capi tal were more c l ose ly  t ied to the 1 0  percent l oan l imi t and the 
overa l l growth of economic  acti v i ty i n  Knoxvi l l e . ) Taxes on capi tal 
s tock were c i ted as  the reason for the l i q ui dati on of  the Fi rst  Nati onal  
Ban k ,  and l ed the cas h i er of that bank  to appea l to the Comptro l l er of 
the Currency for permi s s i on to form a smal l er organ i zati on . He wrote : 
I am i nformed that th i s  Bank  of wh ich  I have been Cas hi er 
for s ome fi ve years wi l l  go i nto l i qui dati on  very soon . 
The only object i n  wi nd i ng up the Bank wi l l  be the profi ts 
to be deri ved from the s a l e  of the Bonds & the di vi di ng 
of i ts surp l us . · 
I n  consequence o f  the onerous taxes imposed upon 
the s tock  of  Nati onal Banks by the State , County & 
Corpora ti on ,  i t  i s  not rega rded as renumerat ive stock 
& the l ower the Capi tal , the better , for th i s  reason . 
. ( Fi rst  Na ti onal  Ban k ,  Apri l  25 , 1 87 1 ) 
The cas h i er went  on · to a s k  for permi s s i on to form a new bank \'li th 
a capi ta l  of $50 thousand . The permi s s i on was den i ed becaus e Knoxvi l l e • s  
popu l at ion was l a rge eno ugh to requ i re nati onal banks  founded there to 
have a capi tal of at l east  $ 1 00 thousand , and when the Eas t Tennessee 
Nati ona l opened , i t  opened wi th a capi ta l of  $ 1 00 thousand . By l ate 
Apri l or  early May of 1 87 1 , the owners o f  the Fi rst  Nati onal were 
i nformed that  they woul d not be gi ven permi s s i on to open a new nati onal  
bank wi th a capi ta l wh i ch was bel ow the amount  s peci fi ed by l aw .  Why 
then d i d  they proceed wi th the l i qu i dation?  I ha ve found no defi n i t i ve 
answer to th i s ,  but the fol l owi ng  conjecture can be advanced . 
The Fi rs t Nat ional  ori g i na l l y  had n i ne s harehol ders , but the 
domi nant sharehol der {W .  Perk i n s ) so l d  out wi thi n two years , after 
havi n g  i nqui red of the Comptro l l er about the correct procedure for 
cl os i ng a nati onal bank and about the resi dency requ i rements for 
d i rectors . I n  the same l etter ,  he a l so as ked that the Comptrol l er • s 
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response  be sent to a bus i ness  house i n  C i nc i nna ti . The l etter made i t  
cl ear that he d i d  not want a response sent to Knoxvi l l e ,  but i t  was not 
cl ear why he wan ted to c l ose the ban k ( F i rs t  Nati onal , November 1 5 ,  1 864 ) . 
Perki n s  sol d out a s hort time l a ter .  
Perez D i c k i n son was el ected presi dent of  the ba nk , repl ac i ng 
Perk ins , but i n  a s hort wh i l e ,  R .  R .  Sweoson ren l aced Di ck i n son . I n  
earl y 1 867 Swepson a l so wrote to the Comptrol l er and as ked i f  a nati onal 
bank coul d he moved to another s tate and i ts name changed wi thout e i ther 
goi ng i nto l i qu i dati on or changi ng i ts charter ( Fi rs t  Nati ona l Bank , 
March 1 6 ,  1 867 ) . Evi dently , the Comptrol l er repl i ed i n  the nega ti ve 
and the s ubject was not di scus sed aga i n  i n  the corresPondence unti l 
spri ng of  1 871 , when the cas h i er wrote the l etter c i ted above (The Fi rs t  
Nati ona l  • s  l etter o f  Apri l 25 , 1 871 ) .  Rel ati vel y h i gh taxes on nati onal 
banks  l ocated i n  Knoxvi l l e  seem to have moti vated Perki ns • and Sweoson • s  
i nqu � ries , and the eventual l i qu i dation o f  the F i rst Nati ona l . Perk i n s  
had come to Knoxvi l l e  from Oh i o ,  and i t  appears that  he s ol d h i s  s tock 
in the Fi rst Nationa l �n order to return there . Swepson too appears to 
have been i n terested i n  movi ng away from Knoxvi l l e .  I n  orde r to do so , 
he proba bly fe l t  he had to sel l h i s  stock i n  the Fi rst Nati ona l . 
L i qu i dati ng the bank woul d enabl e h im  to rece ive the profi ts from the 
bonds  purchased to secure both the c i rcu l at i on i s sued and the U . S . 
government depos i ts ,  as  wel l as enab l i ng  h im  to avo i d  the rel ati ve ly  
h i gh l ocal taxes . 
Bonds wi th a par va l ue of $89 , 900 had been purchased to secure 
ci rcul ati on , and bonds wi th a par val ue of $ 50 thousand had been 
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purchased to secure government depos i ts .  Al l of these bon ds had been 
purchased at a subs tant ia l  d i scount from pa r .  Reports of Cond i t i on for 
the Fi rs t  Nati onal never s howed an entry for premiums pai d for U . S �  
bonds ; they al ways s howed premi ums rece i ved . ( Some of the oremi ums 
were added to profi ts , a l though the amount added var ied from year to 
yea r . ) The bonds had been purchased duri ng  the l as t  year of the War ,  
when i nterest  rates were h i gh , and by 1 871  they so l d muc h  cl oser to 
par .  Consequentl y ,  there was a prof i t  to be had by se l l i n a  the bonds , 
redeeming  the c i rcul ati on , and l i qu i dati ng  the ban k .  
But l i q u i dati ng the ban k  di d not have to be the fi nal s tep . The 
sharehol ders of the Firs t  Nati onal  coul d have so l d the i r  shares at a 
price wh i ch refl ected the in i ti a l  i nvestment as  wel l  as  the s ubsequent 
cap i tal gai ns and profi ts from operat ion wh ich  had not been d i s tri buted . 
(The net worth per share on October 3 ,  1 872 , was about $ 1 35 . )  Why was 
thi s . s tep not taken? I do n ot know .  The correspondence wi th the 
Comptrol l er and the Reports of Exami nati on a re mute . Some of  the owners 
of the Fi rs t  Nati ona l may s imply  have wanted muc h  more than the net 
worth per share as compensa t ion for the va l ue of  a conti n u i nq operati on , 
and the potenti a l  buyers offered l es s . I n  any cas e ,  the Ea s t  Tennessee 
Nati onal had no di ffi cul ty i n  attract ing  i nvestors , ei ther  then ( i n  
1 87 2 )  o r  l ater i n  1 873 when an addi t iona l  $50 thousand worth of  capi ta l 
was sol d ,  br i ng i ng the tota l to $ 1 50 thousand . 
The correspondence wi th the Comptrol l er i ndi cates that the $50 
thousand i ncrease in cap i ta l  was made in order to enabl e the ban k to 
i n crease i ts c i rcu l ati on from $90 thousand to $ 1 35 thousand . The fi rst 
' 
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reques t for an i ncrease  i n  capi ta l was made i n  l a te 1 872 , s hortly after 
the bank  opened . ( East  Tennessee Nati onal Bank , No vember 8 ,  1 872 . }  
The Comptro l l er ' s  respons e  to the reques t for add i t iona l  c i rcul a ti on 
was negati ve , and the pres i dent of  the bank  responded by wri ti ng to 
Congres sman Horace Maynard , as ki n g  i f  i t  woul d be pos s i b l e  to have the 
banknotes reti red by the F i rs t  Nati onal and rei s s ued under the name of 
the Ea st  Tennessee National . Maynard forwarded th i s  l etter to the 
Comptrol l er ( East  Tennessee Nati onal Bank , January 7 ,  1 873 } . Agai n  
the response was negat i ve ,  but he tried aga i n  l a ter i n  the year :  
I am di rected by the Boa rd of  Di rectors Eas t  Tennessee 
Nati onal  Bank of Knoxvi l l e most respectful l y  to a sk  your 
attenti on to appl i cati ons for i ncreases of Capi tal Stock 
�f our associ ati on made l ast  wi nter through Han Horace 
Maynard . We fee l  that both the produc i ng and commerc i a l  
i n teres ts of  our sect ion i s  s ufferi ng  a t  present for want 
of more ban ki ng  cap i ta l . From Br i s tol on the V i rg i n i a  & 
Tennes see l i ne to · C l eve l and Tennessee a d i s tance of two hundred and ten mi l es the ent i re ban ki n g  capi ta l as 
reported by the f ive banks ( four  pri vate and one nati ona l } 
. i s $ 1 61 , 050 . 00 .  Three o f  these ban ks have s uspe.nded i n  
the pas t two weeks wi th an aggregate capi ta l  of  $41 , 050 . 00 
l eav i ng  but 1 20 , 000$ capi tal i n  the two ban ks  s t i l l  open . 
We woul d . mos t  res pectfu l ly refer you to Han W .  G .  Brown l ow U . S .  Senator  and Mess  Maynard and Tho rnburg 
Representat i ves el ected to the next Congres s as to 
cha racter of Stockhol ders Offi cers a nd Di rectors of our 
Associ ati on as wel l as to the fi nanc i a l  wants o f  our 
Country .  ( East Tennessee Nati onal  Bank , October 1 4 ,  
1 873 . The ban k ' s  punctuati on i s  fol l owed . }  
Th i s  t ime the appea l succeeded , and permi s s i on to i ncrease cao i tal 
by $ 50 thousand and c i rcul at i on by $45 thousand was qranted . The 
Comptro l l er responded on October 2 1 , 1 873 , and the bank wrote back  
immed i a te ly ,  say i ng that  it  woul d i ncrease i ts capi ta l s tock by 
$ 50 thousand " i n  the next s i x ty days and i f  advi sed tha t they can qet 
c i rcul at ion may des i re to i ncrease an add i tional  Fi fty thou sand i n  the 
fi rst hal f of  the comi ng year" ( East Tennes see Nati onal Ban k � 
November 24 , 1 873 ) . 
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The bank ' s  request to i ncrease capi tal to $200 thou sand and 
c i rcul ati on to $ 1 80 thousand was not approved . The i ncrease i n  capi tal 
to $ 1 50 thousand and c i rcul ation to $ 1 35 thousand was orobab ly  approved 
because of the cri s i s  of 1 873 and i ts effects on East Tennessee as  
i l l us trated in  the  bank ' s  l etter of  November 1 4 ,  1 873 , quoted above . 
The request to i ncrease both cap i ta l  and c i rcul a ti on the second time 
was probab ly  den i ed because of the aggregate l imi t on c i rcu l at ion . 
By early 1 874 the East Tennes see was ta k ing  ful l advantage o f  the 
note i s s ue pri v i l ege , wi th c i rcu l at i on i ss ued equal i ng 90 percent of 
capi ta l , the max imum a l l owed by l aw .  I ts predecesso r ,  the Fi rs t  
Nati onal , had a l so i ssued about as  much c i rcul at i on a s  was a l l owed by 
l aw .  The Fi rst Nati onal i s s ued c i rcul ation amounti ng to 76 percent of  
i ts capi ta l , a s l i ghtly l ower percentage than other country banks 
i ssued , but a h i gher percentage than was i s sued by e i ther of  the 
reserve ci ty c l asses . These percentages ( see Tab l e · IV - 6 )  are about 
what one wou l d  expec t ,  g i ven the provi s i ons of an  1 86 5  amendment to 
the Nati onal Banki ng Act . 
That upon the trans fer and del i very of bonds to the 
Treas urer . . .  the associ a ti on mak i ng the s ame s ha l l 
be enti tl ed to rece ive from the Comptro l l er of  the 
Currency c i rcul ati nq  notes . . •  i n  proportion  to i ts 
capi tal as fol l ows , and no more : To each a s soc i at ion 
whose capi tal s ha l l not exceed fi ve hundred thousand 
dol l ars , n i nety per centum o f  s uch cap i tal ; to each 
assoc i ati on whose capi tal exceeds fi ve hundred thousand 
dol l ars , but does not exceed one mi l l i on  do l l a rs , 
ei ghty per centum of  such  cap i ta l ; to each assoc i at i on 
whose capi tal exceeds one mi l l i on dol l ars ,  hut does 
not exceed th ree mi l l i ons  of do l l a rs ,  seventy-fi ve 
per centum of s uch capi ta l ; to each assoc i a t i on whos e 
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Tabl e IV-6  
Average Rati o of  C i rcu l ati on I s sued to Capi ta l , i n  Percenta 
Centra l  
East  Res erve Reserve Country 
Year Fi rs t Tennessee Mech an i cs C i ti es C i ti es Banks 
1 867  ( 3 )  76 . 3  46 . 3  64 . 5  79 . 3  
1 868 ( 1 )  7 6 . 3  47 . 0  66 . 2  79 . 4  
1 869 ( 4 )  76 . 3  47 . 1  64 . 0  78 . 8  
1 870 4 76 . 3  46 . 2  6 1 . 8  77 . 9  
1 871  3 76 . 3  . 9  6 . 7 78 . 
1 872 76 . 3  ( 4 )  8 1 . 0  ( 1 )  39 . 6  62 . 7  80 . 2  
1 873 81  . 8  . 39 . 3  6 1 . 7  79 . 8  
1 874 90 . 0  38 . 1  5 9 . 6  79 . 1  
1 875 . 54 . 0  29 . 3  54 . 1  7 5 . 6  
1876 30. 0  23 . 7  4 7 . 5  72 . 1  
1 877  ( 4 )  40 . 0  28 . 6  48 . 1  72 . 3  
1 878 . 45 . 0  36 . 8  5 1 . 8  74 . 4  
1 879  ( 2 )  45 . 0  4 1 . 6  56 . 2  76 . 4  
1 880 ( 2) 45 . 0  36 ·. 6  6 1 . 1  77 . 9  
1 881  45 . 0  37 . 0  60 . 4  76 . 3  
1 882 45 . 0  33 . 8  ( 4 )  37 . 4  56 . 6  74 . 8  
1 883 45 . 0  45 . 0  3 1 . 9  52 . 7  70 . 5  
1 884 ( 3 )  45 . 0  37 . 5  28 . 4  46 . 5  64 . 1  
1 885 45 . 0  2 2 . 5  2 2 . 6  4 1 . 4  5 9 . 2  
1886 27.0 22.5 ,,,, 31.8 50 . 8  
asource : Reports of Cond i t i on .  See a l s o  note b ,  Tab l e IV- 1 , 
page 67 , and Append i x  A .  
capi tal exceeds three mi l l i ons of  dol l ars , s i xty per 
centum of s uch  capi tal . ( Act  of March 3 ,  1 86 5 )  
Tabl e I V - 7  s hows that most country banks were wel l under  the 
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$500 thousand l imi t ,  and consequently most coul d i s s ue c i rcul at ion  up 
to 90 percent of  capi tal . That they general ly  i ssued about 80 percent 
from 1 867  to 1 87 2  i s  a refl ecti on of the effects of the aggregate 
l im i t  on ci rcul ation . The F i rst Nat i onal  was not s i gn i fi cantly di fferent 
from the average country ban k .  
A change i n  the l aw regardi ng ban knote i s sue i n  1 870 req u i res that 
an exami nati on of  the other two cl as ses of  banks be d i vi ded i nto two 
peri ods � l 867 to 1 869 and 1 870 to 1 872 . From 1 867 through 1 869 , the 
average reserve c i ty bank  fe l l i nto the 80 percent category . Some of 
these banks were , of course , l arger ( i n  the 75 or  even 60 percent 
category )  and some were sma l l er .  That they gene ral ly  i s sued bankf10tes 
amount i ng to 65 percent of capi tal i s  aga i n  an i nd icat ion that they 
too �ere taki ng cl ose to ful l advantage o f  the note i s sue pr i vi l ege , 
wi th due recogn i ti on bei ng gi ven to the aggregate l imi t on c i rcu l at ion . 
The average centra l  reserve c i ty bank at th i s  time was i n  the 75 percent 
category ,  w i th some i n  the 60 percent range . Becau s e  the very l arges t  
of these banks had t h e  greatest  i nfl uence on average i s sue rates , i t  i s  
not surpri s i ng that the ban ks o f  New York Ci ty i s sued banknotes amoun ti n g  
to , on average , just  under 5 0  percent of  capi ta l . 
The s i tuati on was a l tered s i gn i fi cantly by the Act of Ju ly 1 2 ,  1 870 . 
That Act i ncreased the aggregate l imi t on c i rcul ation by $54 mi l l i on , 
t6 $ 354 mi l l ion . Th i s  made i t  poss i bl e  for newly chartered nati onal 
banks  to obta i n  ci rcul ation , whereas wi th the prev i ous l imi t they cou l d  
not .  "The number o f  nat i onal banks and thei r ci rcul ati on began to 
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Tabl e I V -7 
Average Cap i tal per Ban k ,  i n  Thousa ndsa 
Centra 1 
Eas t  Reserve Reserve Country Year Fi rst Tennessee Mechan i cs C i t i es C i ti es Ba nks 
1 867 ( 3 )  1 00 1 , 300 633 1 69 
1 868 ( 1 )  1 00 1 , 331  632 1 69 
1 869 ( 4 )  1 00 1 , 336 66 1  1 7 1 
1 870 ( 4 ) . 1 00 1 , 353 688 1 74 
1871 (3) lOO 1 , 359 681 174 
1 872  1 00 ( 4 )  1 00 ( 1 )  1 , 4 1 5 690 1 69 
1 873 1 1 0 1 ,446 700 1 68 
1 874 1 50 1 ,430 702 1 68 
1875 1 50 11426 695 1 66 
1876 150 1 ,410 678 165 
1 877 ( 4 )  1 1 2 . 5  1 , 247 665 1 63 
1 878 1 00 1 , 1 70 652  1 6 1 
1 879  ( 2 )  1 00 1 , 085 643 1 59 
1 880 . { 2} 1 00 1 , 078 634 1 56 
1881 lOO 1 , 061 633 1 5 5  
1 882 1 00 1 ()0 ( 4 )  1 , 03ll 642 1 51 
1 883 1 00 1 00 1 , 05 1  653 1 47 
1 884 ( 3 )  1 00 1 00 1 , 058 6 58 1 43 
1 885 1 00 1 00 l z035 670 1 41 
1886 1i5r5 1oo 1 ,i5o7 l>E>o , jl) 
asource : Reports of  Cond i t i on .  See a l so note b ,  Tab l e  I V  - 1  , 
page 67 , a nd Append i x  A .  
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i ncrease immedi ately . . ( Syl l a ,  1 9 75 , p .  6 0 ) . Wh i l e  i t  is  true that the 
tota l amount of ci rcul ati on i ncreased , i t  is  more important to note that 
i ss ue rates did not i ncrease . In fact , i s sue rates for central reserve 
c i ty banks fel l  sharp ly ,  from 47 percent to 40 percent .  I s s ue rates for 
reserve c i ty banks  fel l somewhat  l es s , from 65  percent to 60 oercent .  
Country bank i ss ue rates changed l i ttl e ,  rema i n i ng ri ght at  80 percent . 
The sharp dec l i ne i n  i s sue rates for the centra l  re serve c i ty 
banks , and the more moderate decl i ne for res erve c i ty banks , wa s cau sed 
by other provi s i ons i n  the Act of  Ju ly  1 2 ,  1 870 , wh i ch gave the Comp -
tro l l er spec i fi c  i ns tructi ons for a banknote red i s tri bution based on 
the 1 870 Census of popul ation . The l as t  prov i so  of secti on 1 of tha t  
Act provi ded that 11 no ban k i n g  assoc iati on hereafter orqani zed sha l l 
have a c i rcul at ion i n  exces s of  five hundred thousand do l l ars . 1 1 The 
Comptro l l er was further empowered to reduce the c i rcu l at ion of  the 
l a rg�st nati ona l  banks  ( fi rs t ,  those wi th a c i rcul at ion in exces s of 
$ 1  mi l l ion  and second , thos e wi th a c i rcu l ati on in exces s of $300 
thousand ) if the red i s tr i but ion scheme requi red i t .  These proposal s 
di d not greatly affect the total of banknotes i s s ued by the banks  of  
New York , but  it  d i d  d i s courage the l arge nati onal ban ks from expand i ng 
thei r c i rcu l ati on as  the i r  cap i ta l  grew . 
O f  greater impact was the effect of  the dec l i ne i n  i nterest  rates 
and the pas sage of the Act of June 2 0 ,  1 874 . I n terest  rates had fa l l en 
s tead i l y  after _1 869 . 
The Resumption Act of  1 875 el imi nated a l l restri cti ons on 
the amoun t of national  bank c i rcul at ion . . . . By thi s time , 
however ,  freedom of note i s sue under the nati onal ban ki ng 
l aws was a dead l etter because pri ces of  Uni ted States 
government bonds had ri sen wel l above par whi l e  nati ona l · 
ban k notes coul d be i s sued on ly  up to n i nety percent of  the 
par va l ue o f  s uch bonds . Nati ona l banks thus beqan to find  
it  more profi tabl e to reti re ci rcul ati on and  se l l thei r 
governmen t bonds than to buy bonds at , say 1 5-20 percent 
above oar and i ss ue ci rcul ati on in amounts 1 0  percent l es s  
than the par  va l ue of  the bonds . ( Syl l a ,  1 97 5 ,  pp , 60-61 ) 
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The Act of 1 875 el i mi nated the cei l i ng on the tota l of  banknotes wh i ch 
coul d be i s s ued by the system a s  a whol e .  The prov i s i on s  deal i n g  wi th 
the di stribution of banknotes between regi on s  was a l s o  repea l ed .  The 
Act di d not ,  however ,  repea l the max imums appl i cabl e to i ndi v i dua l  banks  
of d i fferent  s i zes embodi ed in  the Act of  Ma rch 3 ,  1 865 . The fa i l ure 
to repea l the provi s i ons of the Act of· March 3 ,  1 865 , ci ted above had 
l i ttl e effect ;  i s sue rates were fal l i ng and  fal l i n q  rapi d ly . 
I s sue rates fel l because the Act of  June 20 , 1 874 , a l l owed banks 
wi th a capi tal in  exces s of $ 1 50  thousand to reduce thei r depos i t  of 
bonds to $50 thousand . (Thi s meant that the c i rcul at ion for s uch  banks 
wa s set at  a mi n imum of $45 thous and . ) Prior to th i s  Act ,  the mi n imum 
bond depos i t  had been set at the greater of  e i ther $30  thousand or  
one-th i rd  of  c api tal for a l l nati ona l banks . For nat iona l  banks wi th  
a capi tal between $50 thousand and $ 1 50 thousand , the ol d mi n imum 
{ $30 thousand or one-th i rd of ca p ita l � whi chever was l arger ) remai ned 
i n  effect . That i s ,  thi s Act a l l owed l a rge banks to reduce the i r 
depo s i t  of bonds , and the fa l l  i n  i nterest rates made i t  profi tabl e 
for them to do so . 
I ss ue rates fel l s h arp ly  for both c l asses  of  c i ty ban ks , l es s  s o  
for country banks . Tabl e I V - 7 ,  page 91 , i nd i cates  that many country 
banks fel l i nto the category that was unaffected by the Act of June 20 , 
1 874 . From 1 872 through  1 874 , the East  Tennessee endeavored to i ssue 
as much c i rcul ati on as i t  coul d .  A dramat ic  reversa l  in  th i s  pattern 
occu rred in mi d- 1 875 . Between May 1 and June 30 of that year , the 
East Tennes see ceased to i ss ue the maximum c i rcul ati on a l l owed by l aw 
and i ns tead reduced i ts i ss ue of banknotes to a m in imum . Because i t  
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had a cap i ta l  of $ 1 50 thousand at that t ime , it was requ i red to depos i t  
$ 50 thousand i n  bonds wi th the . Comptro l l er .  Actua l l y ,  the l aw never 
s pec i fi ed a m in imum i ssue of ban knotes . A ban k cou l d  have fu l fi l l ed 
its l egal  ob l i gat ion by depos i ti nq the requi red bonds ; i t  was not · 
requ i red to take the next s tep of  actual l y  i s sui n g  banknotes . B u t ,  
because the addi ti onal  costs a s soci ated wi th that next s tep were sma l l ,  
banks genera l ly took i t .  (There was a 1 percent federa l tax on nati onal  
banknotes outstand i ng , p l us the rel at i vely sma l l  charqes associ ated wi th 
engravi ng  and s h i ppi ng  the banknotes to the ban k . ) The add i t i ona l  costs 
associated wi th c i rcu l ati on i s sued i n  excess  of  the mi n imum requ i red by 
l aw were not , however ,  negl i g i b l e .  Those  cos ts were primari l y  due to 
the rel at ive ly  h i gh premi ums wh ich  the bank  woul d have to pay to acqui re 
bonds . 
On May 1 ,  1 875 , the East Tenness ee ' s  report of cond i ti on s howed 
that i t  had deposi ted $200 thousand worth of bonds wi th the Comptrol l er 
that i t  had pa i d  premi ums on these bonds amounti n g  to $ 1 5 thousand . 
The next report of  condi ti on on June 30 , 1 875 , s howed $ 1 00 thousand i n  
bonds  deposi ted wi th the Comptro l l er ,  wi th  no prem i ums pa i d  on these 
bonds . By reduc i ng i ts bond depos i t  by $ 1 00 thousand , the bank had 
el imi nated premi ums pai d .  I n  fact ,  the East Tennessee had been s l owly 
wri ti ng  off the premi ums i t  had pai d for bonds s i nce early 1 873 . At 
that time ( February 28 , 1 873 ) , i t  owned $200 thousand i n  U . S .  bonds . 
The premi ums pa i d  on those bonds exceeded $1 9 thousand , whi ch was j u s t  
over 9 �  percent . By early 1 875 the bank had wri tten off ju st  over 
$4 thousand of these premi ums . By s el l i n g  $1 00 thousand of i ts banks  
i n  1 875 , the bank  was abl e to  wri te off a l l the rema i n i n g  premi ums 
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pai d .  Therefore , the $ 1 00 thousand i n  bonds had been sol d for at l ea s t  
1 5  percent over p ar  ( and pos s i bly  more ) , c l early refl ect i ng  the cont i nu ­
i ng dec l i ne i n  i nterest  rates from 1 873 to  1 875 . Had the ban k been 
a l l owed to , i t  mi ght have reduced i ts ci rcul ati ng  notes even fu rther . 
The cos t  of ma i ntai n i ng the $ 1 00 thousand i n  bonds and i ss u i n g  $90 
thousand i n  c i rcul ati on was a l most  certa i n ly  in excees of 1 �  percent 
( the 1 5  percent premi um p l us  the 1 percen t tax on ban knotes pl us  the 
o ther i n c i denta l expenses ) .  No bank  coul d expect to match that return 
wi th . the i nterest  on th� bonds pl u s  the i nterest  earned on l oans made 
wi th the ban knotes . 
The force o f  th i s  argument i s  strengthened by recogni tion  of  the 
s harp reduct ion i n  pa rt of the costs associ ated w i th i ss u i ng banknote s -­
t h e  cost o f  ma i ntai ni n g  reserves . T h e  Act of  June 20 , 1 874 , establ i s hed 
a 5 percent reserve fund for a l l nati ona l banks . Prior  to that Act , 
nati onal banks were requ i red to hol d reserves aga i ns t  banknotes out­
s tandi ng in the same proport i on as they hel d reserves aga inst  depos i ts --
1 5  percent  for country banks and 25 percent for c i ty banks . Wi th the 
passage of the Act of  1 874 , a l l banks had the reserve requi rement for 
banknotes outstandi ng  reduced to 5 percent . . In sp i te of th i s  reduct ion 
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i n  costs , i ss ue rates dropped , and they dro'pped most where the reductions 
in  cost were greates t--among c i ty ban ks . I s sue rates d i d  not fa l l  
s harp ly  for country banks  wi th t he passage o f  the Act of 1 874 , because 
the remai ni ng  h i gh m in i mum bond depo s i t  requi rements primari ly  appl i ed 
to them . 
After 1 875  the East Tennes see d i d  not a l ter the amount o f  ban knotes 
i t  i ssued unti l mi d-1 886 . At that time , i ts o l d  bonds matured �nd new 
ones had to be purchased . O n  March 1 ,  1 886 , the East  Tennessee had 
$1 00 thousand i n  bonds  and no premi ums pai d .  On June 3 o f  that yea r ,  
the bank l i s ted $25 thousand i n  bonds securi ng  c i rcu l ati on , $50 thousand 
secu ring  depos i ts , and premi ums pa i d  of $6 , 6 1 5 . 62 . The premi ums pai d 
i ncreased to $1 8 , 940 . 62 by the next reoort o f  cond i t ion on August 27 , 
1 886 . At that t ime premi ums pai d amounted to 25 . 3  percent o f  the par 
val ue of  U . S .  bonds owned ,  i ndi cati ng  the h i g h  cost of i ss u i n g  ci rcul a­
t ion � The  bank at thi s time had  a cap i ta l  o f  $ 1 00 thousand , hav i ng 
reduced i t  tB that po int  by J une 22 , 1 877 , i n  order to reduce taxes . 
( East  Tennessee Nati ona l Ban k ,  Ma rch 3 ,  1 877 . )  From m id- 1 877  throuqh 
Ma rch l ,  1 886 , the East Tennes see i s s ued c i rcul at ion amounti ng  to 45 
percent of  i ts cap i ta l . I t  was abl e to reduce i ts c i rcul ati on to 
$22 . 5  thousand i n  1 886 because of  the passage of  the Act of  Ju ly  1 2 ,  
1 882 . Th i s Act a l l owed banks wi th a capi tal $ 1 50  thousand or l es s  to 
reduce thei r depos i t  of bonds to one-fourth of capi tal . I t  res u l ted 
i n  a steady fa l l  i n  i s s ue rates for country banks . I n  1 881 , country 
banks were i s su i ng  c i rcul ati on at  about the s ame rate that they d i d  i n  
1 867 . I n  1 882 the rate s tarted to fal l  and i t  fel l unti l 1 89 1 , a t  
wh i c h  time i t  was at 24 . 8  percent of capi tal for the averaqe country bank . 
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The East Tennes see Nati onal i ss ued c i rcul ati on at a 22 . 5  percent 
rate ( the  mi n imum a l l owed by l aw)  for the res t  of 1 886 throu�h m i d- 1 887 . 
I t  then i ncreased i ts cap i ta l  to $1 7 5  thousand . (The i ncrease  �  
comp l eted by May 1 3 ,  1 887 . )  I ts c i rcu l ati on was i ncreased to $45 
thousand by Augu st  31 of that  year .  At that poi n t ,  i t  was agai n . 
i s s u i n g  the mi n imum amount . The mi n imum bond deposi t  for the East  
· Tennessee after i ts capi tal i ncrease  was $50  thousand , and it  made that 
depos i t  and no more unti l the l aw regard i ng  c i rc u l a t i on was chan�ed i� 
1 900 . 
After i ts fi rst s i x  months  of operat i on , the Mechan i c s  Nati onal 
had the opti on of depos i ti ng bonds equal to one-quarter of  capi tal . 
I n i ti a l l y ,  th i s  bank  chose not to i s �ue the m i n imum c i rcul ati on . 
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Instead , i t  i ssued 45  pe rcent  as much i n  banknotes a s  i t  had i n  capi ta l . 
I ts premi ums amounted to just  under 3 percent . I t  ma i nta i ned i ts 
ci rcul ati on at  $45 thousand for two and one-ha l f yea rs ,  but then reduced 
i ts bond depos i t  to the mi n imum requi red by l aw .  By December 20 , 1 884 , 
i t  had $25  thousand i n  bonds on deoos i t  and prem i ums pa id  of $400 ( about 
1 . 6 percent ) .  The Mechan ics  Na t iona l d i d  not a l ter i ts c i rcu l at i on aga i n  
unti l 1 900 , and i t  made no i ncrease i n  i ts ca pi ta l  unti l 1 905 . T hat  i s ,  
afte r a rel at ive ly  s hort peri od i n  wh ich  i t  i s s ued  one-hal f  a s  much 
c i rcul ati on as i t  wa s a l l owed by l aw to i s sue , the Mechan i cs Nati onal , 
l i ke the Ea s t  Tennes see , reduced i ts c i rcu l a tion to the m i n imum requ i red 
by l aw .  ( Aga i n ,  the mi n imum requi red wa s actua l ly  set by the mi n i mum 
bond deposi t ,  but  once bonds were depos i ted , the addi ti onal costs of  
i s su i ng banknotes were qu i te sma l l . ) 
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The three na ti onal banks operati ng i n  Knoxvi l l e  from 1 867 to 1 886 
responded , i nsofar as they were permi tted to respond , to changes in the 
co sts of  i ss u i ng ban knotes . When tho se cos ts changed , the . banks al tered 
· thei r note i s sue , aga i n  by as much  as  the l aw al l owed . The Fi rst Nat i ona l 
woul d probab ly  have i ncreased i ts c i rcul ati on had the Comptrol l er agreed , 
but the aggregate l im i t  on ci rcul ati on di d not perm i t  h i s  approval . The 
East Tennessee obvi ous ly was wi l l i n q  to i ncrease i ts c i rcul ati on ( i n  
fact ,  to doubl e what i t  had been through most  of 1 873 ) , unti l the ri se  
i n  bond prices  made ban knotes l es s  and l ess  economi cal compared to other 
sources of l i abi l i ti es .  The Mechan i cs Nati onal a l so  responded to the 
i ncreas i ng cost of  bonds by redu c i n g  i ts ci rcul ati on . 
Throughout the early peri od , the l ocal  nati onal banks demonstrated 
a s trong sen s i ti vi ty to the rel ati ve costs of l i ab i l i ti es . For the 
Fi rs t  National , l ow cost l i a b i l i ties  were ban kno tes and U . S .  government 
depos i ts ,  rather than pri vate depos i ts and borrowed money . The aggregate 
cei l i ng on banknotes , however ,  s tri c tly  l imi ted banknotes as a s ource of 
l i abi l i ti es . The Fi rst Nati ona l  responded by acqu i t i n g  a l arge vol ume 
of government depos i ts and by reduci ng the amoun t of pri vate depos i ts 
upon wh i ch i nterest was pai d ,  even though th i s  s trategy meant that  i ts 
pri vate depos i ts woul d grow s l owly .  
The Eas t  Tennessee i n  i ts f irst  ful l year o f  operat ion was faced 
wi th the Cri s i s  of 1 873 and re l at ive ly  h i qh costs for al l l i abi l i ti es . 
T he effects of that cri s i s  on the l ocal competi t i ve envi ronment ( the 
evi dent wea kness of norinati onal bank  competi tors and the fa i l ure of 
some of them) enabl ed the Ea st  Tennes see to reduce the costs of a l a r9e 
source of l i ab i l i ti es--pri vate depos i ts .  When i ts efforts i n  that 
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di recti on began to prov i de more and  more l ow cost  private depos i ts , the 
Ea st  Tennessee res ponded by reduc i ng the other s ource of h i g h  cos t 
l i abi l i ti es--nati onal  banknotes . 
The Mechan i cs Na ti onal  was l es s  successful  i n  �cqu i ri ng l ow cost 
l i ab i l i ties . I n stead , i t  had to pay for a l arger and l a rger s hare of  
i ts l i ab i l i ti es at  the  same time that  the  East  Tennes see ' s  cos t of  
l i ab i l i ti es was decl i n i n q .  I n  competi ng wi th the Eas t  Tennes see , the 
Mechani cs  Nati onal was at a d i s advantage for several reasons . Fi rs t , 
the East Tennes see was a successfu l , sol vent bank , and i t  had managed 
to s urvi ve a serious depres s i on in 1 873 , when many other ban ks d i d n ot . 
The Mechani cs  d i d  not have so l ong a h i s tory ; i t  had not proved that 
i t  coul d survi ve . Second , becau se the East Tennes see was vi ewed as 
the succes sor of the Fi rs t  Nati onal , the " proven rel i ab i l i ty "  of the 
East Tennessee extended beyond i ts actua l ex i stence . By and l arge , the 
l ocal. commun i ty seems to have regarded the Ea st  Tennessee and the F i rst  
Nati onal as one and the same bank , and therefore the F i rs t  Nati onal ' s  
. surv i va l  duri ng the turbul ent  l a st  year o f  the War and  the p a i nful  yea rs 
of reconstructi on was accepted as fu rther proof that th i s  bank was 
sens i bl y  managed . Experi ence , then , was al l on the s i de of the East 
Tennessee rather than on the s i de of the Mechan i cs .  Thi rd , customer 
fai th i n  the rel i ab i l i ty of the Mechan i c s  mu st have been sorely tes ted 
by the death of i ts pres i dent i n  a duel l es s  than one year after i t  
obta i ned i ts nati onal charter .  Th i s  handi cap p l us  the advan tages 
enjoyed by i ts competi tor compel l ed the Mechani c s  Nati onal to adopt a 
di fferent  strategy from that fol l owed by the Ea s t  Tennes see Nati ona l . 
Empl oyment of  Assets : 1 867-1 886 
The l ocal banks emp l oyed thei r assets i n  the fi rs t peri od i n  a 
more conservative fash i on than d i d  other ban ks . The Knoxv i l l e  ban ks 
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may have had a comprehens ive s trategy d i rect i n9 the acqu i s i t i on o f  thei r 
l i ab i l i ti es , but they d i d  not have s uch  a p l an for the management of 
thei r assets . The re l at ive importance of  severa l  s i gni ficant categori es 
of assets changed s harp ly  from year to yea r ,  wi th no d i scern i b l e  oattern�  
Throughout most of  the f i rst  peri od , the l ocal banks had l ower and more 
vari abl e rat i os of earn i n g  as sets to al l as sets than d i d  other banks 
because they genera l ly l ent l es s  and hel d h i ghe r reserves than d i d 
other banks . (They usua l ly hel d mos t  of the i r  reserves i n  cash  rather 
than in depos i ts wi th other banks . )  Duri ng  the next peri od , th i s  
conservative pattern al tered and the l oca l ban ks came to hol d h i �her 
and more stabl e rati os of ea rn i n g  assets to a l l as sets . Loans grew 
and reserves fe l l ,  wi th ban k  depo s i ts becomi n g  more i mportant and cash  
reserves l es s . Duri ng the  fi rst peri od , the  l oca l banks emphas i zed the 
qual i ty of  the ir  assets whereas i n  the next peri od , they oa i d  more 
attention to the quanti ty and proport ion i nq o f  those as sets . 
The rat i os of  earn i ng a s sets to al l as sets for both reserve c i ty 
and country banks  were usual ly h i gher and more stabl e than the same 
rat ios  were for the l oca l banks . ( See Tabl e IV-8 . )  (The Mechan ics ' 
rati o of ea rn i ng assets to a l l as sets was s tabl e but l ow . )  T he re l at ive 
i ns tabi l i ty of the l ocal ban ks ' rati os was due to the i n stab i l i ty of  
both thei r l oans and  the i r  reserves . The  re l ati ve sma l l ness o f  the 
rat i os was due to l ow rati os of l oans to assets and to l ow rati os of 
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Tab l e IV-8 
Average Rati o of Earn i ng  As sets to Al l As sets , 
i n  Percen ta 
Central 
Ea st  Reserve Reserve Country 
Year Fi rs t  Tennes see Mechan i cs C i ti es C i ti es Banks  
1 867 ( 3 )  73 . 3  57 . 0  77 . 5  87 . fi  
1 868 ( 1 � 82 . 3  55 . 9  7 8 . 5  89 . 3 
1 869 ( 4 79 . 9  55 . 7  80 . 0  89 . 9  
. ���� fj� 76 . 8  60 . 6  80 . 8  90 . 0  64.8 6o.q 81.0 90. 5 
1 872 74 . 2  ( 4 )  64 . 4  ( 1 ) 62 . 6  83 . 1  90 . 7  
1 87 3  79 . 3  63 . 9  8 3  , () 90 . 6  
1 874 81 . 3  63 . 5 .  82 . 1  90 . 1 
1 875  80 . 6  65 . 2  . 82 . 6  90 . 1  
1876 . 75.9 66.2 aj.o 90.2 
1 87 7  ( 4 )  74 . 0  65 . 1  82 . 5  89 . 7  
1 878 72 . 7  64 . 4  82 . 4  89 . 3  
1 879 ( 2 )  76 . 9  62 . 7  . 8 1  . 8  8A . 9  
1 880" ( 2 )  73 . 3 56 . 2  8 1 . 4  89 . 1  
l88l 57. 5 56 . 5  82 .1  89 .4 
1 882 62 . 2  75 . 9  ( 4 )  58 . 6  82 . 1  89 . 6  
1 883 65 . 2  8 1 . 9  63 . 4  82 . 5  89 . 7  
1 884 ( 3 )  69 . 0  79 . 2  65 . 0  82 . 7  89 . 4  
1 885 79 . 0  80 . 6  59 . 5  80 . 5  88 . 9  
1886 72,g 80.5 6b.O 82. 0  88. 7 
aEarn i n g  assets are l oans , securi t i es , and bank depos i ts .  
Source : Reports of Con d i t i on .  See a l so note h ,  Tabl e IV- 1 , oaoe 
67 , and Appendi x A .  
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bank  depos i ts to reserves . The fai l ure of  the three l ocal banks to 
mai nta i n  h i gh and  stab l e rati os i ndi cates that they di d not p l an the 
overa l l emp l oyment  of the i r  assets i n  th i s  peri od as careful ly  as they 
d i d  l ater .  Whi l e  the l ocal banks preferred to l end l ess  and hol d more 
i n  reserve than di d other nat i ona l  ban ks i n  the same cl ass , thei r reserve 
pol i c i es do not refl ect a tendency to d i s crimi nate between l ocal and 
d i s tant cus tomers . Had they done so , l ow l oan-asset rati os woul d have 
been coupl ed wi th h i g h  rati os of bank depos i ts to primary res erves . 
Such was not the case . Low l oan-asset rat ios we re oai red wi th h i qh 
cost to reserve rati os . The behavi or of  the l ocal  ban ks duri nq the 
fi rs t peri od i s  therefore bes t  descri bed as hav inq  been conservati ve , 
not monopol i s ti c .  
Tabl e I V -9 s hows that the l ocal banks were more conservati ve than 
other banks , a l though  that conservat i sm d imi n i shed somewhat by l ate i n  
the peri od . The Fi rs t  Nati onal qeneral l y  had a l oan -asset rati o on l .v 
about one-ha l f as h i g h  as  the l oan-a sset rat i o  for the averaqe country 
bank . The East Tennessee al so  had a rel atively  l ow l oan-asset rati o ,  
a l though not qu i te so  l ow as the Fi rst Nati ona l . The Mechan i cs Nati onal 
after i ts fi rst year of  operati on , l ent at about the same rates as  d i d  
most  other ban ks through the end o f  1 886 . 
I t  i s  a l so  apparent that the l ocal banks di d not settl e on a 
fi xed percen tage of thei r as sets wh i ch s houl d be l ent  ou t .  I n  l ater 
years , the l oan -asset rat i os for the ban ks conti nued to fl uctuate , but 
not by as much as they did i n  the fi rst peri od . Furthermore , in  l a ter 
years , d i fferences in l oan-asset rat i os between the l ocal banks and 
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Tab l e IV-9 
Average Rati o of Loans to Assets , in  Percenta 
Central 
East Reserve Reserve Country 
Year Fi rst Tennes see Mechan i cs C i ti es C i ti es Banks 
1 867 ( 3 )  1 9 . 4  37 . 1  42 . 4  40 . 6  
1 868 ( l )  34 . 7  37 . 9  44 . 8  43 . 3  
1 869 ( 4 )  2 1 . 1  38 . 8  47 . 0  44 . 9  
1 870 ( 4 22 . 4  43 . 0  48 . 6  46 . 4  
1 87 1  3 1 7 . 0  44 . 6  48 . 9  47 . 4  
1 872 22 . 4  ( 4 )  7 . 9 ( 1 ) 46 . €  5 1 . 7  39 . 8  
1 873  2 4 . 6  48 . 8  52 . 6  49 . 7  
1 874 34 . 1  48 . 6  5� . 3  49 . 5  
1 875 1 5 . 3  49 . 8  54 . 0 5 1  . 1 
1876 47.4 48.9 54.6 51.2 
1 877 ( 4 )  37 . q  48 . 1  54 . 3  50 . 2  
1 878 29 . 8  44 . 5  53 . 3  47 . 9  
1879 �2 � 38 . 6  43 . 1  49 . 7  46 . 2  
1 880 2 45 . 0  45 . 4  52 . 1  48 . 2  
1881 33.0 44.5 53.3 49.4 
1 882 42 . 9  47 . 0  ( 4 )  46 . 5  54 . 7  52 . 5  
1 883 44 . 1  5 7 . 5  5 1 . 2  55 . 8  54 . 4  
1 884 ( 3 )  46 . 0  58 . 7 52 . 1  5fi . 9  54 . 9  
1 885 52 . 9 60 . 1  47 . 6  55 . 4  54 . 3  
1886 54.0 54.0 54.9 59.3 5�.8 
asource : Repo rts of Condi ti on . See a l so note b .  Tabl e IV  - 1  , 
page 67 , and Append ix  A .  
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other banks d im in i shed . The wi de swi ngs i n  l oan-asset rati os for the 
Ea st Tennessee Na ti onal from one yea r to the next were not a pe rmanent 
characteri st ic  of  th i s  bank ' s  behav i or .  By the e nd  o f  the · trans i tion  
peri od , the l arge fl u ctua ti ons i n  i ts l oan-as set rat i o  had di sappeared . 
The Mechan i cs Nati ona l d i d  not have l arge vari ati ons i n  i ts 
l oan-asset rati o  ( compared to the Eas t . Tennessee or Fi rst Nat iona l ) .  
Thi s bank had had consi derabl e d i ffi cu l ty i n  acqui ri n o  a l a rge and . 
growi ng  vol ume o f  l ow cost l i abi l i t i es . Because i t  had to pay for so  
many of i ts l i ab i l i ties , i t  was obl i ged to manage i ts assets more 
carefu l l y  than e i ther the F i rst  Nati ona l or the East Tennessee Nati onal . 
The exami ners • reports for 1 884- 1 886 i nd i cate that the Mechan i c s  was 
payi ng 3 to 4 percent for demand certi fi cates of  depo s i t  and 3 percent 
for bank  depos i ts .  (At the same time , the East Tennessee was payi ng 
i nterest on a rap i d ly  d imi n i sh i ng port i on of i ts pri vate depos i ts . )  
Duri ng those yea rs , the Mechan i c ' s  vol ume of  both demand certi fi cates 
of depo s i t  and bank depo s i ts was i ncreas i n g ,  and i ncreas i n9 rel ative 
to other l i abi l i ties . The Mechan ic s  coul d not afford to be as  con serva­
tive towards i ts borrowers as  was the Ea st Tennessee , nor cou l d  i t  
afford to hol d a s  h i gh a proport ion o f  nonea rn i n g  as sets as d i d  the 
East Tennessee . A more aggress i ve pol icy in the acqu i s i ti on of 
l i ab i l i ti es l ed to a more aggres s i ve pol i cy towa rds maki ng l oans . 
On i ts fi rst exami nat i on , 48 percent of  the Mechani cs l oans were 
demand l oans secured by col l atera l , whi l e  41 percent were t ime l oans 
secured by two or more endorsements . Four oercent were time l oans  
secured by col l ateral s ( Mechan i cs Nati ona l  Bank , Report of Exami nati on , 
May 1 8 ,  1 882 ) . When th i s  bank ' s  l oan-as set rat i o  rose  ( 1 884 - 1 886 ) , i t  
al so became more accomodati n g  towards i ts borrowers . Demand l oans 
( l oans payabl e at  the bank ' s  demand)  fel l and t ime l oans i ncreased . 
(T ime l oans were l oans wh ich  were ma de for a spec i fi c  peri od of time , 
and wh i c h  coul d not be ca l l ed before maturi ty . ) Loans  s ecured by two 
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or more endorsements grew and a grow i ng portion of those endorsements 
were made by di rectors of the bank .  That i s , the di rectors demonstrated 
a growi ng  wi l l i ngness  to add the i r  persona l endorsemen t to l oans wh i c h  
were not made for thei r personal benefi t .  Even though these changes  i n  
l oan  po l i cy represented a more aggress ive  approach to l endi ng , the l oan 
pol i cy of  th i s  bank was not as  agqress i ve i n  the se years as  i t  wa s i n  
l ater years , becau se  the Mechani cs d i d  not systemat ica l l y  and b l atantl y 
v i ol ate the rul e that no more than 1 0  percent of paid  i n  capi tal cou l d  
be . l ent to any one borrower . From 1 882 to 1 886 , the Mechani cs d i d  
v io l ate the 1 0  percen t l oan l imi t ,  b u t  the v i ol ations  i n  these years 
were i nfrequent and sma l l .  I n  l ater years , .the number of v i o l a t i on s  
i ncreased , a nd  t he  extent to wh i ch overl oans exceeded t he  l imi t grew 
dramati cal ly  both for th i s  and for other ban ks . 
The Mechan i cs al tered the l oan pol i cy i t  had i n  1 882 i n  order to 
make i t  eas i er for i ts customers to obta i n  l oans , bu t i t  d i d  not ma ke 
i t  eas i er for them to obtai n l arge l oans . I n  l a ter years , the bank 
took  the further steps of i ncreas i ng i ts time l oans endorsed by one 
i nd i v i dual { rather than by two or more i nd i vi dua l s ) , and i ncrea s i n9 the 
s i ze of i ts l oans . From 1 882 to 1 886 , the exami ner repo rted tha t 
overl oans and l imi t l oans  were 4 to 1 1  percent of a l l l oans , whereas 
from 1 891  to 1 895 , for exampl e ,  overl oans and l im i t  l oans were 1 5  to 
26 percent of al l l oans . 
I t  woul d ,  of course , be qui te i nteresti ng to compare the l oan 
pol i ci es of the East Tennes see Nati onal wi th those o f  the Mechan i cs 
Nati onal duri ng the f irst  peri od , bu t the exami ners ' reoorts for the 
East  Tennessee have not been made publ i c . Any compa ri son mu st then 
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rely  upon the correspondence between the l oca l banks and the Comptro l l er 
of the Currency . The correspondence does not make any menti on o f  the 
types of  l oans  granted by the Ea st  Tennes see , but overl oans were an 
occas i onal subject . The l e tters i nd i cate tha t  there were no s i gn i fi cant 
di fferences between the East Tennessee and the Mecha n i cs in respect 
to the sanct i ty wi th wh i c h  they hel d the 1 0  percent l oan l imi t .  Both 
banks occas i onal ly  v i o l a ted the l imi t ,  but when they d i d , the v i ol at i ons 
were sma l l .  Frequent and fl agrant v io l ation s  of the 1 0  percent l oan 
l imi t were not part of the s tra teg ies  of  these two banks duri ng the 
fi rst peri od . Such v io l ati ons d i d  become an important  part of the i r  
acti �i ti e� l ate i n  the trans i ti on per iod . 
The Fi rst Nati onal d id  not habi tua l ly  qrant exces s i ve l oans . The 
few that were granted were re l at i vel y smal l v i ol ati ons . (The exami ner ' s  
reports for the F i rs t  Nati onal were not very exten s i ve ,  and consequentl y 
a detai l ed analysi s of the types of l oans made by th i s  bank i s  not 
poss i bl e . ) 
I n  summary ,  the l oa n  pol i ci es of both the Fi rst Nati onal and the 
Eas t  Tennessee Nati onal seem to . have focused more upon the qual i ty of 
the i ndi v i dua l  l oans rather than upon the tota l vol ume . .  I n  contrast , 
the Mec han ics  Nati ona l  was forced to pay more a ttent i on to the quant i ty 
of  i ts l oans , and d i d  so  by re l axi ng the requ i remen ts that potent ia l  
..• 
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borrowers had to meet . As a cons equence of these pol i ci es , both the 
Fi rst Nati onal and the East Tennessee Nati onal had l oan-asset rat i os 
wh i c h  fl uctuated a great dea l from year to year ,  whereas the Mechan i c s 
Nati onal had a more stabl e l oan-asset rat i o .  
The obverse o f  l oan pol i cy was reverse po l i cy .  W i de vari ations i n  
l oan-asset rat i os from one year to the next had a mi rror i mage effect 
on  reserve-as set rati os ; movements i n  one were accompan i ed by movements 
i n  the oppos i te d i recti on by the other . 
The Fi rst Nati onal ' s  primary res erve rati o was a lways h i qher than 
.... the  same rati o for country banks , and in mos t  yea rs h i gt:er than the 
rat io  for reserve c i ty banks . ( See Tabl e IV� l o . ) 
I n  fac t ,  i n  the four  years o f  1 867 and 1 869-1 871 , the Fi rst Nati onal ' s  
primary reserve rati o was .about the same as that o f  central reserve c i ty 
banks . G i ven the l ega l  reserve requ i rement ,  i t  i s  not surori s i nq that 
centr-al reserve c i ty banks had a h i g her primary reserve rati o than the 
other two c l asses , or  that reserve c i ty banks had a h i gher ra tio  than 
did country banks . The unexpectedly h i g h  rati o for the Fi rst Nati onal 
bespeaks that bank ' s  s trong preference for a cons ervat i ve ly  a rranaed 
bal ance sheet . I n  addi ti on to a h i qh primary res erve rati o ,  the Fi rs t 
Nati onal a l so hel d a secondary reserve rat i o  wh i ch was h i gher  than that 
hel d by the a verage bank in each of  the th ree cl as ses , a l though the 
d i fference between the Fi rst Nati ona l and th e averaqe country bank was 
sma l l er here than for primary reserves . ( See Tabl e IV-1 1 . )  That i s , 
the Fi rs t  Nati ona l hel d a much h i gher proportion of i ts assets i n  l i qui d 
a nd near-l i q u i d  form than d id  other banks . 
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Tab l e I V- 1 0 
Average Rati o of  Primary Reserves to Ass ets , i n  Percenta 
Central 
Ea st  Reserve Res erve Country 
Year Fi rst Tennes see Mechan i c s  Ci ti es Ci ti es Ban ks  
1 867 ( 3 )  40 . 3  44 . 5  28 . 2  1 9 . 6  
1 868 ( 1 ) 22 . 2  45 . 2  27 . 5  1 8 . 0 
1 869 ( 4 )  . 36 . 6  45 . 6  2 5 . 5  ' 1 6 . 6  
1 870 �4� 41 . 7  40 . 6  2 5 . 7  1 7 . 0  1871 3 42. 5 40 . 6  26 . 5  1 6 .9 
1 872 25 . 8  ( 4 )  58 . 2  ( 1 ) 39 . 2  2 4 . 3  1 5 . 8 
1 873 1 8 . 2  37 . 8  24 . 4  1 5 . 8 
1 874 1 6 . 8  37 . 5  25 . 2  1 5 . 4 
1 875 1 7 . 3  . 35 . 7  2 3 . 6  1 4 . 0 
1876 22.7 35.0 . 23.6 14.2 
1 877 ( 4 )  2 1 . 7  36 . 1 2 3 . 0  1 4 . 3  
1 878 . 24 . 3  36 . 4  2 3 . 2  1 4 . 6  
1 879 ( 2 )  2 2 . 2  38 . 0  24 . 7  1 6 . 0 
1 880 {2 )  33 . 0  45 . 1 2 7 . 6  1 8 . 7  
1881 . 50 .2 44 . 7  26 . 5  1 8 . 6  
1 882 41 . 4  34 . 7  ( 4 } 43 . 0  2 5 . 6  1 7 . 0 
1 883 40 . 6  27 . 5  38 . 3  25 . 6  1 6 . 5  
1 884 ( 3 )  38 . 5  2 5 . 1  36 . 6  2 5 . 6  1 6 . R  
1 885 3 L l 2 3 . 6  42 . 6  28 . 3  1 8 . 1  
1�f3� �3.2 2S.7 ��.(i 26.9 18.4 
aprimary reserves are bank depos i ts ,  cash  i tem , c l eari ng house 
bal ances , and cash . 
Source : Reports of Condi ti on .  See a l s o  note b ,  Tab l e  IV- 1 , oage 
page 67 , and Appendi x A .  
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Tabl e IV - 1 1  
Average Rati o of Secondary Reserves to As sets , i n  Percenta 
Year F i rs t  
East 
Tennessee Mechan i cs 
Centra 1 
Reserves 
Ci ti es 
Reserve 
C i ti es 
Country 
Banks 
1 867 ( 3 )  
1 868 ( 1 ) 
1 869 ( 4 )  
1 870 ( 4 )  
1871 (3) 
1 87 2  
1 873 
1 874 
1 875 
1876 
1 877 ( 4 )  
1 878 
1 879 ( 2 )  
1 880 · ( 2) 
1881 
1 882 
1 883 
1 884 ( 3 )  
1 885 
1886 
39 . 0  
39 . 5  
38 . 8  
32 . 9  
36.7 
44 . 8  ( 4 )  2 7 . 5  ( 1 )  
50 . 2  
43 . 2  
30 . 5  
22.8 
32 . 9  
38 . 3  
32 . 7  
1 6 . 8  
1 1 . 8 
1 2 . 7  
1 3 . 8  
1 3 . 7  
1 2 . 6  
11 .5 
1 6 . 3  ( 4 )  
1 1 . 1  
1 1 . 3  
1 1  . 5  
12.6 
1 6 . 9  
1 5 . 1  
1 3 . 6  
1 4 . 1 
12.8 
1 1 . 7 
1 0 . 9 
1 1 . 3 
. 1 1 . 5  
13.1 
1 2 . 4  
1 5 . 9  
1 6 . 0  
7 . 2  
8 . 3  
7 . 9  
7 . 7  
8 . 3 
7 . 2 
6.5 
27 . 8  
26 . 0  
25 . 5  
23 . 7  
22.5 
2 1 . 9  
20 . 9  
20 . 0  
1 9 . 0  
18.3 
1 9 .  1 
2 1 . 7  
2 2 . 0  
1 7 . 4  
1 7 . 5  
1 6 . 9  
1 6 . 0  
1 4 . 9  
1 3 . 8  
11.4 
38 . 1  
36 . 9  
36 . 6  
34 . 6  
33 .6 
42 . 2  
32 . 1  
32 . 0  
30 . 0  
30.5 
31 . 3  
33 . 0  
33 . 5  
29 . 2  
28 . 4  
27 . 0  
25 . 6  
24 . 8  
2 4 . 1  
21.4 
asecondary reserves are U . S .  bonds , premi ums , and other securi ti es . 
Source : Reports of Condi ti on . See al so note b ,  Tab l e  IV- 1 , 
page 67 , and Appendi x  A .  
The Eas t Tenness ee National , wh i l e  not qu i te so cons ervati ve as 
the Fi rs t  Na ti ona l , hel d  a rel at ivel y h i gh  primary reserve rat i o  for 
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most  o f  the fi rs t peri od . The yea rs 1 873-1 879 were an aoparent except i on 
to thi s conservati ve arrangement of assets . T he rel atively l ow primary 
reserve ra t ios  for the East  Tennessee duri ng  those yea rs were , however,  
offset by very h i g h  secondary reserve rati os . On  ba l a nce duri n g  that 
peri od , the Eas t Tennessee had a more conservat ive arrangemen t of a s sets 
than di d other banks . From 1 880 to 1 886 , the Ea s t  Tennes see was somewha t 
l es s  conservati ve than previous ly . Whereas i ts primary reserve rati o  
was rel a ti ve ly  h i gh , i ts seconda ry reserve rat io  fel l  be l ow the rat i o  
hel d by other country banks and was about the same a s  that hel d by 
reserve c i ty banks . Even then , tota l reserves for the Ea st  Tennessee 
con sti tuted a l a rger port ion of  i ts as sets than d i d  total reserves for 
the avera ge bank  of any cl ass . 
Jhe Mechan i cs National  genera l l y  had a l ess con servati ve arrangemen t 
of i ts as sets than d i d  the East  Tennessee Na t iona l  or the average country 
ban k .  The Mechan i cs · general ly  he ld  a h i gher orimary reserve rat i o  but a 
l ower secondary reserve rati o than d i d  the average country ban k .  The 
net effect was a somewhat l es s  conservati ve or mo re aggress i ve arrange­
ment than that of the average country ban k .  However ,  the compos i t i on of 
primary reserves for the Mechan i c s  Nati onal was more conservative than 
the compos i ti on for the average country bank . 
T he l ocal banks  general l y  hel d a h i gher proport i on of thei r primary 
reserves i n  cash and a l ower proporti on i n  bank  depos i ts than di d reserve 
c i ty or country banks . ( See Tabl es IV- 1 2 and IV- 1 3 . ) Furthe r ,  the 
• 
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Tabl e IV- 1 2 
Average Rat io  of  Cash  to Primary Reserves , i n  Percent 
Central 
East . Reserve Reserve· Country 
Year Fi rst Tennessee Mechan i cs Ci ti es Ci ti es Bank s  
1 867 ( 3 )  5 9  0 1  39 o 8  59 o 2  48 o 6  
1 868 ( 1 ) 43 o 5  35 o 5  50 o 9 . 44 o 0  
1 869 ( 4 )  38 o 8  34 o 3  49 o 5  43 o 4  
1 870 ( 4 )  4 1 . 2  47 o 5  50 o 6  40 o 6  
1871 (3) 65 o 9  39 0 3  43 o 8  37 o 6  
1 872 69 o 4  ( 4 )  42 o 4  ( l )  37 o 4  42 o 4  39 o 3  
1 873  68 o 5  37 o 8  42 o 4  39 o 8  
1 874 73 o 9  46 o 2  43 o 8  38 o 8  
1 875 69 . 1  43 o 1  39 .4  35 o 2  
1876 7209 46.5 40.7 35.1 
1 877 ( 4 )  82 o 2  45 o 3  43 o 9  36 o 7  
1 878 78 0 1  4 1 . 9  42 o 7  37 o 5  
1 879 ( 2 }  69 . 9  34 . 4  41 . 1  36 . 5  
1 880 {2} 60 � 7  30 . 0  36 .4  32 . 8  
1as1 72. 8 29 .9 37.2 33 . 2  
1 882 82 o l  59 o 4  ( 4 ) 3 1 . 4  39 o 2  35 o 6  
1 883 80 o 3  49 . 3  39 o 9  39 o 4  36 o 9  
1 864 ( 3 )  73 o 4  59 o 4  54 o 0  43 o 7  37 . 8  
1 885 50 o 0  58 . 0  59 . 2  45 o 6  37 o 5  
' 1 886 74.2 47.3 52 .9 43o9 3S.2 
asource : Reports of Condi t ion . See a l so  note b ,  Tah l e IV- 1 , page 
67 , and Appendi x  A .  
Year 
1 867  ( 3 )  
1 868 ( 1 ) 
1 869 ( 4 )  
1 870 ( 4� 
1871 (3 
1 872  
1 873 
. 1 87 4  
1 875 
1876 
1 877 ( 4 )  
1 878 
1 879 ( 2 )  
1 880 (2) . 
1 88 1 . 
1 882 
1 883 
1 884 ( 3 )  
1 885 
1 886 
Tabl e IV- 1 3  
Average Rat io  of Ban k  Depos i ts to Primary Reserves , 
i n  Percenta 
Fi rs t  
36 . 9  
36 . 3  
54 . 4  
5 1 . 7  
26.5 
27 . 4  ( 4 )  
East  
Tennes see 
49 . 8  ( 1 )  
24 . 8  
23 . 3  
. 27 . 9  
. 25.3 
1 4 . 9  
1 9 . 3  
2 5 . 4  
34 . 8  
25 . 4  
1 5 . 9  
1 7 . 9  
24 . 0  
43', 4  
22.3 
Mechan i cs 
36 . 3  ( 4 )  
48 . 5  
36 . 7  
37 . 9  
48.5 
Central 
Reserve 
C i ti es 
7 . 0 
6 . 5  
7 . 1  
8 . 4  
8. 5 
1 0 . 5  
1 1 . 2  
9 . 6 
1 1  . 1 
12.2 
1 2 . 7  
1 1 . 0 
9 . 5  
8 . 0  
8 . 3  
9 . 6 
1 1 . 4 
1 2 . 0 
1 0 . 8  . 
12.9 . 
R�serve 
Ci ti es 
26 . 0  . 
28 . 0  
29 . 6  
3 3 . 2  
36.3 
39 . 1  
38 . 8  
39 . 4  
40 . 6  
42.7 
39 . 6  
40 . 2  
40 . 8  
43 . 2  . 42 . 9  
40 . 7  
4 1 . 9  
42 . 8  
39 . 9  
42. 0 
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Country 
Banks 
45 . 0  
50 . 6  
50 . 5  
5 3 . 2  
56 . 3  
54 . 6  
5 5 . 3  
5 5 . 8  
58 . 5  
s9.s · 
57 . 6  
5 7 . 1  
58 . 1  
62 . 4  
6 2 . 3  
59 . 0  
58 . 0  
57 . �  
5 8 . 0  
57.5 
asank depos i ts are amounts due from reserve agents , other nati onal 
banks , and other ban ks and c l eari ng house certi fi cates of depos i t  hel d .  
Source : Reports o f  Cond i t i on .  See a l s o  note b ,  Tab l e  I V- 1 , page 
IV-9 , and Append ix  A .  
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rel ati ve importance of these two categories  of prima ry reserves  was not 
espec i a l l y  s tabl e from one year to the next for the l ocal ban ks i n  the 
fi rs t peri od . I n  l ater yea rs ( towa rd the end of  the trans i ti on peri od ) 
there was more s tabi l i ty i n  thei r rel at ive i mportance .  
The Fi rst  Nati onal al most  a lways had a h i gher percentage of . i ts 
primary reserves i n  cash than d i d  the average country bank . I n  s ome 
years , i ts cash -primary reserve rat io  exceeded the rati o for reserve 
c i ty banks . At the same time , the Fi rst Na t iona l usual ly  he l d  a sma l l er 
percentage of i ts primary reserves i n  bank depos i ts than d i d  reserve c i ty 
banks or country banks . ( Compari son wi th the Centra l Res erve Ctiy banks 
i s  d i ffi cul t because those banks often hel d more than one-ha l f  of the i r  
primary reserves i n  cash i tems . There were primari l y  certi fi ed checks 
drawn to fac i l i tate stock and bond trad i ng ,  bu� �h i c h  had not been 
presented for paymen t .  The l ack  of deta i l  i n  the reports of cond i t i on 
publ i s hed i n  the Comptro l l er • s  Annua l Report makes i t  imposs i b l e  to 
determi ne the proporti on of cash i tems derived from certi fi ed checks , 
and therefore i t  i s  imposs i b l e  to produce a usefu l compari son between 
central rese rve c i ty banks and other c l a sses . )  Further , the  range over 
whi ch the Fi rst Nati onal • s  cash  to pri mary reserve rati o vari ed was  
qu i te 1 a rge . 
The same pattern was fo l l owed by the Fi rs t Nati ona l  • s  s uccessor , 
the Ea st  Tennessee . I n  fact , the Ea st Tennessee had a s l i q htly stronqer 
preference for cash than di d the Fi rst Nati ona l . From 1 872 to 1 886 , 
cash  made up more than 60 percent of  primary reserves i n  a l l but two 
years . Bank depos i ts were usual l y  one-quarter or l es s . Both �ercen t�qes 
varied over a wide range . However , by the end o f  the trans i ti on peri od , 
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ban k depos i ts accoun ted for better than 70 percent o f  primary reserves , 
cash  for l es s  than one-quarter ,  and the range over wh i ch both percentages 
vari ed had been s harp ly  reduced . 
The Mechan i cs Nati ona l al so had a s tronq preference for cas h  du ri ng  
· the fi rst peri od , al though i ts cas h  to pri mary reserve rati o was .usu all y 
bel ow that o f  the East Tennes see . I ts bank depos i t  to orimary reserve 
rati o was usual l y  h i gher than the East Tennes see ' s  but l ower than e i ther 
the averaqe reserve c i ty ban k  or the average country ban k .  Furthermore , 
the percentages of  primary reserves comi ng  from cash and from bank  
depos i ts for the Mechan i cs Nati onal d i d  not vary over so  w ide a ranqe 
as d i d  the East Tennessee ' s .  These two percentages al so  underwent the 
same reversa l  i n  rel ati ve importanc� and vari ab i l i ty i n  l ater ye�rs as 
the Eas t  Tennessee ' s .  
The re l ati ve i mportance of cash and bank depos i ts to primary 
reserves i nd i cates that the l ocal banks i n  the early oeri od were more 
conservati ve than l ocal banks were i n  l ater years . They were a l so more 
conservati ve than ei ther reserve c i ty banks or country banks duri n g  the 
fi rst per iod . Th i s  pattern of conservat ive behavi or by the l oca l banks 
i s  enhanced when the bank deoos i t  porti on of  primary res erves i s  
exami ned . ( See Tab l e  IV-1 4 . ) The l ocal ban ks d i d not , as a general  
rul e ,  spread the i r  bank  depos i ts between reserve agents , other nati onal 
banks , and other ban ks . I nstead , they tended to concentrate the i r bank  
depos i ts wi th thei r reserve agents , al though there was  often con s i derab l e  
vari ati on  i n  the proport ion i ng o f  these depos i ts from one year to the 
nex t .  I n  l a ter yea rs , there was a tendency for bank depos i ts to be 
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Table IV- 1 4  
Average Rati o o f  Depos i ts wi th Reserve Agents and C l eari nq House 
Certi fi cates of  Depos i t  Hel d to Ban k Depos i ts ,  in Percent 
East Reserve Country 
Year Fi rs t  . Tennes see Mechan i c s  C i ti es Banks  
1 867 
1 868 
1 869 ( 4 )  62 . 5  ( 1 )  64 . 5  69 . 2  
1 870 ( 4� 29 . 9  67 . 7  72 . q 
1871 (3 86.6 69.3 72. 9 
1872 72 . 6  ( 4 )  34 . 3  ( 1 ) 69 . 2  73 . 0  
1 87 3  47 . 9  li6 . 3  73 . 9  
1 874 85 . 6  65 . 4  72 . 9  
1 875  78 . 2  62 . 8 69 . 4  
1876 62.4 ti3.9 71.3 
1 877 ( 4 )  65 . 7  60 . 0  70 . 3  
1 878 72 . 7  61 . R 70 . 9  
1 879 ( 2 )  97 . E  61 . 6  7 1 . 9  
1 880 ( 2 )  . 63 . 0  6 1 . 4  70 . 3  
1881 98.5 5R. 5  69.4 
1 882 97 . 0  5 1 . 9  ( 4 )  56 . 0  68 . 5 
1 883 7 5 . 7  38 . 7  56 . 9  68 . 7  
1 884 ( 3 )  66 . 6  56 . 4  58 . 2  70 . 4  
1 885 55 . 9 . 5 1 . 7  55 . 6  7 1 . 0  
unn; 52.3 51.4 53.9 69.S 
a source : Reports of Condi t i on . See al so  note b ,  Tabl e IV- 1 , paqe 
page 67 , and Append ix  A .  
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more wi dely di stri bu ted as  the l ocal ban ks ought to depos i t  thei r funds 
where the return was l a rgest . 
Tha t tendency was most  apparent i n  the acti v i t i e s  o f  the Ea s t  
Tennessee Na t ional . After the fi rst per i od ,  the rat i o  of  depos i ts w ith 
reserve agen ts ( and i n  c l earing  hous e ce rt i fi cates of  depos i t ) to al l 
bank depos i ts for th i s  bank fel l and became rel atively s tabl e .  Other 
l ocal ba nks had a more vari ed experi ence . I n  most  yea rs of  the final  
peri od , thei r ra ti o was re l a ti vely l ow and s tabl e ,  but not so l ow or 
s tab l e  as  the Ea st Tennes see ' s .  
The exami ner ' s  reports rarely di sti ngu i shed between i nterest rates 
pa i d  by other ban ks to the l ocal ban ks . I n  most  cases , a s i mol e range 
of rates was g i ven ,  but the range d i d  not i denti fy wh i c h  banks  pai d the 
h i ghest rates . On those few occas i ons when an i dent i fi cat i on was made , 
reserve agents , especi al ly those i n  New York Ci ty ,  qeneral ly  pa i d  l ower 
rates than d i d  other banks , whether they were nati onal or nonnat iona l . 
The decl i ne i n  the percentage of ban k depos i ts go i nq to reserve agents 
in l ater yea rs refl e�ts the more i ntens i ve search for the h i q her return . 
The h i gh rat i os of  the early yea rs i ndi cate that the l ocal  banks were 
not as  aggres s i ve then as they were l ater on . 
Summary 
Duri ng the first pe ri od , the l ocal banks managed the i r  assets 
conservati vel y .  They genera l l y  preferred to ho l d  mo re reserves and make 
fewer l oans than d i d  other nati onal banks . I n  add i t i on ,  they genera l l y  
hel d a h i gher proporti on o f  thei r reserves i n  ca s h  and a l ower proporti on 
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i n  bank depos i ts than di d other bank s . Thei r choice of a l ow-ri s k  
s trategy for the management of  thei r assets was made pos s i b l e  by the i r 
abi l i ty to acqui re l ow-cost  l i ab i l i t i es . Thei r abi l i ty to · acqui re 
l ow-cost l i abi l i ti es through muc h  o f  the fi rst peri od was l i nked to 
thei r s tatus  a s  nati ona l banks ( but  not thei r status as  country banks ) .  
For two banks ( the Fi rs t  Nati ona l and the East Tennes see National ) ,  the 
ri ght  to i ss ue banknotes and the ri g ht  to acqu i re U . S .  government 
depos i ts were i mportant advantages over thei r s tate chartered compet i tors . 
Furthermore , the l ocal nati onal banks  were l arger than thei r s ta te 
chartered competi tors , a nd some of  the di spari ty i n  s i ze can be expl ai ned 
by the re l ati ve ly  l a rge capi ta l requ i red for nati ona l · banks i n  Knoxv i l l e .  
Membersh i p  i n  the · Nati onal Banki ng System does not , however,  account  
for a l l the advantages enjoyed by t he  l ocal ban ks . Thei r conservati ve 
approach to ban ki ng ,  especi a l l y  duri ng the d i ffi cul t recons tructi on years , 
prob�b ly  had strong  support from the publ i c .  I t  wa s on l y  wi th great 
rel uctance and under strong provocat i on that the l ocal nationa l banks  
abandoned the ir  conservat ive hab i ts .  Furthermore , the c hange i n  behav ior  
duri ng the  next period came because of  changes i n  the  s tructure of 
nati onal ban k i ng in  Knoxvi l l e  and because  o f  growth in  Knoxv i l l e ' s  
economy . Changes i n  the l aw affecti ng nationa l banks dur i ng that peri od 
were few and cannot account for changes i n  the banks ' behav i o r .  
CHAPTER V 
THE TRANS IT I ON PERIOD : 1 887-1 900 
I ntroducti on 
Nati onal Ban k i n g  i n  Knoxv i l l e  was transformed between 1 887 and 
1 900 by an i ncrease i n  the number of banks i n  response  to a qu i c ken i n9 
of economi c act i v i ty tha t began wi th the i ntegrati on of the l oca l 
ra i l roads i n to the nati onal ra i l  network . Knoxv i l l e  had good north ­
south ra i l  connecti ons at  th e end of the War ,  but d i rect eas t-west  
l i nks  were not  comp l eted unti l the mi d-1 880 ' s .  Thereafter , Knoxvi l l e ' s  
economy boomed . The fi nanc i al porti on o f  th e economy 9rew l i kewi s e ,  
but not wi thout undergo i ng c hanges i n  i ts conduct . As mo re and more 
banks competed for l ocal sources of l i a bi l i t i es ,  the cos t of those 
l i ab i l i t i es rose . Both demand for and s uppl y of l i a b i l i ti es 9rew , but 
demand grew fa ster . The ri s i n9 cost of l i abi l i t i es ,  i n  turn , forced 
the banks to manage the i r  assets more careful ly . The i ncrea s i n9 ly  
competi ti ve atmosphere a l so had the  effect of  oroduc i n9 d i fferences 
between banks i n  the acqu i s i ti o n  of some l i abi l i ti es and the mana9ement  
of some as sets . 
Mos t  o f  the i ncreases i n  the number of ban ks  occurred between 1 887. 
and 1 892 . Four new banks obta i ned nati onal  charters : the Th i rd ( 1 887 } , 
the C i ty ( 1 888 } , the Sta te ( 1 889 } , and the Ho l s ton ( 1 891 } .  I n  addi ti on , 
four  state banks were founded . Duri ng the remai nder of the tran s i t i o n  
peri od , two more state banks were founded , b u t  they were sma l l a nd they 
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c l osed i n  a few years . One o l d s tate bank ,  the Peop l e s  Ban k ,  c l osed i n  
1 892 , and one nati onal ban k ,  the State , fa i l ed i n  1 893 . At l east  i n  
terms o f  the number o f  banks , the trans i tion  peri od was real l y  two 
peri ods : 1 887 to 1 892 saw a l arge i ncrease  i n  the number of ban ks , 
whereas 1 892- 1 900 saw these banks attempti n g  to adjust  to the new and 
more competi ti ve envi ronment-- i n  fac t ,  there was a s hake-out . 
Duri ng  mos t  of  the years from 1 867  to 1 886 , the l ocal  banks pa i d  
i nterest on a rel ati vely sma l l porti on o f  the i r  l i ab i l i t i e s .  Hi g h  
cost deposi ts--demand cert if i cates o f  deposi t and borrowed money-­
rarely contri buted s i gni fi cantly to l i ab i l i ties . Duri ng the trans i t i on , 
however , h i gh co st depos i ts grew i n  rel ati ve importance . Payment o f  
i nterest on pri vate depos i ts became widespread , and de�and certi fi cates 
grew i n  rel ati on to pr1 vate depos i ts .  I n  addi ti on , banks  found  that 
the s imp l e  payment of s ome i n terest  was not suff ic i ent  to acqu i re a 
growing  vol ume of demand cert i fi cates . As the peri od wore on , the banks 
offered a growi ng  va riety of such cert if i cates , w i th the var i ety bei n g  
characteri zed by di fferences i n  both the tenm to maturi ty of the 
certi fi cates and the i r  i nterest rates . Furthermore , the l oca l  banks 
s howed an i ncreased wi l l i ngness to pay i nterest upon pure check i n g  � 
accounts , otherwi se known as "open accounts . "  ( At the same time , these 
banks  conti nua l l y  compl a i ned to the Comptro l l er of the Currency , and 
he to them , about these practi ces . )  
Borrowed money became an  i ncreas i ng ly  i mportant source of  l i ab i l i tie s ,  
a l though here the record i s  mi xed . Borrowed money was never important 
to the East  Tennessee Nati ona l , but most of  the other banks did  obta i n  
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a s i gn i fi cant  porti on of  the i r  l i abi l i ti es from th i s  source . One ban k ,  
the Ci ty Nat iona l , appears to have dec i ded soon after i t  opened to 
acqui re about  one-quarter of i ts l i abi l i ti es from borrowed money . I t  
met that target by u s i n g  borrowed funds ( redi scounts , b i l l s  payabl e ,  
and bonds borrowed ) to make up any d i ffe.rence between the target . 
percentage and the percen tage of  l i ab i l i ti es deri ved from ban k depos i ts .  
That i s ,  when bank depos i ts fel l be l ow the target , the C i ty Nati onal 
red i s counted wi th i ts reserve agen ts to make up the di fference . The 
other banks genera l ly  had l ower and l es s  defi n i te targets than d i d  the 
C i ty Nat ion a 1 . A 1 1  except the East Tennes see s hawed an i nc rea sed 
wi l l i ngness to s eek bank depos i ts and to redi scount wi th and i s sue  
certi fi cates of  depos i t  to  other ban ks . 
Shareho l der i nvestment genera l l y  contri buted a d imi n i s h i ng 
proporti on to l i a bi l i ties , as  d i d  banknotes i s sued . The l oca l  banks 
genera l ly  i s sued the mi n imum amoun t of ban knotes requ i red by l aw .  
(They di d ,  however ,  respond s trongly to the Act o f  1 900 , wh i ch made 
banknote i s sue mo re profi tab l e . )  Capi ta l  changes were few , and those 
tha t di d occur were , unl i ke thos e i n  the fi rs t  peri od , u nrel ated  to 
the ri ght  to i ss ue banknotes . Rather , capi tal chanqed i n  response  to � 
growth i n  the l ocal economy or to taxes . 
As much as the acqu i s i t i on of  l i abi l i ties  c hanged duri ng the 
second peri o d ,  the management of as sets chanoed even mo re . Part of 
the change i n  the way the banks  managed thei r assets was caused by 
i ncreas i ng competi tion for cus tomers . I ncreas i ng cost of  l i a bi l i ti es 
meant that banks . had to more carefu l l y  se l ect the uses for wh ich  the i r  
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assets were empl oyed . Ea rn i ng -assets to al l -assets rat ios  rose s l i ght ly , 
and l oan-as set rat i os even more . Both rati os s tabi l i zed . The l o ca l  
banks  tended to  hol d l ower rat i os of reserves to  assets , and  the  compos i ­
ti on of thei r reserves changed . They hel d l ower rati os o f  cash to 
primary reserves and h i gher rati os of ban k depos i ts to primary reserves . 
There was a s l i gh t  tendency to d i stri bute bank  depos i ts more wi dely 
between reserve agents and other ban ks . Secondary res erves dimi n i shed 
i n  i mportance . ( Y i e l ds on bonds were s t i l l  h i gher than returns to be 
earned on bank depos i ts ,  but the di fference had narrowed . )  
The effect of i ncreased competi ti on was al s o  fe l t  on the s i ze and 
types of l oans granted . Loans grew i n  s i ze and vi ol ati ons of the 1 0  
percent l oan l im i t  became more frequent . I n  fact , del i berate v i ol at i on 
of  that l im i t was emp l oyed i n  order to reta i n  espec i a l l y  fa vored 
customers . Loans secured by only one endors ement ( one name paper) qrew 
i n  rel ative importance ; l oans secured by more than one endorsement  
fel l .  General l y ,  demand l oans fel l i n  rel at ive importance . T he  banks 
not onl y  made i t  ea s i er for thei r customers to borrow , they a l s o  l en t  
them l a rger and l a rger amounts , even i f  that meant that the l oans 
v i o l ated the 1 0  percent l oan l i mi t .  
I n  s ummary , an i ncrease i n  the number of banks produced greater 
competi t ion for l i ab i l i ti es , and as the cos t of  l i ab i l i t i es rose ,  mo re 
effi ci ent use of those l i ab i l i t i es became i moerati ve . The broad 
arrangement of assets became l ess  errat ic  and more sen s i t ive to potenti a l  
y ie l ds . At the same t ime ,  the more competi ti ve atmosphere l ed bank s  to 
re�s . By the end of  the trans i t i on ,  the l ocal  ban k:
J
v' 
were acti ng  l es s  l i ke country ban ks  and more l i ke c i ty banks . � 
Acqu i s i tion of L i ab i l i ti es :  1 887- 1 900 
Duri ng  the tran s i ti on peri od , pri vate depos i ts were the primary 
s ource of l i abi l i ti es for mos t  of the l ocal banks , but the i mportance 
of pri vate depos i ts to each parti cu l ar  ban k was by no means constant . 
As a general ru l e ,  the establ i s hed ban ks ( the Ea st  Tenness ee Nati ona l 
and the Mechani cs Nati ona l ) had more success i n  attract i n g  pri vate 
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. depos i ts than d i d the newly founded bank s , even though  the o l d banks 
were severely chal l enged by the new ones . The newer banks re l i ed more 
heav i ly on  borrowed money than d i d  the ol der banks , but amona the newer 
banks , some found th i s  source of l i ab i l i ti es more usefu l  and dependabl e 
than di d others . As a general rul e ,  s harehol der i nvestment and c i rcul a­
tio� grew s l owl y ,  and therefore thei r rel ati ve i mportance to l i abi l i ti es 
fel l . 
From i ts foundi ng i n  1 872 ,  the East Tennessee National  had acqui red 
an evergrowi ng proport ion of i ts l i abi l i ti es from pri vate depos i ts unt i l 
1 881 , one year  before the Mechan i cs  recei ved i ts nati ona l  charter . From 
1 882 through 1 885 , the East Tennessee ' s  rat io  of pri vate depos i ts to 
l i ab i l i ti es dri fted downward . (The Mechan i cs ' rati o a l s o  fel l  s l owl y 
after i ts fi rs t  year of operati on . )  There was a sma l l i ncrease  i n  1 886 , 
but the downward· dri ft began aga i n  i n  1 887 and conti nued through 1 892 , 
after wh i ch the rati o  rose  s l owly from around 60 percent { 1 892-1 895 )  to 
65  to 70 percent ( 1 896 - 1 900 ) � ( See Tabl e V- 1 . )  
The behavi or of the Eas t Tennessee ' s  rat i o  from 1 881 to 1 891 i s  
exp l ai ned by i ncreas i ng competi ti on from the other banks  for. pri vate 
depos i ts . I n i ti a l l y ,  the East Tennessee d i d  not resoond to the growi nq 
Tab l e  V- 1  
Average Ratio  of Pri va te Depos i ts to A l l l i ab i l i ti es , i n  Percent 
Central 
Eas t Reserve Reserve 
Year Tennes see Mechanics  Thi rd C i ty State Ho l s ton C i t i es C i t i es 
1 887 63 . 6  66 .9  25 . 8  ( 3 )  48 . 5  47 . 2  
1 888 55 . 1  63 . 1  29 . 9  5 0 . 0  47 . 8  47 . 6  
1 889 58 . 8  62 . 1  38 . 5  52 . 2  7 . 5  ( 1 ) 47 . 1  48 . 8  
1 890 5 7 . 6  57 . 2  39 . 7  3 1 . 7  45 . 9  49 . 7  
1 89 1  5 1 . 4  58 . 4  3 5 . 3  3 1 . 2  (4 ) 37 . 0  ( 1 ) . 46 . 5  49 . 5  
1 892  6 1 . 2  62 . 7  42 . 3  4 1 . 6  39 . 3  ( 4 )  45 . 4  50 . 0  
1 893 59 . 5  55 . 7 3 5 . 8  3 1 . 0  ( 3 ) 28 . 1  46 . 4  48 . 3  
1 894 61 . 7  55 .4  37 . 0  32 . 7  45 . 6  49 . 5  
1895 58 . 9  5 5 . 9  35 . 0  38 .0  46 . 2  49 . 9  
6 63 . 5  53 . 0  36 . 4 . 6  6 . 7  49 . 0  
1 897  65 . 2  52 . 4  43 . 0  49 . 7  44 . 4  49 . 8  
1 898 64 . 3  51 . 9  50 . 8  ( 4 )  50 . 8  ( 3 )  44 . 5  50 . 8  
1 899 67 . 4  56 .4  ( 4 )  49 . 4  45 . 7  45 . 1  51 . 1  
1 900 68 . 2  53 .8  45 . 8  43 . 9  4 1 . 3  48 . 1  
Source : Reports of Condi t ion . See Tab l e  IV-1 , page 67 . 
Country 
Banks 
48 . 0  
47 . 7  
49 . 7  
50 . 8  
50 . 6  
52 . 7  
50 . 4  
50 . 5  
5 1 . 6  
50 . 9  
5 2 . 3  
55 . 3  
58 . 3  
58 . 6 .  
_. 
N 
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competi ti on by greater wi l l i ngness  to pay i nteres t on pri vate depos i ts .  
In  fact , the non i nterest-beari ng port ion of i ts pri vate depo s i ts ros e  
to i ts h i ghest l evel i n  1 887-1 890 . ( See Tabl e V -2 . )  The other ban ks , 
however ,  were wi l l i n g  to pay i nteres t on a growi ng  proporti on of  thei r 
pri vate depos i ts and thei r pri vate depos i ts grew (or at l east d i d  not 
decl i ne ) rel ati ve to thei r l i ab i l i ti es . The cri s i s of 1 890 , wh i l e  a 
rel a ti vely mi l d  one , a l so had an effect , even thouqh i t  was del ayed . 
That cri s i s  s harply accentuated the pri or  trend and appears to have 
forced the East Tennessee to reeval uate i ts pol i cy towards i ts depos i tors . 
(The other l ocal ban ks were affected to a l es ser extent . ) The reeval ua-
tion l ed to the bank payi ng i n terest on a growi ng  proport i on of i ts 
private depos i ts . The East Tennesse� wrote the Comptrol l er o f  the 
Currency i n  1 896 : 
Th i s  ban k has for the past two yea rs been try ing  to get 
the other Nati onal  Banks  here to reduce the rate of  i n terest  
,pai d on certi fi cates of  depos i t ,  or  �hat we wou l d nrefer , 
abol i sh i t  a l together ;  but ,  we have as yet been unabl e to 
get the other ban ks to agree to thi s .  
Years ago th i s  bank d i d  not pay any interest on cert i ficates , 
and we tri ed to keep i t  up , but new ban ks were bei nq  started , 
and these , as  wel l as those al ready i n  exi stence , were payi n g  
i n teres t .  We had to fol l ow su i t o r  see a l a rge port i on o f  
our deposi ts l eave us . W e  enti rel y agree wi th you ,  that i t  
i s  not i n  ha rmony wi th the pri nci pl es of sound commerc i al 
ban k i ng to pay i nterest upon depos i ts .  Yet we feel that we 
mus t  meet competi ti on ,  or l ose a l a rqe part of our bus i ness . 
We trust  that some time i n  the future , the practi ce of  pay i n g  
i nteres t upon depos i ts wi l l  be d i sconti nued by al l o f  the 
best banks i n  our c i ty ,  and we shal l use ou r best endeavor to 
bri ng th i s  about ; ( Eas t Tennes see Nati onal Ban k ,  March  1 q ,  
1 896 ) 
"Years ago " refers to the peri od 1 887 to 1 890-1 891 . Because  the 
East Tennessee Nati onal wa s l os i ng depos i tors to i ts competi tors , i t  
Year 
1 887 
1 888 
1 889 
1 890 
1 89 1  
1 892 
1 893 
1 894 
1 895 
6 
1 897  
1 898 
1 899 
1 900 
Tabl e V-2  
Average Ratio  of Ind i v i dual Depos i ts to  Pri va te Depos its , i n  Percent 
East  
Tennessee Mechani cs Th i rd Ci ty S tate 
98 . 3  82 . 5  90 . 4  ( 3 )  
98 . 3  80 . 5  94 . 6  N . D 
98 . 0  79 . 0  90 . 9  89 . 2  N . D .  
97 . 7  76 . 2  84 . 1  88 . 6  94 . 3  
94 . 2  78 . 9  78 . 9  ( 3) 88 . 4  79 . 9  . ( 4) 
87 . 7  82 . 5  78 . 6  90 . 0  89 . 2  
78 . 6  . 8 1 . 2  79 . 4  83 . 6  87 . 1 ( 3 )  75 . 9  86 . 2  81 . 4  85 . 9  
64 . 2  88 . 0  7 1 . 8  {4) 73 . 9  
64A 81.2 66 .3 74.0 
68 . 9  78 . 1  69 . 3  76 . 8  
63 . 6  76 . 8  5 6 . 4  ( 4 )  65 . 0  
59 . 7  76 . 4  ( 4 )  6 1 . 1  6 1 . 7  
59 . 0  76 . 6  66 . 4  60 . 7  
Source : Reports of Cond i ti on . See Tab l e  IV-4 , paqe 7 1 . 
N . D . i s  No Data . 
Hal s tan 
87 . 1  (1) 
86 . 4  ( 4 )  
81 . 0  
83 . 3  
74 . 1  
63.4 
78 . 0  
81 . 4  ( 3 )  
78 . 3  
77 . 6  
__, 
N 
<J1 
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reversed i ts o l d  po l i cy and began to pay i nterest  on  i ts cert i fi cates 
of depos i t .  I n  the fol l owi ng years , the ratio o f  non i nterest-beari ng  
depos i ts to  pri vate depos i ts fel l steadi l y .  In fact , wi th i n  two yea rs 
of the abandonment of  the ol d pol i cy ,  the East Tennessee Nat i onal  pa id  
i nterest on  a h i g her port ion of i ts l i ab i l i ti es than d i d any of i ts 
l ocal competi tors . By do i ng so , the East Tennessee obtai ned a h i 9her 
proporti on of i t s l i ab i l i ti es from private depos i ts than did i ts l oca l 
competi tors . The Eas t  Tennessee ' s  mani fest  s uccess i n  attract i ng  pri vate 
depo s i ts compe l l ed the other l ocal banks to rely  much more heavi l y  upon 
other sources of l i abi l i ti es ( see the di scus s i on bel ow on borrowed 
funds ) ,  wh i l e  at the same time forc i ng them to offer a greater va ri ety 
of i nterest payi ng accounts . (The ban k ' s s tatement th at at one t ime i t  
d i d  not pay i n terest  on any depos i ts i s  probably an exaggerati on , al though 
a smal l one . )  
The examiners ' reports i ndi cate that compet it ion between the l oca l  
banks  was most  i ntense  duri ng the  mi d-1 890 ' s .  Prior to 1 893 , the 
Mechan ics  Nati onal rarel y pa i d  i nterest on i ts open accounts , bu t from 
1 893 through 1 899 i t  pai d i nterest  on a few o f  these accounts , u sual l y  
at 3 to 4 percent .  ( The ban k exam iners were not al ways careful to 
d i s t i ngu i sh between open accounts an d cert if i cates of  depos i t ,  espec i al l y  
before 1 890 . ) Start ing  i n  1 889 , the Mechani cs had i ncreased the i nterest  
i t  pa i d  on  demand certi fi cates from 3 and  4 percent to 4 percent on a l l 
accounts . At that time , certi f i cates had a matu ri ty range o f  3 to 6 
months , but wi th i n  two years , the term to maturi ty was reduced s impl y 
to three month s . By the l ate 1 890 ' s , the Mechan i cs was sti l l  payi ng 
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i nterest on open accounts as wel l as on  certi fi cates , but the range of 
i nterest rates pa i d  on each i nd i cate tha t  compet i tion  had s l ackened . 
The rate on demand certi fi cates was a un i fo rm  4 percent from 1 887 to 
1 894 . I n  1 895 , a range of  3 to 4 percent  was g i ven , but for the fol l owi ng  
two yea rs , the rate was  aga i n  un i formly 4 pe rcent . I n  1 898 , a range . of  
3 to 4 percent was  aga i n the case , and i n  the next  two years , 3 percent 
was the rul e .  
In contrast ,  a more conserva tive ban k ,  the Th i rd Nationa l ,  d i d 
not pay i n terest on open accounts unti l 1 893 . ( See the d i scuss i on of 
th i s  bank • s  l oan pol i cy . for an exp l a nation of  i ts conservat i v i sm ,  bel ow � ) 
I t  pa i d  i nterest  on such accoun ts ( 4  percent pe r year )  through 1 895 , 
but ha l ted i nterest  payments on open accounts i n  1 896 . I n  1 897 , i t  
resumed payment o f  i nterest  on open accounts , but reduced the rate 
to 3 percent per yea r i n  1 898 . The Th i rd Nati onal genera l ly pai d 4 
perc�nt ori demand certi fi cates through 1 899 , a l though it  d i d  reduce 
the m i n imum term from s i x  months to three ( i n  1 89 1 ) .  That i s , the 
Thi rd behaved much l i ke the Mechan i cs , except that the T h i rd was about 
one to two years beh i nd . 
The C i ty Nat ional  was much more aggres s i ve than ei ther the 
Mechan ic s  or  the Thi rd .  I t  pa i d  4 to 6 percent on open accounts i n  
1 891 and 1 893-1 894 . The s tandard rate on open accounts was 4 percent 
from 1 894 to 1 898 . Thereafter ,  the rate fel l to 3 percent by ea rl y 
1 899 . I n  1 894 , the Ci ty began payi n g  6 percent on some demand certi fi ­
cates and 4 percent on others , and ma i ntai ned these h i gh  rates unti l 
1 896 . The range . on demand cert i fi cates fel l  to 3 to 4 percent i n  1 897 , 
but rose  back to a u n i form 4 percent i n  1 89e . The ran qe fel l i n  the 
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second hal f of 1 899 to 3 and 4 percent , and by 1 900 , i t  was a un i form 
3 percen t .  That i s ,  the C i ty offered i ts depos i tors h i g her rates than 
did i ts competi tors beg i nn i n g  around 1 893 , and conti nu i ng  through 1 896 . 
Thi s practi ce encouraged the ban k  exami ner to comp l a i n :  "The payment of  
3 to 4 percent on deposi ts i s  a bad habi t the Knoxvi l l e banks have 
gotten i nto . " ( C i ty Nat ional Bank , Report of  Exami nat ion , February 1 ,  
1 898 . )  The Comptro l l er took note of  th i s  rema rk ( i n  the report of  
exami nation ) and  ra i sed ·the matter wi th the C i ty Nat iona l . The bank 
repl i ed on Ma rc h  9 ,  1 898 : 
. � . [ i n] regard to the ma tter of i nterest on depos i ts , we 
wi l l  state that th i s  · i s  control l ed l a rgely by competi ti on , 
and that we are gui ded . i n  th i s  matter by th e s uooly and 
demand  for money . We have i n  some case s , reduced the rate 
of i nterest to depos i tors to 3% , and where the demand for 
money fa i l s to justi fy i t ,  we decl i ne to ta ke money on 
depos i t  and pay · i n terest on the same at  any rate . 
At that t ime , the . C i ty Nati onal was pay i ng at  l east  as much , i f  not 
more , for depos i ts than was pa i d  by the other banks in Knoxvi l l e .  ( Of 
course , because the exami ners ' reports for the East  Tennessee Na t ional  
Bank have not  been made publ i c ,  we cannot know how that  ban k  compared 
to the Ci ty Nati onal . )  I t  i s  c l ea r tha t the Ci ty ' s  repl y to the Comp­
trol l er was not that of a conservati ve , re l uctantl y competi ti ve bank 
s imply react ing  to the demands o f  the ma rket pl ace .  I n stead , the  reply 
i nd i cates that the Ci ty Nati ona l was aggres s i ve ly  purs u i ng depos i tors , 
and i n  doi ng so , was s etti n g  ma rket condi t i ons  for the other ban ks to 
meet , rather than pas s i ve ly  respondi ng  to the acti ons of others . 
The other two nati onal bank s  were l ess  succes sfu l  i n  attract i ng  a 
sol i d  base of  depos i tor support , al t hough the reasons  d i ffer .  The State 
National pa i d  h i gh rates on demand certi fi cates of depos i t  ( 4  to 6 
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percent)  from 1 891 to 1 893 . I n  the l ast  year , i t  al s o  pa i d  3 percent 
on at  l east one open account . But i n  sp i te o f  i ts competi t i ve posture 
th i s  ban k  never d i d  succeed i n  attract i n g  a l arge and growi ng  vo l ume 
of  private depos i ts ,  and i t  fa i l ed i n  1 893 . I t  fa i l ed to attract 
depos i tors because i t  was a bad ly  managed ban k ,  touched in i ts early 
years wi th corrupti on . (The reasons for i ts demi se are d i scussed i n  
Appendi x B . )  
The Hol s ton Nati onal , on the other hand , was more succes s fu l �  
eventual ly . It  had a di ffi cul t time s urvi vi n q  the s tronq compet i t i on 
from th� other , o l der banks . On the Hol ston Nat i onal  • s  f irst  exami na­
tion , November 2 4 ,  1 891  ( just  after i t  obtai ned i ts nati onal charter ) , 
the exami ner wrote : 
Knoxvi l l e  i s  a good ban ki n g  town and ther� i s ,  perhaps , 
bus i ness  enough to support al l the banks now here . The 
managers and promoters of th i s  i ns t i tuti on have i nfl uence 
and acqua i n tance wh i ch can secu re a fa i r  share of the 
bus i ness doi ng at th i s po i nt .  A good i ndi cat i on i s  tha t 
' they do not start wi th an i dea of s udden ri ches , but that 
they are to bui l d  u p  a bus i ness for a l i vi n g .  
. . 
The cauti ous opt imi sm of  that fi rst exami nation was rep l aced by a mo re 
pes s im i s t i c  eva l uat i on appea ri nq just  over two yea rs l ater . The exami ner 
wrote at that time : 
In my opi n i on the genera l condi ti on of  th i s  bank i s  fa i rly  
good , i ts management appears good & expenses reasonab l e , 
i ts busi ness i s  very smal l and wi th  s haro competi ti on i ts 
chances for success are not fl atteri ng . ( Ho l s ton Nati onal 
Ban k ,  Repo rt of Exami nati on , January 29 , 1 894)  
By the exami nati on of  September 28 , 1 896 , cond i t i ons  had once more 
a l tered . The economy was recoveri ng s teadi l y  from the cri s i s  o f  1 893 
and the exami ner was more hopefu l about the Hol s ton ' s  chances for 
succes s .  He wrote : 
. I f i nd noth i ng  i n  ban k ' s  cond i t i on to j u s t i fy apprehens i on 
as to i ts condi t i on or ab i l i ty to meet i ts obl i gations . Bank 
s usta i ned heavy l os ses under former adm i n i strat i on and duri ng  
the  pan i c  of 1 893 but these have been qotten r i d  of  and bank 
i s  gett i ng  i n  good s hape and has encouragi n g  pros pects ahead . 
The major d i ffi cul ty faced by th i s  bank conti nued to be the 
competi t i on from the other l ocal banks , not poor management . On the 
exami nati on of Ju ly  1 ,  1 897 , the exami ner wrote : 
Condi t i on o f  ban k  has improved s i nce l a s t  exami nati on . 
Bank i s  weak & has a di ffi cu l t matter  to make headway 
aga i nst  the ol der and l arger ban ks i n  th i s  C i ty ,  but i t  i s  
doi n g  a safe and improv i ng  b us i nes s . 
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Throughout the 1 890 ! s ,  the Ho l s ton Nati ona l qenera l ly  pa i d  the 
same rates on demand certi fi cates as di d the other banks , but i t  pa i d  
i nterest o n  open accoun ts l es s  frequentl y .  When i nterest  was pa i d  on 
s uch accounts , the Hol ston often pa i d  a l ower rate than d i d  other banks . 
• That i s ,  thi s bank made no  effort to chal l enge i ts compet i t i on , and  
i n s tead i t  settl ed for s l ower ,  but  at l east  s teady , growth o f  pr i vate 
depos i ts .  By February 4 ,  1 898 , the exami ner wa s abl e to renort that :  
Bank  h a s  fu l ly charged off bad a nd  doubtfu l  pa pe r .  I s  
about through wi th th i s ,  and I thi n k  wi l l  soon become a 
d i v i dend pay i ng i ns ti tuti on . 
S im i l arly hopefu l eva l ua ti ons fo l l owed on the exami nati ons of 
Augu st  1 9 ,  1 898 , and September 1 9 ,  1 899 . I t  was on l y  after 1 900 that 
the Hol s ton Nati onal was abl e to catch up  wi th the other , ol der ban ks . 
I n  summa ry ,  dur ing  the trans i ti on the l ocal ban ks competed 
aggress i vely for pri vate depos i ts . Some were mo re aggres s i ve ,  but al l 
made an effort . The two mos t  acti ve banks , the Ea st Tennes see Nati onal 
and the C i ty Nat i onal , by and l a rge d i ctated the c i rcums tances under 
whi ch the other banks competed . The Ci ty Nat iona l offered better terms 
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to i ts depos i tors than d i d  the other banks  ( for wh ich  exami ners ' reoorts 
are ava i l abl e ) . The Eas t  Tennes see Nati onal may not have offered i ts 
depos i tors more than the C i ty Nat ional  d i d , for i t  cou l d  rely ,  i n  part 
at  l ea s t ,  upon i ts age a nd pas t success to demon strate i ts so l vency and 
sound management .  The Mecha n i cs Nat i ona l and the Th i rd Nati onal both 
seem to have been wi l l i ng  to l et the two more aggres s i ve banks  ( the 
East  Tennes see and the C i ty )  set pol i cy toward depos i tors . Both the 
Ho l s ton Nati onal and the Sta te Nati onal found the fi nanci a l  market i n  
Knoxvi l l e  crowded , but they reacted to th i s  cond i t i on i n  di fferent ways . 
The State attemoted to match the l eaders , but fa i l ed both because  of  
i ts smal l s i ze and ta i nted h i s tory .  The Hol s ton was a l s o  muc h  sma l l er 
than i ts ri val s ( except for the State ) ,  and i t  di d not attempt to 
compete aggres s i vely wi th them . I ns tead , i t  offered i ts deoos i tors 
s l i  htly l es s  fa vorabl e terms ( and by do i nq s o ,  mi n i m i zed co sts ) and 
�ted as a consequence s l ower growth . Once i t  had oroved that i t  
was capabl e o f  survi val ( sometime by the l ate n i net ies ) ,  the Ho l s ton ' s  
pri vate depos i ts grew steadi l y .  
The trans i t i on peri od ma rked a radi ca l  depa rtu re i n  the ban ks ' 
rel �tions  wi th thei r depos i tors . I n  the fi rst oeri od , the banks made 
l i tt l e  effort to attract pri vate depos i ts , bu t begi nni ng i n  1 887 , ol d 
pol i c i es were overth rown . I n  fact ,  even dur ing  the f i na l  peri od , 1 900 
to 1 9 1 3 ,  competi tion for pri vate deposi ts never reached the l evel of  
i ntens i ty ach i eved i n  the mi d- 1 890 ' s .  ( About the t ime that  the 
i ntens i ty i n  the competi ti on for depos i ts d imi n i s hed amonq the l ocal 
banks , the . competi ti on for borrowers �u i ckened . See the ana lys i s  of  
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the a l terati ons i n  the l ocal  banks ' l oan pol i c i es , bel ow . ) After the 
mi d- 1 890 ' s ,  l oca l  banks di ffered i n  the terms o ffered to the i r depos i tors 
to a l es s er extent than prev i ous ly . 
Because the East Tennessee Nati onal  was s o  s uccessfu l  i n  acqu i ri ng 
pri vate depo s i ts , i t · had l i ttl e reason to turn to other ban ks for 
l i ab i l i t i es ,  whereas the other  l ocal banks found tha t i n  orde r to obta i n  
the des i red vol ume o f  l i abi l i ti es , they had to rely  to a qreater extent 
upon other banks . The East Tennessee Nat iona l  obtai ned a sma l l er 
percentaae of  i ts l i abi l i ti es from other ban ks than d i d  any o f  the other 
l oca l banks or the average country bank . ( See Tab l e  V -3 . ) The C i ty 
Nati ona l , on the other hand , obta i ned a greater port i on of  i ts l i a b i l i ti es 
from other banks than di d any o f  the l ocal banks or the averaqe country 
bank . I n  fact , from 1 890 to 1 900 , the C i ty obta i ned a greater portion  
of i ts l i abi l i ti es from other banks than di d the average reserve c i ty 
bank . Further ,  i t  i s  apparent that the C i ty dec i ded very s hortly after 
i t  was founded to borrow about one-quarter of  i ts l i a b i l i ti es from other 
banks , and a fter 1 890 , i t  wa s qu i te s ucces s fu l  i n  meeti n q  that target .  
The other l ocal banks genera l ly borrowed l es s  than the C i ty Nati ona l  but 
more than th� Ea st  Tennessee . I n  those cases where i t  appea rs that a 
l ocal bank  had sel ected a s peci fi c percentage of i ts l i ab i l i ti es to be 
obta i ned from other banks , that target was bel ow that of the C i ty Nati onal . 
Further , most  of the l ocal banks had more di ffi cul ty i n  meeti ng thei r 
targets than d i d  the C ity . 
The Mechani cs Nati onal appears to h ave deci ded about l BRS-1 886 to 
·obta i n  1 0  pe rcent of i ts l i a bi l i ti es from other banks . I f  thi s  was the 
Tabl e V-3  
Average Rati o of  Borrowed Money to Al l L iabi l i ti es , in  Percent  
East  
Yea r Tennes see Mechanics Thi rd C i ty State Hol s ton 
Centra l  
Reserve Reserve Country 
C i ti es C i ti es Bank s  
1 88 7  3 . 1  9 . 4 . 30 . 7  1 7 . 3  4 . 6  
1 888 3 . 7  9 . 9  5 . 3  30 . 7  1 6 . 8  4 . 8 
1 889 1 . 2 1 1 . 1  1 5 . 3 23 . 2  ( 1 ) 33 . 0  1 8 . 4  5 . 0  
1 890 2 .  5 1 5 . 9 1 9 . 2  1 2 . 0  32 . () 1 7 . 8  5 .  2 
1891 2.4 11 .0  25.5 14. 9 (4) 14.1 (1) 32.2 17 . 3 5.0 
1 892 0 . 6  8 . 8  23 . 2  1 6 . 9  8 . 7  ( 4 )  35 . 2  1 9 . 5  4 . 9  
1 893 3 . 3  1 1 . 1 20 . 6  2 7 . 3  ( 3 )  1 0 . 5  30 . 3  1 7 . 0  5 . 0 
1 894 3 . 8  9 . 6  22 . 2  8 . 0  35 . 0  1 8 . 9  4 . 5  
1 895  4 . 0  8 . 5  24 . 9  1 1 . 9 32 .8  1 8 . 3  5 . 0  
1 9 . 4 0 . 2 • • 6 3 • 30 • • 4 4 • 9 
1 897  . 1 . 4 1 0 . 0  1 2 . 5  20 . 4  1 0 . 1  36 . 7  20 . 4  5 . 0 
1 898 2 . 2  1 1 . 2 1 6 . 5  ( 4 )  24 . 2  1 2 . 8 ( 3 ) 37 . 0  21 . 8  5 . 2  
1 899 1 . 2 1 2 . 2  ( 4 )  1 7 . 6  25 . 5  20 . 7  38 . 2  25 . 0  5 . 1  
1 900 1 . 7 1 1 . 2  20 . 4  . 27 . 1  1 9 . 9  39 . 0  27 . 2  5 . 3  
Source : Reports o f  Condi t i on . See Tab l e  IV-2 , page 68 . 
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target , the Mechan i cs was usual l y  succes s ful  i n · meeti ng  i t .  The Th i rd 
Nati onal does not appear to have sel ected a target prior  to 1 895 . From 
1 887 to 1 894 , i ts rati o of borrowed funds to l i a b i l it ie s  general ly  fel l 
between 6 and 9 percent l  but such a rel ati ve ly  low percentaqe was an 
unl i kely target . I t  does appear that about 1 895  the T h i rd deci ded to 
i ncrease i ts rati o ,  but whether i t  had a defi ni te goal at  tha t  time i s  
not c l ea r .  ( From about 1 898 to 1 907 , the Th i rd ' s  rati o was fa i rly  c l ose 
to 1 7 . 5  percent ,  and it may have found about 1 89�-1 900 that 1 7 . 5  percent 
was a des i rabl e target . ) Nei ther the State Nati onal nor the Hol s ton 
Nati onal had a d i scerni bl e ta rget rati o .  
The l ocal ban ks a l l pa i d  about the s ame rate on bank  ba l ances : 
4 percent through 1 896 and 3 percent thereafter .  There were , however ,  
di fferences between the l ocal ban ks i n  the rates at wh i c h  they red i s ­
counted l oans  and notes . The common rate through 1 8q6 was 6 percent , 
but from 1 897  on , the rates ranged between 3 and 6 percent ,  wi th the 
rate in most yea rs between 4 and 5 percent .  The Ci ty Nati onal was 
the most acti ve of  the l ocal ban ks i n  borrowi nq through redi scounts , 
and i t  general l y  pai d the h i ghes t rates . The exami ner d i d  not separate ly  
report the rates pai d on  11 bi l l s  payab l e . 1 1 ( These were l arge cert i f i cates 
l ent by one bank to another . ) I t  i s  pos s i b l e  that these accounts 'were 
mos t l i kely to earn the hi ghest rates l i sted for cert if i cates of  deoos i t .  
Because the Ci ty Nati ona l genera l ly pai d the h i g hest rates ( among the 
l oca l  banks ) for certi fi cates of depo si t ,  i t  i s  l i kely that i t  pai d the 
hi ghest rates for any form of l oans from other banks . Because the other 
l ocal banks offered l ower rates to other ban ks , they obta i ned a l ower 
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and l es s  stabl e proporti on of the i r l i ab i l i ti es from borrowed money . 
That i s ,  borrowed money was a cons i s tently l a rge supp l i er of  l i ab i l i ti es 
only for the C i ty Na ti ona l . 
As a general ru l e ,  s harehol der i nvestment a nd c i rcul at ion dec l i ned 
i n  importance as sou rces of l i abi l i ti es .  Un i ted States government 
depos i ts were he l d  by on ly  one l ocal ban k ,  the East Tennessee , u nti l 
1 900 , and thei r importance was sma l l  and dec l i n i n g .  The l i abi l i ti es 
of the l ocal ban ks grew because  thei r pri vate depos i ts and  borrowi nqs 
from other banks grew . Neverthel ess , sharehol der i nvestment and c i rcu l a­
tion we re st i l l  i mportant , espec i al l y  for some o f  the newer banks . For 
exampl e ,  in 1 887 better than 70 percent of the T h i rd Nati ona l • s  l i ab i l i ­
ti es were deri ved from s hareho l der i nves tment  and ci rcul ati on . By 1 900 
they contri buted about one-th i rd of i ts l i ab i l i ti es .  ( See Tabl e V-4 . }  
There were few changes i n  capi ta l duri ng the trans i t i on per iod . 
The East Tennessee Nati onal had i ncreased both i ts capi ta l  and surpl us  
to $ 1 75 thousand in  1 B87 � No  fu rther changes were made . The Mechan i cs , 
Ho l s ton , and Sta te ( after a l l  i ts cap i ta l  was subscri bed , by ea rl y 1 890}  
kept the i r capi tal at  $1 00 thousand throughout the peri od . The Th i rd 
Nati onal began operati ons wi th a capi ta l of  $ 1 75 thousand i n  Auqust  o f  
1 887 and i ncreased i t  to $250 thousand by December o f  that year .  A 
further i ncrease to $300 thousand by early 1 889 i nd i cates tha t th i s  was 
probabl y the des i red l evel al l a l ong . At that po i n t ,  the Th i rd was the 
mos t  h i g h ly  capi tal i zed bank in Knoxv i l l e ,  and i t  remai ned so u�t i l  1 8q8 
when i t  reduced i ts capi tal to $200 thousand . The  Ci ty National s ta rted 
wi th $ 1 00 thousand , but by retai ni ng a1 1 earn i nqs , i t  was abl e to i ncrease 
i ts capi ta l to $200 thousand by 1 894 , where i t  remai ned through 1 900 . 
Tab l e V-4  
Average Rati o of  Sha rehol der Inves tment to  Al l 
L i ab i l i ti es ,  i n  Percent 
Eas t 
Yea r Tennes see Mechan i cs Th i rd C i ty State Hol s ton 
1 887 26 o 7  20 0 9  59 o 1  ( 3 )  
1 888 32 o 8  24 o 0  54 o 3  37 o 8  
1 889 32 o 3 24 o 3  48 o 5 27 o 3  55 o 8  ( 1 ) 
1 890 32 o 1  24 o 4  45 o 8  2 1 . 8  46 o 4  
1 891 37 o 6  27 o 7  50 o 4  (3) 23 o 1  44 o 5  (4) 48 0 9 ( 1) 
1 892 3 1 . 3  25 o 9  46 o 7  23 o 2  34 o 4  43 o 2  ( 4 )  
1 893  30 o 4 30 0 2  50 o 9  28 0 3  34 o 8  ( 3 )  5 1 . 4  
1 894 2 7 0 7  3 1 . 9  49 o 3  26 o 7  . 49 0 5 
1 895  29 o 8  32 o 4 47 o0 24 o 0  42 o 2  
8 6 o O  3 0 . . . . 
1 897  26 o 6  34 o l  39 o 4  1 8 0 3  34 o 0  
1 898 26 o 6  33 o 5  27 o 7  ( 4 )  1 6 o 3 30 o 7  ( 3 )  
1 899 25 o 0  28 o 4  ( 4 ) 28 o 0  1 3 o 4 28 o 3  
1 900 23 o 2  26 o 3  2 5 0 7  . 1 3o 1 25 o 3  
Source : Reports of Cond i ti on ;  See Tabl e IV-3 , page 69 o 
Centra l 
Reserve Reserve 
C i ti es C i ti es 
1 8 o 5  30 0 1  
1 8 o 4  29 o 9  
1 8  0 1  28 o 8  
1 9 o 9  29 o 5  
20 0 1  30 o 4  
l 8 o 4  27 0 8  
20 o 7  30'0 2 
l 7 o 8 27 o 7  
1 8 o 3  2 7 . 6  
o 3  
1 s o q  25 o 3  
l 3 o 2 22 o 9  
1 1 . 7  1 8 o 9  
1 3 o 0  1 8 0 5  
Country 
Banks 
36 o 6  
36 o 8  
36 o 4  
3 6 o 4  
3 7  o 1  
35 o 4  
3 6 o 7  
36 o 5  
35 0 0 
3 • 
33 o 7  
31 . 0  
27 o 8  
26 o 5  
w 
"' 
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Dur ing  the trans i t i on , there were three i ncreases and one decrease 
in cap i ta l  by the l ocal banks . The Eas t  Tennes see d i d  not expl a i n  the 
reasons for i ts capi ta l increase i n  1 887 , nor di d the Th i rd expl a i n  i ts 
i ncrease i n  earl y 1 889 . However ,  both the C i ty Na ti onal and the Th i rd 
d id  expl a i n  the l ater chanqes i n  the i r  caoi tal . The C i ty Nat i onal  wrote 
on September 1 8 ,  1 893 : 
Si nce commenc i n g  bu s i ness i n  Feby . 1 888 , th i s  ban k  has never 
pai d a d i v i dend . T he profi ts of each year ' s  work has been 
added to the surp l u s  fund ,  or  keot i n  the s hape of und i v i ded 
profi ts . The surpl u s  f i nd i s  n ow $75 ,000 a nd the und iv i ded 
profi ts amount to $ 1 8 , 000 . We f ind i n  a ci ty the s i ze of  
Knoxvi l l e  that our capi tal i s  too smal l . We  are cal l ed on  
for l oans a l most  da i ly i n  excess  of the l egal  l im i t .  A l l ow 
me to troub l e  you wi th th i s  questi on? Wi l l  we be a l l owed to 
convert the surpl us and profi ts in to capi ta l s tock? In 
other words , can we oay out our s urp l us  and  profi ts to o ur 
s tockhol ders , and a l l ow them to subscri be wi th these funds 
for new stock? We want to i ncrease  our capi tal to $200 , 000 . 
Even by 1 893 , the C i ty Nati onal had troubl e keep i ng i ts l oans w i th i n  
the l aw . .. A t  the exami nati on of  May 5 ,  1 893 , the C i ty had granted n i ne 
overioans , the l argest of  wh ich was for $38 , 500 , even though the l arqest  
l oan that the  C i ty coul d l egal ly make was $ 1 0  thousand . A l toqether , the 
C i ty at that  t ime had made four  l oans that were doubl e  the l im i t (or 
l arger ) . Th i s  had been the pattern for severa l  yea rs , and i t  d i d  not 
change after the C i ty ' s  capi tal i ncrease .  The C i ty conti nued to grant  
overl oans ; they were now much l a rger .  When the  C i ty ' s  exp l anati on of 
i ts capi ta l i ncrease i s  compared to t�e Th i rd ' s  exp l anati on of i ts caoi ta l  
decrease , i t  i s  c l ea r  that these two banks he l d  s harply d i fferi ng  v iews , 
both of  thei r ro l e  i n  the commun i ty and  i n  the opportun i ti es ava i l ab l e  
to them . 
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The Thi rd exp l a i ned i n  a l etter to the Comptro l l er o f  the Currency 
that there were two reasons for the decrease i n  capi tal . . Fi rs t ,  a 
reduction i n  cap i ta l  woul d reduce taxes . Second , i t  woul d . l eave the 
bank  wi th a s urp l us account i n  excess  of  20 percent o f  the rema i n i ng 
capi ta l , and tha t meant that no further addi t i ons  to the surp l us account 
woul d be requi red . Th i s  i n  turn woul d permi t h i g her d i vi dends . The 
bank ant ic i pated an i ncrease i n  d i v i dends from a 6 percent ra te to an 
8 percen t ra te . The ban k al so noted that 
. . .  accord ing  to my j udgement , owi ng to the n umber of 
Ban ks here and the s harp competi t i on among s ome and the 
tendency to l ower . rates of i nterest on g i l t-edged paoer , 
we wi l l  never be abl e to pl ace our Ban k on an 8% d i v i dend , 
on $300 ,000 capi ta l . (Thi rd Nati ona l  Ban k , February 1 ,  
1 898 ) 
Th i s  expl anati on can onl y  be seen as  reas onabl e i f  i t  i s  recogn i zed 
that the Th i rd was a very conservati ve ban k ,  and even then , the exol ana-
ti on is not very sati s factory .  Th i s bank fel t that i t  coul d not 
profi tably emp l oy i ts l a rge capi ta l at  the very t ime that the other 
l ocal banks were fi nd ing  i ncreased opportun i ties and reasons to grant 
overl oans . I f  the Th i rd had wanted to ach ieve a more h i qh ly  l evera ged 
ba l ance sheet ,  i t  coul d have done so by mo re agg res s i ve competi t i on 
for l i abi l i ties . I nstea d ,  i t  achi eved a more h i ghly l everaged bal ance 
s heet by reduc i ng i ts capi tal . Because it chose the l atter course 
rather than the former ,  the T h i rd mus t  be understood to have been a 
conservat�ve i nsti tuti on , and not a ban k faced wi th a dimi ni s h i ng market .  
(The bank ' s  expressed des i re to  reduce i ts taxes cannot be  eva l uated , 
because i t  d i d  not i denti fy the part i cul ar taxes i t  woul d avoi d by 
reduc i n g  i ts cap i ta l . )  
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Thro ughout the trans i tion  peri od , the l oca l ban ks made the m i n i mum 
bond depo s i t requ i red by l aw and no more , wi th one except ion . I n  1 899 
the C i ty Nati onal i ncreashd i ts depos i t  of bonds to secure - c i rcul ati on 
to the maximum a l l owed . Thi s act i on was most l i ke ly  ta ken i n  ant ic i pati on 
of the c hanges i n  the l aw regard i ng note i ssue made i n  early 1 900 . 
Because the change i n  the l aw had i ts major i mpact after 1 900 , i t  wi l l  
be deal t wi th i n  the di scuss i on of  the fi nal pe ri od . Consequently , the 
l oca l banks can be sa id  �o have i ssued banknotes at the l owes t rate 
a l l owed by l aw duri n g  the trans i ti on peri od . ( See Tabl e V -5 . )  ( T he 
d i fferences i n  the rat i os of the c i rcul ati on i ssued to capi tal between 
the l oca l banks refl ect d i fferences i n  the mi n imum bond depos i t  based 
on _ s i ze o f  capi ta l . )  
I n  summary ,  the l ocal  banks competed more aggres s i ve ly  for 
l i ab i l i t i es duri n g  the trans i tion  peri od than prev i ou s ly . Pri vate 
depo� i ts and borrowed money grew more than s harehol der i n vestment and 
ci rcul ation . The growth of Knoxvi l l e ' s  economy duri n g  th i s  peri od 
i ncreased the opportuni t ies  fac i n g  the l oca l ban ks , but the response 
to t hese opportun i ti es  was not un i fo rm .  Some ban ks took the l ead i n  
seek i n g  new and expand i n g  sources of  l i abi l i ties ; others were content 
to fo l l ow .  For each of the l ocal ban ks , the cos t  o f  l i abi l i ti es grew 
and , as wi l l  be seen , forced them to manage the use  o f  thei r funds 
more careful l y .  
Empl oyment of Assets : 1 887-1 900 
Duri ng the trin s i ti on ,  the l oca l banks grew cogn i zant  of the need 
to manage both the qua l i ty and quanti ty of thei r l oans and other assets . 
Tabl e V-5  
Average Patio  of  C i rcul ation . I s s ued to  Cap i ta l , in  Percent 
Central 
East Reserve Reserve Country 
Yea r Tennessee Mechan i cs Th i rd C i ty State Hol s ton C i t i es C i ti es Banks 
1 887 22 . 5  22 . 5  20 . 6  ( 3 )  1 4 . 8  37 . 1  
1 888 25 . 7  22 . 5  1 8 . 0 20 . 4  1 2 . 2 33 . 2  
1 889 25 . 7  22 . 5  1 5 . 0 22 . 5  24 . 9  ( 1 ) 7 . 3  28 . 4  
1 890 2 5 . 7  22 . 5  1 5 . 0  22 . 5  22 . 5  6 . 3 25 . 7  
1891 25.7 22.5 15.0 (3) 22.5 22. 5  {4) 7.1 24 .8 
1 892 25 . 7  22 . 5  1 5 . 0  22 . 5  22 . 5  ( 4 )  8 . 4 26 . 3  
1 893 25 . 7  22 . 5  1 5 . 0  22 . 5  22 . 5  ( 3 )  1 3 . 4  28 . 9  
1 894 25 . 7  22 . 5  1 5 . 0 22 . 5  1 5 . 2  30 . 8  
1 895 25 . 7  22 . 5  1 5 . 0  22 . 5  1 8 .2 32 . 0  
6 . . . 5  . 3 . 4 3 . 
1 897  . 25 . 7  22 . 5  1 5 . 0  22 . 5  22 . 1  23 . 0  36 . 0  
1 898 25 . 7  22 . 5  22 . 5  ( 4 )  22 . 5  22 . 5  ( 3 )  24 . 0  36 . 0  
1 899  25 . 7  22 . 5  ( 4 )  22 . 5  90 . 0  22 . 5  24 . 0  38 . 9  
1 900 36 . 6  24 . 0  39 . 9  98 . 0  53 . 5  38 . 6  45 . 9  
Source : Repo rts o f  Condi ti on .  See Tabl e IV-6 , page 89 . 
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Unti l th i s  peri od o f  i ntense compet i t i on began , the l ocal  banks had l ent  
on ly  to the mos t credi tworthy customers . However , they soon rea l i zed 
o l d  pol i c i es were no l onger appropri ate , and tha t they woul d have to 
attend more carefu l l y  to the broad proporti oni ng of assets than they 
had prev i ou s ly .  As a consequence , the ban ks genera l ly  set  s omewhat 
l ower s tandards for thei r  cus tomers to meet ,  and th i s  acti on permi tted 
s tabi l i zati or. o f  important as set rat i os at des i rab le  l evel s .  Rat ios  
of earn ing  a s sets to a l l assets and l oans to assets rose to  rel at i ve ly  
h i g h  l evel s ,  a nd  s h owed much l es s  year-to-year change . Primary reserve 
to as sets ratios  genera l ly fel l to rel at i vely l ow l evel s ,  as  di d the 
ratios  of s econdary reserves to as sets . Among primary reserves , bank 
depos i ts rose and cash fel l i n  importance . 
The Eas t  Tennessee Nati ona l ' s  rat i o  of  ea rn i ng assets to a l l assets 
had often c hanged a great deal from one year to the next i n  the f i rs t  
peri �d , and i t  was a l ways bel ow that  o f  the average country ban k .  But 
beg i nn i n g  in 1 881 , the rati o s tarted to ri se , and wi th one i nterruot i on , 
the i ncrease conti nued through 1 886 . The fol l owi ng year there was a 
s ubstanti a l  i ncrease ( from 7 7  percent up  to 85 percent) . and i t  reac hed 
i ts h i ghes t l evel to that  time . From 1 888 to the end of the trans i tion  
per i od ,  the  East  Tennes see ' s  rat i o  o f  earn i ng  assets to  al l as sets 
rema i ned very c l ose to 85 percent wi th a l ow of  83 . 9  percent and a h i g h  
o f  87 . 5  percent . ( See Tab l e  V-6 . ) These l evel s  were s l i ghtly bel ow 
that o f  the average country banb i n  those years , but both the rel at i vely 
h i g h  l evel ( compa red to earl i er years ) , and the s teadi ness i n  the rat io  
( a l so compa red to  ea rl i er years ) , i ndi cate that the  Eas t Tenness ee ' s  
bas i c  pol i c i es regard i ng  as s et management were profo undly changed duri ng 
Tabl e  V-6  
Average Rat io  of Ea rn i n g  Assets to Al l As sets , i n  Percent  
East 
Yea r Tennes see Mechani cs Thi rd C i ty State Ho l ston 
central 
Reserve Reserve Country 
C i ti es C i ties  Banks 
1 887 7 7 . 0  83 . 0  84 . 0  { 3 )  66 . 1  82 . 6  88 . 8  
1 888 85 . 3  83 . 9  83 . 4  68 . 1  82 . 9  89 . 0  
1 889 85 . 4  81 . 7  83 . 7  95 . 1  68 . 1  83 . 2  88 . 9  
1 890  86 . 5  86 . 3  . 86 . 4  86 . 9  7 1 . 0  83 . 5  89 . 1  
1891 87.1 86 .7 90 .2 (3) 89. 9 (4) 69 . 3  83 . 0  88 .7 
1 892 87 . 5  87 . 9  90 . 2  85 . 1  70 . 2  82 . 7  88 . 8  
1 893 85 . 1  88 . 6  87 . 1  9 1 . 3  ( 3 )  68 . 4  82 . 7  88 . 0  
1 894 85 . 0  87 . 2  87 . 0  6 6 . 8  82 . 9  88 . 2  
1 895 84 . 7  84 . 1  84 . 2  71 . 7  83 . 8  88 . 3  
• 3 • 9 • • • • • 
1 897  83 . 9  84 .0  84 . 3  89 . 8  90 . 3  69 . 5  83 . 1  87 . 7  
1 898 83 . 8  81 . 9  82 . 7  ( 4 )  90 . 0  90 . 9  ( 3 )  68 . 0  83 . 3  87 . 9  
1 899 85 . 8  85 . 7  ( 4 )  86 . 2  91 . 0  89 . 2  7 1 . 7  84 . 6  88 . 9  
1 900 85 . 9  88 .0  86 . 5  90 . 1  9 1 . 0  7 1 . 7  84 . 8  R9 . 4  
Source : Reports of  Cond i t i on . See Tabl e  IV-8 , page 1 0 1 . 
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formed . 
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The Mec hani cs Nati ona l ' s  po l i c i es d i rect i ng the emp l oyment of  assets 
a l so changed in the early years of the trans i tion , a l though the change 
was not so dramati c as the East Tennes see ' s .  After i ts f irs t year ,  the 
Mechan i cs ' ratio  of earn i ng as sets to as sets was very c l ose to 80 percen t ,  
but by 1 887 i t  had r i sen to 83 percent .  In  the fol l owing  years , the 
rati o fe l l  be l ow 83 percent only twi ce , and was in most  cases s l i ght ly  
above 85 percent and ju st  under that of the  average coun try ban k .  That 
i s ,  from 1 890 on , the Mechan i cs Nati ona l ' s  rati o of earn i ng assets to 
as sets was usual l y  above i ts earl ier l evel s ,  al though the rat io  d i d  vary 
more from year to year than the East Tennes see ' s .  
The newly formed banks general l y  had re l at i ve ly  h i g h ' and s tabl e 
ratios  of  earni ng as sets to assets , espec i a l ly  after the f irst  two or 
three years of operat ion . The Th i rd Nati ona l s tarted wi th a rati o o f  
j us t  bel ow 8 5  percent , but after three years the rat i o  h a d  ri s en to 
between 85 and 90 percent ,  at  wh i ch l evel i t  rema i ned unt i l  the bank 
fel t the effects of the cri s i s  of 1 89 3 .  After that cri s i s  was pas t ,  the 
Th i rd ' s  ratio  was usual l y  c l oser to 85 percent .  Both the C i ty Na ti onal 
and the Hol s ton Nati onal  general ly  had a h i gher rati o of  ea rn i n g  assets 
to al l assets than d i d  the T h i rd , a nd the i r  rati os usua l ly  vari ed l es s  
from one yea r to the nex t .  The State Nati onal ' s  rat io  was genera l l y  
h i g h , b u t  i t  var ied more from yea r t o  year than d i d  the other banks ' 
rati os . The East Tennes see , the Mechan i cs ,  and the Th i rd usua l l y  had 
ratios  of earn i ng assets to as sets between those of the average reserve 
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c i ty bank and the average country ban k .  The Hol s ton and the C i ty 
general ly  had rat i os equal to those of the average country ban k .  Th i s  
represented a s i gn i fi carit departure from the fi rs t peri od , . when the l ocal  
banks genera l ly he l d  rat i os of earn i ng assets to assets that fel l between 
the rat i os hel d by the two cl asses of c i ty banks . ( In the f i nal per iod , 
the rat i os for the l ocal banks usual ly were about the same as  the rati os  
for the average country bank . )  
There were two reasons for the general ri se  i n  rati os of  earn i ng 
assets to al l assets for th e l ocal banks dur i ng the trans i ti on per iod .  
F irs t ,  the l ocal banks l ent a greater port i on o f  thei r assets , a nd 
second , they hel d a l arger port i on of the i r  reserves i n  bank  depos i ts 
and a smal l er port i on of res erves i n  cas h .  The most important o f  these 
two factors was the growth in l oan�asset rat i os , because primary reserves 
to ass ets rati os were genera l ly l ower than  before . The l ower pr imary 
reserve rat i os were , however , accompan i ed by a h i gher proporti on of 
those reserves he l d  in bank depos i ts .  
The Eas t  Tennes see Nati onal ' s  l oan-asset ratio  had been , i n  the 
fi rst peri od , bel ow 50 percent i n  mos t  years . ( See Tabl e V -7 . )  
Beg i nn i ng i n  1 88 1 , that rat i o  s tarted to ri s e ,  and i t  rose  s tead i ly 
unti l 1 888 . For the next three years , the ra ti o ranged between 55  and 
65  percent .  After 1 891 , i t  s tabi l i zed around 55  percent . There was a 
sharp one-year drop i n  1 894 that was a reaction to the cri s i s  of 1 893 , but 
for mos t of the rema i nder of  the trans i ti on period , the l oa n-as s et 
rat i o  for the East Tennessee was very c l ose to 55  percent .  Even though 
there was a s l i ght  d i p_ i n  the rati o from 1 89 9  through 1 902 , the tra ns i ­
ti on period saw the Eas t  Tenness ee Nati ona l l end i ni a t  s i gn i fi cantly 
Tabl e V-7  
Average Rat io  o f  Loa�s to  Assets , i n  Percent 
Ea s t  
Yea r Tennes see Mechani cs Th i rd C i ty State Hol s ton 
56 . 7  58 . 3  56 . 8  ( 3 ) 
67 . 4  67 . 3  66 . 0  65 . 8  
58 . 3  63 . 3  62 . 7  72 . 9  7 1 . 0  ( 1 ) 
65 . 3  65 . 6  69 . 4  77 . 7  63 . 5  
63 . 9  69 .4 . 3 . 4  78 . 3  69 . 
56 . 3  65 . 0  65 . 9 77 . 1  70 . 8 
59 . 3  70 . 5  7 1 . 4  7 1 . 3  7 5 . 0  ( 3 ) 
49 . 3  69 . 1  69 . 0  59 . 9  
55 . 4  63 . 3  68 . 4  65 . 3  
5 . 6  6 . 66 . 8  6 . . 
55 . 0  60 . 9 . 6 3 . 8  6 1 . 2  60 . 5  
57 . 5  57 . 8  65 . 2  (4 ) 66 . 1  69 . 8  ( 3 ) 
5 3 . 9  53 .8  ( 4 )  66 . 1  63 . 2  67 . 0  
5 1 . 8  56 . 0  64 . 0  63 . 7  66 . 2  
Source : Reports of Condi ti on . See Tab l e IV-9 , page 1 03 .  
Centra l 
Reserve 
C i t i es 
54 . 9  
54 . 5  
55 . 5  
57 . 5  
56 . 0  
56 . 9  
54 . 6  
5 1 . 7  
5 5 . 6  
. 
52 . 7  
51 . 6  
53 . 9  
5 1 . 7  
Reserve 
Ci ti es 
6 1 . 8  
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64 . 2  
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60 . 6  
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64 . 6  
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h i gher l evel s than prev i ous ly . The East Tennes see changed i ts l oan 
pol i cy i n  the m i d- 1 880 ' s ,  and the change was brought about by i ncreased 
competi t i on . 
The Mechan i cs National a l s o  a l tered i ts l oan  pol i cy and i ncreased 
i ts l oan-ass et rati o early i n  the trans i ti o n  peri od , a l though the change 
was not so dramat i c  as the East Tennes see ' s .  After i ts f irst  yea r ,  the 
Mechan ics  genera l ly  had a l oan-a sset  rat i o  of 55 to 60 percent through 
the end of the f irst  peri od . The Mechani cs res ponded to the i ncreas ed 
competi t i on by ra i s i ng i ts l oan-asset rat io  to 65 to 70 percent . . Th i s  
re l at i vely h i gh rat i o  was , mai ntai ned through 1 894 , after wh i ch the 
rat i o  dri fted downward toward 5 5  percent by the l as t  yea rs of the 
trans i ti on .  
The other l ocal banks general l y  hel d h i gher l oan-as set rat ios  than 
ei ther the East Tennes s ee or the Mechan i cs ,  and a lmo st  every year of the 
trans i t i on they had h i gher rat i os than d i d  the average . country bank . ( I n  
mos t years , the Eas t Tennes see and the Mechan ic s  had rat i os c l ose to 
those for the average country ban k . ) I n  some years , the s i ze of these 
rati os was a s toundi ng . The C i ty Nati ona l • s  rati o was above 70 percen t  
from 1 889 to 1 893 , and i t  peaked i n  1 89 1  above 78 percent .  Ra tios very 
c l ose to ( and occas i ona l ly  above ) 70 percent were common for the l oca l  
bank s , except the East  Tennes see , throtigh 1 895 . Thereafter the rat i os 
fel l , usual ly  to 60 to 6 5  percent .  
The dec l i ne i n  l oan-as s et rat i os mi dway through the trans i tion 
per iod was a reaction to the cri s i s  of 1 89 3 .  The Eas t Tennessee and 
the C i ty both h ad much l ower l oan-asset rat i os i n  1 894 than i n  1 893 . 
The Hol s ton ' s  rati o a l so fel l ,  but not so muc h .  The Mechani cs and the 
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Th i rd had l oan-asset rat i os that fel l s l ight ly  i n  the same peri od . 
From 1 895  on , there was a general tendency for l oan-asset rati os to move 
l ower , a l though that movement was occas i onal l y  i nterrupted. 
Whi l e  l oan-asset rat ios  fo r the l ocal ban ks were ri s i ng ,  the ir  
reserves were fal l i ng . ( See Tab l e  V -8 . ) From 1 873 to 1 879 , the Eas t 
Tennes see ' s  primary reserve to as sets ratio was usua l l y  near 20 percent .  
I n  the next s even years , the rat io  reached rel ati ve ly  h i gh l evel s ,  
compared to the average country bank . For the next fourteen years , 
the rati o va ri ed w ith i n  a much narrower range ,  22 to 35 percent , than 
prev ious l y .  At the same t ime , the prima ry reserve to assets rati o for 
the East Tennessee general l y  was l ower than i t  h ad been for 1 880 to 
1 886 , al though not a lways much l ower , whereas i t  was h i g her than i t  had 
been for 1 873  to 1 879 . That i s , the Eas t Tennes see Nati onal hel d 
reserves i n  the trans i ti on peri od that  were not qu i te so con servati ve 
as they were in 1 880- 1 886 , nor qu i te so ri s ky as they were from 1 873  
to 1 879 . Compared to  the three cl asses of banks , the  East Tennes see 
appears to have been more conservati ve most of the time . I t  hel d 
reserve rati os wh i ch  -were h i gher than those hel d by the average coun try 
bank throughout the trans i ti on . I n  fact , i ts reserves were on a oar 
wi th those hel d by reserve c i ty banks . Duri ng the trans i ti on , the 
East Tennes see had a mo re conservati ve preference for l i qu i d  a s sets 
than mos t  other country banks , yet i t  was not qu i te so conservati ve as 
i t  had been , once i t  recovered from the c i rs i s of 1 873 . 
The �ther l oca l  banks were l es s  cons ervati ve than the East 
Tennes s ee Nati onal , and usua l ly preferred to ho l d  fewer l i q u i d  as sets . 
The i r  primary reserve rati os genera l ly  ranged between the ratios  he l d 
Tab l e V-8 
Average Rati o of Prima ry Reserves to As sets , i n  Percent  
Central 
East Reserve 
Year Tennes see Mechani cs Th i rd C i ty State Hol ston C i ti es 
33 . 2  27 . 6  24 . 3  ( 3 )  36 . 3  
2 1 . 8  20 . 9  1 9 . 8 1 8 . 3  36 . 0  
3 1 . 7  27 . 5  27 . 0  1 8 . 1  6 . 4  ( 1 ) 36 . 5  
25 . 4  24 . 1  1 8 . 6  1 5 . 8  . 1 5 . 5  34 . 3  
25 . 1  1 9 . 9  1 4 . 0  (3) 1 5 . 9  1 2 . 1  (4) 1 5 . 8 (1) 3 5 . 8  
35 . 1  24 . 6  2 3 . 9  1 8 . 5  1 5 . 3  1 7 . 8 ( 4 )  35 . 1  
29 . 7  1 9 . 5  1 8 . 1  1 9 . 3  1 1 . 8 ( 3 )  1 3 . 6  36 . 3  
27 . 4  1 8 . 7  1 9 . 1  25 . 2  1 5 . 7  37 . 7  
23 . 2  20 . 1  1 7 . 1  20 . 3 1 7 . 5  32 .8  
. 6  3.9  9 .  . 9  . 3 • 
30 . 6  25 . 8  22 . 1  29 . 8  25 . 6  36 . 0  
26 . 4  24 . 9  20 . 3  ( 4 )  26 . 8  1 8 . 4  ( 3 )  35 . 6  
30 . 0  30 . 2  ( 4 )  1 8 . 9  2 1 . 5  2 1 . 4  34 . 2  
31 . 8  23 . 6  1 7 . 8  22 . 3  1 3 . 3  34 . 1  
-
Source : Reports of Cond i t i on . See Tabl e IV- 1 0 ,  page 1 08 .  
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C i ti es 
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32 . 0  
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by the average reserve c i ty bank and the average country bank .  Unti l 
the cri s i s  of 1 893 , these  ban ks often he ld  primary reserve rat ios  that 
were equal to or  bel ow those hel d by the average country ban k ,  but the 
effects of that cri s i s  persuaded them to hol d s omewhat h i gher rati os 
in the future . After 1 893  the rati os tended to ri s e  to l evel s equal 
to or  above the rat i os for the average country bank • . That  i s , there 
were few dramatic  s h i fts i n  preferences for l i q u i d  assets  among the l ocal  
banks dur ing  the tran s i t i on .  There were , however , fa i r ly s ubs tanti a l  
s h i fts i n  the  types of l i qu id  assets preferred . 
I n  the f i r st  peri od , the l ocal banks had kept mos t  of thei r pr i mary 
res erves i n  cas h . The Eas t Tennessee usua l l y  hel d 70 percent or more 
of . i ts primary res erves i n  ca s h  and one-quarter ( often l es s ) i n  ban k 
depos i ts .  Duri ng  the trans i ti on ,  these proporti ons were very nearly 
reversed . The Eas t Tennes see ' s  cas h to primary reserve rat i o  began to 
fal l . at the beg i nni ng of the trans i tion , and the fal l conti nued through­
out . There were , of cours e ,  occas i onal  i nterruptions , but  the trend i s  
c l ear .  ( See Tab l e  V-9 . ) T he  Mechan i cs Nati onal al s o  hel d  h i gh rati o s  
of cash to primary reserves i n  the first peri od . and i t  too s hO\'!ed a 
tendency to reduce that rati o dur i n g  the tran s i tion . The Th i rd Nati onal 
genera l ly · he l d much h i gher cash to reserves rat i os dur i ng  the trans i ti on 
than d i d  the other l oca l ban ks . I ts rat io  tended to vary more from year 
to yea r ,  and i t  was not unti l the l as t  years of the trans i t ion per i od 
that the Th i rd demons trated a defi n i te commi tment to l ower cash reserves . 
The C i ty National  s tarted wi th a rel atively h i g h  cash to reserves 
ratio , wh i ch . soon decl i ned to l eve l s  comparabl e wi th the average country 
Tabl e V-9  
Average Rati o of Cas h to  Primary Reserves , i n  Percenta 
East 
Yea r Tennessee Mechan ics Thi rd C i ty State Hol s ton 
Central 
Reserve Reserve Country 
C i ti es C i ti es Banks 
1 887 60 . 4  43 . 9  48 . 7  ( 3 )  49 . 0  40 . 1  37 . 7  
1 888 46 . 9  56 . 0  69 . 7  52 . 2  . 53 . 9  38 . 1  36 . 8  
1 889 3 5 . 0  46 . 8  53 . 1  49 . 6  1 9 . 5  ( 1 )  50 . 3  36 . 7  35 . 1  
1 890 35 . 9  41 . 0  62 . 0  . 34 . 3  2 5 . 8  5 1 . 2  35 . 8  35 . 9  
1891 39.4 45.9 58.9 (3) 33.0 29. 9 (4) 17.2 (1) 50.5 38. 3  37.2 
1 892 29 . 8  34 . 2  32 . 7  40 . 6  62 . 8  32 . 1  ( 4 )  53 . 6  36 .2 33 . 7  
1 893 36 . 0  37 . 6  57 . 8  35 . 8  3 3 . 4  ( 3 )  42 . 1  54 . 3  37 . 6  41 . 0  
1 894 32 . 9  42 . 4  46 . 9  36 . 9  39 . 0  67 . 3  37 . 7  35 . 8  
1895 37 . 8  38 . 7  53 . 4  28 . 4  28 . 2  60 . 0  36 .8  36 .8  
1 896 3 . . 5 . . 0  6 . 4  58 . 9  37.8 39 . 7  
1 897  32 . 5  37 . 4  4 1 . 4  1 9 . 2  22 . 0  . 59 . 8  34 . 5  33 . 8  
1 898 35 . 5  44 . 8  5 2 . 9  ( 4 )  2 6 . 2  30 . 0  ( 3 )  56 . 6  33 . 1  3 1 . 2  
1 899 23 . 5  24 . 9  ( 4 )  35 . 9  24 . 7  30 . 1  54 . 5  30 . 0  26 . 9  
1 900 2 1 . 5  26 . 0  39 . 9  26 . 8  30 . 2  53 . 7  30 . 8  28 . 0  
Source : Reports of Condi ti on . See Tab l e I V- 1 2 ,  page 1 1 1 . 
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ban k  as wel l as the other l ocal banks ( excepti ng  the Th i rd ) . The State 
Nati onal never seems to have settled on a des i rabl e rel ati on of cas h to 
reserves , and i ts rat io  fl uctuated a good deal from year to year , 
especi a l ly  from 1 891  to 1 893 . The Hol s ton National s tarted wi th rat ios  
· o f  cash  to primary reserves that  were about equa l to  those of  the average 
country ban k ,  a nd though there were some di fferences , the Hol s ton s howed 
no pers i s tent tendency to vary much from the average country bank . 
Wh i l e  cash  reserves for the l ocal  ban ks fel l , thei r bank depos i ts 
(as a percentage of reserves ) rose .  ( See Tabl e V- 1 0 . ) The Ea st  
Tennessee began the trans i ti on peri od wi th bank depos i ts mak i ng uo  
about one-th i rd - of primary reserves . Tha t  rat i o  ros e  s tead i ly  throuqh 
1 900 , at wh i ch po int  it was about three-quarters of primary reserves . 
The other banks a l so  i ncreas ed bank depos i ts as a port i on of primary 
reserves . The Mechan i cs • ratio  rose from around 50 percent to above 
60 p�rcent . The Th i rd Nationa l  • s  rati o var ied often and over a w ide 
range , but i t  fi nal l y  rose  over 50 percent i n  the l ast  years of the 
trans i ti on .  
The C i ty Nati onal s tarted wi th a rat i o  th «t  was l ow re l ati ve to 
the average country ban k ,  but i ts rat io  soon ros e .  After 1 89 5 ,  the 
Ci ty usual l y  hel d a rat i o  of ban k depos i ts to reserves that exceeded the 
average country ban k ' s  rati o .  (Th i s  was espec i a l l y  the case i n  the 
f i nal peri od . ) The State Nati ona l ' s  rati o rose and fe l l  i n  a l ternat i ve 
yea rs and s howed no d i s cern i b l e  pattern . The Hol ston National  u s ua l l y  
hel d about the same rat i o  o f  bank depos i ts t o  reserves as  d i d  the 
average country ban k .  That i s ,  through the trans i ti on the l ocal banks 
Tab l e  V- 1 0  
Average Ratio o f  Bank Depos i ts t o  Prima ry Reserves , i n  Percent 
East 
Year Tennessee Mechani cs Th i rd C i ty S tate 
Centra l 
Res erve Reserve Country 
Ho l s ton C i t i es C i t ies Banks 
1 887 32 . 9  48 . 9  42 . 6  { 3 )  1 7 .  1 43 . 9  57 . 7  
1 888 37 . 3  39 . 8  24 . 0  42 . 0  1 7 . 3  46 . 3  58 . 6  
1 889 57 . 4  44 . 6  44 . 6  4 5 . 1  7 7 . 6  { 1 ) 1 8 . 0  48 . 8  60 . 7  
1 890 49 . 2  5 5 . 2  33 . 8  59 . 8  44 . 7  2 1 . 8  48 . 2  59 . 9  
1891 53 .0 48. 3  39.1 (3) 48. 8 63. 0 (4) 66.7 (1) 20 .3 47. 9 58.4 
1 892 67 . 5  3 1 . 4  6 5 . 2  4R . 5  33 . 8  62 . 4  ( 4) 20 . 6  50 . 4  62 . 4  
1 893 6 1  . R  57 . 3  38 . 5  55 . 2  62 . 5  ( 3 ) 52 . 9  1 9 . 0 46 . 8  54 . 6  
1 894 64 . 7  51 . 4  5 1 . 7  56 . 5  58 . 5  1 7 . 3  5 1 . 9  60 . 7  
1 895 59 . 3  55 . 1  44 . 4  62 . 6  68 . 4  20 . 5  51 . 5  59 . 7  
6 • 1 6 • • • 8 7 • 6 20 . 4 . 5 . 
1 897 6 5 . 4  58 . 0  5 5 . 6  72 . 4  74 . 8  . 2 1 . 2  54 . 4  62 . 9  
1 898 60 . 3  50 . 1  43 . 3  { 4 )  68 . 4  66 . 8  ( 3 )  20 . 4  55 . 9  6 5 . 5  
1 899 74 . 2  69 . 2  { 4 )  58 . 9  66 . 1  66 . 7  2 1 . 8  59 . 0  69 . 3  
1 900 7 5 . 8  64 . 4  56 . 1  6 1 . 9  61 . 7  2 1 . 5  58 . 4  68 . 6  
Source : Reports of Condi tion . See Tab l e  IV- 1 3 ,  page 1 1 2 .  
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( except for the Th i rd and the State ) showed a growi ng preference for 
bank depos i ts over cash reserves . By the end of the trans i ti on , even 
the conservative Thi rd was wi l l i ng to hol d  a growi ng proporti on of i ts 
reserves with  other banks . 
I t  was not unt i l  the fi nal peri od that the l ocal  banks began to 
show a defi ni te preference for wi dely d i s tri buti ng thei r bank depos i ts 
among their reserve agents , other nati onal banks , and state banks . Mos t  
of the l ocal ban ks kept mo�t  of thei r bank depos i ts wi th  the i r  reserve 
agents , not wi th  other banks . ( See Tab l e V- 1 1 . )  From 1 887 to 1 895 , 
the East Tenness ee Nati onal de�os i ted a smal l er proport ion of i ts bank 
depos i ts wi th i ts reserve agents than did the average country bank , 
and whereas the proporti on rose errat i ca l ly unti l 1 89 5 ,  the proport i on 
then s tarted a decl i ne that l asted throughout the fi na l peri od . The 
proporti on of  bank depos i ts hel d wi th res erve agents by the �1echan i c s  
Nat i�nal  i n  1 887 al s o  was l ower than tha t  he ld  by the average country 
bank , and the ra t io  fel l i n  1 888 . I t  then commenced to ri s e , and the 
i ncrease  conti nued through 1 900 . The Th i rd Nati onal ' s  rati o i ncreased 
throughout the tran s i ti on period . The C i ty Nati onal fo l l owed a pattern 
more nearly l i ke tha t  o f  the East Tenne�see . The C i ty ' s  rat i o  ros e from 
1 888 through 1 898 and then began a s l ow dec l i ne .  As was the cas e w i th 
bank depos i ts ,  the State Nationa l ' s  rati o of depos i ts wi th reserve agents 
to al l bank depos i ts ros e and fel l i n  a l ternat ive years , and no pattern 
to i ts change i s  appa rent .  The Hol s ton Nati onal ' s  rat i o  rose ,  at l east  
through 1 89 7 .  After 1 897  the  Hol ston ' s  rat i o  fel l to a l ower l evel and 
s tab i l i zed . 
Tab l e V-1 1 
Average Ratio  of  Deposi ts wi th Reserve Agents and C l ear ing  House Certi fi ca tes of  Depos i t  
to A l l Ban k  Depo s i ts , i n  Percent 
· 
East Reserve Country 
Yea·r Tennessee Mecha n i cs Th i rd · C i ty State Hol ston C i t i es Banks 
Source : Reports of Cond i t i on .  See Tabl e IV- 1 4 ,  oaqe 1 1 5 .  
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The overa l l  pattern for the l ocal banks i nd i cate that  they d i d  not 
make a concerted effort unti l a fter 1 900 to p l ace thei r bank depos i ts 
wi th banks that pa i d  the hi ghest rates of  i n terest . Prior to that , the 
marg i nal di sadvantage ( s l i gh tly  l ower i n terest  rates ) to depos i ts wi th 
reserve agents was outwei ghed by the advantages of s uch deposi ts counti ng  
a s  l egal reserves . ( Nonres erve agen t banks some times pa i d  0 . 5  percent 
more on depo s i ts than d i d  res erve agent bank� . )  The l ocal ban ks hel d 
very l ow res erve rati os , and the extra 0 . 5  percent was not s uffi c i en t  
to attract a very l arge vol ume o f  depos i ts away from res erve agent banks 
where s uch  deposi ts were legal reserves . 
Secondary reserves dec l i ned i n  importance to the l oca l banks , wi th 
two excepti ons .  ( See Tab l e V- 1 2 . ) Fi rs t ,  most  o f  the l ocal ban ks 
i ncreased the i r hol d i ngs of nongovernment securi t i es after the cri s i s  
of 1 893 . A l arger number of borrowers fa i l ed to repay l oans , and the 
bank� forecl osed on the securi ti es  wh ich  had been depos i ted to i ns ure 
the repayment of l oans . The second genera l reversa l  i n  the l ong-run 
trend came in  1 900 ( 1 899 for the C i ty National ) ,  when banknote i s s ue 
was made more attracti ve .  As the l ocal ba nks took advantage of the 
changes i n  the l aw ,  purchases of U . S .  government bonds caused thei r 
secondary reserves to grow rel at ive to thei r ass ets . Wi th these two 
general exceptions noted , the trend was for secondary reserves to fa l l  
as a proporti on of a l l  assets . 
The secondary reserve to assets rat io  fel l for the l ocal  banks 
becaus e they made few i n creases i n  thei r  capi ta l  and even fewer i n  the i r 
c i rcul ati on . I n  fact ,  on ly  the Ci ty Nati ona l i ncreased i ts c i rcu l at ion 
Tabl e V-1 2  
Average Rat io  o f  Secondary Res erves to Assets , i n  Percent 
Eas t 
Year Tennes see Mechan i cs Th i rd C i ty 
Central 
Reserve Reserve Country 
State Hol s ton C i t i es C i t i es Banks 
1 887 9 o 3  1 1 . 2  l 6 o 8 ( 3 )  6 o 5  9 o l  l 7 o 3  
1 888 9 .  8 8 0 2 1 2  0 6 1 2 0 1 7 0 4 9 0 1 1 6  0 9 
1 889 8 o 9  6 o l  9 o 0  7 o 0  l 9 o l  ( 1 ) 6 o 0  7 o 2  l 5 o 0 
1 890 8 • 3 7 0 5 1 0 0 8 4 0 7 1 6  0 5 6 0 1 6 0 4 1 3 0 4 
1891 9o9 706 11 .4 (3) son 13o l (4) . 12.s (1) 6 .o 6 . 4 13 o2 
1 892 7 . 6 7 o 4  8 o 7  4 . 2  9 o 2  l l o l  ( 4 )  6 o 0 6 o 7  1 3 . 3  
1 893 7 o 4  7 o 0  8 o 7 6 o 5  9 o 0  ( 3 )  1 4 o 8  6 o 9  8 o 2  l 4 o 6 
1 894 l 3 o 6 8 o 4  8 o l  1 l o 7  l 7 o l  8 o 6  9 o 5 1 6 o 4 
1 895 1 5 0 5 9 0 7 8 0 1 . ( 4 )  1 0 0 7 1 3 . 1 9 0 4 9 • 6 1 6  0 9 
1896 9 o l  So3 7oS 9.3 11 .4 9.7 l0;7 17o9  
1 897 8 o 9  8 . 2  8 . 1  7 . 1  l 0 o 7 9 o l  1 0 . 2  1 7 . 8 
1 898 1 0 . 3  1 1 . 6  8 0 7 ( 4 )  4 0 1 8 0 8 ( 3 )  1 0  0 9 1 0 . 9  1 7 . 8  
1 899 9 . 6  1 1 . 0  ( 4 )  9 . 0 1 3 . 6  7 o 9  1 0 . 3  l 2 o 0 1 8 . 6 
1 900 1 3 . 7 1 6 . 3 1 2 . 5  1 2 o 6 1 6 o 6 1 2 . 6  1 3 . 1  1 8 . 8 
Source : Reports of Cond i t i on . See Tab l e  IV- 1 1 ,  page 1 09 .  
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between 1 887 and 1 900 . The fi rst of i ts two i ncreases came as a res ul t 
of  i ts capi tal i ncrease i n  1 894 , wh i ch neces si ta ted an i ncrease i n  i ts 
depos i t  of U . S .  bonds . But the c i rcul ati on i ncrease i n  th�t yea r s i mp ly  
brought the C i ty back  to the mi n imum requ i red by l aw .  
I n  s ummary , the l ocal  banks manaqed to control the proport ion i ng 
of thei r assets , and by doi ng s o , they i ncreased the i ncome produci nq 
port i on of those as sets and reduced the porti on not d i rectly oroducti ve 
of i ncome . Two rel ated strateg i es were emp l oyed . On the one hand , 
they i ncreased thei r l oans rel at ive to thei r other a s sets . On the 
other , they reduced ( s l i ghtly ) the i r  l i qu id  a s sets and changed thei r 
composi t i on by reduci ng cash and i nc rea s i nq bank depos i ts .  The res ul t  
was a h i gher proport i on of  ea rni nq as sets wi th i n. reserves . Of the two 
methods ,  the pol i cy of i ncreas i ng loans rel at ive to assets contri buted 
more towards h i gher earn i ng as sets than di d the pol i cy of i n crea s i n g  
ban k . depos i ts .  In creased l oan-asset rat i os were produced by an 
a l terati on i n  the banks ' pol i ci e s  wi th reqard to the i r  borrowers . . The 
ban ks l owered the securi ty requi rements the i r  borrowers had to meet . 
At the same time , l ocal banks  became l es s  wi l l i n g  to restri ct thei r 
borrowers to l oans beneath the l ega l l i mi t .  The devel opment and chanqes 
in l oan  pol i cy wi l l  be d i scus sed i n  the fo l l owi ng secti on . 
Loan Pol i c i es : 1 887 - 1 900 
Much that  i s  known about the l oan  pol i c i es of the l ocal . bank s  i s  
matter o f  i nference , whi ch i s  to say that there are few expl i c i t  
s tatements now avai l ab l e  that were made by the l oca l ban ks about the 
standards  they s et for thei r borrowers to meet . In thei r corres ponden�· 
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wi th the Comptro l l er of  the Currency , the l oca l  banks  somet imes di d 
spel l out a port ion of thei r overa l l  strategy : the rema i nder must be 
determi ned from the records of the bank exami ners . The most g l ari ng 
defi ci ency i s  i n  the records o f  the East Tennes see Nat ional , for wh i ch 
only the corre spondence wi th the Comptro l l er i s  avai l abl e .  The bank 
exami ners ' reports for thi s bank  are not pub l i c l y  avai l abl e ,  and 
wi thout them the i nformation contai ned i n  the corres pondence i s  not 
as useful i n  determi n i n g  the prec i se characteri s ti cs of th i s  bank ' s  
pol i cy .  However , because  the correspondence of th i s  ban k wi th the 
Comptro l l er was much l i ke tha t of the other banks , i t  i s  l i ke ly  that 
the Ea s t  Tennes see ' s  po l i cy di ffered from the other banks ' pol i c i es 
on ly  i n  deta i l . 
The two key el ements i n  l oan pol i c i es were the bank s ' rel axati on 
of s tandard s  and the i r  wi l l i ngness  to v i ol ate the 1 0  percent l oan l imi t .  
Of t�e two , the mos t di ffi cu l t  to prove i s  the rel axat i on o f  l endi nq 
s tandards . Nei ther the banks  nor th ei � exami ners made menti on of  thei r 
exact gu i de l i nes for granti n g  l oans . The exami ners di d ,  however , l i s t  
the types  of  l oans granted . _ 
The exami ners d i v i ded a ban k ' s  l oans i nto s i x categori es : two 
were demand l oans ( l oans made wi thout a spec i fi c  time l imi t and ca l l ab l e  
a t  the bank ' s  demand ) , and four were ti me l oans ( l oans made for a 
spec i fi c  oeri od of  time and not cal l abl e unt i l  that time had e l apsed . )  
Demand l oans were ei ther l oans secured by endors emen ts or l oan s s ecured 
by col l a tera l , whi ch coul d be ei ther stocks and bonds or rea l  es tate . 
Time 1 oans were characteri zed by the type of  sec uri t.v offered : two or 
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more endorsements ( two-name time l oans ) , one endorsement ( one-name t ime 
l oans ) ,  s tock  co l l ateral , or  rea l estate col l ateral . 
Unfortunate ly ,  the l i st i ng  i n  the reports  of  exami nati on represents 
a s i ng l e  s ti l l -frame photograph of the vari ous categori es at a part i cu l ar 
i nstant i n  t ime ;  i t  does not represe�t a movi ng image . For examp l e ,  
nati ona l  banks were proh i b i ted from mak i ng  real estate l oans , yet the 
l ocal banks a lmost  a lways reported some l oans s ecured by rea l  estate . 
Such l oans were not origi nal ly rea l estate l oans . Rather ,  they were 
l oans wh i ch had i n i t i a l l y  been secured by someth ing  other than c l aims  
on  real estate . Sometime before the l oan matured , the bank had requested 
addi tional  securi ty and had been presented wi th a c l a im  on some real 
property . · A l l the l ocal banks at one time or another we re cri ti c i zed 
by the Comptro l l er for th i s  pract i ce ,  but there i s  no evi dence to suggest  
that they ever ceased . The  rea l  wonder is  that they did  not  make mo re 
such l oans than they di d ,  for i t  was obv i ous ly  a very easy way to avoi d 
the proh i b i ti on agai nst rea l  estate l oans . 
Of the four  categories of  t ime l oans , i t  i s  l i ke ly  that � one-name 
time l oans were a l l  o ri g i na l ly o f  tha t part i cul ar type . Some port i on­
exactly how much i s  unce rtai n-of  the other three types was ori gi na l ly  
some other type . For exampl e ,  some po rt i on o f  two-name time l oans  had 
i n iti al l y  been one-name . Some po rt i on of  time l oans on s toc k co l l ateral 
had probabl y  been one-name or two-name t ime l oans . No method i s  ava i l a b l e 
wh i ch woul d provi de a d i v i s i on of  l oans accord i n g  to the i r ori g i na l  type . 
I nstead , the ana l ys i s wi l l  have to depend upon the types exi s t i n g  at 
the date of exami nation . 
The s i x  types o f  l oans l i s ted wi l l  be  consol i dated i nto three 
categori es refl ect i n g  di fferent degrees of ri s k  to the l end i n g  ban k .  
The categori es are :  demand l oans , two-name time l oans and other time 
l oans . Other th i ngs bei ng the same , demand l oans are somewha t l es s  
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· r i s ky than t ime l oans because  the l ender can iiTilled i ately demand payment  
at  the fi rst i nd i cati on of fi nanci a l  troubl e by the borrowe r .  Two-name 
time l oans c l ea rly are l ess  ri s ky tha n one-name t ime l oans . Time l oans 
secured by s tock col l ateral and time l oans secured by real es tate cannot 
be sa i d on a pri ori grounds to be e i ther more or l es s  r i s ky than the 
other tyoes of t ime l oans , but the exami ners ' reoorts i n di cate that 
they are bes t  aggregated wi th one-name t ime l oans . T ime l oans s ecured 
by rea l es tate were l i sted and briefly analyzed i n  a seoarate section 
of the report of  exami nati on . By and l a rge , suc h l oans aooea r to have 
ori g i na l ly  been one-name time l oans . Loans secured by s tock col l ateral 
a l so . s hou l d  be p l aced in the "most  ri s ky "  category . The secti on in the 
report of exami nati on detai l i ng " other securi ti e s  owned " i nd i cates that 
the securi ti es  acqu i red by the banks "for debts previ ous l y  contracted 1 1  
general l y  di d not regu l arly pay i nterest or d i v i dends . That i s , many 
of the securi ti es fo rfei ted to the bank · d i d  not produce i ncome , and 
mu st  be regarded as of doubtful qua l i ty and therefore rather ri s ky for 
the banks  to have taken as i nsurance for paymen t .  That a ba nk  wou l d 
accept such securi ty for a l oan i ndi cates i ts wi l l i ngnes s to l end at 
ri s k .  
Tab l e  V - 1 3 presents demand l oan s a s  a percentage o f  al l l oans for 
the l ocal banks at various dates of exami nati on . (When there were two 
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Tab l e  V- 1 3  
Demand Loans as a Percentage of Al l Loans 
Year Mechani cs Th i rd C i ty State Hol ston 
1 882 48 
1 884 8 
1 885 5 
1 886 5 
1 887 4 0 
1 888 3 5 0 
1 889 0 3 0 
1 890 N . A . 2 0 0 
1 89 1  9 7 0 0 0 
1 892 4 8 0 1 0 
1 893 6 5 0 0 1 
1 894 5-4 8- 5 0-0 0 . 1 - 1 
1 895  0 5 1 0 . 6  
1 R96 · 0-0 2-3  1 - 1 0 . 1 -4 
1 897 0 5-3 0 . 1  0 
1 898 NA-0 6 1 -0 1 - 5 
1 899 2-0 8- 1 2 6-2 3 - 5  
1 900 4-0 7 - 1 1 2-4 4-5  
Source : Reports of Bank  Examinati on . 
NA : Not Ava i l ab l e . 
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exam i nat ions i n  one year , the fi rs t  exami nati on ' s  rat i o  precedes the 
second ' s . )  On ly  the conservative Th i rd regul arly  made demand l oans , 
and even then , such  l oans we re not  often o f  great import . · Nei ther the 
Ci ty nor the Hol s ton showed any propens i ty to make s uch l oans unti l 
l ate i n  the peri od . Demand l oans were never important for the State 
Nati ona l . The i mpo rtance of demand l oans to the Mechani c s  Nati onal , 
however , va ri ed con s i derabl y .  I n  i ts fi rst yea r ,  demand l oans were 
about one-ha l f  of  al l l oans , and may have exi sted at that l evel as  part 
of that bank ' s  transormat ion from a s tate bank i n to a nati onal one .  
{The exami nat ion i n  1 882 was made s hortly after the Mechani cs  obtai ned 
i ts nati ona l  cha rter . )  Wi thi n two yea rs , the proporti on for the 
Mechan i c s  dropped sharp ly , to 8 pertent ,  and dec l i ned further in the 
next fou r  yea rs , d i sappea ri ng  en ti rely by 1 889 . The exami ner i n  1 890 
d i d  not report the Mechan i cs ' l oans by type , and therefore no fi gures 
for �hat yea r exi s t .  However , in 1 891  demand l oans rose  in i mpo rtance , 
but then for the next four  yea rs aga i n  d imi n i shed . None appea red from 
1 895  through 1 898 ,  a l though a few were made i n  1 899 and 1 900 . 
There i s  a pos s i bl e  exp l anati on fo r the ri se i n  demand l oans  i n  
1 891 wh i ch l i nks  changes i n  the genera l  l evel  o f  economi c acti vi ty wi th 
th i s  ban k ' s  response to i ts customers ' d i ffi cu l ti es i n  that peri od . 
Tabl e V- 1 4  presents bad debts , doubtful l oans , and overdue l oans as a 
percentage of  al l l oans for the l ocal  ban ks . Of the l ocal banks , on ly  
the  Mechani c s  Nati ona l had pers i s tently h i gh rates , a l though al l the 
l ocal banks s howed somewhat h i gher rati os i n  1 894 . I n  the case of the 
Mechan ics , the percentage q i ven i s  a lmost  a lways enti rel y  that o f  
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Tab l e  V- 1 4 
Bad Debts t Doubtful Loans , and Overdue Loans as a Percentage 
of Al l Loans 
Year Mechan i cs Th i rd C i ty State Hol s ton 
1 887 1 .  4 
1 888 1 . 1 0 . 2  0 . 2  
1 889 1 . 6 0 . 1  0 . 2  
1 890 0 . 4 0 6 . 2  
1 89 1  1 1 . 7  1 . 4 0 . 4 38 . 1  4 . 0  
1 892 1 2 . 4  2 . 0 2 . 3  1 2 . 2 3 . 3 
1 893  4 . 1  1 . 0 5 . 0  9 . 5  7 . 6  
1 894 . 21  . 1 0 . 7  7 . 5  24 . 2  
1 895  1 8 . 4  1 . 2 4 . 7  9 . 0  
1 896 1 2 . 5  2 . 1  5 .. 3 5 . 9  
1 897 . 1 5 . 6 1 . 7 5 . 7  4 . 6  
1 898 7 . 7  1 . 7 5 . 4  3 . 4 
1 899 1 1 . 2  3 . 8 3 . 8  3 . 4  
1 900 5 . 7  1 . 5 3 . 2  7 . 5  
Source : Reports of  Ban k  Exam i nation . 
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overdue pape r .  The exami ner ra rel y found bad o r  doubtfu l  l oans for th i s  
bank . Consequentl y ,  i t  woul d appear that the Mechan i cs , i n  the d i ff i cul t 
peri od of  the early 1 890 ' s ,  a l l owed i ts borrowers to continue thei r  l oans , 
but on a demand , rather than time bas i s .  (A l l the l ocal banks  duri n9 
th i s  peri od were faced wi th borrowers who coul d not pay--or , at l east  
who coul d not pay at the agreed t ime . )  
After the second cri s i s  i n  that decade ( 1 893 ) , the Mechani cs 
evi dently dec i ded to a l l ow thei r borrowers to conti nue thei r l oans , 
but wi thout revi s i ng e i ther thei r character ( to demand l oans ) or the i r  
time to . matur i ty .  On the few occas i ons  when the exami ner i dent i f i ed 
some of  the overdue paper ,  the borrowers \'Jere fi rms and i nd i v i dua l s  
who had been and con ti nued to be regul ar borrowers . The �echan i cs 
thus appea rs to have been wi l l i ng to qrant  i ts customers fl exi b i l i ty 
i n  repayi ng l oans , e i ther by converti ng the l oan s to demand l oans wi th 
the unders tand i ng that they woul d  not be ca l l ed ,  or by s imply a l l owi nq 
an expi red time l oan to remai n  unpai d ,  agai n wi th the understand i ng that 
it coul d be renewed . Converse ly , the other ban ks appear to have 
preferred to req u i re new l oans , pos s i b ly  wi th some a l terat i on s  i n  the 
col l atera l s or the endorsements . The Th i rd Nati onal d i d  not s how a 
very l arge i ncrease i n  demand l oans fo l l owi ng  the cri s i s  o f  1 893 , nor 
did i t  s how a l a rge proporti on of  bad , doubtful , or overdue l oans  i n  
1 894 . The Th i rd appea rs to have been unwi l l i nq to tol era te any 
i rregulari ty wi th respect to repayment of l oans . The other banks  were 
somewhat more to l erant than the Th i rd ,  but l es s  so than the Mechani cs . 
( Of course ,  the State Nati ona l  was a spec ia l  cas e .  Its di ffi cul ti es and 
eventua l fa i l ure i s  d i scus sed i n  Append i x  B . ) 
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By and l arge ,  most of the l oans made by the l oca l banks were two-name 
time l oans . Wi th the excepti on of the Mechani cs Nati onal , there was a l so 
a wea k tendency for two-name time l oans to d imi n i s h  i n i mportance duri ng 
the trans i ti on peri od . (Yea r to year di fferences i n  the rati os were 
· fa i rl y  l a rge . See Tabl e V- 1 5 . ) From 1 884 through 1 889 , the Mechani cs 
Nati ona l  had a rati o of two-name time l oans to a l l  l oans that was above 
60 percent . Duri ng that same oeri od , the Th i rd and the C i ty a l so had 
fa i rly  h i gh rati os . The report of exami nat i on for the Mechan i cs i n  1 890 
i s  defecti ve ,  but the Th i rd and the C i ty in that year  had l ower rat i os . 
From 1 89 1  throug h  1 894 , the �1echan i c s  rati o was l ower than i t  had been , 
but after 1 894 i ts ratio  was aga i n  back to the rel at i vely h i q h  l evel s 
of 1 884- 1 889 . The Th i rd and the C i ty ,  however ,  had rati os that conti nued 
to move downwa rd from 1 889 , a l though that  mo vement was errati c ,  ri s i nq 
i n  1 893-1 894 , and fi nal l y  fal l i n g  to 50 percent or be l ow by 1 898 . The 
Hol s ton ' s  rati o had ri sen th rough 1 893 , but then i t  too commenced a 
downward though errati c dri ft . The State ' s  rat i o  was genera l l y  h i gh 
and var iab l e .  
The two cri ses i n  the .1 890 ' s  had a depres s i ng effect  on two-name 
time l oa ns . I n  the year  of each cri s i s  and i n  the fol l owing  yea r ,  two­
name time l oans usua l l y  dimi n i s hed rel at ive to other l oans . Th i s  
occurred des pi te an i ncrease i n  the percentaqe o f  a l l l oans endo rsed by 
the pri nc i pa l s  ( offi cers , d i rectors , and other empl oyees ) of the l ocal  
· bank s . ( See Tab l e V- 1 6 . ) C l earl y , the �echani cs  Nati onal made i t  
eas i er for i ts borrowers to obta i n  a second endo rsement ,  wh i ch expl a i ns 
the Mechani c s ' rel at ive ly  h i qh rat i o  of  two-name time l oans . The other 
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Tabl e V- 1 5  
Two Name Time Loans as a Percentage of Al l Loans 
Year Mec hani cs Th i rd Ci ty State Hol s ton 
1 882 4 1  
1 883 N . A .  
1 884 62  
1 885 70  
· 1 886 68 
1 887 fi2 56  
1 888 E5  70 76-66 
1 889 74 59  54  
1 890 N . A .  5 1  53 68-59 
1 89 1  52 54 47 76 50 
1 892 56  52 37 50  57  
1 893 54  60 50  63 64 
1 894 43-50 50-54 5 1 -58 48-61 
1 895  59  52 39 46 
1 896 57-62 55-45 53-45 5 1 -55 
1 897  58  57  59 46 . 
1 898 NA-60 51 - 5 1  62-40 1 7-57  
1 899 6 1 -70 49-36 42-45 46-53 
1 900 69-66 48-48 33-44 55-45 
Source : Reports of  Bank  Exami nation . 
N . A . : Not Ava i l abl e .  
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Tabl e V- 1 6 
Percentage of Loans Endorsed by Pri nc i pa l s  of  the Bank  
Year Mechanics  Th i rd C i ty State Hol ston 
1882 0 
1 883 N . A .  
1 884 3 
1 885 6 
1 886 8 
1 887 7 0 
1 888 0 0 7-8 
1 889 0 0 N . A .  
1 890 N . A .  0 N . A .  5 -0 
1 89 1  1 2  1 3 0 1 
1 892 7 7 4 1 1  3 
1 893 7 1 2  9 8 9 
1 894 8-5  8-1 4 6-8 5-4 
1 895 ' 6 5 5 3 
1 896 7 -5  5 -8  2-6 2-3  
1 897  4 9 6 2 
1 898 NA-7  7 -8  4-2 3-4 
1 899 9- 1 3 1 1 - 1 0  3-3 3-8 
1 900 1 2- 1 4 1 1 - 1 3  5 - 5  1 1 - 1 5  
Source : Report� of  Ban k  Exami n at ion . 
N . A . : Not Ava i l ab l e .  
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banks a l s o  responded i n  th i s  fas h ion , but not q u i te so  s trong ly  as the 
Mechan i cs . 
The other ban ks genera l l y  responded to the cri s i s  by . an i ncreased 
wi l l i n gnes s to accept addi t i onal securi ty for l oans i n  the form of stock 
col l ateral o r  c l a ims on rea l  estate . ( See Tab l e V -1 7 . )  Gi ven the 
proh i b i ti on agai nst  real  estate l oans i n  the l aw govern i n� nati ona l 
banks as  wel l as the questi onabl e nature of  muc h  of the stock col l atera l 
that the l ocal  ban ks obta ined for debts , the l ocal banks cl early had 
res ponded to cri ses i n  economi c acti v i ty by re l ax i ng l end i ng  s tandards . 
Tabl e V- 1 8  presents the percentage of  securi ti es taken for. debts 
prev i ous ly  contracted wh i ch regul arl y  pa i d  i n teres t or d i v i dends . The 
frequency wi th whi ch  � of the securi ti es so taken pa i d  i n teres t or 
d i v i dends does not mean that a l l such securi ti es  were worthl es s .  I t  
does , however ,  i nd i cate a wi l l i ngnes s by the l ocal banks  to accept 
col l �tera l  of questi onab l e qual i ty .  I n  some cases , the securi ti es taken 
had been i s s ued by l oca l f i rms wh i ch were i ndebted to the acqui ri n�  bank , 
but whether i t  was the fi rm wh i ch had defaul ted or whether i t  was a 
stockhol der i n  the fi rm who had defaul ted on a pers ona l debt cannot be 
determi ned . ( Presumab ly , both occurred . ) . I n  any case , the secur i ti es 
ta ken i nd i cate re l at i ve ly  l ax s tanda rds for l oans secured by s tock 
col l atera l . 
The rel ati vely ri s ky l oans-one-name time l oans , l oans secured by 
s tock  col l atera l , and l oans secured by rea l esta te-- i ncreased  re l ati ve 
to other l oans over the l ength o f  the tran s i ti on peri od . ( See Tab l e  
V-1 9 . )  The trend was i n terrupted - duri ng economi c cr i s es , wi th one-name 
time l oans d imi n i s h i ng and l oans on stock col l ateral and rea l es tate 
Year 
1 887 
1 888 
1 889 
1 890 
1 891 
1 892 
1 893  
1 894 
1 895 
1 896 
1 897  
1 898 · 
1 899 
1 900 
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Tab l e V- 1 7  
Time Loans Secured by Col l atera l s as a Percentage of  Al l Loans 
Mechan i cs Thi rd C i ty 
27  46 
26  1 5  1 4- 1 7 
20 20 1 4  
N . A . 24 21 
35 22 1 6  
32 21 1 8  
36 20 1 1  
45-39 24-24 1 6 - 1 8  
3 5  20 26 
34-30 22-26 1 3-2 1  
34  1 9  1 9  
29 21 - 1 8 1 6- 1 8 
27-22 23-2 1  1 4 - 1 8  
1 9-24 1 4- 1 5 ' 2 1 - 1 7 
Sou rce : Reports of  Bank Exami nati on . 
N . A . : Not Ava i l abl e .  
State Hol ston 
7-23  
22  44 
33  32  
27 26 
36-30 
24 
28-29 
32 
49-29 
30-25 
2 1 -23 
Year 
1 882 
1 883 
1 884 
1 885 
1 886 
1 887 
1 888 
1 889 
1 890 
1 891  
1 892 
1 893 
1 894 
1 895 . 
1 896 
1 897 
1 898 
1 899 
1 900 
1 70 
Tab le  V-1 8 
Percentage of Stocks  and Bonds Acqu i red for Debts Prev i ous ly  
Contracted Regul arly  Payi ng I n teres t or  D i v i dends 
Mechan ics  Th i rd C i ty State Hol s ton 
None taken 
N . A .  
None taken 
None taken 
0 
0 None taken 
None taken · None taken None taken 
0 None taken None taken 
0 None taken 0 None taken 
0 None taken 0 0 None ta ken 
37 None taken 0 None taken 0 
0 None taken 0 0 0 
0-0 None taken 0-0 0-0 
0 1 5 5 0 
0-22 1 8-0 0- 1 1 0-0 
1 8  0 0 0 
0-0 63-0 1 3-0 0-0 
33- 1 9  66-0 88-0 0-0 
0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 
Source : Reports of Bank Exami nation . 
None taken means none of the secur it i es l i s ted under "other s tocks 
and bonds " had been taken to secure debts prev i ou s ly contracted . 
N . A . : Not Ava i l abl e .  
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Tabl e  V- 1 9  
One-Name Time Loans and T ime Loans  Secured by Col l ateral 
as a Percentage of Al l Loans 
Year Mechan i cs Th i rd C i ty State Hol s ton 
1 882 1 0  
1 883 N . A .  
1 884 30 
1 885 24 
1 886 26 
1 887 34 46 
1 888 32 25 25-35 
1 889 26 38 47 
1 890 N . A . 46 47 32-41 
1 891  39 39 53 25 49 
1 892 39  40 63 49 43 
1 893 50 35 50 37 34 
1 894 52-46 42-41 49-43 5 1 -39 
1 895 · 4 1  44 60 5 5  
1 896 44-37 42 -52 44-43 48-40 
1 897 42 40 42 55  
1 898 NA-40 45-41 37-50 82- 38 
1 899 39- 29 44- 52 53-53 50-41  
1 900 27-32 44-41 66-52 42- 50 
Source : Repo rts of Ban k Exami nati on . 
N . A . : Not Avai l ab l e .  
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i ncreasi ng  i n  importance . The total of the three types wou l d  i ncrease  
i n  peri ods o f  cri s i s , b ut  once the cri s i s  was pa s t ,  the total woul d  fal l . 
However , the s ubs equent fa l l  was not q u i te so  l arge �s  the previous  
i ncrease . The l ocal banks mi ght  have preferred to rai se  thei r l end i ng 
s tandards , g i ven thei r unpl easant experi ences i n  1 890 and 1 893 , but 
because of  the competi t ive envi ronment , they did not . That i s ,  a fter 
the cri s i s  \'tas  pas t ,  l end i ng s tandards  were s l i g h tly  l es s  exacti ng than 
befo re . 
The l arge and frequent var i a tions  i n  the types o f  l oans made from 
one year to the next mean .. th at a ny trend or tendency i s  an approximati on 
. 
of l es s  than des i rabl e certa i n ty .  Furthennore , the a l terati ons i n  the 
securi ty gi ven for l oans may no t have been a rel axati on i n  a l l ,  or even 
mos t ,  cases , because the exami ners ' reports on ly des cri be the securi tes 
i ns uri ng defaul ted l oans  that the ba nk  conti nued to hol d .  ( I nterest  
pay i ng s tocks or  bonds mi ght  have been d i sposed o f  i nmed i ate  ly . )  Never 
.
. -l 
.
. Y thel ess , i t  does appear that the ban ks grew more wi l l i n g  to make l oan� 
on rel ati vely ri s ky secur ity .  I n  addi ti on ,  the l ocal  banks made 
adju stments i n  exi s ti ng l oans  duri ng peri ods of economi c cri s i s wh i ch 
permi tted the extens i on o f  those l oans  and wh i ch appear to have been , 
for the most  part , favorabl e to the borrower . ( There was an  i ncrease  i n  
l oans secured by stocks , bonds , and rea l estate rel a t i ve to other l oans . 
Borrowers were a l l owed to pl edge a s oec i fi c  portion of the i r  a s sets 
rather than make a general p l edge o f  a l l  thei r a s sets . Bank pri nci pal s 
demons trated a greater wi l l i nqnes s to add thei r endorsements on exi s ti n g  
l oans . )  
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F i nal l y ,  the reported i nterest  rates cha rqed by the l oca l banks for 
l oans do not show a c l ea r  tendency to decl i ne or ri s� over t ime .  ( See 
Tabl e V-20 . ) But here the reports of exami nat ion are orobab ly  defect i ve 
i n  that the exami ner reported the usua l or norma l rate for the majori ty 
of  l oans . Only for two yea rs , 1 896 and 1 897 , was a range of mo re than 
two percentage poi nts l i s ted . I n  mos t  years , on l y  a s i ngl e rate was 
reported , yet a lmost · certa i n ly the l ocal banks charged some of thei r 
borrowers more than they cha rged others i n  every yea r .  I n  the fi nal 
peri od , the range g i ven was a lmost  a l ways 6 to 7 percent . Thus i t  
appea rs that the rates reported were ak i n to current reports of the 
" prime" rate . I f  that was the case , then i n terest  rate and trends were 
probably downward from the m id- 1 890 ' s  on , even though the r�oorts for 
1 89 5  ( the  fi rst yea r that i n terest  rates on l oans were reported by the 
examiner)  i ndi cate a us ual rate of 8 oercent .  I n terest  rates pa i d  h y  
the l ocal  banks on  demand cert i fi cates o f  depos i ts a nd  redi s counts 
peaked ( a round 6 percent )  between 1 891 and 1 897 . In 1 896 and 1 897 , 
when the range of  rates charged on l oans wa s 8 to 1 2  oercen t ,  the rate 
pai d on redi scounts was 6 percent .  From 1 89 1  through 1 895 , when the 
redi scount rate was 6 percent ,  i t  i s  l i kely that the majori ty of l oans 
qranted by the l oca l banks pa i d  8 to 12  percent ,  but of course , wi thout 
expl i ci t  confi rmati on th i s  must rema i n  a guess . I f ,  however , i t  wa s the 
case , then from the mi d- 1 890 ' s  on , i nterest rates on l oans d i d  dec l i ne ,  
thereby mak i ng i t  somewhat eas i er for the banks ' cus tomers to eorrow . 
The second aspect o f  l oan pol i cy deservi ng of attenti on has  to do 
wi th the banks ' wi l l i ngness to grant l oans i n  exces s o f  the 1 0  percent 
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Tab l e V -20 
U sua l  I nteres t Rate on Loans 
Year Mechani cs Th i rd C i ty Hol s ton 
1 895  8 8 8 8 
1 896 8- 1 2  6-8 8 8 
1 897 6-8..: 1 0  6-8- 1 2  6-8- 1 0  6-8-1 0 
1 898 8 6-8 6-8- 1 0  6-8- 1 0  
1 899 6-8 6-8 7-8 8 
1 900 8 6-7-8 6-8 8 
Source :  Reports of Bank Exami nation . 
1 75 
of  pa i d  i n  capi tal ( over l oans . or exces s i ve l oans ) .  The s tark d i fferences 
among the l ocal banks i n  thei r wi l l i n gness to grant  overl oans prov i des 
about the best  i ndi cator of  the di fferences i n  thei r atti tudes towards 
thei r cu stomers and the competi ti ve c haracteri st ic s  of thei r market . 
The Th i rd Nati onal hardl y ever granted exces s i ve l oans , whereas the C i ty 
Nati onal a l most a lways d i d , and the other banks fel l i n  between . By the 
end of the trans i ti on , the di fferences between the extremes d imi n i shed 
because overl oans had become an importan t dev i ce for attract ing  and 
hol d i ng  favo red customers fo r a l l the banks . Actua l l y �  the ful l effect 
of the competi t i ve urge to grant excess i ve l oans appeared i n  the fi nal  
peri od . ( I n  1 906 the l aw reqardi nq  overl oans was mod i fi ed ,  and w i th 
s tri cter en forcement of the l aw by the Comptrol l er ,  overl oans by the 
l oca l banks dimi ni shed greatly . But th i s  i s  a matter for the next 
chapter . )  
Tabl e V-21  presents the number of overl oans made by the l ocal  banks . 
Throughout the trans i ti on , the Mechani cs and the Hol s ton made overl oans 
occa s i onal ly , and somewhat more often towa rd the end of the oeri od . For 
a l l practi cal purpos es , the Thi rd Nati ona l  made no overl oans pri or to 
i ts cap i ta l  reduct i on i n  1 898 .  (The two overl oans  g ranted i n  1 896 were 
just  over the l imi t ,  and i n  fact there i s  reason to ques t ion the exami ner ' s  
eva l uati on of them bei ng  over the 1 imi t .  See be l ow . ) The C ity Nati onal , 
however ,  emp l oyed overl oans from the fi rst  as  a competi t i ve devi ce .  
Tabl e  V-22 presents these  excess i ve l oans as a percentage of a l l  l oans . 
Aga i n ,  i t  was not unti l 1 898 that  overl oans were a s i gni fi cant port i on 
of the Th i rd ' s  l oans . Overl oans were a lmos t a l ways a l arge proporti on of  
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Tab le  V-21  
Number of Overl oans 
Year Mechan ics  Th i rd C i ty State Hol s ton 
1 882 0 
1 883 N . A . 
1 884 1 . 1 885 2 
1 886 0 
1 887 2 0 
1 888 0 0 1 -0 
1 889 1 0 0 
1 890 N . A .  0 4 0 - 1  
1 891  1 0 8 1 0 
1 892 0 0 1 1  2 ( 3 ? }  0 
1 893 1 0 9 2 0 
1894 . 2-2 . 0-0 3-3  1 -0 
1 895  1 0 3 1 
1 896 1 -0 2-0 4-3 2 - 1  
1 897  1 0 3 0 
1 898 0-0 0-5 5-3 2 - 1  
1 899 0-0 3-3  6-9  0-3 
1 900 2 - 1  3-2 1 6- 1 2 2-0 
Source : Reports of Ban k Exam i nati on . 
N .  A . : Not Ava i l a bl e .  
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Tab l e  V-22 
Overl oans as  a Percentage of Al l loans 
Yea r Mechani cs Th i rd C i ty State Hol s ton  
1 882 0 
1 883 N . A .  
1 884 4 
1 885 1 1  
1 886 0 
1 887 6 0 
1 888 0 0 . 1 7- 0  
1 889 2 0 0 
1 890 N . A .  0 9 0-7  
1 89 1  1 0  0 30 7 0 
1 892 0 0 33 1 0 ( 1 4 ? )  0 
1 893 _z 0 33 9 0 
� 5-7 0-0 1 9-20 9-0 
1 895  3 0 1 6  7 
1 896 3-0  1 2 -0 22-1 2 1 4-6 
1 897 5 0 1 5  0 
1 898 0 -0 0-24 29- 1 8  9-4 
1 899 0-0 1 3- 1 4  25-35 0- 1 7 
1 900 6-3  1 5- 1 0  49-46 1 0-0 
Source : Reports of Bank . Exami nation . 
N . A . : Not Ava i l ab l e .  
1 78 
al l l oans for the C i ty Nati onal , and the proporti on g rew . The Mechan i c s  
and the Hol s ton agai n fe l l  somewhere between the Thi rd and the C i ty .  
I t  wi l l  be u seful to compare the exami ners ' fi ndi n� s  and commen ts 
on the operati on of the l ocal  banks wi th thei r comments to the Comptrol l er 
wi th regard to same . The c l earest  d i fferences a re to be found between 
the Th ird and the C i ty ,  al though some reference to the other ban ks wi l l  
be empl oyed . 
On i ts f i rst  examination (Ma rch 1 ,  1 888) , the exami ner anti c i pated 
some of the probl ems the C i ty Nat iona l  was l i ke ly  to cause . F i rs t ,  he 
found one overl oan to a l oca l rea l estate fi rm ,  \'lh i c h  th e bank expl a i ned 
as a mi s take . The l oan was for an amount  equal  to 1 0  percent of the 
ant ic i pated capi ta l of the bank . However , not a l l  o f  the subscri bed 
capi tal had been actua l ly  pai d  i n ,  and consequently  the l oan was i n  
v i ol ati on o f  th e l aw .  The exami ner d i d  not f ind  the bank to b e  espec i al ly 
cont�i te once i ts error had been po i n ted out . 
Second , he found that one d i rector had pa i d  the fi rs t ca l l for 
cap i tal stock wi th a check drawn on a Morri stown ban k (of  wh i ch he was 
the pre s i dent ) , but then had had the check returned so that he woul d not 
forfe it  the i n teres t on . a  t ime depos i t  a9a i nst  whi ch the check was drawn 
and wh i ch was due to mature s hortl y .  I n stead the d i rector had g i ven the 
C i ty h i s personal note for the capi tal s ubscri pti on . The exami ner then 
wrote : 
The Cash i er seemed to th i nk  that the reason was a qood one , 
and that the s tandi ng and . f inanc ia l  s trength o f  [ th i s  
d i rector] woul d be suffi ci ent to exempt h i m  from the rul es 
app l i ed ord i nari l y .  
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The exami ner urged the Comptrol l er to 11 admon i s h 11 the ban k not  to do th i s  
agai n and to immedi ately get cas h  for the note . 
F i nal l y ,  the exami ner i nc l uded the fol lowi n q  estimate o f  the C i ty 
Nati onal ' s  prospects and l i kely mode of operati on . 
Thi s bank was organ i zed by some parti es l i v i ng i n  other 
parts of  Eas t  Tenn . Not one of the offi cers have been 
ci ti zens of Knoxv i l l e ,  but they are wel l known i n  the c i ty ,  
and the other banks tel l me that they are qood peop l e  and 
s tand wel l in  a l l respects . Offi cers of other ban ks al so 
tel l  IT'e that the Knoxvi l l e  d i rectors are taken from among 
the bes t bus i ness  fi rms of the c i ty .  I t  i s  probab l e that 
th i s  bank wi l l  do a good bus i ness . There i s  ampl e room , 
i ndeed there i s  need for yet more ban ki np capi tal i n  
Knoxvi l l e .  The bank wi l l  have but a sma l l capi tal for an 
acti ve bust l i n g  c i ty of  35 , 000 peopl e and as  some of i ts 
customers do qu i te a l arge bus i nes s , there wi l l  be a 
constant  tendency to make l oans i n  excess o f  l eqal  
l im i t . . .  ( C i ty Nati onal Ban k , Report of Exami nat ion , 
Ma rch 1 1 ,  1 888 . The exami ner ' s  grammar is followed. )  
Of a l l the pred i cti ons made by the exami ners of the l ocal  ban ks 
about thei r futu re behav ior and prospects for succe� s or fa i l ure , th i s  
was �Y far the most accurate forecas t .  
By 1 89 1 , the Ci ty National  wa s requ l arly mak i nq overl oans to 
some of  i ts favored customers . The exami ner reoorted the bank ' s  
expl anati on for the habi tual v io l ati on o f  the 1 0  oercent l oan l imi t 
as fo l l ows : 
. • .  th i s  i nst i tuti on has found i t  des i rab l e  to thei r 
[excess i ve l oan customers ' ]  bus i nes s . They say they cannot 
keep wi th i n  the l imi t wi thout l os i ng thei r bes t cus tomers , 
and that th i s  busi nes s  i s  both profi tab l e and absol ute ly  
safe . -- I  bel i eve the l oans safe . ( C i ty National Ban k ,  
Report of  Exami nati on , November 28 , 1 89 1 ) 
That i s ,  the ban k found two reas ons to j us ti fy the pol i cy of maki ng  
l oans i n  excess of the  l ega l l im i t to  a few , favored cus tomers . Fi rs t ,  
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i f  the bank were to refuse  to grant overl oans , these customers mi ght  qo 
e l sewhere . Second , granti ng overl oans to those customers removed the 
need for them to borrow from severa l  ban ks . I f  the C i ty was the � 
cred i tor to these fi rms , i t  woul d have a much c l earer noti on of the 
fi nanc ia l  po s i t i on of these fi rms and wou l d  consequently  be i n  a much 
safer pos i ti on .  Were any of  the fi rms to experi ence seri ous d i ffi cu l ti es , 
those probl ems wou l d  not be h idden by a mu l t i tude of  accounts . Of  course , 
th i s  may or may not be a val i d  argument .  The Ci ty thought i t  was , b u t  
the exami ner and the Comptro l l er had the i r doubts and con ti nued to 
cri ti c i ze the bank for th is  pract ice . The ban k i n  turn responded wi th 
i ncreas i ngly deta i l ed exp l anati ons of i ts pol i cy .  I n  1 893 , the bank 
wrote : 
I n  regard to the l oans exceedi ng  the l egal l i mi t ,  whi ch are 
l i s ted i n  your l etter , I wi l l  s tate that they have been 
reduced , and are bei n g  further reduced as they mature . 
These are the l oans of our l argest  and wea l th i es t  
. cus tomers , whose deposi t accoun ts average bal ances of  
$3 , 000 to $ 1 0 , 000 and whose demands for l oans on  account 
of the l arge bus iness  they do , requ i re more than the l ega l  
l i mi t ,  but  we a re fami l i ar wi th the deta i l s  of  thei r 
bus i ness and know that the i r  indebtedness i s  a l l , or 
nearly so , due to th i s  bank , and further that they are 
unquesti onably sol ven t .  ( C i ty Nati onal , May 2 9 , 1 893)  
In the same l etter , the Ci ty a l so exp l a i ned why it  had 9i ven some 
rather l arge l oans to a few of i ts offi cers and d i rectors . The l etter 
conti nued : 
As the l i ab i l i ty of  our d i rectors , wh i l e  i t  i s  l a rge , they 
are wea l thy sol vent men , engaged i n  l eg i timate s uccessful 
bus i nes s , and are the l a rgest  depos i ti n g  cus tomers of the 
ban k ,  and are therefore enti tl ed to l a rge accomodat i ons . 
( Ci ty Nati onal , May 29 , 1 893 ) 
I n  thi s  l etter the Ci ty promi sed no effort to reduce ei ther the 
overl oans or the l arge l oans to i ts offi cers and di rectors . The capi tal 
i ncrease i n  early 1 894 d i d  reduce the number of overl oans and the i r  
percentage o f  a l l l oans , but even then , the rema i n i ng overl oans and 
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l oans to the pri nci pal s o f  the bank caused the exami ner of. August  4 ,  
1 894 , to wri te : 1 1 Excess i ve 1 oans and 1 oans to d i rectors s hou l d  be 
reduced . Loans s houl d be more wi de ly  d i s tri buted .. ( C i ty Nati onal , Report 
of Exami nati on , August  4 ,  1 894 ) . Tab les  V-21  and  V-22 , pages 1 76 ,  1 77 ,  
i ndi cate that  by 1 893 , a sma l l number of the Ci ty ' s  l oans accounted for 
a rel ati vely l arge porti on of the total . Even w i th the capi tal i ncrease 
t n l 894 , the di s tri buti on of  the C i ty ' s  l oans was questi onabl e .  The 
concentrati on of l oans was questi onabl e .  The concentration o f  l oans 
i ncreased through 1 900 . 
S imi l ar compl a i nts about th e di stri buti on of the Ci ty ' s  l oans  
and  the  presence of  overl oans appea red aga i n  and  aga i n  in  reports of  
exami nati on . The exami ner on No vember 1 8 , 1 896 wrote : 
. Too much money i s  l oaned to di rectors & enterpri ses 
in whi ch  they are i nterested , so i t  appears to me . The 
amounts due by [ the presi dent and one d i rector] --the l atter 
was formerly Cas hi er o f  the ban k--both exceed the l i mi t ,  
and the aggregate of d i rect and conti naent l i a b i l i ty of  
the di rectors are about 25% of  the l oans � di scounts . I 
a l s o  note a l oan [ to a l ocal  mi l l i n g  fi rm for] $ 1 5 , 200 
and an i ndi vi dual l oan to i ts owner of $ 1 3 , 200 , .tota l 
$28 ,400 . [The company] i s  i n corporated but ch i efly owned 
by [the i ndi vi dual menti oned above] . These l oans  are 
now secure . . . a nd  no 1 oss  i s  anti ci pated , but I thi n k  
the bank s houl d di s tri bute i ts l oans mo re . 
Management i s  economi ca l  but [ the]  bank i s  not maki ng  
as . much money as  i t  once di d .  I th i nk too much i s  l oaned 
to di rectors & enterpri ses i n  w h i ch they are i nterested , 
and i t  woul d benefi t the bank to d i stri bute i ts l oans  
among a greater number of  borrowers . ( Ci ty Nati ona l , 
Report o f  Exami nati on , November 1 8 ,  1896 )  
Overl oans found by t he  exami ner i n  the s ummer of  1 897  prompted the 
Comptrol l er to wri te to the ban k .  The bank responded : 
I n  regard to the l oans to [ the mi l l i n g  company menti oned i n  
t he  report of exami nation of November 1 8 ,  1 896] , wh i ch i s  
not a fi rm ,  but a corporati on ,  wh i ch has not a l oan over 
the l egal l imi t i n  i ts corporate name , and the other paper 
referred to i n  your l etter is only endorsed by th i s  Corpora­
ti on , and to secure these l oans , we have deposi ted wi th 
our bank $66 , 000 of fi rst mortgage bonds � and $ 70 , 000 fi re 
i nsurance pol i c i es ,  regu l arly and properly transferred to 
the ban k  as col l ateral securi ty .  Th i s  company does a l a rge 
and prosperous bus i nes s � and we have thei r enti re account 
and carry a l l  the i r  l oans . ( C i ty Nati onal , August  5 ,  1 897 ) 
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The next ·year the exami ner noted that the Comptrol l er had wri tten 
to the Ci ty several times about l oans to the mi l l i ng company wh i ch were 
over the l egal  l imi t ,  but wi th no effect . He al so wrote : 
[The] ban ks exces s i ve l oans appea r open to obj ection  though  
these do not  s how u p  any l os ses at present . . . .  
I t  i s  apparent [ that the] bank i s  l a rgel y extend i ng i ts 
bus i nes s and i s  taki ng  great ri s ks i n  mak i ng  these 
exces s i ve l oans . The l oans to [the mi l l i n g company] in the 
aggrega te amounti ng to $ 1 2 5 ,000 exceed the caoi tal of the 
company by $25 , 000 and i s  more than one ha l f bank ' s  cap i ta l . 
Thi s woul d appear. not only unl awful but h i g hly  i moruden t ,  
i f  not dangerous . ( C i ty Na tional , Report of Exami nation , 
February 1 ;  1 898)  
On the fol l owi ng . exami nati on the exami ner aqai n compl a i ned tha t  the 
Comptro l l er ' s  l etters about exces s i ve l oans , part icu l arl y  those to the 
mi 1 1  i ng company menti oned above , had been i gnored . The Comptro l l er 
aga i n  wrote to the bank and comp l a i ned ,  and the Ci ty responded that th i s  
and "other l arge l oans are made to them sol e ly  on accoun t o f  the va l ue 
of thei r bus i nes s to our Ban k ,  and i n  cons i derat i on of the fact that 
they do not borrow any money from any other source" ( C i ty Na ti ona l , 
September 1 6 ,  1 898 ) . 
The next year the bank aga i n  expl ai ned some of  i ts overl oans : 
These l oans were made to good peop l e and are i n tended to 
be temporary . Some of them have been reduced and  the 
others wi l l  be as rapi d ly  as i t  i s  pos s i bl e  to do s o .  
( C i ty Nati onal , March 1 7 ,  1 899 )  
A s l i ght var iat ion i n  the s tandard expl anation for the exces s i ve 
l oans appeared i n  a l etter to the Comptro l l er i n  l ate 1 900 : 
There has been an enormous mercant i l e  bus i ness i n  Knoxvi l l e  
s i nce the presi der.ti a l  el ect ion and a great dea l of money 
has been requi red by the merchants to pay for ooods purchased 
subject to the re-el ect i on o f  Mr .  Mc Ki n l ey ,  and as these 
goods are s ettl ed fo r ,  a l l  of  our b i l l s rece i vabl e w i l l  be 
l argely reduced . ( C i ty Nati ona l , December 7 ,  1 900 ) 
I t  s h ou l d be  noted that the Ci ty Nati ona l never promi sed to 
inmedi ate ly  reduce a l l overl oans to the l egal l im i t ,  nor di d i t  ever 
promise  to refra i n  from maki n g  exces s i ve l oans i n  the future . The 
Ci ty ' s  response to cri ti c i sm from the Comptro l l er i nstead was an 
exp l anati on , not an apol ogy .  I t  usua l ly  i ncl uded both a s tatement 
about the credi tworth i ness  of the borrower and a s tatement about why 
s uch l oans were to the C i ty ' s  advantage . In  contras t ,  the Th i rd 
Nati onal ' s  comments on cri ti c i sm from the  Comptro l l er were usual l y  
apol og i es , accompan i ed by promi ses  n o t  t o  vi ol ate the l aw agai n ,  
together wi th s tatements l es s  i ndefi n i te than the C i ty ' s ,  about when 
the l oan wou l d be reduced to the l ega l  l imi t .  
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The Th i rd National  dec i ded earl y  to ooerate i n  a cons ervati ve 
manner and to cons i s tently obey a l l the l aws · regul ati ng  behavi or by a 
nati onal bank . The exam i ner of November 25 , 1 895 , wrote : "Th i s  ban k 
i s  excel l ently managed- the best I have seen th i s  year ,  I thi nk . "  Th i s 
was after l es s  than four yea rs o f  operation . On the exami nat ion o f  
February 1 ,  1 894 , the exami ner wrote : 
I n  my opi n i on the condi t i on of  bus i ness i s  sati s factory . 
i f  I were as ked why not mo re pro fi tabl e ,  I s hou l d f i nd  no 
reason other than over conservati sm . 
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To fi nd a bank exami ner c i ti n �  a bank fo r "over cons ervati sm "  i s ,  to 
say the l eas t ,  unusua l . 
On that exami nati on , the examiner had found a rel at i ve ly  l arge l oan 
that  was mi l dly i rregu l a r  wi th respect to the endors ements . The l oan i n  
. ques ti on was not an overl oan , but the Comptro l l er wrote to the bank , 
requesti ng a c l ari fi cati on of  the l oan ' s  s tatus . The hank repl i ed on 
Ma rch 5 ,  1 894 , an d i ncl uded the fol l owi ng  i n  its l etter :  
I t  i s  not our i nten tion to v io l ate any of  the l aws qovern i ng 
us , but the reverse , and · i f at anyt ime we s houl d do so , i t  woul d 
be by an error of the head , and not of  the heart , and wi l l  
g l adly correct same , whenever our attenti on i s  cal l ed to i t .  
Two and one-hal f yea rs l ater ,  the Th i rd had con ti nued to operate 
i n  s tr i ct  compl i ance wi th the l aw ,  and  the exami ner on November 1 3 ,  
1 896 , comp l i mented the bank for i ts atti tude . No probl ems aooeared unti l 
the bank reduced i ts cap i ta l ' from $300 thousand to $200 thousand i n  
earl y 1 898 . A s  a consequence of  that reduct ion , several l oans wh i ch 
had been w ith in  the ol d l imi t were now over the new l imi t .  (Thi s s hows 
up both i n  the number of ove rl oans and i n  the i r  percentage o f  a l l l oans . ) 
The bank expl a i ned the s i tuati on to the Comptro l l er i n  a l etter on 
May 1 3 ,  1 898 , and i ndi cated that the l oans wou l d be reduced . (They were . 
Overl oans decl i ned i n  number thro ugh the end of  1 900 .  Thei r percentage 
of a l l l oan s a l so  decl i ned . ) Even though the cap i ta l  reduct i on produced 
some overl oans , i t  i s  c l ear thes e  were temporary and that the bank 
i ntended to operate stri ctly wi th i n  the l aw .  There had been no chanqe i n  
the bank ' s  pol i cy wh i ch "made i t  a rul e  not to l oan over the 1 0  oercent 
l imi t of  Capi tal " (Thi rd Nati ona l : March 1 6 ,  1 896 ) . 
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The statement  of the ban k ' s  pol i cy had been q i ven i n  a l etter 
expl a i ni ng the two overl oans found by the exami ner duri ng  the exami na tion 
o f  February l l , 1 896 . In  fac t ,  the l oans in  questi on were. not overl oans , 
but l oans at the l im i t to wh i ch had-for some reason not s peci fi ed-been 
added the i nterest  due at the l oans • maturi ty .  There was no chanqe i n  
th i s  bank ' s  pol i cy wi th regard to ove rl oans unti l early i n  the fi nal  
peri od . 
Tab l e  V-23 presents the rat i o  of the l arqest  l oan  actua l ly  made to 
the l argest l oan wh ich  coul d lega l ly be made by the l ocal ban ks at the 
vari ous exami nati ons . Except for the C i ty National , the l ocal banks 
general l y  di d not vi ol ate the 1 0  percent l oan l imi t by a qreat deal . �any 
of  the v i o l a ti on s  were qui te sma l l ,  and some of the rel a ti ve ly  l arqe 
ones posed no threat to the l endi ng  ban k .  Fo r exampl e ,  the overl oan bv 
the Mechan i c s  Nat iona l  at  the second exami nation of 1 894 (whi ch was 3 . 5  
time�  the l im i t ) was actual ly  two l oans to the C i ty of  Knoxv i l l e .  They 
had been made i n  anti ci pati on of taxes to be recei ved i n  the fol l owi n g  
s pri ng . L i kewi s e , the rel at i ve ly  l a rge l oan made by the Th i rd National  
at the second exami nat ion of 1 898 was a l so  made to the C i ty o f  Knoxv i l l e .  
On the other hand , these banks began to v i ol ate the l Q  percent l imi t 
more and more frequently and by wi der and wi der marq i ns i n  the l ast  two 
years of the trans i t i on peri od , and thi s trend conti nued i n to the f ina l  
peri od . 
Tab l e V-23 a l so demons trates tha t  the C i ty Nati onal was never a 
respecter of the 1 0  percent l oan l imi t ,  and tha t i ts l ow regard for 
that provi s i on i n  the Nati onal Bank Acts fel l fu rther as the trans i t i on 
wore on . Furthermore , the Ci ty i n  th i s  resoect set the styl e to be 
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Tab l e  V-23 
Rati o of  the largest loan Made to the la rges t Legal Loan 
Year Mechan i cs Thi rd C i ty State Hol s ton 
1 882 N . A .  
1 883 N . A .  
1 884 1 . 29  
1 885 1 .  99 
1 886 N . A .  
1 E87 1 .  68 N . A .  
1 888 N . A .  0 . 22 1 . 67-0 . 80 
1 889 1 . 1 7  0 . 47 0 . 70 
1 890 N . A . 0 . 78 1 . 45 0 . 50-1 . 00 
1 891  1 . 02 N . A .  3 . 70 1 . 1 0 
1 892 1 . 00 1 . 00 3 . 7 5 1 . 06 1 . 00 
1 893 1 . 20 1 . 00 3 . 85 1 . 2 5  1 . 00 
1 894 1 . 1 0- 3 . 50 1 . 00-1 . 00 1 . 50-2 . 25 1 . 1 6- . 025  
1 895 . 1 .  so 1 . 00 2 . 2 5 1 . 34 
1 896 1 . 06- 1 . 00 1 . 07-0 . 83 2 . 25-1 . 42 1 .  72- 1 . 30 
1 897 2 . 00 · 1 . 00 2 . 55 0 . 7 7  
1 898 N . A .  - 1 . 00 0 . 97-2 . 30 6 . 25 - 5 . 05 1 . 08- 1 . 0 3  
1 899 1 . 00- 1 . 00 1 . 30- 2 . 1 3  s . •  1 1 -8 . 25 . 1 . 00- 1 . 93 
1 900 1 . 50-1 . 26 2 . 53-2 . 06 6 . 25-6 . 00 1 . 65- 1 . 00 
Sou rce : Reports of Bank  Exami nati on . 
N . A . : Not Avai l ab l e .  
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fol l owed by the other banks i n  the f i nal peri od . At l eas t throuqh 1 906 , 
excess i ve l oans by the l ocal ban ks became more frequent and grew i n  s i ze ,  
just  a s  the C i ty ' s  overl oans had done duri ng the trans i ti on peri od . 
Summary 
The l ocal banks had ta ken severa l s teos i n  the trans i ti on peri od 
wh i ch  made i t  ea s i er for the i r  customers to borrow . There was a gradual 
dec l i ne in demand l oans and two-name time l oans rel at i ve to the other 
types of l oans . The banks were i ncreas i ngly wi l l i ng to ass i s t  thei r 
debtors i n  obta i n i n g  a s econd endorsemen t .  Towa�d the end o f  the oeri od , 
the l ocal banks began to a l ter thei r pol i cy wi th reqard to l a rge l oans . 
Fi na l l y ,  i nteres t rates on l oans fe l l ,  at  l east  after the mi d- 1 890 ' s / 
These acti ons i n  tu rri had the dua l effect of  i�crea s i ng and eventua l ly 
s tabi l i zi ng l oan to as set rati os . H i gh and s tab l e l oan-asset rat i os , 
together wi th a s h i ft i n  reserves toward bank depos i ts and away from 
cash , tended to i ncreas e ,  as wel l as s tab i l i ze ,  rati os o f  earn i ng assets 
to a l l as sets . 
The reformat ion i n  asset management dur ing  the trans i ti on peri od 
can , in part , be expl a i ned as a reacti on to i ncreas i ng  cost of  
l i abi l i t ies . The cos t o f  l i ab i l i ti es had ri sen because there was 
i ncrea s i n g  competi ti on fo r those l i abi l i t i es from the growi ng  number 
of banks , both nati ona l  and nonnat ional . Increas i ng competi t i on a l s o  
contri buted t o  a l terati on s  i n  as s et management . Competi tion  grew 
because . the l ocal economy boomed fol l owi ng expan s i on of  the rai l l i nes 
and the eventua l _  recovery from the C i v i l War .  By the end of the trans i ­
ti on per iod , the l ocal nati ona l  banks were no l on ger smal l ,  conservati ve , 
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uncompeti tive country banks . They had become re l ati vely l arge , h i g h ly  
competi ti ve and aggres s i ve urban financi al i ns t i tuti ons . 
CHAPTER  V I  
THE F INAL P ERIOD : 1 900-1 91 3 
I ntroducti on 
The Knoxvi l l e national banks made few fundamenta l a l terati on s  i n  
the proporti on i n g  of thei r as sets and l i ab i l i ti es dur i n g  the fi nal  
peri od . The patterns  tha t  devel oped duri ng the tran s i ti on peri od were , 
for the most . part , common dur ing  the l as t  peri od �  There were few ba s i c  
changes because there were no fundamental changes ei ther i n  the s truc ture 
of bank i ng  i n  Knoxv i l l e  or . i n  Knoxvi l l e ' s  economy . Knoxvi l l e ' s  economy 
conti nued to grow , but i t  grew more s l owl y than before and i ts character 
di d not change . The few changes that the banks made had the i r  ori g i n  
i n  changes i n  the l aw govern i ng nati ona l banks . I n  1 900 , ban knote i s sues 
were made more profi tabl e ,  and i n  1 906 ,  the l imi tati on on the l argest 
l oan . that a bank coul d l egal l y  make was rel axed . Both of these c hanges , 
together wi th overa l l growth i n  Knoxvi l l e ' s  economy ,  encouraqed the 
l ocal ban ks to make several i ncreases in the i r capi ta l . Bu t a s i de from 
these , there were few other changes o f  note . 
The s imi l ari ty of  the behavi or patterns deve l oped i n  the tran s i t i on 
peri od to the behav i or patterns common to the f ina l  oer iod _ resul ted from 
a conti nuat ion of the competi ti ve envi ronment  of the tran s i ti on i n to the 
fi nal peri od , al bei t  at a l es s  i ntense  l evel . However , the competi ti ve 
natu re of the l ocal fi nanci a l  ma rket was not ma i nta i ned by the entry of  
new banks . I nstead , the competi ti ve atmosphere was ma i nta i ned by growth 
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i n  Knoxv i l l e ' s  economy that "made room " for s ome of  the smal l er and 
weaker i n sti tuti ons that bare ly  s urv i ved the trans i ti on . · The i r growth 
made them mo re effec ti ve competi tors . 
There were , i n  fact , remarkably few changes i n  the s tructure of 
banki n g  from 1 900 to 1 9 1 3 .  A very sma l l ban k ,  the Marbl e C i ty Ban k ,  
c l os ed i n  1 904 , but i ts demi s e  can hardly  have a ffected the competi ti ve 
envi ronment . The Mecha n i cs Nati onal gave up i ts nati onal  charter i n  1 907  
but i t  conti nued to operate wi th a s tate charter . On l y  one new bank was 
formed , the Ameri can Nat i ona l , i n  1 9 1 3 .  Al so  i n  1 913 , one o l d s tate ban k , 
the Un i on Bank , obtai ned a nati onal charter .  Therefore ,  from 1 900 through 
1 91 2 ,  there were n i ne ban ks in Knoxv i l l e ,  not counti n9  the Marbl e C i ty ,  
whose presence unti l 1 904 can be d i s rega rded . The number ros e  to ten i n  
1 91 3 .  The fact that · no new ban ks were founded i n  Knoxv i l l e unti l 1 9 1 3  
was probably due to the very l arge n umber of entrants that had s uper­
saturated the l ocal market i n  the trans i ti on peri od . When that market 
was d i s turbed , and i t  wa s ,  some fi rms fa i l ed ,  and had Knoxvi l l e ' s  eccnomy 
not conti nued to grow , more woul d have fa i l ed .  But Knoxv i l l e ' s economy 
d i d  conti nue to grow , and therefo re the smal l er and weaker f i rms were 
g i ven the opportuni ty to grow and become effecti ve competi tors w i th the 
l arger and s tron ger ones , an d th i s  kept Knoxv i l l e ' s  bank i ng  i ndus try 
competi ti ve . .  
As a resul t of  the conti nued compet i tive  atmosphere , nati onal banks 
i n  Knoxv i l l e behaved more l i ke c i ty banks  and l es s  l i ke country bank s  
than they had i n  the pas t .  Duri ng the fi nal peri od they di sp l ayed 
patterns o f  behavi or tha t were , i n  some i nstances , l i ke those d i s pl ayed 
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by reserve c i ty banks . I n  some other respects � the 1 oca 1 banks more 
c l osel y  fo l l owed country ban ks . I n  s hort , thei r behavi or was a m i xture 
o f  c i ty and country ban k i n g .  
Acqui s i t i on of L i ab i l i t i es : 1 900-1 9 1 3  
The l ocal banks general l y  mai ntai ned the same propo rti ons  for thei r 
l i ab i l i ties  i n  the fi nal peri od as they d i d duri n g  the l ast  hal f of  the 
tran s i t i on period . There we re dev iat i ons , o f  course , but these mos tly 
occurred because of  i ncreases in  capi tal and c i rcul ati on outs tand i ng .  
For examp l e �  the proport i on of l i a bi l i ti es obtai ned from pri vate depo s i ts 
fel l whenever one of  the ban ks i ncreased i ts capi ta l and c i rcul ati on , 
but wi th i n  a short time , that proport i on woul d ri se to i ts former l evel . 
That i s ,  the broad proporti on i ngs  devel oped i n  the trans i ti on peri od 
conti nued to be the rul e for each bank . Of course , each bank chose i ts 
own �et of s tandards . 
The East  Tennessee Nati onal conti nued to be the mos t s ucces s ful  among 
the l oca l banks  in  obtai n i ng  pri vate deoos i ts .  Furthermore , it  general l y  
got a h i gher proport i on of i ts l i abi l i ti es from that source than d id  the 
average country ban k .  The o ther l ocal  banks were u sua l l y  l es s  s ucces sfu l  
than other country banks i n  attracti ng pri vate deoos i ts �  but they were 
general ly  mo re successfu l  than reserve c i ty ban ks . The C i ty Nat i onal  
and the  Hol s ton Nati onal each had  rat ios that we re c l ose to  those  he l d  
by reserve c i ty ban ks . The Mechani cs Nati onal a nd the T h i rd Nationa l 
(after i ts capi tal decrease i n  1 898) had rat i os that were c l oser to 
those hel d by t�e average country ban k .  ( See Ta bl e V I - 1  . )  
Tabl e V I - 1  
Average Rat io  of Private Depo s i ts to Al l L i a b i l i ti es ,  i n  Percent 
Central 
East Reserve Reserve Country 
Yea r Tennessee Mechani cs Th i rd · C i ty Hol s ton C i ti es C i t i es Banks 
1 900 68 . 2  53 .8  45 .8  49 .8  43 .9 41 . 3  48 . 1  58 . 6  
1 901 71. 1 . 54 .7 48.8  48. 7 44.8 44 . 0 4f' . 5 59 . 6  
1 902 7 3 . 2  57 . 5  5 1 .8  50 . 9  54 . 8  42 . 8  46 . 4  60 . 8  
1 903  7 1 . 5  64 . 9  53 . 2  49 . 9  55 . 3  38 . 7  45 . 4  60 . 6  
1 904 70 . 7  60 . 9  ( 4 )  53 . 2  50 . 0  54 . 2  ( 3 )  39 . 5  44 . 1  60 . 3  
1 905  70 . 1  50 . 1  49 . 0  48 . 4  49 . 6  42 . 5  44 . 7  6 1 . 4  
1906 67. 9 51. 6 ( 4) 49. 9 44. 3 50. 3 42. 3 44. 9 62. 1 
1 907 64 . 6  50 . 0  ( 4 }  5 1 .6 43 . 8  46 . 5  37 . 2  43 . 5 61 . 7 
1 908 65 . 7  53 . 0  44 . 7  47 . 1  39 . 3  43 . 7  60 . 2  
1 909 69 . 0  53 . 2  46 . 1  ( 4 )  49 . 9  41 . 4  45 . 4  6 1 .8  
1 91 0  70 . 1  56 . 9  40 . 3  44 . 8  42 . 5  46 . 0  62 . 7  
1 91 1  68. 5 54 . 5  42. 5 45 . 6  39 .2 . 45 . 8  63 . 0  
1 9 1 2  69 ;1 56 . 4  44 . 0  45 . 5  40 . 5  46 . 1  63 . 7  
1 9 1 3  68 .8  53 . 7  44 . 3  41 · . 2  39 . 5  45 . 9  64 . 9  
Source : Reports  of Cond i t i on . See a l s o  Tab l e  IV-1 , page 67 . 
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The l ocal banks , as a general rul e ,  cont i nued to i ncrease the 
proporti on of thei r  pri vate depos i ts on wh i ch they pa i d  i nterest ,  al thoug h 
th i s  i s  not what i s  apparently shown by the rati os of  i nd i vi dual  
depoti ts to pri vate depos i ts .  (See Tabl e V I -2 . )  Cl earl y , the Ea st  
Tennessee ' s  rati o of i nd i v i dual depo s i ts to pr ivate depos i ts fel l , and 
consequently  i ts rat i o of demand cert i fi cates of depos i t to pri vate 
depos i ts rose .  On the other hand , the same rati o of i nd i v i dua l  deoos i ts 
to pri vate depos i ts rose for both the Mechani cs and the Ho l s ton . The 
C i ty ' s  rati o changed l i ttl e ,  and the Th i rd ' s  rati o  ros e  and then fel l .  
I n  s p i te of what happened to the rat io  o f  i nd i vi dual depos i ts to pri vate 
depos i ts ,  the proportinn of private depos i ts upon wh i c h  each hank pa i d  
i nterest a lmost  certa i nl y  rose because  each bank ( for wh i ch exami ners ' 
reports a re ava i l ab l e ) pa id  i nterest on an i ncreas i ng proporti on of i ts 
11 0pen accounts . .. That i s ,  by the fi nal peri od , the rat i o of i nd i vi dual  
depos i ts to pri vate depos i ts i nd i cated l es s  and l es s  a bout the proport ion  
of  pri vate depos i ts upon wh i ch no  i n terest  was pa i d  than i t  d id  formerly ,  
because s uch depos i ts ( open accounts ) i ncreas i ng ly  pa i d  i nteres t .  The 
exami ners ' reports i nd i cate . that the rates pai d  on open accounts were 
general l y  the s ame as rates pa i d  on demand certi fi cates throughout t he 
fi nal peri od , and that an i ncreas i ng  port i on of a l l accounts pa i d  i nterest .  
As a resu l t ,  the l ocal banks pa i d  i nterest  o n  a growi ng proporti on of 
thei r pri vate depos i ts , a l though  that proport i on arew more s l owly than 
before . 
The l oca l  banks borrowed from other ban ks at  about the same rates 
that they d i d duri ng  the l a s t  hal f  of the trans i ti on peri od . The C i ty 
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Tabl e V I -2  
Average Rati o of  Ind i v i dual  Depos i ts to Pri vate Depos i ts ,  
i n  Percent 
Eas t  
Year Tennessee Mechani cs Th i rd Ci ty Hol s ton 
1 900 59 .0  76 . 6  66 . 4  60 . 7  77 . 6 
1901 59 . 5  76.8 - 66 . 0  54 .1 67 . 8  
1 902 5 7 . 2  76 . 9  69 . 4  59 . 1  66 . 8  
1 903 53 . 6  - 78 . 1  69 . 3  59 . 6  74 . 0  
1 904 56 . 6  79 . 0  ( 4 )  68 . 6  55 . 1  7 7 . 1  ( 3 )  
1 905 5 7 . 8  77 . 4  66 . 8  59 . 0  81 . 2  
1 906 5 5 . 7  79 . 0  (4) 7 1 . 1  56 . 1  83 . 8  
1 907 56 . 2  80 . 0  ( 4 )  70 . 8  55 . 4  86 . 5  
1 908 48 . 7  72 . 6  53 . 0  85 . 0  
1 909 40 . 9  64 . 7  57 . 4  ( 4 )  76 . 4  
1 91 0  35 . 3 54 . 9  55 . 5  8 1 . 3  
1911 35.2 58 . 4  . 55 .  7 79 .8  
1 9 1 2  38 . 9  55 . 6  58 . 1  7 9 . 5  
1 9 1 3  43 . 6  62 . 2  66 . 3  83 . 5  
Source : Reports of  Cond i ti on .  See Tabl e IV-4 , page 7 1 . 
Nati onal conti nued to obta i n  about one-quarter o f  i ts l i abi l i ti e s  from 
other banks . The Eas t  Tennessee borrowed at  a l ower rate than d i d  the 
average country bank . The other l oca l  banks fel l between those two . 
( See Tab l e V I -3 . ) The proporti on of the l oca l  b anks ' l i abi l i ti es obtai ned 
from other banks showed no tendency to change dur i n 9  the fi nal  Peri od . 
E xcepti ng the East  Tennes see , the l ocal  banks borrowed at  rates that were 
c l oser to the rates at wh i ch reserve c i ty banks  borrowed than they were 
to the rates at whi ch the average country ban k  borrowed . 
The mos t noti ceab l e a l terati on i n  the proporti oni ng of l i ab i l i ti es 
i nvo l ved i ncreases i n  c i rcul ati on and s ha rehol der i nvestment .  There 
were three rel ated reasons for the banks to i ncrease the i r s hareho l der 
i nvestment . F i rs t ,  Knoxv i l l e ' s  economy grew , and as i t  d i d ,  there was a 
need for more bank cap i ta l . Second , i n  1 900 , i ss uance of  nati ona l  
banknotes was made mo re profi tab l e ,  and because banknote i s sues were 
l i n��d to ban k capi ta l , the banks were g i ven a s tron9er i ncenti ve to 
i ncrease the i r capi tal . Th i rd ,  by 1 900 the l oca l banks were hav i ng 
i ncreasi ng  probl ems wi th the 1 0  percent l oan l im i t ,  a nd the only means  at 
thei r d i sposa l  for dea l i n9 w i th those prob l ems were s i on i fi cani i ncreases 
in thei r capi ta l . Of the three reasons g i ven , the l ast was probably the 
s tronqest .  Most of the capi tal  i ncreases by the l oca l banks were begun 
i n  the years duri ng wh i c h  they had the greatest  d i ffi cul ty obeyi n g  the 
1 0  percen t  l imi t ,  1 900 to 1 906 . I n  1 906 the l aw reqard i ng the 1 0  percent 
l imi t was revi sed , and the banks then found i t  ea s i er to ab ide  by i ts 
prov i s i on s . On ly  one ban k ,  �he Hol s ton Na ti onal , conti nued to i ncrease 
i ts capi ta l  after 1 906 . ( See Tab l e  V I -4 . ) 
Tabl e V I-3 
Average Rat i o  of Borrowed Funds to A l l L i ab i l i ti e s , in Percent 
Centra 1 
East Reserve Res erve Country 
Yea r Tennessee �1echan i cs Th i rd C i ty Hol s ton C i ti es C i ti es Ban ks 
1 900 1 . 7 1 1 . 2  20 . 4  27 . 1  1 9 . 9  39 . 0  27 . 2  5 . 3  
l90l 1 .7 9 . 9 17 . 5  27. 9 12.1 37. 9  29 . 6  5.7 
1 902 _ 2 . 0 R . O  1 5 . 0 24 . 9  1 0 . 5  37 . 1  29 . 1  5 . 7  
1 903 5 . 2 8 . 3  1 7 . 4  28 . 3  1 5 . 5  38 . 1  28 . 8  5 . 8 
1 904 4 . 2 1 1 . 4 { 4 )  20 . 1  27 . 5  1 9 . 2  { 3 )  40 . 4  30 . 6  5 . 7  
1 905 3 . 9 1 2 . 1  1 9 . 4 24 . 4  1 6 . 2  38 . 8 - 3 1 . 5  5 . 9  
1906 3 . 9  10. 3 (4) 19 .4 26 �9  16 .5 37.8 30 .8 6.0  
1 907 6 . 1  1 3 . 7  {4 )  1 6 . 6 26 . 3  20 . 5  39 . 8  30 . 6  6 . 2  
1 908 3 . 1  1 2 . 1  22 . 0  1 2 . 5  40 . 9  30 . 6  6 . 1  
1 909 1 . 8 1 3 . 0  23 . 3  ( 4 )  1 1 . 9  40 . 4  31 . 5  6 . 1  
1 91 0  1 . 6 1 0 . 3  30 . 2  9 . 0  37 . 8  30 . 4 - 6 . 4 
1911 3 .1 l6 .l - 28�2 7.9 41 . 0  30 . 9  6 .2 
1 9 1 2  2 . 8 1 4 . 4  24 . 1  9 . 9 40 . 6  3 l . i  6 . 3  
1 91 3  3 . 7  1 6 . 5  22 . 7  - 1 4 . 2  40 . 7  30 . 9  6 . 3 
Source : Reports of  Cond i ti on .  See Tab l e I V-2 , page 68 . 
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Tab l e V I -4 
Average Cap i ta l  per Bank ,  i n  Thous ands of  Dol l ars 
Centra l 
East Reserve Reserve Country 
Yea r Tennessee Mechani cs Th i rd C i ty Ho l s tof"' C i ti es C i ti es Banks 
1 900 1 75 1 00 200 200 1 no 1 , 3q4 565 1 1 2 
1901  1 75 1 00 200 200 100 1 , 576 569 104 
1 gn2 1 75 100 200 200 1 00 1 , 980 594 98 
1 903  1 75 1 00 200 200 1 00 2 , 304 602 93  
1 904 1 90 1 00 ( 4 )  200 220  1 00 ( 3 )  2 , 403 60 1  90 
1 905 200 1 80 200 300 1 80 . 2  2,351 fi32 87  
19o6 4oo 2oo (4) 2co 46o 2oo . o  2,38o 665 86 
1 907 400 200 ( 4 )  200 500 239 . 2  2 , 6 1 5 687 85 
1 908 400 200 500 250 . 0  2 , 704 694 84 
1 909 400 200 500 ( 4) 250 2 ' 691 698 84 
1 9 1 0  400 200 500 400 2 , 9 1 7 734 85 
1 9 1 1  400 200 500 400 . 3 , 1 49 171 85 
1 91 2  400 200 500 460 3 , 3 1 1 801 86 
1 9 1 3  400 200 500 500 3 , 490 834 86 
Source : Repo rts of Cond i t i on .  See Tab l e IV-7 , page 91 . 
<.0 
........ 
1 98 
Each of the l ocal  banks , except the Th i rd Nati onal , doubl ed ( at 
l ea s t )  i ts capi tal between 1 904 and early 1 906 . The Mechani cs  and the 
Hol ston rel i ed mostl y upon the s a l e  o f  add i t i onal  s tock . The Eas t Tennes see 
and the C i ty empl oyed both the s a l e  of  addi t i onal  s toc k and the rei nvestment 
of ea rn i n gs to produce thei r cap i ta l  i ncreases . Consequentl y ,  the 
Mechan i c s ' and the Hol ston ' s  rati os of  s harehol der i nvestment to 
l i abi l i ti es were more strongl y affected than were the same rat i os for 
e i ther the Eas t  Tennes see or the C i ty .  ( Convers i on of s urpl u s  to 
capi ta l d i d  not affect the rat i o  of  s harehol der i nves tment to l i ab i l i t i es . )  
( See Tab l e V I -5 . )  I t  was for th i s  reason  that the Mechan i cs and the 
Hol ston had rel at i ve l y  h i gh rat i os of s ha reho l der i nvestment to a l l 
l i ab i l i ti es duri ng  pa rts of the fi nal  peri od . Duri ng mos t  other years , 
s harehol der i nvestmen t  contributed about as much to thei r l i abi l i t ie s , 
and to the l i abi l i ti es o f  the other l ocal ban ks , as to the l i abi l i ties  
o f  reserve ci ty banks . That i s ,  the l ocal banks were more h i g h ly  
l everaged i n  the fi nal peri od than they had  been previ ous l y .  
Whi l e  sharehol der i nvestment contri buted some\'1hat  l es s  than i t  had 
to the l i abi l i ti es of the l ocal  banks , c i rcu l at i on added more . The 
i ncrease i n  the importance of c i rcul ati on as a s ource of  l i ab i l i ti es 
was due to a change i n  the l aw made i n  1 900 . Before that mod i fi cati on , 
the l ocal  banks genera l ly  i s s ued the m i n i mum amount o f  c i rcu l ati on . 
After the change , however ,  they usua l l y  i s sued the maximum a l l owed by 
l aw .  (The "mi n i mum" was determi ned by the m i n i mum bond depos i t . ) 
The Act of  March 1 4 ,  1 900 , i ncreased the amount of  c i rcu l at i on 
that cou l d be i ss ued by a bank from 90 percent of  the l ower of e i ther  
Tabl e V I -5 
Average Ratio  of  Sharehol der Investment to A l l L i abi l i ti es , i n  Percent 
Year 
East 
Tennessee 
1 900 23 . 2  
Mechan i cs Hol s ton 
Central 
Reserve 
C i ti es 
Reserve 
C i ti es 
Country 
Banks 
lffi___ lT.4 - --- 18c�2 -- l6 . .l £� . U  l �  • .l 1 0 . �  £ 1  . I  
1 91 2  
1 9 1 3  
1 6 . 5  
1 6 . 2  
1 8 . 2  
1 7 . 9  
1 7 . 9  
1 7 . 5  
27 . 2  
24 . 8  
Source : Reports of  Cond i ti on .  See Tab l e  IV-5 , page 83 . 
1 5 . 6  
1 6 . 3  
1 6 . 5  
1 6 . 8 
20 . 5 
20 . 0  
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the market val ue or the par val ue o f  bonds depos i ted to secure that 
c i rcul at i on to 1 00 percent of the va l ue of the bonds so depos i ted . That 
Act a l so  provi ded that the max imum bond depos i t  for any bank be i ncreased 
to equal i ts cap i ta l . (Th i s  repea l ed the ol d max imums created by the Act 
of March 3 ,  1 86 5 . ) . Furthermore , the Act of  Marc h  1 4 ,  1 900 , al l owed banks 
to convert the bonds they had a l ready depos i ted i nto bonds of a new 
ser i es a t  favorabl e terms . 
The actua l terms at wh i ch the o l d  bonds were to be exchanged for 
the new ones were not spec i fi ed i n  the Act . One prov i so of that Act 
read in part , 
Provi ded , That under regu l at i ons  to be prescri bed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury any nati onal ban k i ng as soc i at i on 
may subs ti tute the two per centum bonds i s s ued under the 
prov i s i ons of  th i s  Act for any of the bonds depos i ted w i th the 
Treasurer to secure c i rcu l ati on . 
Th i s  enabl ed the Secretary of the Treasury to accept the o l d  bonds 
at the i r  market val ue , and th i s  was necessary because mos t  of these bonds 
were trad ing  above par and wou l d  not have been otherwi se exchanged by 
thei r owners for the l ower y i el d i ng new bonds i f  the exc hanqe had been 
based on the par va l ues of the bonds concerned . Had the Congress i n tended 
the bonds to be exchanged at  par ,  then the prov i s o  wou l d  have been 
wri tten d i fferentl y .  
The resu l t was that : 
Banks were a l l owed to i s s ue notes to the amount of the 
pai d - i n  capi ta l  and to one hundred per cen t .  of  the market 
val ue of the bonds depos i ted , but �ot exceed i ng one hundred 
per cen� of the i r  pa r va l ue .  The act authori zed the refund i ng 
of the greater part of the funded debt i nto two per cen t .  
bonds , payab le  after th i rty years , i n  exchange for several 
former i s s�es payi ng h i g her rates of i n terest but a l l redeem­
abl e before 1 909 . Upon notes secured by the new bonds the 
tax on c i rcul ati on was reduced from one to one ha l f of one 
per cent . For at  l east another generati on , then , a n  amp l e 
bas i s  of  bonds to secure c i rcul a ti on was provi ded , and for 
the time bei ng at any rate the profi t to be gai ned from the 
i s sue of notes was s l i ghtly i ncreased . Wi thi n  l es s  than 
four months after the pa ssage of  the l aw the note- i s sue , 
wh i ch had rema i ned a lmost  s tati onary for more than a year , 
rose  . • .  and  thereafter conti nued to expand s l owly but 
a lmost  cont i nuously unt i l  1 9 1 2  . . . . ( Dunba r ,  1 922 , 
pp . 233-234) . 
The Act o f  March 1 4 ,  1 900 , s i gn i fi cantly ·reduced the cost of  
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i ss u i ng banknotes by l ower i n g  the tax on the notes i s sued and by 
i ncreas i n g  the amount wh i ch coul d be i ss ued for a g i ven amount of  bonds 
depos i ted . At the same time , ban ks were gi ven i ncenti ves to expand thei r 
c i rcu l at ion . Large banks , to whom the prov i s i ons o f  the Act of  March 3 ,  
1 865 , real ly appl i ed ,  were a l l owed to i ncrease the i r  c i rcu l at ion to an 
amount equal to thei r cap i tal . Perhaps more important was the s ubst i tu­
ti on of o ld  bonds for new . The banks were g i ven the opportun i ty to 
exchange the i r  o l d bonds at a prem i um ,  and they wou l d no l onger have to 
take ' i nto account the possi b i l i ty tha t such bonds mi ght , i n  a few years , 
te redeemed at  par  pr ior to thei r maturi ty .  Had the Secretary of  the 
Treasury chosen to redeem such  bonds at par at  the earl i est  opportun i ty ,  
the owners o f  those bonds m·i qht  have sustai ned s i gn i f i cant l os ses . The 
Act of  March 1 4 ,  1 900 , a l l owed the banks to avo i d  th i s  pos s i b i l i ty and 
at  the same t ime assure themsel ves of havi ng , for at l east th i rty yea rs , 
an amp l e supoly o f  bonds to secure thei r c i rcu l a ti on . 
The response to the Act was cramati c .  ( See Tab l e V I -6 . )  Banks 
i n  each c l ass i ncreased the i r  ci rcul ati on . Wi th i n  two ·years , centra l  
reserve c i ty ban ks had doubl ed the rate at  wh i ch they i s s ued c i rcul a t i on . 
Reserve c i ty banks a l so boosted the rate at wh i ch  they i s sued banknotes , 
Tabl e V I-6 
Average Rat io  of C i rcu l ati on I s s ued to Cap i ta l , in Percent 
Central 
East  Reserve Reserve Country 
Year Tennessee Mechani cs Th i rd C i ty Ho l ston C i ti es C i t ies Banks 
1 898 25 . 7  22 . 5  22 . 5  22 . 5  22 . 5  24 . 0  2 1 . 2  36 . 0  
1 899 25 . 7  22 . 5  22 . 5  90 . 0  22 . 5  24 . 4  23 . 4  38 . 9  
1 900 36 . 6  24 . 0  39 . 9  98 . 0  53 . 5  38 . 6  3 1 . 4  45 . 9  
1 901 42. 9  45 . 0  50 . 0  1 00 . 0 1 00 . 0  48.5 38. 9 53 .1 
1 902 42 . 9  50 . 0  50 . 0  1 00 . 0  99 . 5  40 . 8  37 . 4  50 . 7  
1 903 42 . 9 . 50 . 0  50 . 0  1 00 . 0  97 . 9  41 . 7  40 . 2  52 . 9  
1 904 65 . 8  57 . 5  ( 4 )  50 . 0  97 � 3  98 . 9  ( 3 )  38 . 5  48 . 6  57 . 6  
1 905 1 00 . 0  50 . 4  1 00 . 0 1 00 . 0  98 . 8  45 . 2  54 . 1  6 1 . 8  
1906 80. 0 57. 5 (4) 100 . 0  91.3 98.8 50.7 58 .7 66 .7 
1 907 1 00 . 0  57 . 5  ( 4 )  1 00 . 0  1 00 . 0  83 . 6  5 1 . 0  6 1 . 7  6 7 . 5  
1 908 1 oo . o 1 oo . o 1 o o . n 96 . o 53 . 6  66 . 3  7 1 . 3  
1 909 98 . 2  1 00 . 0  1 00 . 0  ( 4 )  1 00 . 0  50 . 5  66 . 3  74 . 8  
1 9 1 0  98 . 8  1 00 . 0  1 00 . 0  85 . 0  47 . 8  6 5 . 4  75 . 9  
1911 96 . 9  99 .4 1 00 . 0  lOO . O  44 .1 64.2 76 . 6  
1 9 1 2  95 . 3  99 . 5  1 00 . 0  95 . 7  43 . 1  63 . 8  78 . 2  
1 91 3  95 . 9  1 00 . 0  1 00 . 0  1 00 . 0  42 . 8  62 . 1  78 . 9  
Source : Reports of Cond iti on . See Tab l e  IV-6 , page 89 . 
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al though not qui te so h i g h  as cen tra l  reserve ci ty banks . Country bank 
a l so res ponded s trong ly .  I s s ue rates conti nued to  ri s e  a nd  peaked for 
c i ty bank s  i n  1 908 . I s s ue rates for country ban ks rose s tead i ly throughout 
the rema i ni ng years of  the Nati onal Banki ng Sys tem , demonstrat i ng that 
banknotes were s ti l l  more important for the smal l er banks than for the 
l arger . Country ban k i s sue rates probably conti nued to r i se because the 
Act of March 1 4 ,  1 900 , a l l owed the formation of nationa l banks  wi th a 
cap i ta l  of  $25 thousand i n  pl aces wi th � popul at i on bel ow three thousand . 
Many such banks were form€d and they tended to take fu l l advantage of  
t he  note i s s ue priv i l ege . (On the l as t  report of cond i t i on of 1 899 , 
there were 3 , 283 country banks wi th a total capi tal of  $384 mi l l i on ,  
but by the l ast  report for 1 904 , there were 5 , 1 28 country banks wi th  a 
tota l capi tal of $455 mi l l i on . That i s , there were an add i ti ona l 1 , 845 
country banks formed and they added about $38 thousand api ece to total 
cap i tal . See a l s o  Tabl e  V I -4 , page 1 97 .  
The l ocal banks a l so responded s trongly , and by the end o f  the 
peri od they were a l l i ss u i ng c i rcul at ion at,  or very near to , the maximum 
a l l owed by l aw .  The rat i o  of c i rcul ati on i s s ued to cao i ta l occas i ona l l y  
fel l  bel ow 100  percen t ,  e i ther because  o f  changes i n  accounti ng procedures 
to l i s ti ng notes outstandi ng rather than notes i s sued ( th e  Ea st Tennessee , 
1 909- 1 91 3 ,  and the Th i rd ,  1 9 1 1 - 1 9 1 2 ) , or because there was s ometimes a 
del ay i n  i s s u i ng addi ti onal c i rcu l at i on once a bank ' s  cao i ta l  was 
i ncreased ( the Hol s ton , often after 1 906 ) . Some of the l ocal banks 
responded to the change i n  1 900 more qu i c k ly than did others , but a l l 
res ponded wi th in  a few years . Only the Mechani cs Nat i ona l fa i l ed to 
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i ss ue , a t  sometime , a l l the c i rcu l ati on i t  was al l owed , a l though i t  more 
than doubl ed i ts i s s ue rate . The Ci ty Nati onal s eems to have anti c i pa ted 
the change i n  the l aw ,  and early i n  1 899 i ncreased i ts c i rcu l ati on to the 
maximum i t  was then al l owed . ( There i s , however , noth i n9 that woul d 
confi rm thi s suppos i t i on i n  the bank ' s  corres pondence wi th the Comptro l l er . ) · 
Empl oyment of As sets : 1 900- 1 91 3 
Duri ng the fi nal  peri od , the l oca l  banks managed the i r  as sets about 
as they had done duri ng the trans i ti on peri od . For the most  part , t he 
changes i n  the proporti oni ng of as sets that di d occur were cont inuati ons 
of trends wh i c h  fi rst appea red i n  the trans i ti on oeri od . As wi th 
l i abi l i t i es , the patterns of as set management showed s im i l ar i ti es to 
those of ci ty banks and . to those of country banks . By the fi nal  per i od ,  
there were sma l l er d i fferences between country banks and reserve c i ty 
bank� i n  r�spect to the proporti on i n g  of some as sets . The prev i ou s  
di fferences between reserve c i ty e nd country bank  l oan-as set rati os and 
earn i ng-as set rat i os had dimi n i s hed ,  but there were s t i l l  l arge 
di fferences  i n  primary and s econdary reserve rati os . For th i s  reason , 
1 t  i s  mo re di ffi cu l t  to prec i sely i dent ify a part i c u l ar  behav i or pattern 
as h av i ng been representati ve of ,  for examp l e ,  country banks rather than 
of reserve c i ty bank s . By and l arge , the l oca l ban ks settl ed on patterns 
that were s im i l a r  to those  common to reserve c i ty ban ks . 
The l ocal banks general ly hel d h i g h  and s tabl e  rat i os of  earni n g  
assets t o  a l l as sets dur i ng the f i n a l  pe ri od . For the most  part , the i r  
rati os were s l i gh tly h i gher and more stab l e than they h ad been during  
205 
most of the tran s i ti o n ,  and they more cl osely aoprox imated the rati os 
hel d by the average country bank . (See Tabl e V I - 7 . } The Hol s ton 
Nati onal , from 1 9 1 0  through 1 9 1 3 ,  had l ower and dec l i n i ng ratios because 
in 1 9 1 0  it began cons tructi on of a l a rge bank bu i l d i ng .  Consequentl y ,  
the port i on o f  i ts assets devoted to rea l e state was abnorma l ly h i gh . 
However , the Hol s ton d i d  not appreci ably al ter the rel ations among i ts 
other assets . The l ocal ban ks were abl e to ma i nta i n  h i g h  and s tabl e 
ratios  of ea rn i ng assets to a l l as sets becaus e  they he ld  s tabl e rat i os 
of l oans to as sets and because the bank depos i t  porti on o f  thei r reserves 
was al so s tab le  and h i g h . They a l so hel d h i g h  and rel ati ve ly stabl e 
secondary reserves . 
Duri ng the f i na l peri od , l oan-as set rat ios  were l ower than they 
had been dur i ng the fi rs t  hal f of the trans i ti on peri od , when the l ocal  
banks  were at  the i r  most aggres s i ve in  bu i l d i ng the vol ume of the i r  l oans . 
In  t�e second ha l f  of  the trans i ti on ,  l oan-asset rat i o s  fel l , and the 
decl i ne conti nued i n to the f i na l  peri od .  ( See Tabl e V I - 8 . ) By 1 903 or 
1 904 the l oca l banks had reduced the i r l oan-a sset rati os to l evel s that 
were c lo se  to those of country banks ( but not greatly d i fferent from 
ratios  hel d by reserve c i ty banks ) . Through the rema i nder of the fi nal  
peri od ,  the l ocal  ban ks general ly l ent  at the same rates as country banks . 
The rati os were more stab l e  than they had been , and there were u sua l ly 
smal l er d i fferences among the l ocal  banks . 
There were somewhat greater di fferences among  the l ocal  banks i n  
thei r rati os of primary reserves to assets . (See Tabl e V I - 9 . } They hel d 
primary reserve rati os  that were cl ose to those hel d by reserve c i ty banks 
Year 
Eas t  
Tennessee 
Tabl e V I -7 
Average Rat i o  of Earn i ng As sets to Al l As sets , i n  Percent 
Mechan i cs Th i rd C i ty Hol ston 
Central 
Reserve 
C i t i es 
Reserve 
C i t i es 
Country 
Banks 
1 900 85 . 9  88 . 0  86 . 5  90 . 1  9 1 . 0  71 . 7  84 . 8  89 . 4  
1 901 86 .7 87.2 86 . 6  90.1  89 . 5  69. 3  85.1 90 .0  
1 902 87 . 8  88 . 2  86 . 3  93 . 4  89 . 5  70 . 6  85 . 9  90 . 5  
1 903 88 . 6  90 . 3  86 . 8  90 . 6  89 . 2  74 . 2  86 . 3  90 . 6  
1 904 89 . 9  88 . 9  ( 4 )  88 . 6  90 . 2  90 . 9  ( 3 )  72 . 3  85 . 9  90 � 7  
1 905 90 . 9  90 . 9  87 . 8  9 1 . 3  . 9 1 . 0  7 1 . 6  85 . 9  90 . 8  
1966 89.9 89 .7 (4) 87. 9  92. 9  92. 9  69.4 85.8 91 . 0  
1 907 90 . 1  92 . 3  (4 )  89 . 4  93 . 1  92 . 6  75 . 1  86 . 6  90 . 9  
1 908 87 . 8  88 . 3  92 . 0  90 . 4  72 . 0  85 . 1  90 . 3  
1 909 89 . 3  87 . 3  90 . 9  ( 4 )  90 . 3  7 1 . 5  85 . 1  90 . 5  
1 91 0  88 . 5  90 . 6  89 � 0  88 . 1  7 1 . 0  85 . 2  90 . 6  
1911 88. 0  92 . 0  88 .4 86.2 73.7 85.7 90. 5 
1 9 1 2  89 . 1  93 . 1  89 . 0  84 . 4  74 . 1  86 . 1  92 . 7  
1 91 3  89 . 9  92 . 5  89 . 2  73 . 8  75 . 2  86 . 3  91 . 8  
Source : Reports o f  Cond i tion . See Tabl e I V -8 ,  page 1 01 . 
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Tab l e V I -8 
Average Rat io  of Loans  to As sets , i n  Percent 
Centra l 
Eas t Reserve Reserve Country 
Yea r Tennessee Mechan i cs Thi rd C i ty Hol ston C i ti es C i ti es Banks 
1 900 5 1 . 8  56 . 0  64� 0 63 . 7  66 . 2  5 1 . 7  53 . 3  54 . 9  
l90l 50 . 0  48 . 6  61 . 5  . 62 . 1  58 . 8  50 . 5  52. 7  54 .7 
1 902 50 . 8  42 . 2  5 9 . 8  58 . 9  55 . 7  5 1 . 1  53 . 6  56 . 4  
1 903 53 . 2  46 . 9  58 . 0  54 . 7  50 . 4  52 . 2  53 . 8  57 . 4  
1 904 53 . 8  46 .4  { 4 )  62 . 6  53 . 6  56 . 7  { 3 )  52 . 0  5 1 . 6  56 . 2  
1 905 56 . 4  55 . 5  58 . 7  57 . 1  58 . 1  5 1 . 6  52 . 0  55 . 6  
1906 57 . 1  54 . 0  (4) 60 . 2  57 . 5  63 . 1  49 . 6  53 . 3  56 . 7  
1 907  55 . 2  55 . 0  ( 4 )  65 . 0  56 . 4  66 . 7  53 . 2  53 . 6  57 . 3  
1 908 54 . 0  5 7 . 4  55 . 0  62 . 1  5 1 . 3  50 . 9  55 . 3  
1 909 53 . 9  55 . 1  55 . 4  ( 4 )  60 . 0  52 . 3  51 . 5  55 . 4  
1 91 0  56 . 5  55 . 8  59 . 0  61 . 8  52 . 2  53 . 4  57 . 7  
1911 54 . 1  56.7 52.7 55 . 6  52.6 52. 6 57.0  
1 9 1 2  53 . 0  62 . 0  56 . 8  55 . 7 . 53 . 9  52 . 5  56 . 7  
1 9 1 3  56 . 6  67 . 9  56 . 5  46 . 3  54 . 7  53 . 5  58 . 8  
Source : Reports of Condi t i on . See Tab l e I V -9 , page 1 03 .  · 
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Tab l e  V I -9 
Average Rati o of Primary Reserves to As sets , i n  Percent 
Centra l 
Ea st  Reserve Reserve Country 
Year Tennes see Mechanics  Th i rd C i ty Hol ston C i t i es C i ti es Banks 
1 900 3 1 . 8  23 . 6  1 7 . 8 22 . 3  1 3 . 3  34 . 1  3 1 . 6  22 . 9  
1901 32. 4 . 23.7 19 .7 24.4 13. 0 36.6 31 .5 22.8 1 902 26 . 7  27 .8  21 . 8  25 . 6  20 . 3  35 . 3  30 . 5  2 1 . 5  
1 903 36 . 0  3 1 . 1  27 . 5  3 1 . 5  28 . 6  32 . 0  29 . 1  20 . 2  
1 904 35 . 4  31 . 4  ( 4 )  2 5 . 0  33 . 2  25 . 4  ( 3 )  33 . 7  3 1 . 1  20 . 5  
1 905 3 1 . 7  23 . 8  23 . 1  28 � 5  2 1 . 7  34 . 3  3 1 . 1  21 . 0  
WXXS XX X x: = lit XX W x: I WW AA X XX A AX J I �UO �ts . �  �b . ::>  l 'J }  a . t  �ti .4 . 17. 9 - -�o.3 29.6 20 .4 
1 907 28 . 8  27 .0  ( 4 )  1 8 . 0  26 . 7  1 6 . 3  30 . 5  28 . 4  1 9 . 7  
1 908 29 . 0  20 . 4  26 . 1  1 5 . 6  33 � 1  30 . 5  1 9 . 7  
1 909 30 . 6  22 . 8  25 . 5  ( 4 )  1 7 . 4 33 . 4  31 . 1  1 9 . 8 
1 9 1 0  2 7 . 9  1 5 . 0 22 . 1  1 2 . 6  34 � 2  30 . 2  1 8 . 7  
1 91 1  3 1 . 2  20 . 9  27. 8 16 . 8  32.3 30.6 18 . 9  
1 9 1 2  3 1 . 6  1 8 . 6  22 . 7  1 3 . 4  32 . 2  30 . 5  1 8 . 8  
1 9 1 3  29 . 2  1 5 . 8  23 . 4  1 1 . 0 3 1 . 1  29 . 5  1 8 . 2  
Sou rce : Reports o f  Condi ti on .  See Tabl e I V -1 0 ,  page 1 08 .  
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unti l 1 904 or 1 905 . Thereafter ,  the l arger es tabl i shed banks , espec i al ly 
the Eas t  Tennessee and  the C i ty ,  conti nued thi s  oract ice . After 1 905 , 
the Hol s ton , and to a l es ser extent the Th i rd ,  he l d  l ower rati os wh i ch 
were more l i ke those hel d by the avera9e country bank . Th i s  d ifference 
is a ccounted for by more aggres s i ve behav ior by the Hol s ton after i t  
s urv i ved the trans i ti on peri od and attempted to become one o f  the l argest  
o f  the  l ocal banks . The Thi rd a l so may have become more agqres s i ve toward 
the end o f  the period  as part of an  attempt to grow l arger ,  but i f  so , 
the two ( or perhaps three ) years at the end o f  the peri od , when the 
more aggress i ve pos ture appears , do not prov i de a l ong  enough span of  
time to  accurately j udge the rea l i ty of  the  trend . ( As wi l l  be seen , 
both of these banks hel d rel at ive ly h i q h  rati os o f  secondary reserves , 
and therefore the rel ati vely l ow rati os of  primary reserves do  not 
refl ect as  ri s ky an arrangement of assets as might be thought , ta k i ng 
acco�nt only of primary reserves . )  
Whi l e  the l ocal banks  genera l ly hel d  hi g her primary reserves than 
d i d  the average country ban k ,  they al so  held  a h i gher propo rt i on of  
those reserves i n  the form of  ban k depos i ts .  ( See Tabl e  V I - 1 0 . ) As 
m i ght  be expected , the l ocal  bank s  wh i ch hel d the h i g hest  primary res erves 
al so hel d the h i ghest proporti on of those reserves i n  ban k depos i ts . The 
Th i rd and the Hol ston , by hol d i ng l ower res erves , had to hol d a h i gher 
proporti on i n  cas h , and consequently thei r bank  depos i t oorti on of 
primary reserves was l ower than e i ther the East Tennessee ' s  or  the C i ty ' s . 
In most yea rs , the Th i rd and the Hol s ton hel d bank depos i ts i n  rel ati on 
to primary reserves that were cl ose to the proporti ons he l d  by reserve 
Tab l e  V I - 1 0  
Average Rati o o f  Bank Depos i ts to Primary Reserves , i n  Percent 
Central 
Eas t  Reserve Reserve Country 
Year Tennes see Mechan i cs Th i rd C i ty Hol s ton C i ti es C i t ies Ban ks 
1 900 75 . 8  64 . 4  56 . 1 61 . 9  61 . 7  21 . 5  58 .4  68 . 6  
l90l 76 .3 66.0 62. 6  74.3 �1 .4 19 . 9  58.7 69 . 8  
1 902 77 . 8  73 .8 6 5 . 1  78 . 7  7 1 . 4  20 . 6  59 . 8  69 . 5  
1 903 77 . 5  79 . 0  67 . 4  73 . 3  71 . 9  24 . 7  59 . 9  67 . 9  
1 904 79 . 0  74 . 7  67 . 9  73 . 3  7 1 . 4  22 . 5  6 1 . 4  69 . 1  
1 905 79 . 8  74 .9  62 . 1  73 . 0  66 . 2  21 . 8  62 . 1  70 . 3  
l906 73 .2 71 .2 6 1 . 3  77. 6 67.7 20 . 3  61 .7 70 . 3 
1 907 73 . 9  79 .8 59 . 0  79 . 5  65 . 7  24 . 2  6 1 .8  68 . 7  
1 908 65 . 7  5 9 . 7  76 . 4  56 . 3  20 . 9  59 . 9  66 . 7  
1 909 7 1 . 7  59 . 5  78 . 6  68 . 8  20 . 4  60 .9 68 . 3  
1 91 0  67 . 2  54 . 9  70 . 0  70 . 1  21 . 1  60 . 2 . 66 . 7  
1 911 69 . 5  72.0 75.2 65.0 24.8 62.7 67.6 
1 91 2  72 . 9  74 . 6  72 . 8  67 . 5  25 . 4  63 . 2  68 . 7  
1 9 1 3  73 . 0  66 . 3  74 . 0  59 . 4  26 . 7  62 . 9  67 . 6  
Source : Reports o f  Cond i t i on .  See Tabl e I V - 1 3 ,  page 1 1 2 .  
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c i ty ban ks . The C i ty and the Eas t  Tennes see , on the other hand , hel d 
more of  thefr reserves  i n  bank depos i ts than di d the average country ban k .  
Furthermore , the l ocal banks usua l ly  had h i gher and more stabl e  rat ios  
than they hel d prev i ous ly . Aga i n ,  thi s characteri s t i c  represented the 
conti nuat ion of a trend begun duri ng the l as t  hal f of the trans i ti on 
peri od . As a genera l  ru l e ,  the l ocal  banks a l so  spread the i r  bank depos i t  
reserves more wi dely among thei r reserve agents , other nati ona l banks , and 
other banks than they had done in ea rl i er years . ( See Tabl e V I - 1 1 . )  
There were sometimes l arge d i fferences between the l ocal  ban ks i n  a g i ven 
year ,  but the trend towa rd a \'li der d i s persa l  of ban k  depos i ts was a 
common characteri sti c for each of the l oca l bank s . 
The l ocal  banks general ly he l d  a l ower proporti on of  the i r  primary 
reserves i n  ca sh  than di d other ban k s . ( See Tab l e V I - 1 2 . ) .  Th i s  oattern 
had been establ i shed as  common for the l ocal banks  after the fi rst  hal f 
of the trans i ti on peri od , and i t  conti nued through the f i nal peri od . 
The rati os common to the fi nal peri od were , of  course ,  much l ower than 
the usual rati os of the fi rs t peri od . 
The l ocal  banks i n  the fi nal  peri od hel d rati os of  secondary reserves 
to a s sets that were about one-ha l f  aga i n  as h i g h  as they had been duri ng 
the trans i tion  peri od . ( See Tab l e V I - 1 3 . )  Of course ,  the i ncrease i n  
the i r  secondary reserves occu rred hecause  they i ncrea sed the vol ume of 
banknotes i s sued and therefore the vol ume o f  bonds denos i ted to secure 
that c i rcul ati on . Furthermore , the secondary reserve rat i os for the l ocal  
banks  did not show any strong tendency to fa l l  duri ng  the fi nal per i od ,  
because  the banks conti nued to make l a rge i ncreases i n  thei r cap i tal  and 
21 2 
Tabl e V I - 1 1 
Average Rat io  of Amounts Due from Res erve Agen ts 
to Bank  Depos i ts ,  i n  Percent 
East Reserve Country 
Yea r Tennes see Mechan i cs Th i rd C i ty Hol s ton C i ti e s  Banks 
1 900 55 . 3  70 . 7  91 . 8  69 . 1  49 . 0  6 1 . 9  . 7 5 . 8  1901 55.8 73.6 93.1 76.8 61.7 59.8 74 . 9  
1 902 43 . 5  69 . 3 '  94 . 1  73 . 6  55 . 6  . 57 . 9  74 . 6  
1 903 3 5 : 3  76 . 1  92 . 7  73 . 0  . 48 . 3  54 . 4  74 . 2  
1 904 36 . 6  69 . 5  ( 4 )  90 . 2  62 . 6  56 . 1  ( 3 )  57 . 3  74 . 8  
1 905 35 . 5  . 82 . 5  85 . 8  68 .8  56 . 9  54 . 6  74 . 8  
1 906 42 .8  55 . 6  �4) 83 .4 45 . 1 60 . 8  5 1 . 9  74 . R  
1 907 45 . 5  62 . 0  4 )  7 5 . 7  45 . 1 60 . 0  5 1 . 5  75 . 0  
1 908 45 . 3  85 . 6  58 . 3  53 . 7  54 . 9  7 7 . 2  
1 909 44 . 2  84 . 4  52 . 5 ( 4 )  58 . 6 53 . 3  7 7 . 0  
191 0 39 . 6 . 80 . 4  44 . 6  63 . 8  49 . 3  76 . 6  
1911 3§. 8  70. 5 47 . 3  68.3 49 . 9  76 . 9  
1 9 1 2 39 . 9  64 . 9  48 . 6  7 1 . 2  48 . 7  76 . 7  
1 9 1 3  40 . 9  74 . 6  55 . 2  60 . 8  48 . 2  76 . 3  
Sou rce : Repo rts of Con d i t i o n .  See Tabl e I V - 1 4 , pa ge 1 1 5 .  
Tabl e V I - 1 2 
Average Ra tio  o f  Cash to Primary Rese rves , i n  Percent 
Centra l  
Eas t  Reserve Reserve Country 
Yea r Tennessee Mechan ics Th i rd C i ty Hol ston C i ti es C i t i es Banks 
1 900 21 . 5  26 .0  39 . 9  26 . 8  30 . 2  5 3 . 7  30 . 8  28 . 0  
1901 20 . 4  28 .4  34 . 8  25 . 6  27. 4 45.9 28.8 26.1 
1 902 1 8 . 5  2 1 . 6  30 . 9  1 5 . 8  23 . 5  45 . 5  28 . 5  27 . 0  
1 903  20 . 3  1 9 . 2 27 . 8  20 . 1  23 . 0  48 . 0  29 . 0  28 . 6  
1 904 1 7 . 5  1 9 . 6  ( 4 )  28 . 0  1 6 . 0  23 . 5  ( 3 )  5 1 . 1  28 . 6  27 . 5  
1 90 5  1 7 . 7  21 . 6  33 .6 1 7 . 6  25� 5 46 . 1  27 . 4  26 . 7  
1 906 23 . 7  2 3 . 2  (4) 30 . 3  1 8 . 8  26 . 2  40 . 1  27 . 6  26 . 3  
1 907 23 . 1  1 5 . 9 ( 4 )  35 . 1  1 6 . 6  3 1 . 8  49 . 5  28 . 8  28 . 1  
1 908 3 1 . 3  36 . 9  21 . 1  38 . 4  53 . 4  3 1 . 4  30 . 4  
1 909 25 . 3  32 . 9  1 9 . 1  ( 4 )  25 . 8  . 49 . 8  30 . 1  28 . 8  
1 9 1 0  29 . 3  38 . 1  25 .0 . 23 . 6  45 . 8  28 . 8  29 . 8  
1911 26 .2 24.8 21 .8 30.2 52.4 28. 9 29.0 
1 91 2  22 . 3  23 . 2  23 . 4  27 . 5 . 5 1 . 6  28 . 3  28 . 2  
1 91 3  23 . 3  28 . 2  20 . 8  33 . 6  52 . 5  28 . 6  29 . 1  
Source : Reptirts of  Condi ti on . See Tab l e  I V - 1 2 ,  page 1 1 1 . 
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Tabl e V I - 1 3 
. Average Rati o of  Secondary Reserves to As sets , i n  Percent 
Centra l  
East Reserve Reserve Country 
Yea r Tennessee Mechani cs Th i rd C i ty Hol s ton C i ti es C i t i es Banks 
1 898 1 0 . 3  1 1 . 6 8 . 7  4 . 1  8 . 8  1 0 . 9  1 0 . 9  1 7 . 8  
1 899 9 . 6  1 1  . 0  9 . 0 1 3 . 6  7 . 9  1 0 . 3  1 2 . 0  1 8 . 6  
1 900 1 3 . 7  1 6 . 3 1 2 . 5  1 2 . 6  1 6 . 6  1 2 . 6  1 3 . 1  1 8 . 8 
l90T- -lr. g - 23. o -- - -Tz-:-r---12-.r- ------z2� 7 11. s 14. o --nr. 4 
1 902 1 0 . 3  25 . 5  1 2 . 3  1 4 . 3  1 9 . 3 1 2 . 2  1 4 . 0  1 9 . 2 
1 903 7 . 5  1 8 . 8 1 0 . 3  1 2 . 8  1 8 . 1  1 4 . 1 1 5 . 1  1 9 . 6  
1 904 8 . 1  1 9 .0  (4 ) 9 . 0 1 2 . 2  1 6 . 1  ( 3 ) 1 2 . 7  1 5 . 1  20 . 3  
1 905 9 . 3  1 7 . 6 1 4 . 8  1 3 .4 1 8 . 5  1 2 . 5  1 4 . 6  20 . 4  
1906 12.2 16.9 (4) 13 .8 14.9 17.7 12.4 14. 3 20.0 
1 907 13 . 6  1 5 . 7  ( 4 ) 1 3 . 8  1 5 .6 1 5 . 2 1 4 . 5  1 5 . 4 20 . 1  
1 908 1 4 .  7 1 8 . 8  1 7 . 0  1 9 . 6 13 . 8  1 5 . 0 21 . 9 
1 909 1 3 .  5 1 8 . 6  1 5 .  5 ( 4 ) 1 8 .  3 1 2 . 3  1 4 . 7  2 1  . 6 
1 910 1 3 . 2  26 . 5  1 4 . 5  1 7 . 5  1 1 . 6 1 3 . 6  20 .4 
1 911 12 . 3  20 . 3  1 4 .7 19.7 13. 2 14.o ·2o .1 
1 9 1 2 1 3 .  1 1 7 .  2 1 5 .  7 1 9 .  5 1 2 .  1 1 4 .  2 21 . 0 
1 9 1 3  1 2 . 0  1 4 . 1  1 5 . 4  2 1 . 0  1 2 . 1  1 4 . 3  20 . 7  
Source : Reports o f  Cond i ti on .  See Tab l e  IV- 1 1 ,  page 1 09 .  
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c i rcul ati on . The al terati on i n  the importance of  th i s  category o f  thei r 
as sets had a s i gn i fi cant impact on the re l at i ve importance ' of  the i r  other 
assets . I t  d i d  not � however ,  represent a change i n  preference regard i ng 
the degree of  ri sks  that the l ocal ban ks were wi l l i n g  to accept . The 
i ncrease in secondary reserves was not so  much a fundamenta l s h i ft i n  the 
bank s ' proport ion i ng of thei r assets as i t  was a temoora ry rearrangement 
that wou l d  fac i l i tate the ir  l ong -term growth . For examp l e ,  the l oca l 
banks coul d have ach ieved the same rat ios  fo r earn i nq as sets , l oans , and 
secondary reserves by reduci ng thei r l oans i n  order to devote more of the i r 
resources to the purchase of U . S .  government bonds . Th i s  mi q ht have 
occurred if the banks had wanted to have a l ess  ri s ky arranqemen t of 
thei r assets , and i t  woul d have represented a fundamenta l change i n  thei r 
rel a ti on to each other and  to thei r bus i nes s envi ronment . However , thi s  
i s  not what they di d .  
The i ncrease i n  s econdary reserves by the l ocal ban ks was , i nstead , 
part of a proces s l ead i n g  to further growth . The proces s wa s one i n  
wh i ch the l oca l banks  wou l d  temporari ly i ncrease  one as set ( or category 
of a s sets ) rel at ive to the others ( usual ly meani ng tha t l oans wou l d  fa l l  
and secondary reserves woul d ri s e  re l at i ve to other as sets ) i n  order to 
promote for the futu re both an overa l l  i ncrease i n  assets and a rees ta b­
l i s hment of  the prev i ous ly  exi s t i ng re l a t ions . The i n i ti a l effect of 
i ncrea ses i n  c i rcul at ion and bond s depos i ted to secu re c i rcu l ati on was 
to i ncrease both the amount of l oans and the amount of bonds on deposi t ,  
but because the i ncrease i n  the amount o f  l oans was about eq ual to the 
i ncrease  i n  the amount of  bonds on depos i t ,  secondary reserves g rew 
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rel ati ve to other categori es of assets . Thi s effect appears to have been 
a temporary one because the bank s  d i d  not fundamenta l ly a l ter the 
rel at ion s  among other as sets ( as sets other than s econdary reserves ) .  
An anal ogy can be drawn between th i s  process and a sma l l  snake swa l l owi ng 
a l arge egg . The snake ' s  feature s  wi l l  be  temporar i ly di storted but i ts 
fundamenta l phys i o l ogy wi l l  be unchanged . The. Ho l s ton ' s  new ban k bu i l d i ng 
a l so caused a s im i l a r  d i stort ion i n  important asset rati os . 
The broad proportioni ng of a s sets by the l ocal  banks  d i d  no t undergo 
a fundamenta l change in the fi na l  peri od . The l oca l  ban ki nq market 
rema i ned a competi ti ve one even thouqh  the competi t i on was at a l es s  
feveri s h  p i tch than i t  had been i n  the mi ddl e yea rs o f  the trans i t ion · peri od . 
A s imi l a r  pa ttern was demonstrated by the l oan pol i c i es of the l ocal 
banks . Some changes were made i n  th e types of  l oans granted by the 
bank s , and these changes i ndi cate that over the l ength of the fi na l 
peri od the l endi ng s tandards  were ra i sed s l i ghtl y .  
Demand l oans became mo re common , but they amounted to a l arge 
proporti on of a l l l oans only for the Th i rd Nati onal . ( See Tabl e IV- 1 4 . ) 
Two-name time l oans grew rel ati ve to a l l l oans . ( See Tab l e V I - 1 5 . )  The 
other , more ri s ky t ime l oans  general ly  fel l i n  rel ative  i mportance . ( See 
Tabl e V I - 1 6 . )  However,  the rel at i ve s h i fts in i mportance were not l arge 
and i ndi cate that the l ocal ban ks d i d  no t ma ke thei r borrowers meet 
s i gn i fi cantly h i gher standards than they had met in the trans i ti on peri od . 
I n  fact , the onl y  s i gn i f i cant change i n  l endi ng pol i c i es i n vol ved the 
l oca l  banks ' observance of the 1 0  percent l oan l imi t .  
Year 
1 900 
1 90 1  
1 902 
1 903 
1 904 
1 905  
1 906 
1 907 
1 908 
1 909 
1 9 1 0  
1 9 1 1  
1 9 1 2  
1 91 3  
Year 
1 900 
1 901 
1 902 
1 903 
1 904 
1 905 
1 906 
1 907 
1 908 
1 909 
1 9 1 0  
1 91 1  
1 9 1 2  
1 9 1 3  
Tabl e V I - 1 4 
Demand Loans as a Percentage of Al l Loans 
Mec han i cs 
4-2 
1 -2 
1 
1 - 1 
2- 1  
1 
1 - 1 
1 - 7  
Th i rd 
7 - 1 1 
1 4- 1 8  
1 7  
1 3- 1 7 
1 7- 1 9  
1 1 - 1 0  
1 3- 1 1 
1 7- 2ll, 
1 2- 1 4  
1 5- 1 7  
1 6  
22- 1 8  
1 6  
N . A .  
Sou rce : Reports o f  Examinat ion . 
N . A . : Not Ava i l abl e .  
Tabl e V I - 1 5 
C i ty 
2-4 
6- 1 0  
4 
3-5  
1 -4 
0-2  
3-3 
1 - 2 
1 - 1 
2-3  
2 
3-2  
2 
N . A .  
Two-Name Time Loans a s  a Percentage o f  Al l Loans 
Mechan i cs Th i rd C i ty 
69-66 48-48 33-44 
70-58 46-43 42-37 
6 1  38 87 
61 -66 40-38 69- 4 6  
59-66 38-37  66-59 
39 30-35  49-65 
53-47 41 -3 1  54- 52 
51 -49 33-25 50-52 
29-52 49-58 
27-34 50-67 
32 81  
37-38 62-90 
34  90 
N . A .  N . Jl  . .  
Source : Reports  of Examinat ion . 
N . A . : Not Ava i l abl e .  
21 7 
Hol s ton 
4-5  
5-6 
4 
3 - 5  
4 - 7  
4 
5-6 
8-7 
4 - 5  
8- 1 1  
8 
3-3  
3 
N . A .  
Hol s ton 
55-45 
44-57 
67 
7 1 - 54 
6 1 - 5 5  
42 
45-38 
48-5 1  
48-55  
53- 1 1 
52  
52-49 
47  
N . A .  
2 1 8  
Tabl e V I - 1 6  
Other Time Loans as  a Percentage o f  Al l Loans 
Year  Mechan ics  Th i rd C i ty Hol s ton 
1 900 27-32 44-4 1  6 6-52 42-50 
1 901 28- 39 . 39-39 52-53  50-37 
1 902 38 45  9 30 
1 903 37-33 47-46 29-49 27-42 
1 904 38- 32 44-4 5 33-37 35-38 
1 905  6 1  59-55 50-33 54 
1 906 46-52 46-58 4 2-44 50-55 
1 907 47-44 49-51 48- 4 7  44-42 
1 908 59-34 49-41 47-40 
1 909 . 57-49 49-29 39-77 
1 9 1 0  52 1 7  39  
1 91 1  . 42-44 35-8 44-48 
1 9 1 2  49  8 49 
1 9 1 3  N . A . N . A .  N . Jl  . .  
Source : Reports of  Exami nat i on . 
N . A . : Not Ava i l ab l e .  
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Tab l e V I � l 7 presents the rati 1 of  the l argest l oan  found  on  the 
· vari ous dates of exami nati on to th1 l a rgest l oan tha t cou l d  l egal ly be 
made by each ban k .  From 1 900 through 1 905 , each of the l ocal banks 
habi tuta l ly v i ol ated the l aw by mak i n g  l oans i n  excess of  the l ega l l imi t .  
Th i s  produced a vast correspondence between the l oca l ban ks , the exami ners , 
and the Comptrol l er .  { For brev i ty ' s  sake onl y one i tem from that mammoth 
bul k wi l l  be c i ted . )  The debate over th i s  i s sue by the l ocal banks and 
the Comptrol l er had become i ncreas i ngly  acrimon ious , i nd i cat i ng the 
seriousness wi th wh i ch both part i es v i ewed the probl em .  The l aw d i d  not 
s pec i fy a pa rti cu l a r  penal ty for banks wh i ch v i ol ated the 10 percent 
l imi t ,  and we shal l . never know what the Comptro l l er actua l ly  threatened 
to do . Sect ion 53 of the Act of June 3 ,  1 864 , was a general prov i s i on 
al l ow ing  the Comptrol l�r to pl ace a bank i ri  rece i versh i p i f  i ts offi cers 
. . 
or di rectors knowi ngly v i o l ated any of the other prov i s i ons of the Act .  
Th i s . may be what the Comptrol l er threatened to do , a l though i t  woul d 
seem to have been an extreme act i on on h i s  part . 
The C i ty Nati onal wrote the fol l owi ng  l etter to the Comptro l l er on 
December 20 , 1 905 : 
S i r : 
Your  l etters of recent date to the offi cers and di rectors 
of the th ree l ead i ng nati onal ban ks i n  th i s  c i ty ,  h ave 
aroused a great deal of i n terest  among them . 
Wh i l e  we ful ly  recogni ze the ex i stence o f  that sect i on of  
the nati ona l  banki ng  l aws l imi t i n g  l oa-ns to  1 0% of t he  capi tal 
stock of each ban k ,  we a l so ful ly recogn i ze the fact  that 
under present bus i ness condi ti ons i f  th i s  l aw i s  ri g i d ly  
enforced , ft  wi l l  n ot  o n ly  cri ppl e the bus i nes s of the banks , 
but of the mercanti l e  and  manufacturi ng corporat i ons  and 
fi rms of Knoxv i l l e  to an extent that wi l l  be very ha rmfu l . 
There a re fi ve nati onal banks i n  Knoxv i l l e ,  w i th an 
aggregate capi tal stock of $ 1 , 1 00 , 000 . 00 ,  and there are many 
Year_ 
1 900 
1 901 
1 902 
1 903 
1 904 
1 905 . 
1 906 
1 907 
1 908 
1 909 
1 91 0  
1 91 1  
1 9 1 2  
1 9 1 3  
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Tabl e V I - 1 7  
Ra t io  of Larges t Loan Actua l ly Made to the Largest  Lega l  Loan 
Mechan i cs 
1 .  50-1 . 26 
1 . 00- 1  . 00 
1 . 00 
2 . 00-1 . 00 
7 . 00-2 . 00 
8 . 50 
4 . 2 5-0 . 86 
1 . 00-2 . 00 
Th i rd 
2 . 53-2 . 06 
1 ; 49-2 . 1 4  
2 . 46 
3 . 00- 3 . 1 7  
3 . 00-3 . 00 
3 . 6 1 -3 . 00 
1 . 00 -0 . 95 
0 . 9 5-0 . 92 
1 . 00-1 . 04 
2 . 5 5-N . A .  
N . A . 
0 . 99-N . A .  
0 . 89-1 . 00 
1 . 00- 1 . 00 
Source : Reports of  Exami nati on .  
N . A . : Not Ava i l abl e .  
C i ty 
6 . 25-6 . 00 
3 . 00- 6 . 00 
2 . 50 
8 . 00-4 . 7 5  
5 . 75-3 . 00 
9 . 33-9 . 3 3 
2 . 7 5- 1 . 82 
2 . 35- 1 . 8 1  
0 . 98-0 . 96 
0 . 83 - 1 . 33 
N . A .  
1 .  00-0 .82  
0 . 94- 1 . 00 
0 . 82- 1 . 00 
Ho l s ton 
1 . 6 5- 1 . 00 
1 . 25- 1 . 50 
4 . 95 
1 . 40-2 . 00 
3 . 00-2 . 53 
1 . 50 
1 . 89-1 . 96 
1 . 87-2 . 77 
1 . 90-2 . 42 
1 . 45-1 . 73 
N . A .  
0 . 95-0 . 95 
0 . 95-0 . 80 
0 . 78-0 . 78 
fi rms and corporati ons do i ng bus i nes s wi th these bank s , who , 
i f  they were to ma i nta i n  l oan accounts w ith  each ban k ,  a . 
th i ng  i mposs ib l e for them to do , and the i r  l oans were 
restri cted to the l egal l im i t i n  each  ban k ,  thei r  bus i nes s 
woul d be brought to a standsti l l , thei r factori es shut  down , 
and thei r empl oyees di scharged . 
I t  i s  impos s i b l e  i n  a commun i ty l i ke th i s  for fi rms and 
compan ies  to conduct the i r  banki ng bus i ness and l oans  throuqh 
more than  one or  two banks , and wi th the l arge number of · 
sol vent ,  prosperous and progress i ve bus i nes s i nterests i n  
Knoxv i l l e ,  to b e  curta i l ed s udden l y  to the l ega l  l im i t o f  
one or two o f  our banks , wi th the i r  comparati ve ly  sma l l 
capi tal , i n  obta i n i ng l oans , i t  woul d work a hardsh i p  and a 
d i sa s ter i n  bus i nes s here that we woul d not recover from very 
qui ckly . · 
The d i rectors of our ban k  want to comply wi th  the nationa l 
ban ki ng l aws � and w i th th i s  s i ng l e exceptfon of ma k i ng l o�n s  
exceed i ng the l egal l im i t ,  have observed a n d  obeyed your 
i ns tructi ons fu l ly and consci enti ous l y .  
The extendi ng  of  these l oans beyond the l imi t prescri bed 
by l aw has  been a neces s i ty ,  not so much so for the benef i t  
of the ban k ,  a s  i n  order to promote and sus tai n the bus i ness  
i nterests of  our customers · and patrons . 
I f  i t  i s  i ns i s ted that we are to comp ly  wi th thi s l aw to 
the l etter ,  i t  wi l l  be impos s i b l e  for us to operate th i s  
ban k  i n  th i s  commun i ty wi thout shocki ng our cus to�ers and 
doi ng thei r bus i nes s great i njury ,  and there wi l l  be but one 
l eft for us  to purs ue , l i q u i dati on , and the ret i rement of  our  
i nst i tuti on from the  nati onal bank  system , and  do  bus i nes s  
under a s tate charter . 
We s i ncere ly  hope the extreme measures i nd icated i n  your 
l etters wi l l  not be enforced aga i nst  us for more reasons than 
one . 
You can read i ly see that i f  a l l the banks  i n  Knoxv i l l e  
were fo rced to reduce �he l oans  o f  thei r customers oromptly 
to w ith in  the l egal l imi t prescri bed by the nat i ona l  bank in�  
l aws , a depress ion  i n  our  commun i ty ,  i f  not a pani c ,  wou l d  
resul t ,  do i ng great and l a s ti ng ha rm .  
We respectful ly  ca l l  your  attention to the facts a s  set 
out above , and wh i l e  we know you have nei ther the d i s po s i t i on 
nor the authori ty to permi t us to v i ol a te a ny of  the orovi s i on s  
o f  the bank i n g  acts , yet we must i n s i s t  tha t the l etters you 
are wri t i ng to our di rectors , and the cou rse  you are 
imperat ive ly  i ns i st i ng upon them pursu i ng  w i l l  i nj ure and wi l l  
be rui nous to the bus i ness  i nterests o f  thi s commun i ty .  
The sa l i ent  facts a re that the l oca l ba nks made excess i ve l oans 
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for two reasons , even though numerous  other j usti fi cat i ons cou l d  be and 
2 22 
were advanced . On the one hand , grant ing  l a rge l oan s was a usefu l  
dev i ce for attracti ng and retai n i ng favored cus tomers . On the other 
hand , the l ocal banks had not i ncreased thei r cap i ta l  in proport i on to 
the growth of · economi c acti vi ty i n  Knoxv i l l e .  Between 1 887 and 1 900 
only the Ci ty Nat i ona l  had i ncreased i ts cap i ta l . (The Eas t  Tennes see 
had done so  i n  1 887 . ) I n  fact , i t  was on ly  toward the end of  1 904 that 
thes e two banks began to i ncrease the i r  capi tal , and even then the 
i ncreases were not l a rge . 
A rel axati on i n  the l oan l imi tat ion came wi th the Act of  June 22 , 
1 906 , wh i �h i ncreased the maximum l oan  to one borrower from an  amount  
equa l  to one-tenth of  a bank • s  capi ta l to  an amount equa l  to  one-tenth 
of a bank • s  capi ta l and s urpl us , so l on g  as the total d i d  not exceed 
30 percen t of cap i tal . At the time that th i s  Act became l aw ,  the 
Comptrol l er s erved noti ce that he woul d enforce the new l imi tati ons more 
ri g iq ly .  That i s ,  the banks were p l aced on noti ce tha t v io l a ti on s  woul d  
not be tol era ted , but they were a l so gi ven a good opportun i ty to take 
the s teps to avo i d  further v i o l at i on s . 
From the pas sage of  the Act of  June 22 , 1 906 , on , the banks cou l d 
i ncrease the i r  maximum l egal l oan to one borro\'Jer by ei ther i ncreas i n g  
cap i tal o r  i ncreas i ng surp l us . ( They cou l d do both . )  Of  the two , 
i ncreas i ng the surpl us  account offered a bank some advantages over 
i ncreas i ng cap i ta l , even though h i gher capi tal was preferred . A bank  
s ti l l  h ad  to go  through a cumbersome process of obtai n i n g  t he  Comptrol l er • s 
permi s s i on and then dec i d i ng upon the d i v i s i on o f  the new s ha res among 
the current owners ( or fi ndi ng  purchasers for the new shares ) i f  i t  were 
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to i ncrease i ts capi tal . I f ,  i ns tead , the surpl u� actoun t was i ncreased , 
no s uch  process was neces sary .  The l ocal ban ks often found i t  usefu l  to 
i ncrease thei r surpl u s  accoun ts gradua l ly and , hav i ng  once · bu i l t  the i r  
s urpl u s  to the desi red l evel , they coul d convert the surp l u s  to cap i ta l . 
The effect o f  the Act of  June 22 , 1 906 � was that the banks  had both 
a s tronger pos i ti ve i ncenti ve and a s tronger negati ve i ncenti ve to obey 
the l oan l imi tati on . .  The banks found i t  ea s i er to i n crease the i r  l arges t 
l egal l oan , and the Comptrol l er made i t  c l ea r  that  he cou l d  not tol erate 
v i o l ati ons . The l ocal  b an ks responded by i ncreas i ng thei r capi ta l · and 
surp l us � In  only a few cases d i d  the typ i cal l a rge l oan actual ly  get 
reduced . (The C i ty Nati onal , i n  1 905 , hugely v i o l a ted the 1 0  percent 
l imi t on l oans , but a fter 1 906 , i t  never aga i n  l ent as  much to one 
borrower as i t  di d in 1 905 . I t  d i d ,  however ,  conti nue to make l a rge 
l oans of about the same s i ze i t  had made i n  earl i er years . )  The other 
banks genera l ly  conti nued to make the same s i ze l oans , but wi th i ncreases 
in capi ta l  and surpl u s , s uch l oans were no l onger in v i ol ati on of  the l aw .  
Only the Hol s ton Nati onal regu l arly v i o l a ted the l aw after 1 906 , but 
i n  most  cases the exces s i ve l oans appear to have been made i n  anti c i pati on 
of  a s ubsequent i ncrease in cap i ta l  that ,  when accomp l i shed , brought  the 
l oans back  wi th i n  the l i mi t .  
Summary 
Duri ng the fi nal peri od , the nati onal banks of Knoxv i l l e  conti nued 
to demons trate the competi t i ve patterns of behav i or that had been 
devel oped i n  the . trans i t i on per i od because  the fundamenta l condi t i ons 
224 
that had g i ven r i s e  to those patterns d i d  not c hanqe . The l ocal  banks  
grew and conti nued to improve the management o f  the i r  as sets . The 
acqu i s i ti on of the i r _ l i a b i l i ti es was not al tered i n  any fundamental 
respec t ,  except for the change i n  the rates at wh ich  they i s s ued bank­
notes . By i mprovi ng the. management  o f  the ir  assets and conti nui ng to 
corr.pete aggres s i ve ly  for l i ab i l i ti es , the l ocal  banks acted more and 
more l i ke c i ty ban ks rather than l i ke country banks . Th i s  i s  not , 
however , an argument that the l oca l banks  beh� verl ex� ctly a l i ke .  
Instead , the di vers i ty o f  patterns i nd i cates that the Nati onal Bank Act 
of 1 864 ( and s ubsequent amendments ) permi tted the l o cal banks  to choose 
over a wi de range of opti ons , and that l ocal cond i t i ons l ed them to make 
choi ces that were more · l i ke the cho i ces �ade by c i ty banks  and l es s  l i ke 
the choi ces made by country banks than had been the case i n  the f i rs t  
peri od .  Consequentl y ,  the vario us arrangements of  a s sets and l i abi l i ti es 
sel e�ted by the l ocal banks di ffered from one another i n  deta i l  and 
demonstrated the ban ks ' wi l l i ngness to compete for deoos i tors and borrowers . 
The trans i ti on peri od can be vi ewed as one i n  wh i ch the l ocal  banks 
tested a var i ety of arrangements and eventua l ly  se l ected patterns that 
they fol l owed throughout the fi nal period . 
CHAPTER V I I 
CONCLUSION 
The Nat i onal  Ban k i n g  Sys tem has attracted the i nteres t of numerous 
s tudents , s ome of whom have focused thei r attention  upon those character­
i sti cs of the sys tem that were rel ated to the peri od i c  cri ses du ri ng the 
time i t  was i n  force . Others have concentra ted thei r efforts upon those 
characteri s t i cs of the system wh i ch had an espec i a l ly  strong effect upon 
the fl ow of ca pi ta l in a rap id ly  i ndus tria l i z i nq Un i ted States . There i s  
now widespread agreement that the Nati ona l  Bank i n q  System was unab l e to 
respond wel l to cri ses because of i ts reserve structu re and the absence 
of a l ender of l ast  resort . Because there was no agency or mechan i sm 
that woul d provi de s hort term l i qu i d i ty to the banks of  that sys tem , 
s harp i ncreases i n  the demand for l i qu i di ty cou l d not be met wi thout 
s harp reducti ons in the amount  of credi t extended by the banks  of  that 
system . About th i s  prob l em ,  thi s s tudy can add l i ttl e to what is a l ready 
known . I t  can , however,  add to our k nowl edge of  how the ban ks o f  that 
sys tem affected ca pi ta l  fl ows . 
Ri chard Syl l a  ( 1 975 . See a l so the di s cu ss i on i n  Chapter I I , oaqe 7 )  
has devel oped an exp l anati on of  how the Nati ona l Ban king Sys tem i nfl uenced 
the devel opi ng  capi ta l markets i n  the Un i ted States duri n g  the l ate 
n i neteen th centu ry .  He has argued that because the Na ti ona l Bank Acts 
conta i ned provi s i on s  that favored the establ i shment of nati onal banks 
in  the urban areas of the northeast  and d i s couraged the i r  formati on i n  
the rura l areas i n  the ·rest  o f  the country ,  l ocat i on affected performance . 
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Country banks  that were estab l i s hed in rura l areas were protected from 
competi ti on ,  and therefore we re abl e to di scri mi nate between thei r l ocal 
customers and other banks l ocated i n  the rese rve c i t i es . The country 
banks cou l d l end l es s  at home , but s ti l l  ma i nta i n  an acceotabl e rat i o  of 
earn i ng as sets to assets by l end i ng to other ban ks , esoec i a l l y  to the i r  
reserve agents . Thus , the monopol i s ti c s tructure of country ban k i ng i n  
mos t o f  the country tended to red i rect funds away from the ru ra l  reg i ons 
( and therefore away from agri cul ture ) and toward the urban areas ( a nd 
therefore toward i ndustry ) . The compet i ti ve s tructure of nati ona l ban ki nq 
in  the urban areas --espec i a l ly  in  reserve c i t i es -- i n  tu rn i nsured that 
i ndu s try woul d recei ve capi ta l  at favorabl e rates . (The i nteres t rates 
at wh i ch i ndu s tri a l  debtors borrowed woul d have been h i gher had the 
country bank market for capi tal been more competi ti ve . ) Consequentl y ,  
Syl l a  argues that the agri cul tura l sectors of the Un i ted States · fi nanced 
the expans i on of i ndustry in the urban areas . I t  was not un ti l l a te i n  
the period that country banks were s ubj ected to i ncreas i ng compe t i t i on 
from s tate chartered ban ks . Wi th the i ncrease i n  competi t i on from state 
cha rtered and pri vate banks , nati onal banks i n  ru ral areas ceased to 
behave as monopo l i s t ica l ly  as they had i n  earl i er years . 
The fi ndi ngs  of thi s d i s sertati on do not refute Syl l a ' s  thes i s , but 
they do offer an al ternati ve v i ew of country bank behavi or  for one l ocat i on . 
From the time when the fi rst nati ona l  bank was founded i n  Knoxv i l l e unti l 
the mi ddl e of  the 1 880 ' s ,  the nati ona l  banks l ocated here were not 
greatly d i fferent from wha t  woul d be expected from Syl l a ' s  descri pti on of 
country bank i ng . The l o ca l  nati onal ban ks duri n g  those  years coul d be 
descri bed as monopol i s ti c because  there are some i nd i ca ti ons tha t they 
did  use thei r oos i ti on to acqui re l i ab i l i ti es at favorabl e rates . On  
the other hand , the management o f  thei r assets is  best descri bed as  
hav ing  been conservative , ra ther than monopol i s t i c . 
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Duri ng the fi rs t peri od , the l ocal nati ona l ban ks were not subject 
to oers i s tently s trong competi ti on from state cha rtered and ori vate 
banks , and they tended to pay i n terest  only upon a sma l l  porti on of 
thei r pri vate depos i ts .  Whenever i n terest  beari ng  deoos i ts rose  above 
the usual  l evel , the l ocal banks appear to have been abl e to ta ke action 
tha t permi tted the reduct ion of  those depos i ts to more norma l l evel s .  
Had there been s tron g competi t ion from s tate ch�rtered banks , the l oca l 
nati onal ban ks probably woul d not have been abl e to res nond i n  th i s  
fash ion . Consequentl y �  the l ocal na ti ona l banks · can be s a i d  to have 
used the i r market power td reduce the cos ts of  thei r l i a bi l i ti es bel ow 
wha t i t  woul d h ave been , and therefore i n  respect to the ocqu i s i t i on of  
l i a b� l i t ies , the l ocal nati ona l banks can  be  sa i d  to have behaved a s  
monopol i es are expected to behave . 
The monopo l i s ti c pattern for the l oca l banks dur ing  the f irst  
peri od d i d  not , howeve r ,  extend i nto the i r  management o f  assets , whi ch  
can  best be descri bed as havi ng  been conservati ve . The  l oca l ba n ks d i d  
not  show a tendency to res tri ct  thei r l oca l l oans  i n  order to l end to 
c i ty banks . They d i d  restri ct thei r l oans , but the moti vati on seems to 
have been to mai nta i n a conservati ve portfol i o .  By l imi ti ng the vol ume 
of  l ocal  l oans , the l ocal  nati onal banks were l eft wi th  a rel ati vely 
l arge amount of assets that woul d  have been l ent  to c i ty banks , but the 
l ocal nati ona l  banks chose i ns tead to hol d  rel ati ve ly  h i gh amounts of 
cas h .  That i s ,  the l oca l nati ona l  banks di d not s ubsti tute l oans to 
c i ty banks for l oans to l oca l fi rms . They c hose i ns tead a more 
conservati ve proporti oni ng of thei r assets , wh i c h  had the effect of  
keepi ng thei r ea rn i ng as sets to al l as sets rati os be l ow those common 
for other banks i n  thei r cl ass . 
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The behav i or  of the l oca l  nati ona l banks in . the fi rst peri od  i s  
broadly cons i stent wi th the behav i or expected of them , g i ven Syl l a ' s  
genera l i zati ons . That the l ocal nati ona l ban ks di d not fo l l ow h i s  
mode l i n  every respect i s  not unexpected . There i s  ampl e room i n  Syl l a ' s  
model  for the conservati ve country ban k ;  and i f  a parti cu l ar bank  or 
group of ban ks i s  not thorough ly  monopo l i s t i c  at al l times , h i s descri ption 
i s  s ti l l  a reasonabl e and u seful one . However , the behav ior  of the l ocal 
nati ona l ban ks from the m i d- 1 880 ' s  to around the turn of  the cen tury 
was qui te di fferent from what i t  s houl d have been had Syl l a ' s  model of  
the behav ior  of  country banks  been appl i cabl e to Kno xv i l l e .  
_ Duri ng the second peri od , the behav ior  of the l ocal nati onal ban ks 
changed dramati cal l y  from what i t  had been i n  prev i ous  years . The l ocal 
banks  began to aggres s i vely compete for l i ab i l i t i es w i th one another ,  and 
the management of thei r as sets i ndi cates that they a l so  began to compete 
aggres s i vely for customers . There was an i n creased wi l l i ngness  to pay 
i n terest to thei r deposi tors and an i ncreased wi l l i n gnes s to borrow from 
other banks . At the same time , the ban ks demons trat ed a greater wi l l i ng­
ness to i ncrease the vol ume of thei r l ocal l oans , to  l end l arger and 
l arger amounts and thereby v io l ate the l aw regard i ng l arge l oans , and to 
rel ax the s tandards  that the i r depos i to rs were requi red to mee t .  Th i s  
pattern i s  not neces sari ly  i ncons i stent w i th Syl l a  ' s  rnodel , for h e  argued 
that country banks d i d  eventua l l y  become more compet i ti ve . But Syl l a  
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traced the change i n  behav ior  to an i ncrease i n  compe ti t i on from s ta te 
chartered banks , whereas i n  Knoxvi l l e ' s  cas e ,  the change i n  behav ior  
came as a resu l t of  an  i ncrease i n  t he  number of nati ona l banks . State 
banks i n  Knoxv i l l e  were a lways smal l er than the nat i ona l ly chartered ones , 
and there i s  no i n d i cati on that the nati ona l banks regarded the s tate 
banks as parti cu l arl y  strong competi tors . Furthermore , Syl l a  put the 
i ncrease i n  s tate chartered banks and the i ncreas i ng ly  competi ti ve 
atmos phere for nati onal bank s  as havi ng occurred aro und  the turn of  the 
century .  The i ncreas i ng ly  competi ti ve a tmosphere for Knoxv i l l e ' s  banks , 
however ,  began earl i er and had a d i fferent impetus from that pos tu l ated 
by Syl l a .  
I n  the fi nal peri od , when accordi ng  to Syl l a ' s  mode l , country banks 
s hou l d h ave been s ubjected to i ncreas i ng compet i t i on from state chartered 
banks and shou l d themsel ves have acted i n  more comoeti ti ve ways , the 
nati 9na l ban ks of  Knoxvi l l e  were behavi ng  somewhat l es s  compet i t i ve ly  
than they had duri n g  the decade of  the n i neti es . Even thouqh the l ocal 
nati onal ban ks were sti l l  competi ti ve duri ng  the fi na l  oeri od , the 
i ntens i ty of competi ti on had dec l i ne d . Ouri nq the trans i t ion peri od , 
the l ocal banks had a l tered the proport i on i n g  of  the i r  as sets and 
l i abi l i ti es in order to become more competi t i ve ,  and whi l e  there were 
few s ubstanti a l  changes i n  the fi nal peri od , the proporti ons chosen 
i nd i cate that  the l ocal  banks  were not as aggres s i ve as they had been . 
On the other hand , i t  i s  c l ear that even though there was a l es s  i ntens e  
competi ti ve atmos phere duri ng  the fi nal peri od , the l ocal nati onal  banks 
behaved much more competi ti vely than they had done i n  the fi rst oeri od . 
There was not a return to the rel ati vely con servative ( or oerhaos 
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monopol i s ti c }  arrangement of as sets and l i ab i l i ti es ,  nor di d the l oca l 
banks s i gn i fi cantly ra i s e  the s tanda rds wh i c h  the i r  borrowers had to 
meet . 
The h i s tory of the l ocal banks ' profi ts i s  rough l y  cons i s tent 
wi th the descri pti on of thei r behavi or g i ven above . The l ocal  banks 
had h i gher-than-average prof i ts dur i n q  the f i rs t  oer i od .  I n  spi te o f  the 
more i ntense competi tion , thei r pro f i ts rema i ned rel at i vel y h i gh unti l 
mi dway through the trans i t ion peri od , because the banks ma naged thei r 
assets more effect i vely .  loan-asset rati os rose to extremel y  h i gh 
l evel s .  { The  bank depos i t  port i on o f  the i r  reserves a l s o  rose ,  and so  
d id  earn i ng assets as a percentage of  al l assets . )  The  ri s ks as soci ated 
wi th  th i s  s trategy were revea l ed duri ng the c i rs i s  of 1 893 , and the 
banks res ponded by reduc ing  l oan -as set  rati os to more prudent l evel s .  
At the same time , thei r pro fi ts  fel l to l evel s that  were about the s ame 
as o�her country banks . By the end of the trans i ti on oeri od , the l ocal 
banks  profi ts had recovered , and i n  mos t years of the fi nal  peri od , 
the i r  profi ts exceeded those of  the average country bank . *  
What was i t  that l ed nati ona l  banks i n  Knoxvi l l e  to become more 
competi ti ve pri or to the t ime th at most other country banks di d ,  and why 
was the i ncrease i n  compet i t i on not rel a ted to an i ncrease i n  the n umber 
*No further comments on the l ocal banks ' profi ts  wi l l  be presented 
i n  the text , because  the est imates o f  the i r  profi ts devel oped for thi s  
s tudy are qu i te unre l i ab l e .  The reasons for the unre l i ab i l i ty o f  the 
profi t estimates , as  wel l as the es timates thems el ves , are presented i n  
Appendi x C .  Wh i l e the profi t es timates tend to support the arguments 
presented i n  t h i s  s tudy , thei r character makes the ir  support mi n ima l , 
at bes t .  
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of s tate chartered banks ? The i ncrease  i n  competi t i on among the l ocal  
banks  began s hortly after a s i gn i fi cant improvement in  the transportati on 
system s erv i ng Knoxv i l l e .  Th i s  evi dently stimu l a ted a l arge i ncrease  i n  
economi c acti vi ty ,  parti cu l a rly  amon g the manufacturi ng and mi n i n g  
i ndustr ies that were l i n ked to the natural resources of  the reg i on .  For 
many of  these i ndustries , transportat ion fac i l i ti es capabl e of  hand l i ng 
heavy , bul ky i tems were a neces s i ty .  Once the transportati on system 
was deve l oped to the po i nt that these i tems coul d be effi ci ently and 
cheaply hand l ed ,  Knoxvi l l e boomed , and natura l ly the l ocal  fi nanci al 
sector grew a l so . 
From the m idd l e  of the 1 870 ' s  to 1 900 , the Nati ona l  Ban k Acts 
underwent no changes that  greatly i ncreased the ease of national ban k  
formation . There were re l at i vely few chanqes i n  the l aw regard i n g  
nati onal ( or s ta te chartered ) ban ks duri ng th i s  per i od ,  and the great 
i ncrease in  the number of banks i n  Knoxv i l l e  must therefore be exp l a i ned 
by the great i ncrease i n  economi c acti v i ty that fol l owed upon the 
improvements i n  that communi ty ' s  trans portati on system . 
The improvements i n  the transportati on system servi ng Knoxv i l l e  may 
expl a i n  the i ncrease i n  econom ic  act i v i ty that fol l owed , as  wel l  as  the 
i ncrease in the number of  banks operati ng  in  Knoxvi l l e .  A bette r  
transportati on system cannot , however ,  expl a i n  why Knoxv i l l e  appears to 
have been s uch an  ho spi tab l e envi ronment for nati ona l banks . As Syl l a  
has argued , there were a number of provi s i ons  of the Nati ona l Bank Acts 
that  s hou l d have di s couraged the formati on of nati onal banks  here . The  
rel atively l arge capi tal requi rements , the proh � b i ti on a gai ns t l oans 
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secured by rea l estate , the l imi tati on on l a rge l oans , and the banks ' 
obl i gati on to undergo exami nati on and ma ke frequent reoorts may have a l l  
d i s couraged nati ona l bank format ion .  Yet i t  i s  c l ea r  that  the competi ti ve 
response  by the ol der national  banks was produced by an i ncrease i n  the 
n umber of nationa l , and not state cha rtered , i n st i tu tion s . I n  Knoxv i l l e ' s  
case , modi fi cati on of the l aw govern i ng nati ona l  banks was not the facto r 
that  st imu l a ted the great i ncrea se i n  the number of nati ona l ban ks . 
There i s  no c l ear reason why Knoxvi l l e  woul d have had more national  banks 
than s tate chartered ones , but  a pos s i bl e expl anati on may be tha t 
Kno xv i l l e ' s  experi ence especi a l l y  du ri ng  the cri s i s  of  1 873 , when at 
l eas t two nonnati onal  banks fa i l ed ,  convi nced the publ i c  tha t  na ti onal  
banks wer� s afer than other banks . The great i ncrease i n  the number of 
nati ona l  banks  from 1 887 to 1 891  had occurred pri or to the fai l ure of  
any of the l ocal nati ona l banks . From the end of  the C i v i l  War to the 
early 1 890 ' s ,  none of the l ocal nati ona l  banks  had fai l ed ,  whereas 
several of the s tate chartered and pri vate banks operati n g  i n  a nd near 
Knoxvi l l e  had .  Consequently ,  the pub l i c  probably had qreater fa i th i n  
banks wi th nati onal cha rters than they d i d  i n  pri vate banks or banks 
wi th state charters . 
I n  addi ti on , by the mi d- 1 880 ' s ,  the l ocal nati ona l banks  may have 
found that the restri cti on s and burdensome ob l i gati on s  assoc i ated wi th 
nati onal aff i l i ati on were not as restri cti ve or burdensome as had once 
been though t .  There was not h i nq nati ona l  banks cou l d  do to avo i d  the 
s tatutory capi ta l requ i remen t or to m i ti gate the obl i gati on to make 
peri odi c  reports and undergo exami nati on . The p roh i b i ti on agai n s t  l oans 
secured by rea l  es tate and the l imi tati on on l arge l oans , however ,  cou l d  
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be ( and were ) evaded by various  s tratagems , and therefore these 
restri cti ons ceas ed to be the impedi men ts to joi n i ng the Nat i ona l  Ban k i ng 
Sys tem that they had once been . The experi ence of the l ocal nati ona l  
banks dur i ng the fi rs t period s howed others that the pres tiqe and 
advantages of a nati onal  cha rter coul d be enjoyed wi thout thei r havi ng 
to r ig i d ly  obey a l l the provi s i on s  of  the Nati onal Bank Acts , and therefore 
the i ncrease  i n  the number of  banks i n  Knoxvi l l e  i n  the l ate 1 880 ' s  and 
early 1 890 ' s  was primari l y  due to an  i ncrease  in the number of  nati onal 
bank s . 
The centra l poi n t  i s  that  i t  was the cha racteri s ti cs o f  
Knoxvi l l e ' s  economy and h i story ,  and not the impediments to free entry 
conta i ned i n  the Na t ional Bank Acts , that determi ned the s tructure , and 
therefore the performance , of ban ks i n  Knoxv i l l e .  Accordi ng to Syl l a ' s  
model , the deci d i ng factors determi n i ng nati ona l  bank formati on and 
the performance of  the Nati onal Ban k i ng Sys tem were prov i s i ons in  the 
Nati ona l  Bank  Acts favori ng the formati on of nati onal  banks i n  s ome 
p l aces over other pl aces and l im i ti ng the operat i on of al l nati onal ban ks  
in  s pec i fi c  ways . These two v i ews of the Nati onal Banki ng System are 
not i ncons i stent wi th one another . There i s  nothi nq i n  Syl l a ' s  descri pti on 
that  woul d rul e out the i nfl uence of l ocal condi t i ons  upon nati onal bank 
formati on and performance . On the other hand , Syl l a ' s  mod�l does not 
s uggest  that l ocal condi t i on s  woul d exert as  s trong  an i nfl uence as 
they did in Knoxv i l l e ' s  case , nor does h i s model suggest that there shou l d  
have been as much di vers i ty among the . l ocal nati ona l bank s  a s  there was . 
I n  l arge part , th i s  i s  due to di fferences i n  focus . Syl l a  devel oped a 
broad genera l i zation � whereas th i s  d i s sertati on has a much na rrower focus . 
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Exami nati ons of broad aggregates neces sari l y  damp out any i ndi v i dua l  
i d i osyncras i es ,  whereas s tud ies  of  i ndi v i dua l  enti t ies  neces sari l y  
he ighten the �ol e  and i mportance of  features un i que t o  those enti ti�s . 
Th i s  s tudy has argued that rap i d  economi c growth i n  Knoxv i l l e  wa s c l osely 
coupl ed wi th rap i d  growth in  Knoxv i l l e ' s  fi nanc 1 a l  i ns ti tuti ons . Even i f  
th i s  same pattern had been corrmon for other communi ties i n  the Un i ted 
States , i t  i s  un l i kely that aggregated data wou l d revea l the c l oseness 
of  the l i n kage . The Uni ted States experi enced great growth i n  econom ic  
acti v i ty between 1 880 an d l 900 , but that growth was not  equa l l y  d i stri buted 
among al l reg i ons . Some grew mo re rap i d ly than d i d  others , and the 
aggregated data woul d average out  al l these di fferences . 
The ana lyti cal advantage of segrega t in9  the i n d i v i dua l  bank s , rather 
than aggregat ing  them i n to an  "average " ban k ,  can be obs erved wi th the 
fol l owing  exampl e .  The Eas t  Tennessee Nati onal  and the C i ty Nat i ona l , 
i n  the decade o f  the 1 890 ' s ,  demonstrated pol ar extremes among Knoxv i l l e 
banks  i n  the manner i n  wh i ch they acqu i red l i ab i l i ti es . I n  a s ense , the 
East Tennes see represented an extreme vers i on of the average country bank , 
whereas the C i ty wa s not very di fferent from the average reserve c i ty 
bank . Yet i f  these two banks  were to be merged i nto an i maq i nary thi rd 
ban k , that bank woul d have had a ba l ance s heet whose l i abi l i ti es s i de 
wou l d be a lmost  i den ti ca l to that o f  the average country ban k .  More 
important ,  thi s  i magi nary thi rd bank woul d not demonstrate the d i vergent 
path s to success chosen by the two rea l banks . The d i vers i ty i n  the i r  
approaches to the i r  market was , i n  a sense , a measure of  the deqree o f  
competi ti on present i n  Knoxv i l l e , for i t  i nd i cated the w i l l i n gnes s  o f  the 
l ocal fi nanc i a l  i nst i tuti ons to tai l or the i r  servi ces to the needs of  
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thei r customers . Product d i fferenti ati on can be a p·owerful competi t i ve 
dev i ce and i n  Knoxvi l l e • s  case , product d i fferenti ati on--d i fferent behav i or 
patterns for di fferent banks--represented the competi t ive res pons e  o f  the 
banks i n  thi s market to the chan g i ng s tructure of the market . I f ,  howeve r ,  
al l the l ocal banks were merged together i nto a n  1 1average Knoxv i l l e bank , 11 
the i r  di vers i ty woul d be obscured . Furthermore , the d i fferences i n  the 
behav ior  patterns among the Knoxv i l l e  banks i l l u strates an i mportant ,  
. 
and sometimes overl ooked , characteri s t i c  of the Nat i onal  Banki ng  System : 
the National Bank Acts d i d  not  i mpose  very many l imi tati ons on the 
acti vi ti es of nati onal banks . 
A secondary theme o f  th i s  d i s sertati on has been that the Nat i ona l 
Bank Acts gave nati onal ban ks  much more freedom than has been reco9n i zed. 
Not on ly  �ere there few res tri cti ons p l aced upon the arrangement of a 
nati onal ban k • s  bal ance sheet , but there were a l s o  many fewer res tri cti ons  
pl aced upon other aspects of  i ts operat i on than i s  genera l ly  acknowl edged . 
Furthermore , those res tri cti ons often had qui te d i fferent effects upon the 
acti vi ti es of nati onal banks than they were ant i c i pated to h ave . The 
di vers i ty in behav ior  among the nat i onal  banks  of Knoxvi l l e wou l d  no t 
have been pos s i b l e  otherwi se . 
One good  examp l e of  the di fference between the i ntent of  the l aw and 
i ts actual effects i nvol ves the i s suance of nati onal  banknotes . The 
Nati onal Ban k  Acts a lways l imi ted the amount of banknotes that coul d be 
i ssued by each bank and the l imi tati on was l i nked to the amount of  
capi ta l i nvested i n  the bank . Prior to 1 900 , the mos t  that any bank  cou l d  
i s sue was 90 percent o f  i ts capi tal (and some o f  the l arges t  bank s  had 
even l ower l imi ts ) . Afte r 1 900 , a l l banks  were a l l owed to i s sue as much 
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i n  banknotes as  they had i nvested i n  capi ta l . C l earl y ,  t he i ntent of 
the l aw as ori g i na l ly  wri tten was to keep nati onal banks from i s s u i n q  
too much ci rcul ati on . However ,  from about 1 875  to 1 900 th i s  l imi tat i on 
had very l i ttl e i mpact on the operati on of  nati onal banks . ( I t  d i d  have 
an impact unti l about 1 875 and after 1 900 , but for d i fferent reasons . )  
In  fac t ,  for many years preced i n g  1 900 , national  banks cou l d have chosen 
to expand the i r  note i s sue by three or  four times as much as they had 
i ssued . That i s , for many years , th i s  l imi tation had no effect ; i n stead , 
the important l imi tation on bank  note i ss ues became the requi rement 
that banks  depos i t  a mi nimum amount of bonds . The mi n imum bond depos i t ,  
i n  turn , i nsured that banks woul d not i ss ue " too l i ttl e "  ci rcu l ati on , 
and not that they wou l d  i ssue  " too much . "  Yet , i t  i s  doubtfu l that the 
mi ni mum bond depos i t  was i ncl uded as part of the Nati ona l Bank Acts i n  
order to provi de for a m i n imum c i rcu l ati on for each bank . The i ntent , 
i ns tead , seems to have been to requi re a mi n imum bond deposi t i n  order to 
provi de a smal l amount o f  securi ty for depos i tors . (There has , however , 
been so  l i tt l e  d i s�u s s i on of th i s  aspect of  the l aw ,  and the l aw i tsel f 
i s  s o  u nc l ea r ,  that i t  i s  i mposs i bl e  to say wi th certa i n ty why a mi n imum 
was requ i red i n  the fi rs t  pl ace . )  
Another exampl e i l l ustrat ing  the d i fferences between the i ntent of  
the l aw and i ts actua l effects , wh i ch i s  cri ti ca l  to an understandi ng  o f  
the behavior o f  the l oca l  nati ona l ban ks after 1 890 , i s  the 1 0  percent 
l oan l imi t .  Hacker thought that th i s  provi s i on o f  the National Bank Acts 
l im i ted the s i ze of  accomodation l oans to fi nance the capi ta l requ i rements 
of  bus i nessmen " . ( 1 970 , p .  222 ) . Thi s l imi tation and others l i ke i t  had 
the further effect that "the nationa l  banks were hed9ed around w i th a l l 
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sorts of  protecti ve devi ces , many of  wh i c h  turned out to be l imi tati ons 
on i mag i nati ve banki ng "  { Hacker ,  1 970 , p .  223 ) . There s houl d be no doubt ·  
that the 10  percent l imi t on  l oan s was des i gned as  a protecti ve dev i ce . 
The i nten t was c l earl y  to l imi t the amount of  cred i t  a bank extended to 
a pa rti cu l ar cus tomer .  That i t  l imi ted 11 imag i nati ve ban ki ng .. i s  much 
more doubtfu l . Th i s  s tudy has found that sys temat i c  and bl atant v io l ati on 
of  th i s  prov i s i on of the Nati onal Bank Acts was c l osely rel ated to the 
i ncrea s i ngly competi t i ve atmosphere present i n  Knoxv i l l e from the l ate 
1 880 ' s  i n to the f irst  decade of the twentieth century . · In fact , an 
exami nati on of the v i ol ati ons  of th i s  provi s i on commi tted by the l ocal 
banks  shows that s i gn i fi cant change i n  the magni tude , oers i stency , and 
frequency wi th  wh ich  i nd i v i dua l  banks v i ol ated the l imi t is an exce l l ent 
i ndi cator of  s i gn i fi cant change in . the compet i ti ve envi ronment . Fa i l ure 
to percei ve that there i s  an important d i fference between the actual 
effects and the i ntended effects of vari ous prov i s i on s  of the Nat i onal  
Bank  Acts severe ly  l imi ts our unders tandi ng of how national  banks operated . 
Nati onal bank i ng i n  Knoxvi l l e from 1 864 to 1 9 1 3  cl ea rly fol l owed a 
d i fferent pa ttern from that of  country banks vi ewed as a grou p .  The major 
facto rs produc i ng that d i fference had thei r  ori g i n  i n  forces di rectly 
affect ing  Knoxv i l l e  rather than national  ban ks i n  genera l , but whether 
other communi ti es { and the i r  banks ) were �mi l arly  affected i s  not known . 
Exam i nat ion of  the nati onal banks i n  other communi ti es may revea l that 
thei r behavior  patterns were a l s o  di fferent from other banks i n  thei r c l as s . 
The patterns fol l owed by the national  banks of Knoxv i l l e  i nd i cate that 
there was probabl y  a great d i vers i ty among i nd i vi dua l ban ks that i s  not 
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reveal ed by the aggregate data . As was the ca se wi th the l ocal nati onal 
banks , other nati ona l banks in other commun i ti es shou l d  have reacted 
· and adj usted to the res tri ctions embod i ed i n  the Nati ona l  Bank Acts i n  
ways that a l s o  demonstrated the d i vers i ty o f  behav i or  oermi tted by the 
Nati onal Bank i ng Sys tem . 
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APPENDICES 
APPEND I X  A 
A l a rge portion  of the research for th i s  s tudy was based on 
i nformat ion taken from Reports of Condi t i on publ i s hed i n  the l ocal 
news papers and i n  the Annua l  Reports of  the Comptro l l er of the Currency . 
Tabl es IV- 1  through IV-1 4 ,  pages 67-1 1 5 ,  V- I through V- 1 2 ,  pages · 1 23 - 1 56 , 
and V I - 1  through V I - 1 3 ,  pages 1 92-21 4 ,  have as  t hei r foundat i on the 
data contai ned i n  these Reports . The Reports for each yea r for one 
bank (or c l a s s  of banks ) were added together and then d i v i ded by the 
number of  Reports to form an average Report of Cond i t i on . The tab l es 
were then ca l cul ated from th i s  average Report . Thi s  procedure was 
chos en because i t  woul d e l imi nate sea sonal  vari at i ons i n  the proport i on­
i ng of assets and l i abi l i ti es , and  by doi ng s o ,  focus attenti on upon 
l on g-run trends rather_ than upon trans i tory changes . 
The data for the three c l asses of  banks was taken from the Annual 
Repo rts of the Comptro l l er of the Currency . The Comptro l l er di d not 
report tota l s for each c l as s , except for the autumn Repo rt of Condi t i on . 
The rema i n i ng tota l s  were cal cu l a ted from tota l s for each res erve c i ty 
and for each state at  each cal l date . The method used was to round off 
the val ue of each entry to the nearest  one thousand dol l ars , and 
consequently some sma l l errors occurred . There were a l so  some errors 
produced by typograph i cal errors . None of the errors from ei ther source 
were l arge  enough to s i gn i fi cantly affect the fi ndi ngs . 
More errors were as soci ated wi th the Reports taken from the l oca l  
newspapers . A number of  the earl i er newspapers are mi s s i ng i ssues , and 
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some of  the ones that rema i n  are i n  s uch  poor condi t i on that they cannot 
be read . Consequently ,  some errors in the Reports for the l ocal  banks  
exi s t ,  but they were not l arge enough to s i gn i fi cantly a ffect the 
fi ndi ngs . 
APPEND IX  8 
The State Nat i ona l and I ts Fa i l u re 
When the State Nati ona l fa i l ed i n  the s ummer o f  1 893 , the prox imate 
cause was an  i ns uffi c i ency of  cas h  reserves , wh i ch oroduced a temporary 
suspens i on o f  i ts acti vi t i es that became permanen t .  T h e  s hortage o f  
i ts cash reserves was , however , not i ts rea l  probl em .  �any other banks 
had suspended i n  t imes of fi nanc i al stri ngency but  l ater reopF.ned . Of 
course ,  some di d not ,  but i t  i s  cl ea r that s u�pens ion  d i d  not i nvari ably 
l ead to · fa i l ure .  To  fi nd the  root cause  of  the  fa i l ure of th i s  bank  
requ i res goi ng beyond a s impl e exami nati on of  i ts bal ance s heet , or for 
that matte r ,  a s impl e reference to the compet it i veness o f  the l oca l 
market . The Ho l s ton Nat iona l , after a l l ,  d i d manage to surv i ve ,  even 
though i t  was two years younger than the State and even though i t  too 
was much sma l l er than the o l der nati ona l banks . Whi l e  i ntense competi ­
tion among the l oca l nat i onal  ban ks undoubtedl y was a ccntri but i n g  
factor i n  t he  State t s  demi se , i t  was not  the mos t i mportant . 
There were two rel ated factors wh i ch so wea kened the State tha t i t  
cou l d  not s urvi ve a seri ous fi nanci a l  and economi c d i stu rbance . F i rs t ,  
the State ' s  ori g i nal  management was corrupt . Second , even when the 
corrupt adm in i s trati on was repl aced wi th  an honest one , the new management 
d i d  not have the foresi ght  nor the col d -bl ooded character to compl etely 
sever i ts connecti on s wi th the bank ' s  former management . That i s ,  the 
new admi n i strati on was honest but not h i gh ly  competent . The new management 
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took over a bank  severely weakened by i ts former owners , but i t  d i d  
not take the s teps neces sary to remove forever the causes o f  that weaknes s .  
The fi rs t  h i n t  of  troubl e  came wi th the exami nat i on of January 1 3 ,  
1 890 . The new exami ner i ncl uded i n  h i s  report the fol l ow i ng : 
Bank el ected new boa rd today ( 1 4th ) and new cas h i er .  The 
new management i s  composed of  prudent and experi enced 
bus i nes s  men . The former cas h i er . . .  was rec k l es s  i n  
h i s  management and caused ban k drafts to be protes ted by 
i s su i ng  them to as s i st h i s  personal " Ki t i ng . "  Other ·  
parti es bought  o u t  h i s  i n terests Dec . 3 1 , 1 889 . Hi s 
s uccessor i s  a man of i nteg ri ty and experi ence and the 
bank now has good prospects of  s uccess and usefu l nes s . 
( State Nati onal , Report of Exam inat i on , January 1 3 ,  1 890 )  
Few other detai l s  were g i ven , and  i t  was not unt i l  t he  bank  wrote 
to the Comptrol l er l a ter tha t  spri ng , request i ng that an exam i nat ion be 
ordered , espec i a l ly i n  regard to some transacti ons made by the former 
admi n i s trati on , that the real s tory was reveal ed ( State Nati onal , 
Apri l 25 , 1 890 ) . Appended to the exami nation of May 1 9 ,  1 890 , was the 
fol l �wi ng l etter to the Comptro l l er .  
Under your instructi ons I arri ved here l as t  n i q ht  and  th i s  
morn ing  vi s i ted the State Na ti onal Bank . The great troub l e  
i s  from a contes t for control of the Bank . The Bank i s  i n  
good cond i t i on ,  present management has confidence of  the 
commun i ty and , i f  not for the to-do a nd s canda l growi ng out 
of th i s  contes t the Ban k wou l d be prosperi ng . There is no 
doubt that great i rregu l a ri ti es took pl ace under management 
of [the former cas h i er] , but al l of thes e had been arranged 
when he reti red ( so far as here then known ) . [ He] when he 
reti red owed the Bank Ten Thousand Do l l ars ( 1 0 , 000°0 ) wh i ch 
was secured by a note of  1 5 , 00000 cons i dered by the new 
offi cers perfectly good , and I thi n k  now i t  i s  a s afe 
col l atera l . There was no money i n  t h i s , but on maturi ty 
of  [ h i s ]  paper ,  the contest hav i ng commenced , he  enjoi ned 
the Ban k  from real i z i ng on h i s  co l l ateral , on the grounds , 
so  far as I can l earn ,  that when he gave th� col l a teral 
. . .  the then Pres i dent gave h im  a verba l  prom i se that the 
paper coul d be renewed at maturi ty .  The great i rregu l ari ty 
whi ch caused [the new pres i dent] to cal l for an exami ner 
was the i s su i ng by [the former cas h i er and pres i dent] of  
. a certi ficate of  stock for 1 5 ,ooooo to  [a d i recto r] o n  a 
s ubscripti on of 25 , ooooo when only 1 5 , ooooo had been pa i d  
i n .  Th i s  certi ficate was taken  from near the back of  
certi fi cate book , be ing  no . 248 date Oct  1 7 ,  1 889 . The 
s tock was a l so torn out . T h i s  s tock was at  once hypothecated 
wi th  the 4th Nat ' l  Lou i sv i l l e  and no doubt proceeds were u sed 
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to pay for other s tock of [the former cash i er and the d i rector] . 
The matter was d i scovered by the n ew cash i e r  when he  was 
i s s u i n g  ful l cert if i cates after a l l the s tock  was p a i d  i n  fu l l .  
I t  i s  p robab l e  thi s woul d never have been h eard from , i f  the 
[ former cas h i er ' s ] party were not attempti ng to get control 
aga i n ,  as t h i s  i rregul ar  certi f i cate was taken up under present 
admi n i s trati on and regul ar certi fi cates i ss ued i n  l i eu of s ame . 
In  send i ng for an exami ner , [the new pres i dent ' s ] i dea was 
wi th  a v i ew to a crimi nal prosecuti on of · the former cas h i er , 
but as the matter was settl ed up at  the t ime when d i scovered 
and accepted by presen t  admi n i s trat i on , the s tock pa i d  . . .  I 
knew that no j ury i n  th i s  Secti on woul d fi nd  [ h i m] gu i l ty of  
crime . . . . 
· P . S .  From what I di s covered of [the former cas h i er ' s ] 
methods i n  bus i ness on my v i s i t i n  Jan 'y  l a s t ,  I am sati sf i ed 
i t  wi l l  be i nj urious  to the ban k  for h i s  fri ends and h im  to 
get control  but i f  they ovm the stoc k I do not see how i t  
can be prevented . ( State Nati onal , Report o f  Exami nati on , 
May 1 9 ,  1 890 )  
On  the  actual report , the  exami ner i nc l uded the  fol l owi ng .  
[The $ 1 0 , 000 note from the former cas h i er i s ] s ecured by 
col l ateral note of 1 5 , 000 . Al l of above [overdue l oans · from the former cas h i er ' s  party] are in hands of a tty .  
and s ome i n  s u i t .  [The former cas h i er] has enjo i ned the 
Bank from rea l i z i ng on h i s  col l atera l . . . .  In my opi n i on 
[ h i s  paper i s ] bei ng res i s ted s imply to g i ve troubl e to 
present management on account o f  contest for control of 
the Ban k  . . . .  The ban k  is now under carefu l , honest ,  and 
good management and i f  l eft a l one wi l l  become useful  
prosperous , but if i t  fa l l s  i nto the hands o f  the former 
managers , I fear  i t  wi l l  soon come to gri ef .  ( State 
Nat ional , Report of Exami nation,  May 1 9 ,  1 890 ) 
The matter dragged on , however ,  wi thout  a c l ear reso l uti on . Two 
of the d i rectors c l osely a l l i ed wi th the former admi n i s trati on were not 
d i s qual ifi ed and  removed from offi ce unti l December of that year ( State 
Nat i ona l , December 1 3 ,  1 890 ) . The fol l owi ng s ummer , the new pre s i dent 
wrote the Comptrol l er about the bank ' s  reorgani zati on in  January of 
that year :  
Prior to the reorgan i zat i on of the Bank January 1 4 ,  1 89 1 -a 
l oan of ten thousand dol l a rs had been made to [ the former 
cas h i er] on col l atera l  that after a thorough i nves t igat ion 
I fel t  certa i n was not s afe . I n  order to s ecure i t  beyond 
the s hadow of doubt I renewed i t  for n i ne months ta ki n g  a 
mortgage on C i ty property to secure the $ 1 0 ,000 . 00 .  I took 
h i s note for the [ i nterest of] $ 1 , 1 7 1 . 66 s ecured wi th a 
$ 1 4 ,000 . 00 note wh i ch was the former col l atera l on the 
$ 1 0 ,000 . 00 .  ( State Nati onal , June 1 7 ,  1 891 ) 
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On the exami nation of November 27 , 1 891 , the exami ner found the 
l oan , wh i ch was by then over the l egal  l imi t ,  to the former cas h i er s ti l l  
on the books . At the same time he found that the bank  had made a l oan 
· o f  $8 ,000 to an i nd i v i dua l  of ques ti onab l e  character .  T he  exami ner 
wrote : 
[Thi s i ndi v i dua l ] was Pres i dent of  the Knoxv i l l e  Southern 
Rai l road and i s  i nvol ved i n  l i ti gati on wi th  the Rai l road 
Company and i ts credi tors . The Bank cl aims some s ort o f  
l i en wh ich  I d o  not unders tand . I know th i s ; that [he]  i s  
a s  b i g  a s camp a s  ever robbed . a ban k  . . � . I t  wi l l  be 
observed that I do not deduct for probabl e l os s  on the 
$8 ,000 due from [ h i m] : whi 1 e i t  i s  admi tted on al l s i des 
that he  i s  a man of bad character , the opi n i on of some 
. versed i n  the l aw i s  that h i s  c l a im  on the Rai l road 
Company i s  a l ready establ i s hed , and i f  so , h i s  i ndebtedness  
to  th i s  bank  wi l l  be  good by reason of . . .  a l i en the 
bank ho l ds . ( State Nati onal , Report of Exami nati on , 
November 27 , 1 891 ) 
Th i s  l oan  was s ti l l  on the books on the exami na t i on of  June 1 0 ,  1 892 , 
but i t  had e i ther been pa id  off or wri tten off by the exami nati on of 
May 1 0 ,  1 893 . The exami ner d i d  not say wh i ch . That the bank wou l d 
have l ent  to an i nd i vi dual wi th th i s  man ' s  reputati on i s  puzz l i ng ,  
g i ven the exami ner ' s  eva l uati on of  the new pres i dent of  the bank and 
h i s character . The exami ner wrote : 
The pres i dent i s  not an  experi enced banker , but a very 
sensi b l e ,  pruden t ,  pa i nsta ki ng offi cer of f ine  character 
who wi l l  11 bri  ng the bank  out 11 of  i ts troub 1 es . . . . The 
fanner management came near to \'/ree ki ng th i s  i nst i tution , 
and i t  wi l l  requ i re time and prudence to recover i ts l ost  
ground . I bel i eve [he] c an  do i t .  ( State Nati onal , Report 
of Exami nati on , November 27 , 1 891 ) 
Evi dently , the new pres i dent ' s  i nexperi ence l ed h im  to grant a 
l oan to "as bi g a s camp as ever robbed a ban k . " 
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The exami ner of June 1 0 ,  1 892 , was mo re hooefu l about t he bank ' s  
prospects , i n  sp i te o f  the conti nued pres ence of the l arge l oan to the 
former cas h i er .  He wrote : " From present outl ook , the bank wi l l  be i n  
good condi ti on by 1 s t  o f  February wi th good prospects o f  a payi ng  
busi ness " ( S tate Nati ona l , Report of Exami na tion , June 1 0 ,  1 892 ) . 
However ,  wh i l e the State had managed to hang on , i ts bu s i nes s was not 
pros perous . The exami ner of May 1 0 ,  1 893 , had been encouraged enoug h 
to wri te : " I  bel i eve the general condi t i on of  t h i s  bank  to be fai rly 
prosperous . The management is  l arge l y  i nterested i n  [ i ts ]  s tock and 
i s  cons i dered safe "  ( State Nati onal , Report o f  Exami nati on , May 1 0 ,  1 893 ) . 
Jus t · over two months l ater the State Nati ona l s uspended , on Ju ly 22 , 
1 893 . 
Why the exami ner s houl d have been hopeful i s  not  c l ear . On that  
exami nati on , he had  found an overl oan to a l ocal  fi rm .  The  bank  exp l a i ned 
to the Comptrol l er that the l oan was a mi s take , and that the bank  d i d  
not know of or had forgotten a prior l oan to the sarne fi rm .  �/hen a 
second l oan was granted to tha t fi rm ,  the two tota led more than the 
l imi t .  Furthermore , the presi dent admi tted tha t he d i d  not know that 
the d i rectors were requi red to g i ve thei r approval for the redi s counti ng  
of  l oans ( State Nati onal , June 8 ,  1 893 ) . Three weeks l ater , the  bank 
wrote the Comptrol l er and  aga i n  d i scussed the mi s taken overl oan , as 
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wel l  as the overl oan to the former cas h i e r ,  wh ich was s ti l l  on the books 
( Sta te Nati onal , June 28 , 1 893 ) . 
To s um up , the State Nati onal had l ent  money to a former emp l oyee 
who i t  knew to be d i s hones t ,  and h i s  l oan was conti nual l y  renewed , 
often at  an amount that was i n  v i ol at ion of  the 1 0  percent l oan  l im i t .  
The bank a l s o  demons trated that i t  woul d l end to oth ers o f  bad reputat i on . 
The bank admi tted that i t  forgot a previ ous l oan to a l ocal  fi rm and 
that it was i gnorant of the requ i rement that di recto rs approve red i s coun ts . 
Had i t  not been for the conti nued references to the honesty of the new 
admi n i s trati on by the exami ner , one m i q ht  be jus ti fi ed i n  suspec ti ng 
the new management of ma l feasance . However ,  s i nce i t  appears that the 
new management was honest  ..... the new cas h i er went to another l ocal  ban k 
when the State fa i l ed , d i d  wel l there , and i n  ti me founded a s ucces sful  
bus i ness of  h i s  own ..... it  mus t  be conc l uded that t he presi dent was j u st  
. a po9r choi ce to d i rect a ban k .  I n  retrospect , i t  appears that the 
State National  s houl d have i mmed i ate ly  cal l ed the l oans to the members 
of the former admi n i strat ion . Had i t  done s o ,  s ome l os s  wou l d  certa i n ly  
have occurred , but  at  l east the ban k  coul d have s tarted fres h .  Because 
the l oans were conti nued and renewed , they were a runn i n g  sore on  the 
ban k , sapp i n g  i ts s trength , and endanger ing  i ts ab i l i ty to s urv i ve .  
Because the new management seemed to have been unabl e to bri ng  i tse l f 
to take th i s  drasti c but neces sary step , i t  i s  l i ke ly  that the bank 
al l owed other l oans of poor qual i ty to be conti nued . The cri s i s  of  1 893 
put enough extra pressure on the bank ' s  condi tion  to force i t  to suspend , 
and the poor qua l i ty of i ts l oans prevented i t  from resumption of  bu s i ne s s . 
APPEND IX  C 
Profi ts 
Profi t estimates fo r the l ocal  banks and for the three c l asses of  
. banks were cal cul ated by di v i d i ng net  i ncome by average net  worth . Net 
worth was , for a l l banks , the s um of capi tal , surp l us , und i v i ded profi ts , 
and unpa i d  d i vi dends l e s s  current expenses and taxes . Average net worth 
for a g i ven year was the sum of net wo rth from each Report of Condi t i on 
d i v i ded by the number of avai l abl e Reports fo r that year .  The resu l t  
was the · average s hareho l der i nves tment i n  the ban k over the ent i re yea r .  
Net i ncome was cal cu l ated from two d i fferent sources . The Annual  
Reports of the Comptrol l er of the Currency publ i s hed net i ncome for the 
banks  in each reserve c i ty and s tate for two s i x -month peri ods . Th i s  
i nformati on was used to fi nd net i ncome for the three c l a s ses of banks . 
From 1 869 to 1 906 , the s i x-month peri ods were Ma rch l to September 1 
and September 1 to March 1 .  For a g i ven year ,  net i ncome was determi ned 
by the s um of one-thi rd of net i ncome from September l of the prev i ous 
year to March  1 of that yea r ,  net i ncome from March l to September l 
of  that yea r ,  and two-th i rds of net i ncome from September l to Ma rch 1 
of  the fol l owi ng yea r .  After 1 906 , the s i x-month peri ods were January l 
to Ju ly  1 and Ju ly  l to January l .  Net i ncome for those years was the 
sum of net i ncome of the two peri ods . There wi l l  obv i ous ly  be s ome 
d i fference between the estimates of net i ncome and . true net i ncome for 
the yeirs 1 869 to 1 906 because  of the averagi ng procedure , but these 
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The semi annual reports o f  profi ts made by the l ocal banks  no l onger 
exi st , and therefore a d i fferent method was used to estimate the i r  
prof its . Net i ncome for the l ocal  banks was the sum of the change i n  
net worth from January 1 to December 3 1  p l us the di v i dends pa id  duri ng 
the yea r .  That  i s , esti mates were requi red for d i v i dends and  Ja�uary 1 
net worth for each l ocal ban k  for each year .  For a l l  of  the l oca l banks , 
except the East Tennessee Nat i ona l , a d i v i dend record was ava i l ab l e i n  
the Repo rts o f  Exami nat i on . For the Eas t Tennessee , several sources 
prov i ded i nformati on . From 1 872 through the fi rs t s i x months  of 1 879 , 
di vi dends and net i n come were l i s ted on a form wh ich  was reta i ned i n  
the ban k ' s  correspondence fi l e  i n  the Na t ional  Arc h i ves . For the 
re�a i n i n g  yea rs , the d i v i dends of the Ea s t  Tennes see were estima ted from 
the di fference between actua l and expected changes i n  net worth between 
Repo rts o f  Condi ti on immedi a te ly precedi n g  and fol l owi ng  di v i dend 
paym�nts . For each d i v i dend payment ,  net worth on four consecut i ve 
Reports was found . The four dates ( for the Reports ) were chosen so that 
the d i vi dend to be estimated was pa i d  sometime between the s econd and 
the thi rd Reports . The next s tep was to estimate what  net worth on the 
th i rd Report wou l d  have been had no d i v i dend been pai d .  Thi s i nvol ved 
fi ndi ng the change i n  net worth between the fi rst and second Reports and 
between the thi rd and fo urth Reports , and u s i n g  thes e col l ecti vely and 
i ndi v i dual ly  to form estimates of  the change in net \A/Orth between the 
second and t h i rd Reports , a s sumi ng no d i vi dends pai d . The di fference 
between the estimated and actual net worth on the th i rd Report represented 
estimated di vi dends . 
The estimates o f  d i v idends pai d woul d have been re l at i ve ly  
usel ess ( the estimates for one d i v i dend were o ften qu i te d i fferent 
from one another )  i f  the l ocal ban ks had changed thei r d i v idend rate 
frequentl y .  However ,  they di d not change the i r  d i vi dend rate often . 
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Furthermore , they fi xed thei r d i v i dend rate on  the bas i s  of s ome " fu l l "  
or " even "  percentage of cap i ta l . D i v i dends were usua l ly  5 ,  6 ,  7 ,  8 ,  or 
9 percent of  capi tal . An add i ti ona l check i nvol ved exami n i ng changes 
in the amount of  d i vi dends decl ared , but unpa i d ,  between the second 
and thi rd Reports . I f , for exampl e ,  unpa i d  d i vi dends rose between those 
two reports by $ 1 8  (a not , i nfrequent occurrence ) ,  the d i v i dend rate 
coul d have been 1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  6 ,  9 ,  or 1 8  percent .  Most  banks pai d more than 
4 percent but l es s  than 1 0  percent ,  and therefore the mos t  l i ke l y  ra tes 
were 6 and 9 percent ;  The actual choi ce of 6 or 9 percent woul d be 
based on the previous  rate as wel l as on the estimates based on chan�es 
i n  net worth . 
Once the d i v i dend estimates were compi l ed ,  they were s ubjected to 
an addi t i onal  test . · The Ea s t  Tennessee pl aced an advert i sement i n  the 
Apri l 2 ,  1 904 , edi ti on of the Knoxvi l l e  Senti nel , wh i ch s tated that the 
bank had pa i d  $587 , 500 i n  di vi dends s i nce i ts foundi ng  i n  1 872 . The total 
for the estimated d i v i dends for the East  Tennessee from 1 872 to 1 904 
was s l i ghtly be l ow the adverti sement ' s  total and i nd icates that the 
estimates were approxima tely correct . 
January 1 net worth for the F ir st  Nati onal from 1 864 through 1 869 
was as sumed to be the net worth at  the f irst  Report of Condi t i on .  ( The 
fi rs t  Report i n  thos e years fel l on the fi rst Monday i n  January . ) For 
the Fi rs t  Nati ona l after 1 869 and for the other l oca l  banks , January 1 
net worth was estimated by fi ndi n g  the change i n  net worth from the 
l ast  Report of the previ ous year to the f i rs t  Report of the year i n  
questi on . That d i fference was then apporti oned on the ba s i s  of the 
t ime from the l as t  Report of the prev ious yea r to the fi rst  Report of  
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the current year ,  where the January 1 date l i es between the two report 
dates . The yea rly change i n  net worth wa s then cal cul ated , and to that 
fi gure was added the d i v i dends pai d  duri ng the yea r .  The resul t was 
net i ncome . Net i ncome ·di v i ded by average net worth was the rate of 
return on s harehol der i nvestment .  The resul ts are presented i n  Tabl e C- 1 . 
Are these estima tes of net i ncome for the l ocal banks accurate? 
They are probabl y a reasonabl e aoprox imati on of net i ncome reported to 
the Comptrol l er ,  but they are a lmost certa i nl y  not accurate estimates 
of t he banks ' actual net i ncome . The  reason why actual and reported net 
i ncome for these banks  s houl d be d i fferent i s  that there wa s no general l y  
accepted , un i form set o f  accounti ng  procedures .  Standards  vari ed widely , 
but there wa s one common characteri st i c wi th a beari ng on the probl em 
at hand : the l ocal banks  were qu i te rel uctant to wri te off bad debts 
and other l o sses . In fact ,  they made every effort not to do so , despi te 
the admon i ti ons o f  the exami ners and the Comptrol l er .  Th i s  was not a 
matter of  fraud on  the banks ' part nor was i t  a matter o f  thei r reckl ess­
nes s . I t  was , rather ,  a matter o f  the s tate of  the accounti ng a rts . 
Currently , banks are requ i red to make an exol i c i t  prov i s i on for 
l oan l os ses on each Report of  Condi t i on . Furthermore , they are requ i red 
to report capi ta l  ga i ns (or  l os ses ) separate ly  from other i ncome . Banks 
wh i c h  operated under the Nati onal Bank i ng Sys tem were not requi red to do 
ei ther , and because they d id  not ,  thei r profi ts often may have been 
Tab l e C- 1  
Net  I ncome a s  a Percentage of  Average Sha reho l der  Inves tment . a 
Centra l  
East Reserve Reserve Country 
Yea r Fi rst Tennes see Mechan i cs Th i rd C i ty State Hol s ton C i ti es C i ties  Banks 
1 864 
1 865 21 . 9  
1 866 6 . 5  
1 867  1 3 . 5  
1 868 3 . 2  
1 869 1 3 . 6  9 .  1 1 0 . 7  1 1  . 4 
1 870 1 4 . 3  8 . 0 9 . 5  1 0 . 6  
1 871  9 . 2  7 . 8 8 . 8 1 0 . 0  
1 872 1 6 . 9 8 . 1  9 .  5 1 0 . 4  
1 873 1 2 . 9  8 . 2· 9 . 5  1 0 . 2  
1 874 1 3 . 2 7 . 7  8 . 7  9 . 3 
1 875 1 2 . 7  3 . 9  7 . 9  8 . 8 
1 876 1 0 . 7  2 . 1  5 . 7  7 . 2 
1 877  4 . 8  3 . 0 4 . 6  5 . 8 
1 878 1 0 . 5  3 . 9  3 . 7  5 . 2 
1 879} 1 8 . 8  7 . 5  5 . 2  5 . 8 1 880 9 . 7 7 . 1 7 . 3 
1 881 1 7 . 7  1 0 .  1 . 8 .  2 8 .  5 
1 882 0 . 8  1 2 . 7  8 . 3  7 . 2 8 . 2  
1 883  1 3 .  7 1 8 .  5 7 .  4 7 0 2 8 .  2 
1 884 1 1 . 6  1 3 . 2 4 . 5  6 . 2  7 . 2 
1 885 1 0 . 2  1 2 . 9  6 . 1  5 . 6  6 . 9  
1 886 1 4 . 8 1 4 . 3  8 . 9  6 . 7  7 . 8  
1887 1 0 .6 1 4 . 6  9 . 2 9.8 t. o 8 .1  
1 888 9 . 9  21 . 5  7 . 4  1 0 . 6  9 . 2  6 . 8 8 . 1  
1 889 8 . 9  1 5 . 3  6 . 8 1 2 . 2  8 . 6  5 . 9  8 . 5  
1 890 1 0 . 8  7 . 6  6 . 5  1 6 . 7  - 1 . 7  9 . 4  6 . 6  8 . 2  
1 891  6 . 2  6 . 9  8 . 3  1 1 . 9 0 . 1 8 . 9  6 . 1 7 . 4  
N 
(J'l ........ 
Tabl e C- 1  ( Cont ' d )  
Central 
Eas t Reserve Reserve Country 
Yea r F i rs t  Tennessee Mechani cs Th i rd C i ty State Hol s ton C i ti es  C i t ies Banks 
1 892 5 . 4  6 . 3  3 . 6  1 0 . 1  6 . 0 7 . 4  5 . 6  6 . 9  
1 893 2 . 3  4 . 7 5 . 3  8 . 3  2 . 4  4 . 8  6 . 0  5 . 0  5 . 8 
1 894 2 . 0  6 . 9  5 . 8 1 0 . 0 3 . 1 4 . 2  4 . 2  4 . 5  
1 895  6 . 6  7 . 6  3 .  1 1 0 .  1 5 . 2  4 . 4  4 . 6  5 . 0 
1 896 5 . 6 6 . 8 5 . 8  6 . 5  -0 . 1  4 . 9  4 . 6  5 . 1  
1 897  2 . 3  3 .  1 5 . 9  1 1 . 8 6 . 4  4 . 9  4 . 6  4 . 6  
1 898 5 . 3 0 . 3  3 . 8 1 0 . 8  -2 . 1  6 . 4  4 . 5  5 . 1  
1 899 8 . 6  6 . 3  5 . 3 1 7 . 1  8 . 0  9 . 2  5 . 6  6 . 6  
1 900 8 . 6  3 . 7  6 . 0  9 . 2 3 . 8 1 1  . 5 7 . 8  B .  1 
1901 4 . 3 3 . 9  5 .  1 10 .1  -4 .2 1 2 . 8  7 . 6 7 . 8  
1 902 1 0 . 5 4 . 9  5 . 9  1 6 . 4 7 . 0  1 0 . 4  8 . 5  8 . 9  
1 903 1 1 . 4 7 . 7  9 . 0  1 5 . 5  6 . 7  1 0 . 9  . 7 .  9 8 . 5  
1 904 1 3 . 7  9 . 9  6 . 3  1 4 . 5 . 1 1 . 9 8 . 3  7 . 2  8 . 2  
1 905  5 . 9  8 . 6  7 . 4  5 . 4  1 2 . 4  7 . 7  7 . 3  8 . 3  
1 906 1 0 . 0 5 . 9  9 . 1  1 0 . 7  9 . 3 1 2 . 4  1 0 . 0  1 0 . 7  
1 907 1 6 . 6  7 . 2  6 . 1  3 . 1 5 . 0  8 . 1  9 . 0 9 . 1  
1 908 1 5 . 9  6 . 4  7 . 1  7 . 7  9 . 9  6 . 0 7 . 9  
1 909 1 3 . 5  5 . 9  8 . 3  1 6 . 8 8 . 6  7 . 2  8 . 2  
1 91 0  1 6 . 8 6 . 9  4 . 8 9 . 7  1 0 . 6  8 . 2  8 . 6  
1 9 1 1  1 0 . 7  5 . 2  5 . 6  7 . 8 7 . 7  6 . 7  8 . 0  
1 9 1 2  3 . 7  2 � 7  7 . 6  1 1  ; 5 . 7 . 6  7 . 0  8 . 3  
1 91 3  20 . 9  1 . 6  8 . 9  3 . 3  7 . 6  7 . 3  8 . 4  
asource : Sources and procedures used to estimate net i ncome and s harehol der i n ves tment are 
d i s cussed i n  the text .  
bThe percentage g i ven for the Eas t  Tennes see Nati ona l for 1 879 and  1 880 i s  the average for those 
two years . M i s s i ng Reports of Cond i t i on made i t  i mpos s i bl e  to ca l cul ate net i ncome for those  two 
years separate ly .  N U1 00 
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greatly overstated . losses del ayed are l osses  den i ed , and by denyi ng 
l os ses , a ban k cou l d  report profi ts . When bad l oans are not wri tten 
off , but i nstead trea ted as i f  they were good l oan s , then the fi gures 
for profi ts a re enhanced by an  amount equal  to the eventual l os s . 
Furthermore , a s imi l a r  procedure affects some o f  the other accounts of  
the na ti ona l banks . The bank s  were rel uctant to depreci a te thei r 
bank i ng houses and thei r furn i ture a nd fi xtures , nor d id  they have a 
systemati c and peri od i c  schedu l e  for wri t i ng  off the premi ums they had 
pa i d  for U . S .  government bonds or other securi ti es . Therefore , thei r 
profi ts were overstated by the amounts o f  l os ses wh i c h  they fa i l ed to 
wri te off ,  whatever the source of the l os ses . 
D id  these pract i ces represent a s i gn i fi cant mi s statement o f  true 
ea rn i ngs? After a l l �  the pi per does have to be pa i d ,  doesn • t  he? Wel l , 
yes , but i n  the �eantime , bad l oans  can be treated a s  i f  they were good , 
furn i ture and fi xtures  may not be depreci ated , and premi ums may not be 
wri tten off .  Consequently ,  the profi ts of the l oca l banks  were i nfl ated 
beyond thei r true val ue . For exampl e ,  the es timates of prof i ts devel oped 
for t h i s  study appear to i ndi cate tha t the State Nati ona l  was a profi tab l e 
ban k  i n  three of  i ts l as t  four yea rs . The State Nati ona l , however , 
wa s a l most  certa i nly  a money l os i ng ban k i n  every yea r ,  w i th 1 892 a 
pos s i b l e  excepti on . I t  appeared to be a profi tab l e  ba nk  because i t  
avoi ded acknowl edg i ng i ts l os ses . 
I n  the case of  a bad l oan , bank s  coul d avo i d  wri ti ng  off thei r l os ses  
by wa i ti ng unti l - the i ss ue was settl ed in  court , and even then the  matter 
sometimes was unreso l ved for many yea rs . The banks sometimes took 
pos ses s i on of  secur i ti es wh i c h  had been p l edged as col l atera l  for l oans . 
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When tha t happened , the securi ti es woul d be carri ed on the books at 
a va l ue equal to the unpa id  debt . The banks genera l l y  c l a imed , accord i ng 
to the Reports of  Exami nati on , that s uc h  securi ti es had a val ue equa l  
to or  i n  excess of thei r boo k va l ue ,  but  whether or not  th i s  was an 
accu rate appra i sa l  i s  open to quest i on .  Many of the securi t i es taken 
for debts previ ous l y  contracted di d not pay i nterest or d i v i dends , and 
thei r worth i s  q uest ionabl e .  The ban ks coul d hol d these secur i t i es 
.unti l the i s sui ng  fi rm c l osed down before fi nal l y  wri ti ng off thei r 
l os ses , and thereby del ay fo r many yea rs an accurate account i ng of the i r 
profi ts . 
F i na l l y , nati onal banks were not requi red to pl ace a market val ue 
on . the secur it i es they owned , or  to report that val ue i n  the i r  Report of  
Cond i ti on .  Had they been requ i red to  make s uch a report , ca l cul ati on of 
thei r actua l profi ts woul d be much mo re certa i n  . 
. Unfortunate l y ,  there i s ,  to my knowl edge , no ana l ys i s  o f  the 
accounti ng practi ces fol l owed by nati ona l  banks wh i c h  woul d i ndi cate 
whether or not the practi ces fo l l owed by the nati ona l banks  of Knoxv i l l e  
were typ i cal . The temptat ion i s , of cours e ,  to suggest that al l ban ks 
used s im i l ar accounti ng methods , and therefore thei r profi ts can be 
compa red . Th i s  s tudy woul d s uggest tha t i t  woul d be best to rej ect  the 
temptati on unti l such t ime as the accuracy of the orofi t data i n  the 
Comptro l l er ' s  Annua l  Report can be ascerta i ned . The resea rch  presented 
here has i nd i cated that the Knoxv i l l e  ba nks behaved di fferently than the 
other nati ona l  banks i n  many i mportant respects , and d i strus t  of the i r  
profi t data woul d certa i nl y  be cons i stent wi th those  f ind i ngs . Therefo re , 
the estimates of the l ocal banks ' profi ts  have been presented , but they 
have not been heavi l y  we i ghed i n  formi ng  concl us i on s  about those  banks . 
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